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EASTERN    PROBLEMS 


AT    THE 


CLOSE  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY 


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EASTERN  PROBLEMS 


AT   THE 


CLOSE  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY 

BY 

ALFRED  L.  P.  DENNIS,  A.B. 


Submitted  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements 
for  the  Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 

in  THE 

Faculty  of  Political  Science 
Columbia  University 


CAMBRIDGE,  MASS. 

CJjt  fcluCtocraitfi  press 
1901 


Copyright,  iqoi 
By  Alfred  L.   P.   Dennis 


CONTENTS 

Page 

Introduction i 

Chapter 

I.    The  Colonial  Question  and  the  War  of  1793  .     •     •  7 

II.    The  Eastern  Question  and  the  Revolution  ....  74 
III.    Napoleon  Bonaparte  and  the  Orient  :   the  Egyptian 

Expedition 147 

Appendices.  —  Statistical  Tables 219 

Bibliography 227 

Vita 279 


|  UNIVERSITY    J 


EASTERN   PROBLEMS 

AT  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY 

INTRODUCTION 

The  history  of  the  world,  in  its  largest  aspect,  is  the  history 
of  the  intercourse  between  East  and  West.  This  intercourse 
has  been  potent  in  many  important  directions;  in  affairs  of 
race,  religion,  and  trade,  the  vital  relation  between  Asia  and 
Europe  has  either  created  or  solved  difficult  problems  in 
human  existence.  It  has  also  been  continuous,  and  though 
there  have  been  years  when  this  interchange  has  seemed  of 
small  effect,  the  true  interpretation  of  world  history  can  be 
given  only  when  the  struggle  between  Orient  and  Occident 
is  recognized  as  an  ever  present  factor.  Then  the  simplest 
events  of  daily  life  in  regions  where  the  forces  of  two  civiliza- 
tions have  joined  battle  for  dominion  become  significant  of 
great  issues.  The  struggle  is,  furthermore,  a  signal  example 
of  the  unity  of  history  ;  older  than  historical  chronicles,  the 
contest  touches  the  lives  of  men  and  nations  to-day  as  it  did 
when  Jason  sailed  in  search  of  the  Golden  Fleece,  or  when  the 
champions  of  Greece  crossed  over  to  Asia  in  pursuit  of  Helen. 

This  conflict  between  East  and  West  is  an  essential  part  of 
the  thought  and  life  of  the  ancient  world.  The  Homeric  epic 
derives  from  it ;  it  is  embodied  in  the  story  of  Zeus  and 
Europa,  who  is  shown  as  the  daughter  of  an  Asiatic  king ;  it 
is  the  inspiration  of  Herodotus  and  Xenophon ;  Marathon, 
Salamis,  and  Platea  tell  of  the  antagonism  of  two  conti- 
nents.    The  struggle  between  Hellas  and  Persia  is  the  first 


2  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

historic  expression  of  that  antagonism ;  the  story  of  that  con- 
flict is  the  first  chapter  in  the  history  of  the  Eastern  Question, 
and  the  lasting  glory  of  Alexander  is  that  he  levelled  the 
ground  for  Western  institutions  in  the  border  lands  of  Asia, 
and  marked  the  flood-tide  of  European  influence  in  the  Orient. 
But  even  in  his  lifetime  and  with  his  consent  the  forces  of  the 
East  made  known  their  conservative  strength,  and  in  three 
centuries  pushed  the  focal  point  of  the  struggle  back  even  to 
Epirus.  For  the  place  of  Actium  among  the  world's  great 
battles  is  only  half  realized  unless  the  stake  of  empire  between 
the  opponents  is  truly  estimated.  Rome,  as  the  later  champion 
of  the  West,  the  shield  and  sword  of  Europe,  fought  in  Antony 
the  Asiatic  peril  and  a  leader  inspired  by  an  Orientalism  which 
would  have  made  Egypt  the  ruler  of  both  worlds.  Virgil  and 
Horace  became  the  poet  apostles  of  a  Roman  empire  which 
should  wage  war  against  a  despot  about  whom  were  grouped 
the  forces  of  the  East  from  Arabia,  India,  and  M  ultima 
Bactria"  The  victory  of  the  West,  and  the  epochal  day  when 
the  entrance  of  Egypt  into  the  empire  transformed  the  idea  of 
Roman  dominion,  gave  clear  title  to  a  high  calling  in  the  mind 
of  the  Roman  people.  The  feeling  of  the  later  republic  be- 
came conviction  of  duty  in  the  heart  of  Augustus,  and  he 
dreamed  to  make  of  himself  an  Alexander.  Thus  the  march 
of  the  Roman  legions  along  the  road  of  the  "  Great  King  " 
lifted  the  affairs  of  Asia  Minor,  the  Armenian  Question,  the 
battles  against  the  Parthians  on  the  Euphrates  frontier,  to  a 
position  of  world  importance  in  the  second  phase  of  the  East- 
ern Question.  In  the  place  of  Hellas  and  Persia  stood  Rome 
and  Parthia.  For  whatever  meaning  the  expansion  and  the 
fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  held  for  the  people  of  western  Eu- 
rope, the  fate  of  the  eastern  imperial  frontier  was  pregnant  for 
all  the  world.  That  border  line  became  the  defence  of  a  Europe 
unprepared  to  meet  the  threat  of  Asiatic  dominion.  The  vic- 
tory of  Tours  was  won  against  a  mere  flanking  party  ;  the 
brunt  of  the  battle  against  Asia  was  borne  by  a  much  maligned 


INTRODUCTION  3 

state,  which  for  centuries  held  in  check  the  forces  of  a  civiliza- 
tion whose  power  was  growing,  while  that  of  Byzantium  was 
waning  before  the  double  attack  of  the  untiring  East  and  the 
ungrateful  West.  The  leadership  of  the  Orient  was  at  first 
given  to  the  rulers  of  Iran,  later  to  the  Semitic  tribes  of  Ara- 
bia breathing  the  inspiration  of  an  unshaken  religious  faith, 
and  finally  to  Turanian  peoples  from  the  heart  of  Asia ;  their 
attack  was  the  manifestation  of  forces  which  governed  half 
the  world,  and  with  which  modern  Europe  has  not  yet  fully 
reckoned. 

In  the  days  of  Alexander  Europe  had  camped  on  the  Indus  ; 
fifteen  centuries  later  she  was  forced  to  be  content  with  Acre 
and  parts  of  Asia  Minor ;  and  before  two  thousand  years  had 
passed  she  was  compelled  to  draw  her  line  of  defence  against 
Asiatic  conquest  under  the  walls  of  Vienna.  Since  that  day 
the  decline  of  Ottoman  power  and  the  advance  of  commercial 
crusaders  from  Europe  have  defined  the  Eastern  Question  of 
modern  history  in  terms  familiar  to  all.  In  the  narrower  defi- 
nition, it  is  the  problem  of  the  succession  to  the  empire  at 
Constantinople,  that  is,  the  Balkan  peninsula,  the  Levant,  and 
those  provinces  of  Asia  which  drain  into  the  Black,  ^Egean, 
and  Mediterranean  seas.  As  such  this  question  is  only  the 
application  to  a  specific  geographical  field,  and  to  particular 
peoples,  of  Eastern  and  Western  forces  which  are  in  conflict 
throughout  Asia. 

In  the  past  the  line  between  Europe  and  Asia  was  clearly 
drawn.  Over  against  the  static  East,  subjective  in  thought 
and  theocratic  in  rule,  stood  the  dynamic  West,  objective  in  its 
ideals  and  democratic  in  its  political  tendency ;  the  relation  of 
the  two  continents,  whether  in  peace  or  war,  was  simple.  But 
to-day  the  West  is  no  longer  all  Roman  :  the  nationalism  of 
the  Occident  has  found  its  own  hemisphere  too  small,  and  is 
trying  to  find  an  answer  to  its  own  industrial  problems  on  an 
alien  soil ;  the  battle  of  Slav  and  Teuton  and  Latin  is  to  be 
fought  out  in  a  strange  land ;  and  the  conditions  of  these  minor 


4  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

struggles  are  thus  modified.  The  rulers  of  Asia  are  called 
to  readjust  the  balance  of  power  in  a  fight  essentially  local, 
between  one  or  another  of  the  powers  of  Europe  or  America  ; 
and  the  Armageddon  of  Orient  and  Occident  is  set  for  an 
unknown  day.  The  result  is  that  the  oldest  Eastern  Question, 
that  which  centres  at  Constantinople,  has  companion  problems 
in  Egypt,  Persia,  Central  Asia,  and  China.  They  are  all  simi- 
lar and  all  go  to  make  the  problem  of  Asia,  of  which  each  is  at 
once  a  phase  and  a  microcosm.  The  problem  of  Asia  being  near 
the  heart  of  world  history,  the  progress  of  Western  economic 
and  political  questions  to  an  Asiatic  and  Oceanic  stage  evolves 
world  politics  ;  and  in  Asia  these  politics  deal  with  issues 
between  West  and  East  which  block  the  road  to  imperial 
expansion  throughout  the  Orient. 

It  is,  therefore,  as  parts  of  a  world-problem  that  colonial 
affairs  in  Asia  and  the  Turkish  Question  reveal  their  true 
meaning  ;  nor  is  this  a  new  thing,  for  the  Eastern  Question,  to 
use  the  conventional  term  for  the  Turkish  Question,  is  an  old 
force  in  history.  It  has  been  neglected,  its  influence  dis- 
counted, and  even  its  existence  denied  by  local  historians  in 
the  West,  who  write  of  the  German  Reformation  with  scarce  a 
word  about  Turkish  armies,  and  who  tell  of  the  rise  of  France 
to  the  leadership  of  Europe,  but  say  little  of  the  alliance 
of  the  "  Most  Christian  King "  and  the  "  Grand  Seignior." 
Yet  there  is  no  fundamental  difference  in  the  Eastern  Question 
of  the  fifteenth  and  twentieth  centuries;  then  as  now  the 
Ottoman  power  profited  by  the  jealousies  of  Western  states, 
intent  upon  gaining  economic  advantage  in  tlie  trade  of  the 
East ;  for  earlier  still,  geography,  the  great  constant  in  politics, 
had  determined  the  true  value  of  Constantinople  as  an  imperial 
city,  and  of  Egypt  as  forum  utrique  orbi.  Indeed,  one  object 
of  this  monograph  is  to  insist  upon  the  need  of  a  History  of 
the  Eastern  Question,  which  will  tell  the  r61e  of  Asia  in  the  life 
of  our  own  races  and  states,  and  will  win  recognition  for  the 
East,  the  slighted  factor  in  European  history.     The  colonial 


INTRODUCTION  5 

expansion  of  Europe  has  been  described  both  as  an  extension 
of  the  history  of  the  home  countries  and  as  a  movement  of  in- 
herent importance.  The  real  meaning  of  its  history  lies  in  both 
aspects,  and  also  in  the  interacting  relation  of  Asia  and  Europe 
through  its  medium.  The  influence  of  an  Asiatic  domain, 
which  is  itself  subject  to  Asiatic  tradition  and  history,  upon 
the  life  and  ideals  of  its  Western  parent  or  governor,  cannot  be 
lightly  estimated.  The  plan  of  our  investigation,  therefore,  is 
based  on  these  thoughts.  It  does  not  include  the  history  of 
certain  Asiatic  countries  at  a  given  period,  nor  an  account  of 
political  events  in  either  hemisphere :  it  is  rather  an  attempt 
to  discover  the  conditions  which  governed  colonial  affairs  and 
the  Eastern  Question  in  the  closing  years  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  and  to  measure  the  influence  which  these  extra- 
European  problems  exerted  in  a  period  of  stress  when  the 
storm  centre  is  believed  to  have  been  in  western  Europe,  and 
to  observe  the  evolution  of  Asiatic  questions  during  that  period. 
The  story  of  the  French  Revolution  and  of  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte has  been  told  so  often  that  the  choice  of  that  period  for 
study  may  seem  a  mistake.  Yet  it  gives  just  the  situation  with 
which  to  test  the  claim  of  the  importance  and  significance  of 
Asia.  The  events  are  well  known,  little  new  material  is  avail- 
able, and  no  startling  interpretation  is  to  be  dreaded.  The 
view  usually  taken  by  students  of  the  Eastern  Question  is  that 
the  Napoleonic  period  was  comparatively  barren  of  results  in 
the  evolution  of  that  problem,  and  that  held  by  some  students 
of  Western  history  is  that  the  colonies  occupied  a  minor  place 
in  the  great  European  struggle,  and  that  though  Napoleon's 
dreams  might  be  of  the  Orient,  his  politics  dealt  only  with  Eu- 
ropean affairs.  If,  therefore,  the  influence  of  Asia  in  Europe, 
and  the  development  of  her  problems,  can  be  shown  to  have 
been  appreciable  in  a  period  so  hostile,  those  who  support  the 
plea  for  recognition  of  the  East  may  find  encouragement. 

Only  the  preliminary  chapters  of  this  investigation  appear 
at  present  in  a  pamphlet  for  use  as  a  dissertation  for  the 


6  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy;  the  method  of  presentation 
and  the  form  of  the  work  are  those  required  of  the  writer  for 
this  purpose.  For  all  that  the  writer  has  gained  during  his 
course  at  Columbia  University,  and  for  whatever  may  be  found 
worthy  of  acceptance  in  his  future  work,  he  desires  gratefully 
to  recognize  his  indebtedness  to  those  who  have  inspired  and 
directed  him,  and  in  particular  to  Professor  William  M.  Sloane, 
Professor  James  Harvey  Robinson,  and  Professor  Richard  J.  H. 
Gottheil.  He  wishes  also  to  express  his  thanks  to  Professor 
Archibald  Cary  Coolidge  of  Harvard  University,  and  to  those 
who  have  helped  him  in  the  Libraries  of  the  Pennsylvania  State 
Historical  Society  and  of  Columbia  and  Harvard  Universities. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  COLONIAL  QUESTION  AND  THE  WAR  OF  1 793 

The  international  Rivalries  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  as  influenced  by  Asia  — 
The  Theory  of  Colonial  Dominion  —  "The  Balance  of  Trade" — Colonies 
and  Sea  Power — The  Antagonism  of  France  and  Great  Britain  —  French 
Colonial  Policy  —  French  Colonies  in  the  Eighteenth  Century:  Trade,  Size, 
and  Population  —  Economic  influence  of  the  Colonies  —  Administration  — 
The  Colonial  Question  in  France:  the  Cahiers — Colonial  Compact  —  Privi- 
leged Companies  —  Treaty  of  1786  —  British  India —  Trade  of  Great  Britain 
with  Asia  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  —  General  Condition  of  British  Com- 
merce in  1783  and  1793  —  British  Power  in  Asia  —  Its  Progress  and  its  Dangers 

—  The  State  of  India  —  French  Opinion  regarding  Asiatic  Questions  —  Talley- 
rand's Plan  —  The  Preparation  for  the  War  of  1793 —  The  Position  of  Spain 

—  Asia,  the  Source  of  British  Power  —  Opinion  in  Great  Britain,  1790-93  — 
The  Importance  of  the  Netherlands  —  "The  War  on  Sugar  Islands  "  —  The 
Continental  and  Colonial  Policies  of  France  —  The  Negotiations  at  Lille  — 
The  Colonial  Question  and  the  Problem  of  Asiatic  Dominion  during  the  Rev- 
olutionary period. 

The  eighteenth  century,  though  cosmopolitan  in  thought,  was 
international  in  politics.  The  "  inter-colonial  wars "  were  a 
struggle  for  commerce  and  colonial  empire,  but  they  reacted 
with  energy  upon  the  institutional  and  political  reformation 
which  focussed  in  the  Revolution  ;  the  Eastern  Question  and 
its  corollary,  the  Polish  Question,  then  took  rank  with  the 
French  Question  in  the  councils  of  Europe;  and  the. jealousies 
they  caused  blinded  the  eyes  of  diplomats  to  the  real  meaning 
of  events  in  Paris,  thus  gaining  for  the  French  chance  to 
organize  more  fully  forces  with  which  to  fight  Europe.  The 
interest  of  Europe  and  more  particularly  of  France  in  Asiatic 
matters  has  been  hidden  by  events  at  home ;  it  was  by  no 
means  slight,  and  in  the  case  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  became 


8  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

at  one  time  overpowering.  The  synthesis  of  these  ideas  and 
the  traditional  policy  of  France  made  easy  the  preparation  for 
the  Egyptian  Expedition;  and  that  event,  a  natural  step, 
marked  in  turn  an  important  evolution  in  the  problem  of  Asia. 
In  this  chapter  the  attempt  must  be  made  to  discuss  the 
colonial  question  at  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  to 
summarize  with  special  reference  to  Asiatic  affairs  the  theories 
and  conditions  involved  in  the  imperial  struggle  between 
France  and  Great  Britain. 

Montesquieu,  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  had 
written  of  the  English  as  a  people  who  above  all  others  had 
known  best  how  to  "  profit  simultaneously  by  three  great  forces 
—  religion,  commerce,  and  liberty." *  Each  of  these  three  had 
been  at  stake  at  one  time  or  another  during  the  wars  of  Great 
Britain  with  Spain,  Holland,  and  France;  the  conflict  with 
Spain,  the  "  monopolist  of  the  New  World,"  was  for  religious 
and  economic  reasons  and  during  this  conflict  was  founded 
that  sea  power  of  Great  Britain,  which  was  to  support  her 
international  prestige  and  commercial  prosperity.  The  do- 
mestic controversies  which  produced  modern  England,  with 
the  naval  combats  against  the  Dutch,  and  the  later  alliance  of 
the  two  nations  against  France,  introduced  the  long  struggle 
of  the  eighteenth  century  for  commerce  and  colonies ;  and  this 
antagonism  between  Great  Britain  and  France,  which  reached 
a  new  stage  in  the  wars  of  the  Revolution,  was  related  to  Great 
Britain's  rivalry  with  Spain.  It  was  the  threatened  increase  to 
French  domains  by  the  addition  of  the  trans-oceanic  empire 
of  Spain,  and  the  checking  of  British  advance  in  India  and 
America  by  the  Bourbons,  that  moved  Great  Britain  to  join 
battle  against  France  in  order  to  protect  and  enlarge  her  com- 
merce and  colonial  domain.  Thus  the  policies  of  the  two  rivals 
grew  world-wide  in  their  scope ;  the  political  geography  of  the 
Antipodes  was  discussed  in  the  councils  of  Europe;  and  the 

1  Esprit  des  Lois,  1.  xx.  c.  7. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  9 

question  of  curbing  the  ambitions  of  France  at  the  Pyrenees, 
the  Rhine,  or  the  Scheldt  was  linked  with  that  of  control  on 
the  Ganges  and  the  Mississippi.  The  stories  of  wealth  in  the 
Indies  made  men  speak  of  the  "  Grand  Mogul "  as  they  would 
have  spoken  of  Louis  XIV. ;  and  new  measures  of  value  pro- 
duced new  theories  of  commerce  and  politics.  Trade  itself 
became  political ;  and  it  was  said  :  "  All  the  Nations  of  Europe 
seem  to  strive  who  shall  outwit  one  another  in  point  of  Trade, 
and  they  concur  in  this  Maxim,  That  the  less  they  consume  of 
foreign  Commodities,  the  better  it  is  for  them."  x  With  such  an 
axiom  colonial  problems  were  attempted  and  the  principles  of 
commerce  and  foreign  policy  demonstrated  in  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries.  Overlooking  subtler  laws  of  credit 
and  engrossed  in  the  idea  that  wealth  could  be  measured  only 
in  gold  and  silver,  men  gauged  a  nation's  prosperity  wholly  by 
the  difference  between  its  exports  and  imports.  This  was 
supposed  to  be  in  bullion  and  gave  the  "  balance  of  trade,"  the 
economic  barometer,  which  to  the  mind  of  governor  and  mer- 
chant marked  success  or  failure,  according  as  exports  exceeded 
imports  or  were  exceeded  by  them.  Whatever  judgment, 
therefore,  may  be  passed  on  the  "  Mercantile  System  "  as  a 
whole,  or  the  economic  theory  on  which  it  rested,  this  must  be 
remembered :  the  system  was  a  vital  element  in  the  period ; 
the  conclusions  to  which  men  came  in  matters  of  commerce 
and  colonial  policy  were  influenced  by  it ;  and  the  spirit  of  the 
time  cannot  be  truly  understood  if  it  be  disregarded.2 

1  Jansson:  Maxims  in  Trade  (17 13)  publ.  in  Somers :  Fourth  Collection  of 
Tracts,  iv.  p.  153. 

2  Mun :  England's  Treasure  by  Forraign  Trade  (1664)  (Maculloch's  edition), 
p.  125,  chap.  ii. :  "The  ordinary  means,  therefore,  to  increase  our  wealth  and 
treasure  is  by  Forraign  Trade,  wherein  wee  must  ever  observe  this  rule  :  to  sell 
more  to  strangers  yearly  than  wee  consume  of  theirs  in  value/'  Boislisle  :  Corr. 
des  controleurs  generaux,  ii.  p.  477  (Me?n.  de  M.  de  Mesnager,  dipute  de  Rouen,  sur 
Vetat  du  commerce  en giniral,  Dec.  3,  1700):  "Si  nous  fournissons  aux  etrangers 
en  vin,  en  eau  de  vie,  sel,  toiles  et  etoffes  pour  plus  de  valeur  que  ce  que  nous 
tirons  d'eux,  alors  notre  commerce  est  utile  a  l'fitat,  parce  que  le  debit  que  nous 
faisons  de  nos  march andises  excedant  la  valeur  de  celles  qu'ils  nous  envoient,  cet 


10  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

As  a  natural  result  of  this  economic  system,  the  problems  of 
colonial  dominion  and  sea  power  took  front  rank  among  the 

excedent  nous  est  toujours  paye  en  argent  qui  est  la  richesse  et  la  force  de  l'lstat." 
Child  :  Discourse  on  Trade  (5th  ed.  1751),  p.  115:  "  The  ballance  of  trade  is  com- 
monly understood  two  ways  :  1.  Generally:  something  whereby  it  may  be  known 
whether  this  kingdom  gains  or  loses  by  foreign  trade.  2.  Particularly  :  something 
whereby  we  may  know  by  what  trades  this  kingdom  gains,  and  by  what  trades  it 
loses.  .  .  .  This  ballance  is  to  be  taken  by.  a  strict  scrutiny  of  what  proportion  the 
value  of  the  commodities  exported  out  of  this  kingdom  bear  to  those  imported; 
and  if  the  exports  exceed  the  imports,  it  is  concluded  the  nation  gets  by  the  gen- 
eral course  of  its  trade,  it  being  supposed  that  the  overplus  is  imported  bullion, 
and  so  adds  to  the  treasure  of  the  kingdom,  gold  and  silver  being  taken  for  the 
measure  and  standard  of  riches."  Child  criticises  this  prevailing  opinion  and 
shows  that  when  applied  to  particular  branches  of  trade  it  fails  to  consider  the 
relation  of  that  branch  to  the  total  trade.  He  examples  the  East  India  Co.  on 
this  point  (p.  120);  he  declares  his  measure  of  trade  is  the  ratio  of  increase  in  the 
general  shipping  and  trade  of  a  nation  (p.  123).  On  the  other  hand,  he  says  : 
"  It  is  to  our  interest,  by  example,  and  other  means  (not  distasteful),  above  all 
kinds  of  commodities,  to  prevent,  as  much  as  may  be,  the  importation  of  foreign 
manufactures"  (p.  132).  Coyer:  La  Noblesse  commercante  (1756),  p.  93.  "  Ce 
n'est  pas  le  Commerce  interieur  qui  enrichit  un  £tat,  il  etablit  seulement  une  cir- 
culation de  richesses,  sans  en  augmenter  la  masse ;  c'est  au  Commerce  exterieur 
qu'est  reserve  le  grand  ceuvre.  L'Europe  nous  ouvre  ses  Ports,  TAfrique  nous 
appelle,  l'Asie  nous  attend,  1'Amerique  nous  solicite"  (p.  151).  "  I/Argent,  ce 
tyran  du  monde  a  bien  etendu  son  empire  depuis  l'usage  de  la  poudre  a  canon 
et  des  armes  a  feu.  La  guerre  est  devenue  une  depense  d'argent  plutot  qu'une 
depense  d'hommes  "  (p.  158).  "  Le  commerce  est  le  nerf  de  l'litat.  ...  La  bal- 
ance du  commerce  et  la  balance  du  pouvoir  n'en  sont  plus  qu'une."  The  very 
urgency  with  which  such  statements  are  made  shows  the  idea  of  empire  founded 
on  trade  to  be  a  new  and  pregnant  one  to  the  men  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Ibid.  p.  22  :  "  Je  pourrois  demontrer  que  la  France,  dans  la  position  actuelle  de 
l'Europe,  ne  peut  se  soutenir  que  par  le  commerce,  d'oii  je  concluerois  que  toute 
la  Noblesse  se  doit  s'y  porter.  .  .  ."  Cf.  pp.  54,  179,  214-215.  Child:  op.  cit.  p. 
114:  "  That  the  greatness  of  this  kingdom  depends  upon  foreign  trade  is  ac- 
knowledged, and  therefore  the  interest  of  trade  not  unbecoming  persons  of  the 
highest  rank."  Beausobre:  V Introduction  h  Vetude  de  la  politique  (ed.  of  1791)* 
i.  p.  257:  "  Le  commerce  est  actif  lorsque  l'Et'at  vend  a  l'etranger  beaucoup  plus 
de  marchandises  et  de  denrees  qu'il  ne  lui  en  achete,  il  est  passif  si  l'Etat  achete 
plus  qu'il  ne  vend."  The  author  attacks  this  prevailing  definition,  and  claims  the 
principle  upon  which  commerce  must  be  judged  is  that  "  les  productions  de  la 
terre  fournissent  le  necessaire,  que  le  produit  de  circulation  fait  naitre  l'abondance 
et  que  les  tresors  de  l'etranger  donnent  le  superflu  :  .  .  .  que  tout  commerce  qui 
ne  fait  pas  hausser  le  prix  des  terres  est  un  commerce  destructif  et  vicieux  "  (p. 
258).     Arnould,  Balance  du  Commerce  (1793),  i.  p.  64:   "  Suivent  le  raeme  sys- 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  II 

political  and  commercial  questions  of  the  day ;  for  the  corollary 
to  the  proposition  regarding  the  balance  of  trade  was  that 
the  colonies  and  foreign  establishments  of  a  European  state 
must  minister  only  to  the  prosperity  of  the  home  ports.  Such 
a  belief,  enforced  by  prohibitive  laws  or  by  war,  made  the  own- 
ership of  a  colony  a  necessity  to  the  mother  country ;  and  the 
Asiatic  trading-posts,  or  "  factories,"  of  European  companies 
thus  became  the  scenes  of  political  intrigue  or  actual  hostil- 
ity between  associations  of  merchants.  The  readiness  of  the 
mother  country  to  support  the  claims  and  help  the  endeavors 
of  her  citizens  was  determined  by  the  supposed  value  of  a  new 
and  exclusive  market,  as  well  as  by  the  ability  shown  by  the 
colony  or  factory  to  assist  the  balance  of  trade  between  the 
home  country  and  some  other  European  nation.  For  often 
the  imports  from  the  foreign  possessions  were  in  turn  exported 
to  a  European  market,  the  profit-taking  being  for  the  benefit 
of  home  merchants,  and  the  increase  of  exports  credited  in 
calculating  the  balance  of  trade  for  the  mother  country.1    The 

teme,  il  falloit  beaucoup  vendre  aux  etrangers,  et  leur  acheter  peu,  afin  d'attirer 
une  plus  grande  masse  d'argent  dans  les  canaux  de  la  circulation  interieure  de 
1'empire."  The  author  gives  his  own  definition,  viz.  (i.  p.  132)  :  "  D'apres  ces 
definitions,  j'entends  par  balance  du  commerce,  la  comparaison  des  differents  rap- 
ports de  rhomme  avec  la  terre.  C'est  dans  ce  sens  que  j'ai  intitule  cet  ouvrage, 
de  la  balance  du  commerce"  The  matter  is  thus  summarized  by  Adam  Smith  : 
Wealth  of  Nations  (ed.  of  1796),  ii.  p.  173;  Bk.  iv.  ch.  1.  "The  two  principles 
being  established,  however,  that  wealth  consisted  in  gold  and  silver,  and  that  these 
metals  could  be  brought  into  a  country  which  had  no  mines  only  by  the  balance 
of  trade,  or  by  exporting  to  a  greater  value  than  it  imported,  it  necessarily  became 
the  great  object  of  political  economy  to  diminish  as  much  as  possible  the  impor- 
tation of  foreign  goods  for  home  consumption,  and  to  increase  as  much  as  possi- 
ble the  exportation  of  the  produce  of  domestic  industry.  Its  two  great  engines 
for  enriching  the  country,  therefore,  were  restraints  upon  importation  and  en- 
couragements to  exportation."  Cf.,  for  Smith's  criticism  of  this  theory,  pp.  141, 
147,  170  et  sea.;  243-250,  485  et  sea.  Cf.  also  Montesquieu :  Esprit  des  Lois,  1. 
xx.  c.  4-14 ;  and  for  a  general  statement  regarding  mercantilism,  Schmoller  :  The 
Mercantile  System,  pp.  47  et  sea.,  58  et  sea. 

1  Child:  Discourse  on  Trade,  p.  146:  "  That  all  colonies  and  foreign  planta- 
tions do  endammage  their  mother-kingdom,  when  the  trades  of  such  plantations 
are  not  confined  to  their  said  mother-kingdoms,  by  good  laws,  and  the  severe 


12  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

result,  however,  of  such  endeavors  in  empire-building  might  be 
totally  the  reverse  of  that  intended;  should  the  contest  for 
colonial  domain  or  commercial  privilege  prove  too  expensive  to 
the  mother  country,  the  profits  of  the  new  market  would  be 
more  than  counterbalanced  by  an  increased  national  debt  and 
heavy  taxation.  Especially  would  this  be  true  when  the  con- 
sumption of  colonial  produce  was  confined  to  the  home  land, 
and  when  no  part  of  the  colonial  output  was  re-exported  to 
foreign  consumers  in  Europe.    It  was  this  aspect  of  the  problem 

execution  of  those  laws."  Gomel :  Causes  financieres  de  la  Revolution  franfaise, 
ii.  pp.  223  et  seq.  In  1784  the  chief  cities  of  France  protested  against  the  decree 
of  Aug.  30,  which  permitted  foreign  ships  to  trade  in  certain  specified  goods  with 
French  colonies.  The  deputies  of  these  cities  claimed  that  "  c'est  un  principe 
inconteste  que  les  colonies  sont  crees  par  et  pour  la  metropole ;  elles  n'ont  le 
droit  de  s'approvisioner  qu'en  France,  et  de  meme  elles  ne  peuvent  vendre  qu'en 
France  les  produits  de  leur  sol.  Le  monopole  du  commerce  colonial  assure  aux 
negociants  et  armateurs  de  la  mere-patrie,  est  pour  celle-ci  un  dedommagement 
aux  depenses  qu'entrainent  la  fondation  et  la  garde  des  colonies  ;  il  est  pour  elle 
une  source  de  benefices,  et  s'il  cesse  d'exister,  si  les  vaisseaux  etrangers  peuvent 
amener  dans  les  Antilles  les  produits  dont  celles-ci  ont  besoin,  ils  ne  tarderont 
pas  a  supplanter  nos  batiments  ainsi  que  nos  marchandises,  au  grand  detriment 
de  notre  marine  et  nos  manufactures/'  Cf.  Bachaumont :  Memoires,  xxvii.  p.  84; 
xxviii.  pp.  143-145.  Beausobre :  Politique,  i.  pp.  279,  '280  1  "  II  ne  faut  jamais 
oublier  qu'elles  [les  colonies]  ne  sont  fondees  qu'en  faveur  du  pays  de  la  domi- 
nation ;  c'est  pourquoi  les  fabriques  et  les  manufactures  y  sont  deplacees." 
Uztariz :  Theory  and  Practice  of  Commerce  (written  in  1724,  Eng.  ed.  1751),  i. 
p.  6 :  "  ...  we  [Spaniards]  principally  suffer  by  having  bought  of  foreigners  more 
merchandize  and  fruits,  than  we  have  sold  to  them,  so  as  to  make  a  ballance  to 
our  disadvantage  of  millions  of  dollars  yearly."  Page  49:  "  .  .  .  the  Indies 
are  not  the  thing  that  enervates  and  dispeoples  Spain,  but  the  commodities  by 
which  foreigners  have  drained  us  of  our  money,  and  destroyed  our  manufactories, 
at  the  same  time  that  our  heavy  taxes  continue."  This  statement  was  based  on  the 
fact  that  the  exports  to  Spain  from  her  colonies  were  chiefly  bullion,  which,  while  it 
increased  Spain's  purchasing  power  in  Europe,  altered  the  balance  of  trade  to  her 
debit.  The  dangerous  progress  of  English  trading  in  Asia  is  treated  in  Bielfeld  : 
Institutions  politiques,  i.  p.  304 :  "  Mais  il  y  a  eu,  en  Asie,  des  Nations  ou  trop 
formidables  par  elles-memes  pour  etre  subjugees,  ou  que  la  jalousie  mutuelle  des 
Puissances  Europeennes  a  laissees  en  paix,  ou  qu'on  n'a  pas  cru  valoir  la  peine 
d'etre  attaquees.  Le  Commerce  avec  ces  peuples  et  la  Navigation  sur  leurs 
Cotes  sont  demeur^s  libres  a  toutes  les  Nations  Europeennes ;  et  c'est  aujour- 
d'hui  une  violence,  une  injustice  affreuse  lorsq'une  Puissance,  qui  domine  sur  la 
Mer  par  ses  forces  Navales,  veut  troubler  les  autres  dans  cette  Navigation." 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  1 3 

which  appealed  to  Adam  Smith  in  his  well-known  chapter  on 
the  colonies.1  The  idea  that  sea  power  was  a  deciding  fac- 
tor in  history,  that  the  future  of  nations  depended  on  a  flour- 
ishing commerce  upheld  by  a  profitable  colonial  empire  and 
defended  by  a  powerful  navy,  was  advanced  on  both  sides  of 
the  Channel.  The  Earl  of  Shaftesbury  had  already  measured 
the  foundation  of  British  power  when  he  wrote :  "  The  Fleet 
are  the  Walls  of  England  "  ;  in  France  a  like  thought  and  hope 
were  heralded;  and  the  realization  of  the  ideal  of  sea  power  by 
Great  Britain  in  her  long  duel  with  France  was  the  full  expres- 
sion of  a  theory  by  no  means  novel  or  mysterious.  As  Great 
Britain  gained  this  maritime  supremacy  a  corresponding  ad- 
vance in  her  manufactures  further  strengthened  her  hold  on  it. 
Exports  to  the  Antipodes  discovered  national  resources,  which 
in  turn  became  the  nation's  mainstay  in  war.  The  merchant- 
marine  and  industrial  interests  stored  the  power  of  the  country, 
while  the  enlargement  of  the  empire  opened  new  markets  and 
found  naval  stations  the  world  over.  Gentz  called  it  the  "  Mon- 
opoly of  Trans-European  dominions."  2 

1  Smith:  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  397,  429,  431,  439,442,  459-469,  516-517.  (Book  iv. 
chap.  7.) 

2  Gentz:  State  of  Europe  in  1789,  pp.  308  et  sea.  Shaftesbury:  Delenda 
Carthago,  in  Somers :  Second  Collection,  in.  pp.  213,  214.  "The  Fleet  are  the 
Walls  of  England.  To  command  at  Sea,  not  to  make  conquests  by  Land,  is  the 
true  Interest  of  England  .  .  .  What  then  is  the  Interest  of  England  as  to  France  ? 
Surely  to  grow  at  Sea  and  command  the  trade,  which  is  our  greatness."  Mahan  : 
Sea-Power  {1660-1793),  pp.  i.  73  et  sea.  (Cf.  O'Meara's  Talks  with  Napo- 
leon at  St.  Helena,  Cenhiry  Magazine,  Feb.  1900,  p.  631.)  Cunningham  :  English 
Industry,  ii.  pp.  445,  508,  537-538.  Mallet  du  Pan  :  Memoirs  and  Correspondence, 
i.  p.  39 :  "  From  the  Baltic,  from  Hudson's  Bay,  from  Jamaica,  from  the  Wind- 
ward Islands  and  the  East  Indies,  immense  and  rich  cargoes  come  to  minister  to 
the  necessities  of  the  State  [England],  while  sustaining  the  fortunes  of  individuals. 
This  care  in  protecting  the  returns  of  her  merchant  marine  by  the  aid  of  a 
fleet,  ever  ready  for  the  purpose,  makes  no  noise  in  the  papers.  It  occasions 
no  firing  of  cannons  or  chanting  of  Te  Deums  ;  but  it  preserves  individuals 
from  the  evils  of  war.  So  long  as  this  circulation  shall  last,  England  will  retain 
life  and  movement.  So  long  as  the  capital  of  her  merchant  marine  shall  be 
circulating  at  the  two  ends  of  the  world,  an  exchange  for  their  treasures,  so  long 
as  a  maritime  and  commercial  power  shall  lose  neither  her  convoys  nor  her  war- 


14  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Power  thus  gained  stimulated  the  imagination  and  widened 
the  political  horizon  of  Europe ;  but  the  process  was  slow  and 
of  ten  throughout  the  eighteenth  century  local  reasons  were  given 
for  policies  which,  though  they  seemed  European,  were  destined 
to  work  changes  in  other  continents.  But  the  history  of  the 
period  has  noplace  here,  for  it  is  upon  the  principles  of  foreign 
policy  that  attention  must  be  centred ;  and  the  main  theme 
being  the  rivalry  of  France  and  Great  Britain  in  the  latter  half 
of  the  century,  the  theories  entertained  by  each  about  the  other 
are  connected  with  colonial  and  naval  policy.  Of  French  writers 
on  the  subject  no  other  is  as  typical  as  Favier,  the  diplomat 
and  author  of  political  treatises ;  his  ideas  were  popular  and  his 
influence  great.  The  gist  of  his  doctrine  was  the  annihilation 
of  Great  Britain  as  the  only  obstacle  to  French  expansion  on 
the  continent  and  over  seas.  He  cited  the  conflicting  and 
commercial  interests  of  the  two  states,  which  had  involved  them 
or  their  allies  in  war  four  times  within  a  century ;  he  talked 
of  treaties  between  them  as  mere  truces,  and  celebrated  the 
centennial  of  their  mutual  hatred.  Frenchmen,  comparing  their 
struggle  with  Great  Britain  to  the  Punic  wars,  dreamed  of  them- 
selves as  Romans  and  shouted,  Delenda  est  Carthago.  Other 
writers,  of  widely  differing  character,  expressed  similar  ideas. 
Rousseau  in  1760  declared  that  Great  Britain  would  be  ruined 
within  twenty  years.  An  attack  at  the  extremities  of  the 
British  Empire,  a  rebellion  in  Ireland,  internal  parliamentary 
dissensions,  and  a  fierce  onset  by  France  would  make  of  England 
an  insular  Poland.1     Nor  was  the  animosity  only  in  France ;  a 

ships,  she  will  impose  on  the  imagination  by  the  energy  of  her  efforts."  Coyer  : 
op.  at.  p.  109  —  quoting  a  saying  attributed  by  Pompey  to  Themistocles,  "Qui 
est  le  Maitre  de  la  mer,  est  le  Maitre  de  tout  **  —  the  author  claims  that  Louis 
XIV.  was  animated  by  this  idea.  Page  182  :  "  D'un  Vaisseau  Marchand  on  passe 
sur  la  Flote  Royale  pour  y  disputer  l'Empire  de  la  mer." 

1  France  and  England  or  their  allies  had  gone  to  war  in  1689,  1702,  1739, 1756, 
and  again  later  in  1775.  Favier,  Conjectures,  in  Segur  :  Politiques,  etc.  ii.  p.  165 : 
"  Dans  les  beaux  jours  de  Louis  XIV.  la  France  profita  de  l'animosite  nationale, 
de  la  jalousie  du  commerce  entre  les  Anglais  et  les  Hollandais,  pour  tenir  la 
balance  entre  les  deux  puissances  maritimes."    Page  167  :  "  On  peut  done  le  dire, 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  1 5 

reciprocal  feeling  in  Great  Britain  spoke  of  France  as  a  "  nat- 
ural political  enemy,"  and  declared  that  any  union  with  her 

nous  void  arrives  a  l'anniversaire  d'un  siecle  de  haine  implacable  entre  les  deux 
nations  [France  and  England.]     Depuis  cette  paix  separee  en  1673,  elles  n'ont 
point  cesse'  d'etre  en  guerre  ouverte,  ou  en  temps  de  paix,  de  nourir  les  jalousies, 
les  defiances,  les  craintes  reciproques,  qui  ont  ramene  quatre  fois  de  nouvelles 
hostilites "  (et  passim    to  p.   195).      Rousseau  :   Extrait   du   Projet  de  Paix,  in 
CEuvres,  vii.  p.  364  (written  in   1760) :  "  II  est  par  exemple  tres-aise  de  pre  voir 
que  dans  vingt  ans  d'ici  l'Angleterre  avec  toute  sa  gloire  sera  ruinee  et  de  plus 
aura  perdu  le   reste    de   sa   liberie. "      Zevort:    d'Argenson,  p.   409,    maxim  of 
d'Argenson :  "  L'Angleterre  et  la  maison  d'Autriche  sont  nos  seuls  rivaux  de 
puissance  par  mer  et  par  terre,  ce  sont  deux  Carthages  contre  une  Rome."     (This 
was  prior  to   1756J     Gentz :  op.  cit.  pp.  99,  100:  [1789]  "There  was  only  one 
among  the  greater  powers  whose  interests  were  contrary  to  those  of  France,  and 
who  at  the  same  time  possessed   the  means  of  injuring  her ;  and  that  was  Eng- 
land. .  .  .  But  with  respect  to  the  danger  resulting  to  France  from  this  hostile 
relation,  it  appears  that  .  .  .  the  security  and  integrity  of  its  territory  [were]  not 
invaded  or  materially  endangered  in  any  war  with  England.     Colonial  and  com- 
mercial interests,  the  constant  objects  of  contention  between  them,  though  certainly 
great  and  important,  were  only  secondary  to  the  above  consideration ;  and  the 
danger  that  ensued,  though  serious  and  afflicting,  was  only  subordinate."     Coyer  : 
op.  cit.  pp.  62  et  sea.,  101,  106, 107.     Voltaire :  Siecle  de  Louis  XV.  ch.  35.     Gomel  : 
op.  cit.  i.  pp.  5,  230  ;  ii.  p.  35.     D'Argenson  :  Journal  et  Mem.  iii.  p.  170 :   [Sept.  19, 
1740]  "Iln'est  pas  douteux  que  l'Angleterre  n'ait  un  grand  interet  a  ecraser 
notre  marine  renaissante.     lis  la  chercheront  et  se  diront  en  droit  de  commencer 
la  querelle  par  nous  combattre,  puisque  tout  dessein  de  notre  flotte  ne  peut  etre 
qu'offensif  contre  eux."     Cf .  vii.  pp.  37, 397  ;  viii.  pp.  108,  348.     Linguet :  Annales, 
iv.  p.  53  :  "  Cinq-cents  ans  de  rivalite  ont  rendu  personnelle  a  chaque  particulier 
l'emulation  qui  aiguillonne  les  deux  peuples  "  [English  and  French].     (Quoted  by 
Sorel :  L' Europe  et  la  Revolution  francaise,  i.  p.  338,  note  4.)     Cf.  Sorel :  op.  cit. 
i.  pp.  291,  292,  306,  338,  345,  347.     Dubroca  :  Politique  du  Gouvernement  Anglais, 
p.  vi :  *  La  nature  a  place  l'Angleterre  et  la  France  dans  une  situation  respective 
qui  doit  necessairement  etablir  entre  elles  une  eternelle  rivalite.     Rapprochees 
sous  ce  rapport,  les  deux  nations  offrent  sous  un  autre  point  de  vue  des  diffe- 
rences qui  etablissent  aussi  imperieusement  la  superiority  de  la  France  sur  la 
Grande-Bretagne."     De  Witt:  Jefferson  and  American  Democracy,  p.  389.     (Paper 
written  in  March,  1776,  by  Gerard  de  Rayneval,  of  the  French  foreign  office, 
entitled,   u  Reflections  on  the  actual  position  of  the  English  colonies   and  the 
course  which  France  ought  to  take  with  respect  to  them.")     "  After  describing 
England  as  the  natural  enemy  of  France,  and  as  a  greedy,  ambitious,  unjust,  and 
faithless  enemy,  the  invariable  and  cherished  object  of  whose  policy  was,  if  not 
the  destruction,  at  all  events  the  impoverishment,  humiliation,  and  ruin  of  France, 
he  urged  as  a  natural  consequence  that  it  was  the  business  of  France  to  take 
every  possible  opportunity  of  weakening  the  strength  and  power  of  England." 


1 6  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

would  be  "  disgraceful  and  degrading  to  England."  The  com- 
mon talk  was  not  so  bitter ;  the  road  to  war  was  rather  paved 
by  suspicion,  a  readiness  to  expect  French  hostility,  and  by 
contentment  in  French  discomfort.1      Such  an  attitude,   how- 

1  Rousset :  Louvois,  ii.  p.  309  [1677] :  (Report  of  a  French  agent  in  London): 
"  II  a  passe  tout  d'une  voix  dans  la  chambre  basse  que  les  Anglais  vendront 
jusqu'a  leurs  chemises  (ce  sont  les  termes  dont  ils  se  servis)  pour  faire  la  guerre 
a  la  France  pour  la  conservation  des  Pays-Bas."     Browning  :  Leeds  —  Pol.  memo- 
randa, p.   in   (May  9,  1785):    "Austria   and  France  are  united  for  views  of 
mutual  aggrandizement.     Russia  is  closely  connected  with  Austria,  Spain  with 
France.     The  Consequences  of  this  formidable  League  are  evident.     They  would 
be  felt  by  all  Europe  in  general,  but  more  particularly  by  England  and  Prussia. 
It  behooves   therefore  these  two  Courts  to  concert  Measures  for  their  recip- 
rocal Safety."     Stephens  :  Home  Tooke,  i.  p.  56:  "The  Whigs  of  that  day  [1765] 
always  beheld  France  with  an  invidious  eye,  and  rejoiced  at  her  humiliation  and 
disgrace.     Considering  the  example  of  successful  tyranny  as  contagious,  they 
vowed  eternal  enmity  and  everlasting  hatred  against  a  king,  who  kept  more  than 
twenty-five  millions  of  his  subjects  in  slavery ;  and  they  would  willingly  have 
waged  perpetual  war  with  a  nation,  base  and  abject  enough  to  hug  their  chains, 
and  sacrifice  themselves  at  the  bidding  of  an  unfeeling  despot."    Pari.  Hist.  xxvi. 
421,  422.     Debate  on  commercial  treaty  with  France  in  1787.     Mr.  Francis  :  "  It 
has  been  the  deliberate  policy,  not  the  passion,  of  England  in  all  times  but  those 
of  the  House  of  Stuart,  to  prefer  the  friendship  of  any  distant  nation  to  that  of 
France.  ...  An  intimate   union  with  France   must  always  be  disgraceful   and 
degrading  to  England."     Burke,  speaking  on  the  subject,  said  (p.  488) :  "  The 
designs,  then,  of  France  were  to  allow  us  some  present  gain  in  the  sale  of  our 
manufactures,  for  some  permanent  advantages  which  she  promised  to  herself  in 
commerce.     Through  her  rivers  and  canals  she  intends  to  pour  the  commodities 
of  England  into  other  countries.     She  had  already,  by  her  politics,  contrived  to 
wrest  our  share  of  the  Levant  trade  from  us ;  and  it  was  a  part  of  her  present 
design  to  divert  the  remainder  from  its  former  channel ;  and  by  supplying  all  the 
ports  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea  through  the  Seine,  the  Garonne,  the  canal  of 
Languedoc,  and  the  Rhone,  to  engross  the  carrying  trade  to  the  Levant,  and  to 
ruin  our  factory  at  Leghorn  and  our  other  establishments  in  those  seas."     During 
the  course  of  this  debate  Mr.  Fox  was  particularly  severe  in  his  attacks  on 
France,  declaring  her  the  **  natural  political  enemy  "  of  Great  Britain.     One  of 
the  most  distinguished  exceptions  to  the  general  anti-Gallican  sentiment  had  been 
Lord  Shelburne.     Cf.  Fitzmaurice:  Shelbume,  iii  pp.  166,  167  [1782].     For  Fox's 
change  of  view  in  1789.  cf.  Russell :  Corr.  of  Fox,  ii.  p.  361.     (Fox  to  Fitzpatrick, 
July  30,  1789.)     Annual  Register,  1784-85,  p.   137.      (English  sentiment  as  to 
the  treaty  signed  Nov.  8,  1785,  between  Holland  and  the  Empire.)     "  It  could 
not  but  be  a  grievous  consideration  to  Englishmen  that,  while  France,  through 
the  happiness  of  great  ministers  at  home,  and  their  choice  of  able  negotiators 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  1 7 

ever,  was  fatal  to  peace ;  given  this  mutual  distrust,  the  avowed 
policy  of  France  was  to  ally  herself  with  every  enemy  of  Great 
Britain,  and  that  of  the  British  was  no  less  effective  in  its  oppo- 
sition to  French  schemes.  As  in  the  affairs  of  the  American 
colonies  the  French  had  tried  to  strike  at  Great  Britain,  so  in 
Holland  the  plans  of  the  Bourbons  aimed  not  only  at  European 
success,  but  at  serious  opposition  to  British  power  in  India.  The 
"favorite  design"  of  the  French  court  was  said  to  be  "to  in- 
jure as  much  as  possible  the  commercial  and  political  inter- 
ests of  England  in  India ;  "  and  as  the  Revolution  drew  near, 
no  abatement  in  this  policy  is  to  be  seen ;  Indian  princes,  by 
their  opposition  to  British  control  in  the  East,  were  to  sat- 
isfy the  national  jealousy  of  France;  French  diplomacy  de- 
lighted to  play  at  intrigue  in  Eastern  affairs,  and  the  gossip 
of  Versailles  fed  on  embassies  from  Asia.  That  these  hopes 
were  futile  does  not  make  them  less  an  index  to  the  mind  of 
France.1 

abroad,  was  spreading  her  consequence,  and  extending  her  influence  through  the 
nations  of  the  earth,  Great  Britain,  through  some  unaccountable  fatality,  seemed 
to  be  fallen  from  that  high  seat  in  which  she  had  so  long  and  so  gloriously  pre- 
sided, and  to  be  no  longer  considered,  or  almost  remembered  in  the  general  poli- 
tics and  system  of  Europe."  Auckland  :  Correspondence,  i.  p.  127  (  Pitt  to  Eden. 
June  10,  1786)  :  "  .  .  .  though  in  the  commercial  business  I  think  there  are 
reasons  for  believing  the  French  maybe  sincere,  I  cannot  listen  without  suspicion 
to  their  professions  of  political  friendship";  ii.  p.  215  (Storer  to  Eden.  June 
30,  1788):  "  ...  we  suppose  the  French  are  looking  out  for  opportunities  of 
commencing  hostilities  against  us,  and  the  French  think  that  Great  Britain  is 
seeking  for  pretences  to  begin  a  war  against  them."  For  English  pleasure  at 
French  disorder,  see  Ibid.  i.  pp.  195,  205;  ii.  pp.  233,  377,  458  462,  484.  Cf.  also 
Lecky :  Hist,  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  v.  pp.  443,  444,  455,  456,  474. 
1  Barral-Montferrat :  Dix  ans  de  paix  armee,  i.  p.  14  (Lord  Carmarthen  to 
Hailes,  Jan.-Feb.  1784) :  "  I  feel  sure  that  you  will  take  the  opportunity  to  pay 
closer  attention  than  ever  to  the  plans  of  the  French  Court,  now  that  it  is  free  to 
press  the  accomplishment  of  its  favorite  design,  that  is  to  injure  as  much  as  pos- 
sible the  commercial  and  political  interests  of  England  in  India.  These  plans 
must  appear  as  easier  of  realization  now  than  at  any  other  time  previous,  in  view 
of  the  new  intimacy  which  has  been  established  between  France  and  the  United 
Provinces  of  Holland.  The  principal,  not  to  say  the  only  object  of  their  alliance 
is,  it  appears,  to  drive  the  English  from  the  East  Indies."    Page  95  (Despatch  of 

2 


1 8  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

The  positive  side  of  French  policy  in  colonial  affairs  and  the 
success  of  French  colonization  must  not  be  forgotten.     It  has 

Hailes,  Sept.  7,  1786) :  "As  soon  as  she  can  France  will  recommence  hostilities. 
She  will  advance  as  she  has  previously  given  as  her  motives  for  the  rupture,  the 
liberties  and  rights  of  humanity,  and  she  will  use  the  Indian  princes  to  satisfy  her 
national  jealousy  still  more  than  her  ambition."  Cf.  pp.  1,2.  Malmesbury: 
Diaries  and  Corresp.  ii.  p.  289  (The  Hague,  April  13,  1787 ;  Harris  to  Car- 
marthen) :  "  M.  de  Vergennes  has  agents  employed  at  Amsterdam,  for  no  other 
purpose  than  to  find  out  persons  who  had  been  accustomed  to  India,  who  knew 
that  language  and  habits  of  the  country ;  and,  wherever  they  could  be  discovered, 
they  were  engaged  at  almost  any  price ;  and  I  am  told  that  there  is  scarcely  an 
Indian  prince  who  has  not  a  French  emissary  at  his  court."  Cf.  p.  189.  Rose  : 
Diaries,  i.  p.  85  (Pitt  to  Stafford.  Sept.  6,  1788)  :  "  Our  accounts  from  India  of 
the  Chevr.  de  Conway's  return  from  Trincomale,  without  having  done  anything, 
and  of  all  being  quiet  in  that  quarter,  are  very  satisfactory.  The  State  of 
France,  whatever  else  it  may  produce,  seems  to  promise  us  more  than  ever  a  con- 
siderable respite  from  any  dangerous  project,  and  there  seems  scarce  anything  for 
us  to  regret  on  our  own  account  in  that  condition  of  foreign  countries,  except  the 
danger  that  the  King  of  Sweden  may  suffer  too  severely  for  his  kindness." 
Notice  must  be  taken  of  the  embassy  of  Tipu  Tib  which  reached  Paris  in  1788. 
Though  it  accomplished  nothing,  it  is  interesting  as  showing  the  temper  of  the 
time.  Tantet :  Ambassade  de  Tippoo  Sahib  a  Paris  in  Revue  de  Paris  (1899),  i. 
pp.  393-420.  A  previous  attempt  had  been  made  by  Tipu  to  communicate  with 
European  courts.  In  1784  G7mlam  'Ali  Khzxx  had  started  from  Mysore  on  a 
mission  to  the  Porte,  France,  and  England.  Owing  to  lack  of  funds  he  only  went 
as  far  as  Constantinople.  His  instructions  and  journal  are  noted  by  Stewart: 
Catalogue  of  Tippods  Library,  p.  92.  Letters  No.  xxix.  and  xxx.  But  on  July  27 
Muhammad  Darwaish  Khzxs.,  Akbar  'Ali  A7/an  and  Muhammad  Osman  Khzx\ 
sailed  from  Pondicherri  on  a  mission  to  the  court  of  Versailles  from  Tipu  Sultan 
of  Mysore.  They  landed  at  Toulon,  June  9,  1788,  and  were  received  Aug.  10,  by 
Louis  XVI.  They  returned  to  Seringapatam  in  May,  1789,  with  promises  and 
presents.  Politically  the  mission  was  a  failure,  though  it  alarmed  several  British 
diplomats.  Cf.  Stewart :  op.  cit.  p.  54.  Lescure :  Corr.  secrete,  ii.  pp.  193,  273, 
278-79,  281.  (The  ambassadors  asked  for  6,000  French  troops  to  fight  the  Eng- 
lish.) Malouet:  Mimoires,  i.  p.  206.  Kirkpatrick:  Select  Letters  of  Tippoo  Tib, 
p.  13.  Auckland:  Corr.  i.  p.  169.  (Mr.  Morton  Eden  to  Mr.  William  Eden, 
Jan.  18,  1787.)  Mr.  Hope  of  Amsterdam  had  been  speaking  of  "  the  power  and 
art  of  France-  in  Holland,  in  diverting  the  Dutch  from  their  real  commercial  in- 
terests to  establish  in  India  a  military  power  which  must  be  at  their  command  ; 
and  prove  probably  fatal  to  our  interests  in  that  quarter."  Page  342  (Mr.  Hugh 
Elliot  to  Mr.  Eden,  Dec.  26,  1783)  :  "  Foreigners  in  general  think  we  are  in 
danger  of  losing  our  East  India  possessions  entirely  by  the  intrigues  of  the 
French  and  the  strength  of  their  allies  in  Hindostan."  Cf.  i.  p.  229;  ii.  pp.  227- 
228.    (The  duke  of  Dorset  was  inclined  to  mock  at  Tipvi's  embassy.)     Barral- 


COLONIAL  QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  19 

been  the  habit  of  some  to  recall  only  British  victories  ;  they 
look  on  the  French  colonial  domain  as  a  pitiful  and  unwise 
attempt  to  equal  the  success  and  enterprise  of  Englishmen ; 
and  they  depreciate  the  interest  of  French  statesmen  and  mer- 
chants in  fostering  a  foreign  dominion.  This  view  is  unsup- 
ported by  facts;  the  value  of  colonies  was  estimated  more 
highly  in  France  than  in  England,  more  money  was  spent  for 
them,  and  greater  endeavors  made  to  help  them.  Clear 
theories  regarding  the  problems  of  colonial  expansion  were 
first  formulated  in  France;  Frenchmen  first  conceived  the 
idea  and  applied  the  system,  which,  when  copied  by  the  Eng- 
lish, led  to  the  conquest  or  absorption  of  India.  Since  the 
sixteenth  century  France  had  wished  to  be  a  colonial  power ; 
and  Francis  I.,  Coligny,  Henry  IV.,  Richelieu,  Colbert,  and 
Louis  XIV.  had  raised  an  empire  which  in  1683  was  at  its 
widest  limits,  including  territories  and  spheres  of  influence  of 
vast  extent  in  North  and  South  America  and  India,  together 
with  rich  islands  in  the  East  and  West  Indies  and  establish- 
ments along  the  coast  of  Africa ;  only  the  dominion  of  Spain 
exceeded  that  of  France  prior  to  1700.  Even  as  the  Revolu- 
tion threatened,  fashions  at  home  were  for  things  d'ontre-mer; 

Montferrat:  op.  cit  i.  pp.  51,  52.  In  1785,  the  French  ambassador  in  London, 
the  Count  d'Adhemar,  was  full  of  a  plan  which  Vergennes  thought  too  reckless. 
He  propose  to  induce  Warren  Hastings,  then  returning  from  India  to  be  tried,  to 
turn  traitor  in  the  event  of  his  conviction.  France  was  to  cherish  his  ambition 
to  be  a  king  in  India,  and  was  to  supply  him  with  means  to  create  of  India  an 
independent  state,  at  enmity  with  Great  Britain  and  useful  to  France.  (The 
crudeness  of  this  plan,  as  seriously  suggested  by  one  high  in  the  diplomatic 
service,  gives  additional  reason  for  French  failure  in  other  eastern  Affairs.) 
Masson :  Dipt.  Aff.  Strang,  p.  63:  "  Ainsi  Mgr.  Pigneau  de  Behaine,  eveque 
d'Adran,  etait  venu  du  fond  de  l'empire  d'Annam,  menant  avec  lui  le  prince,  fils 
du  roi  de  Cochinchine,  proposer  a  la  France  un  territoire  immense.  Un  traite 
stipulant  une  alliance  offensive  et  defensive  avait  ete  signe  a  Versailles  le  28 
novembre,  1787 ;  on  le  laissa  sans  execution.  Les  ambassadeurs  de  Tippoo- 
Sahib  etaient  arrives  a  Versailles  le  13  aout,  1788  [probably  August  10] :  ils 
avaient,  en  quelque  sorte,  fait  acte  de  vassalite  vis-a-vis  de  Louis  XVI. :  on  les 
econduisit  poliment.  Cette  immense  attaque  qu'on  aurait  pu  tenter  contre  l'An- 
gleterre,  en  Europe  par  les  quatre  puissances  alliees,  en  Asie  par  la  Cochin- 
chine  et  l'lnde,  echoua  miserablement." 


20  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

French  discoverers  were  sailing  on  unknown  seas,  a  vigorous 
colonial  policy  was  favored  by  Louis  XVI.,  and  that  new  force 
in  politics,  the  pamphleteer,  was  sending  out  his  pages  prais- 
ing colonial  power  and  urging  aggressive  expansion.1  A  few 
figures  showing  the  relative  condition  of  colonial  trade  at  the 
death  of  Louis  XIV.  and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  will 
put  this  in  a  clearer  light.  In  1 716  the  export  trade  of  France 
amounted  to  about  118,000,000  livres,  of  which  13,500,000 
livres  went  to  her  colonies  and  foreign  establishments,  and 
17,650,000  livres  originally  came  from  them,  but  were  exported 
to  the  rest  of  Europe  by  home  merchants ;  the  total  imports 
from  the  colonies  were  23,500,000  livres,  in  which  the  above 

1  Beer :  Gesch.  des  Welthandels,  2te  Abth.  pp.  44,  45.  Stephens :  The  French 
Revolution,  i.  p.  270.  Seeley  :  The  Expansion  of  England,  p.  35.  Lorin :  Bor- 
deaux et  la  colonisation  francaise  in  Quest,  diplo.  et  colon.,  1900,  p.  385:  "Le  fait 
est  que  la  periode  la  plus  eclatante  de  la  grandeur  bordelaise,  le  dix-huitieme 
siecle,  fut  celle  des  relations  les  plus  actives  avec  les  possessions  franchises 
d'outre-mer,  particulierement  les  Antilles."  Rambaud:  La  France  coloniale, 
p.  xxx.  Levasseur:  Population  francaise,  iii.  p.  446.  Dubois:  Systemes  colo- 
niaux,  pp.  259  et  sea.  Malleson  :  History  of  the  French  in  India,  pp.  I  et  seq.,  and 
Final  French  Struggles  in  India,  p  249.  Rapson :  Struggle  between  France  and 
England,  p.  IX.  Leroy-Beaulieu  :  La  colonisation,  pp.  139  et  seq.  151,  711.  Cas- 
tonnet-Desf osses  :  La  Revolution  et  les  clubs  dans  VInde  francaise  in  Revue  de  la 
Revolution,  i.  p.  235.  De  Lanessan :  Expansion  coloniale,  p.  xxiii.  Bailleu : 
Preussen  und  Frankreich,  i.  pp.  ix,  x.  Voltaire:  Siecle  de  Louis  XIV.,  ch.  29. 
Hanotaux  :  Le  Havre  et  le  commerce  maritime  de  la  France  in  Quest,  diplo.  et  colon., 
1900,  pp.  667,66s :  "Jamais  la  France,  au  cours  de  son  histoire,  n'eut  une  activite 
maritime  et  coloniale  comparable  a  celle  qui  marqua  cette  brilliante  epoque  [1763- 
1789].  .  .  .  Les  Antilles  notamment  etaient  en  pleine  prosperite.  Tous  les 
esprits  etaient  attires  vers  cette  source  de  richesse  qui  paraissait  inepuisable.  La 
cour,  la  ville,  la  societe  tout  entiere  etaient  prises  dans  la  tourbillon.  .  .  .  Ce 
gout,  cette  fureur  du  commerce  des  lies  penetrait  jusqu'  a  Paris.  II  influait  sur 
les  mceurs.  Des  fortunes  rapides  se  constituaient  et  s'ecroulaient  selon  les  suc- 
ces  ou  l'insucces  des  entreprises  lointaines.  Tout  ce  qui  venait  des  colonies 
etait  a  la  mode.  Les  filles  des  traitants  etaient  recherchees  et  leurs  dots  fer- 
maient  les  yeux  sur  leurs  origines.  On  portait  des  coiffures  a  la  criole,  et  la 
litterature  elle-meme  s'en  melant,  on  etait  tout  oreilles  aux  petits  vers  des  littera- 
teurs venus  des  lies,  les  Parny  et  les  Bertin."  The  bibliography  includes  the 
titles  of  many  books  and  brochures  on  colonial  subjects.  The  list  might  have 
been  largely  increased,  but  preference  was  given  to  writers  on  Asiatic  matters. 
The  work  of  Deschamps,  La  question  coloniale,  has  much  to  say  on  this  point. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  21 

mentioned  17,650,000  is  included.  In  1789  the  total  exports 
amounted  to  358,000,000  livres,  of  which  119,000,000  livres 
went  to  the  colonies,  and  about  160,000,000  livres  of  colonial 
imports  were  exported  from  France  to  foreign  countries; 
the  imports  from  the  colonies  were  from  226,000,000  to 
240,000,000  livres.  In  1789  the  total  import  trade  of  France 
was  about  345,000,000  livres,  and  in  the  language  of  the  period 
a  balance  of  trade  of  1 3 ,000,000  livres  was  created  in  her  favor. 
The  r61e  of  the  colonies  in  thus  changing  a  balance  of  imports 
over  exports  of  nearly  150,000,000  livres  to  one  of  exports  over 
imports  of  13,000,000  livres  was  evident  to  every  one,  and 
this  fact  was  brought  out  frequently  in  the  colonial  contro- 
versy of  1 79 1  as  great  reason  for  careful  management  of  the 
colonial  domain.  Taking  the  trade  of  the  colonies  as  an  item 
in  itself,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  the  American  or 
West  Indian  and  African  colonies  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
Asiatic  establishments  on  the  other,  excluding  the  Levant  and 
Eastern  Asia,  which  will  be  treated  in  the  next  chapter  as 
an  important  part  of  the  Mediterranean  problem  and  the 
Eastern  Question.  The  total  colonial  trade  in  1789  amounted 
to  about  362,000,000  livres,  according  to  Levasseur,  and  to 
43 2)37 1,000  francs,  according  to  Deschamps.  Even  if  the 
lower  figure  be  accepted  the  volume  of  commerce  was  larger 
than  at  any  subsequent  period  till  i860.  The  distribution  of 
this  wealth  cannot  be  definitely  determined,  for  in  their  total 
figures  various  writers  differ  radically ;  but  basing  our  calcula- 
tions entirely  on  contemporary  statisticians  and  official  docu- 
ments it  is  safe  to  make  an  estimate  which,  though  it  may  not 
be  absolutely  correct,  is  uninfluenced  by  prejudice  either  for  or 
against  colonial  expansion.  In  the  case  of  the  American 
colonies  imports  from  France  for  a  period  prior  to  1789  had 
been  98,000,000  livres  annually,  but  owing  to  the  increase  of 
trade  between  the  French  Antilles  and  countries  other  than 
France  (a  trade  which  had  been  authorized  by  a  recent  de- 
cree and  which  had  been  estimated  at  37,000,000  livres  in 


22 


EASTERN  PROBLEMS 


1788),  the  figures  for  1789  were  reduced  to  78,000,000  livres. 
The  exports  to  France  for  a  corresponding  period  had  been 
190,000,000  livres,  and  for  1789  they  were  218,000,000  livres. 
Thus,  while  French  trade  in  general  had  increased  fourfold 
since  17 16,  the  imports  from  her  American  colonies  had 
grown  over  tenfold,  and  that  despite  forty-four  years  of  war 
since  1689,  and  a  century  and  a  half  of  exploitation.  The  con- 
tents of  these  imports  were  the  staple  tropical  products  ;  the 
use  of  coffee  and  sugar  had  increased  in  Europe,  and  in  1788 
the  equivalent  of  95,000,000  kilograms  of  sugar  was  exported 
to  France,  supplying  the  needs  of  the  country  and  in  addition 
furnishing  63,000,000  francs  worth  of  sugar  and  syrups  to  be 
exported  by  her  to  the  rest  of  Europe.1 

1  French  Commerce,  17  [6-1788.  —  This  table  is  compiled  from  Arnould's 
Balance  du  Commerce^  ii.  [Table  No.  12],  and  has  been  given  credence  by  Levas- 


Commerce  of  France  with  her  Amer- 
ican and  African  Colonies. 

Commerce  of  France  with  her  East 
Indian  establishments. 

Imports  to  France. 

Exports  from 
France. 

Imports  to  France. 

Exports  from 
France. 

1716 

17.2 

9-8 

6-3 

3-7 

1725-32 

I8.I 

16.O 

12.8 

9.2 

*733-3S 

21.8 

15-9 

20.0 

10.0 

1736-39 

37-5 

21.8 

20.1 

15-9 

1740-48 

39-o 

26.6 

13.8 

1 0.0 

1749-55 

69.0 

37-2 

21.4 

18.2 

1756-63 

16.3 

12.9 

5-7 

4-5 

1764-76 

1 16.6 

39-i 

19.0      • 

12.8 

1777-83 

108.7 

50.6 

0.8 

10.4 

1784-88 

193.2 

93-o 

33-7 

26.8 

seur  in  his  France  et  ses  colonies  (iii.  p.  355) ;  though  by  no  means  absolutely 
correct,  he  regards  it  as  the  best  obtainable.    In  presenting  it  here,  I  would  call 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  2$ 

The  trade  statistics  of  French  East  Indian  establishments 
are  not  easy  to  obtain;  the  subject  of  Asiatic  commerce  is 

attention  to  the  well-known  prejudice  of  M.  Arnould  against  the  East  India  trade, 
and  would  suggest  comparison  with  other  figures  given  by  Goudard  and  cited 
below.  The  figures  are  in  millions  of  livres.  A  livre  Arnould  estimated  at  54 
au  marc  which  differs  little  from  the  present  franc  in  weight. 

The  fluctuations  of  trade  are  remarkable  testimony  to  the  losses  of  French  mer- 
chants during  the  wars  with  England,  and  in  the  East  Indian  columns  the  story 
of  the  privileged  companies  is  eloquently  told.  This  point  will  be  treated  later. 
Arnould :  Balance  du  Commerce,  pp.  262,  263 :  "  Les  exportations  de  la  France 
pour  les  puissances  et  contrees  de  l'Europe,  s'elevoient  a  la  fin  du  regne  de 
Louis  XIV.,  a  la  somme  de  105  millions ;  au  moment  de  la  revolution,  elles 
montent  a  424  millions,  ce  qui  fait  une  augmentation  dans  la  proposition  d'un 
a  quatre.  ...  La  troisieme  classe  concerne  Les  Denrees  Des  lies  Francoises  De 
HAmerique,  reexportees  a  l'etrangers,  formant  seulement  une  valeur  de  15 
millions  a  la  fin  du  regne  de  Louis  XIV.,  et  devenues  un  objet  de  152  millions,  au 
moment  de  la  revolution.  La  quatrieme  classe,  enveloppe  Les  Marc handises pro- 
venues  Du  Commerce  Francois  Aux  Indes  orientales,  et  reexportees  a  l'etranger ; 
A  la  fin  du  regne  de  Louis  XIV.  cet  article  etoit  de  2  millions  650  mille  livres, 
et  au  moment  de  la  revolution,  c'est  un  objet  de  4  millions  160  mille  livres." 
Goudard:  Rapport  sur  le  commerce  de  la  France  en  1789  (read  Aug.  24,  1791). 
It  is  to  be  found  in  Arch.  Pari.  xxix.  pp.  684  et  sea. ;  Proc.  Verb.  No.  745,  in 
vol.  lxvii.  pp.  1-17.  I  have  used  the  report  in  the  first  edition  of  1791  in  pamph- 
let form  as  it  is  freer  from  typographical  errors,  pp.  4-7.  In  1789  the  total 
foreign  trade  of  France  was  702,687,000  livres,  which  was  made  up  of  345,083,000 
of  imports,  and  357,604,000  of  exports.  Jullian :  Hist,  de  Bordeaux,  pp.  519 
et  sea.  The  commerce  of  Bordeaux  developed  steadily  from  the  Regency  to  the 
Revolution.  The  first  foreign  marine  postal  service  established  in  France  (1787) 
started  from  Bordeaux.  Under  Louis  XVI.  the  city  was  the  first  port  of  France, 
doing  a  quarter  of  the  national  commerce,  or  about  250  millions  annually ;  the 
colonial  trade  amounted  to  over  150  million  livres.  Foncin :  Bordeaux  et 
V esprit  colonial  in  Bull.  Soc.  geogr.  comm.  de  Bordeaux,  1900,  p.  129:  "On 
a  dit  de  la  ville  de  Bordeaux,  etalee  en  un  croissant  magnifique  au  bord  de 
son  fleuve,  qu'elle  n'etait  que  la  moitie  d'une  capitale,  dont  l'autre  moitie 
etait  aux  colonies."  Cf.  Deschamps  :  Les  Colonies  pendant  la  Revolution,  pp.  4,  5, 
296.  (Though  this  little  book  is  of  undoubted  value  and,  when  carefully  con- 
trolled, can  be  used  to  great  profit,  the  prejudices  of  the  author  and  his  con- 
clusions upon  the  general  subject  of  the  colonial  question  in  France  should 
materially  weaken  his  influence.)  Deschamps:  Question  coloniale  en  France, 
p.  235  and  note.  Levasseur:  France  et  ses  colonies,  iii.  pp.  354-355.  The  seven 
colonies  which  remained  to  France  in  1822  did  a  trade  of  96,000,000  livres ;  in 
18 \o,  of  177,000,000,  and  in  i860,  before  the  new  tariff  went  into  effect,  of 
271,000,000.  In  general,  the  author  says:  "Le  commerce  des  colonies  francaises 
a  eu  dans  la  seconde  moitie  du  X VHP  siecle  une  periode  brillante  de  prospe- 


24  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

involved  with  the  question  of  the  Compagnie  des  Indes.  As  a 
problem  of  colonial  policy  and  economic  theory,  the  affairs  of 

rite/'  To  illustrate  the  difficulty  of  securing  correct  statistics :  the  statement 
of  M.  Leroy-Beaulieu  that  the  total  colonial  commerce  of  1788  reached  the  figure 
of  600,000,000  livres  is  not  borne  out  by  the  figures  of  the  Bureau  de  la  Balance 
du  Commerce,  nor  do  they  agree  with  those  of  Goudard.  Chaptal,  Industrie 
franc,  i.  pp.  132-134,  gives  still  another  set  of  figures  and  calculates  the  total 
commerce  of  France  as  follows:  — 

Imports.  Exports. 

1787  .     .     .     630,871,700  fr.  444,611,100  fr. 

1788  .     .     .     575,393400  "  463,156,700  " 

1789  .     .     .     634,365,000  "  438,477,000  " 

Of  the  imports  he  says  240,000,000  francs  came  from  French  colonies,  and  of  the 
exports  90,000,000  went  to  them.  Thus  he  is  enabled  to  calculate  a  balance  of 
trade  favorable  to  France,  for  he  refuses  to  consider  60,000,000  in  gold  and  silver, 
which  are  included  in  the  imports,  as  affecting  the  balance.  Foville :  Le  com- 
merce exterieur  de  la  France  depuis  1716,  in  Bull,  de  statistique  et  de  leg.  comp.  xiii. 
(1883).  Moreau  de  Jonnes :  Le  Commerce  au  XIX  siecle,  i.  p.  104.  Moreau: 
Tableau  co?np.  du  commerce  and  Tableau  statistique  des progres  du  commerce  in  Bull, 
de  la  Soc.  franc,  de  Statistique  universale  (1830).  Biollay :  £tudes  icojiomiques  sur 
le  XVIII  sihle>  i.  (L'administration  du  commerce).  Cf.  Lohmann :  Handelsta- 
tistik  Englands  und  Frankreichs  im  18  Jahrhundert,  in  Sitzungsberichle,  Berlin. 
Akad.  der  Wissensch.,  1898,  pp.  872-886,  891-892.  The  tables  there  given  differ 
from  those  adopted  by  the  author,  especially  in  regard  to  the  figures  for  1716, 
which,  according  to  Lohmann,  were  only  33  million  total  imports,  and  47  million 
livres  exports.  In  the  matter  of  the  sugar  trade  the  tables  of  Avalle:  Tableau 
comparatif  des  productions  des  colonies  francaises  aux  Antilles  avec  celles  des  colonies 
anglaises,  espagnoles  et  hollandaises  de  Fannie  1787  d  1788,  will  be  found  very  useful. 
I  have  not  attempted  to  give  an  analysis  of  his  figures,  as  the  Antilles  are  not  to  be 
particularly  considered  in  this  monograph.  Cf.  Levasseur:  Population  francaise, 
iii.  p.  411  (200  million  livres  are  given  for  1788),  and  France  et  ses  colonies,  iii. 
P-  355-  Chaptal:  op.  cit.  ii.  p.  179-181.  The  value  of  sugar  exported  from  the 
colonies  in  1789  is  given  at  85,913,405  fr.,  and  of  that  re-exported  from  France 
as  63,878,900  fr.  Avalle  agreefe  to  the  last  figure  (see  Table  I.) ;  but  he 
gives  104,938,200  fr.  as  the  total  exports  of  sugar  (see  Tables  II.-V.,  VIII.). 
Deschamps,  Colonies  pendant  la  Revolution,  pp.  289  et  seq.,  estimates  the  im- 
ports of  all  sorts  from  the  Antilles  at  234  millions,  of  which,  according  to  Avalle's 
analysis,  fully  65  per  cent  should  be  credited  as  sugar.  Cunningham :  English 
Industry,  ii.  p.  517,  note.  (On  the  authority  of  Reinhard  :  History  of  the  present 
state  of  the  Commerce  of  Great  Britain  [ed.  of  1805,  trans.  from  German  by 
Savage].)  The  returns  in  produce  from  the  French  colonies  between  1763  and 
1778  were  of  the  annual  value  of  about  ^"6,400,000  sterling.  Of  this  one  half 
was  consumed  in  France  and  the  other  half  exported  to  other  parts  of  Europe. 
The  opinion  of  Frenchmen  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  and  particularly 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  2$ 

that  company  will  be  mentioned  later.  When  by  the  decree 
of  May,  1 7 19,  the  old  organizations  for  privileged  trade  in  the 
East  Indies,  China,  and  Louisiana  were  merged  in  a  new  Com- 
pagnie  des  Indes,  the  Compagnie  des  bides  Orientates  was 
doing  a  business  of  about  ten  million  livres  a  year.  The 
capital  of  the  new  Company  was  increased  by  twenty-five 
million,  but  its  finances  were  so  involved  with  those  of  Law's 
Bank  that  they  suffered  in  the  failure  of  "Law's  system." 
But  during  the  century  trade  with  Asia  increased  in  volume, 
and  suffered  only  by  war;  the  average  annual  imports  to 
France  for  the  decade,  1725— 1735,  were  fourteen  million 
livres   and   the   exports   ten    million ;    by    1745    the   imports 

in  the  midst  of  a  bitter  fight  over  colonial  policy  must  be  carefully  received. 
Though  the  figures  of  the  following  writers  have  not  been  implicitly  followed,  the 
interest  of  their  testimony  requires  fuller  citations  from  their  arguments.  Gouy : 
Vues  ginerales  sur  Vimportance  du  commerce  des  colonies,  etc.,  Imp.  nat.  l'an  III. 
4to  pamphlet,  p.  12  :  u  Les  Colonies  sont  done  bien  importantes?  Oui,  bien  im- 
portantes ;  car  elles  seules  sont  la  source  et  l'aliment  de  notre  commerce  qui  etoit 
immense,  eft  qui  nous  assuroit  la  suprematie  sur  toutes  les  nations.  Et,  comment 
cela  ?  [The  author  claims  that  the  French  American  colonies  supply  220  million 
francs  of  produce  needed  in  Europe.]  Si  les  colonies  sont  detruites,  plus  de 
commerce;  plus  de  commerce,  plus  de  manufactures,  plus  d'agriculture,  plus  de 
marine,  consequemment  quatre  millions  de  malheureux  indigens  de  plus  en  France, 
et  a  la  charge  du  tresor  de  la  Republique  que  nulle  portion  du  souverain,  dans 
une  democratic,  ne  devait  perir  de  faim  et  de  misere."  De  Curt :  Motion  an 
nom  de  colonies  reunies,  Paris,  1789,  8vo  pamphlet,  p.  13:  "Ce  n'est  pas  tout, 
Messieurs;  vous  avez  mis  la  dette  de  l'fitat  sous  la  sauve-garde  de  la  loyaute 
Francoise  :  dans  mon  opinion,  les  richesses  seules  des  Colonies  peuvent  garantir 
l'execution  de  ce  Decret  honorable.  En  effet,  sur  243  millions  de  denrees  que 
vous  en  recevez  annuellement,  vous  en  consommez  a-peu-pres  80  millions,  qui  se 
decuplent  par  la  circulation  interieure.  Le  reste  passe  a  l'fitranger ;  et  comme 
les  objets  qu'ils  vous  donnent  en  echange,  ne  s'elevent  tout  au  plus  qu'a  88 
millions,  il  vous  reste  une  solde  de  75  millions,  qui  diminue  d'autant  Importa- 
tion de  numeraire  a  laquelle  vous  seriez  forces,  pour  faire  honneur  aux  interets 
enormes  de  la  dette  que  vous  avez  declaree  Nationale."  De  S.  Mery :  Opinion 
sur  la  motion  de  M.  de  Curt,  etc.,  Paris,  1789,  8vo  pamph.  pp.  18,  19 :  "Ces  colo- 
nies en  recevant  pour  plus  de  150  millions  d'importations  nationales,  en  fournissant 
a  leur  tour  pour  plus  de  240  millions  de  productions,  donnent  en  definitive  un 
resultat  avantageux  a  la  France  dans  la  balance  de  commerce  et  mettant  dans  la 
circulation  une  somme  enorme."  Roussillou :  Opinion  sur  I'affaire  des  colonies, 
Sept.  25,  1791,  pp.  3-7.    This  is  an  interesting  brochure. 


26  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

were  twenty  and  the  exports  were  twelve  million ;  and  the 
following  decade  to  1755  showed  a  still  further  increase ;  but 
the  succeeding  years  were  disastrous ;  the  war  which  ended 
with  the  treaty  of  Paris  in  1763  reduced  the  trade  with  Asia  to 
five  million  in  imports  and  four  million  in  exports.  In  the 
next  period,  1765-75,  a  great  change  took  place  in  the  condi- 
tions which  governed  Asiatic  trade  ;  the  expiration  of  the  Com- 
pany's privilege  in  1769  and  the  establishment  of  free  trade 
with  India  acted  as  a  tonic,  and  the  figures  rose  to  twenty 
million  of  imports  and  thirteen  million  of  exports ;  again  war 
intervened  and  by  1784  the  annual  average  was  less  than  one 
million  imports  and  ten  million  exports.  A  privileged  com- 
pany was  re-established  in  that  year,  and,  the  general  commer- 
cial conditions  being  much  better,  the  increase  was  beyond  all 
expectation ;  the  imports  to  France  for  1787  were  fifty-six  mil- 
lion livres  and  the  exports  to  Asia  over  twenty-five  million ; 
and  while  this  point  was  not  touched  again,  the  annual  average 
for  the  three  years,  1785-88,  was  over  thirty-five  million 
imports  and  nearly  twenty-seven  million  exports.  Thus,  from 
1775  to  1789  Asiatic  imports  had  risen  75  percent.  The 
profit  to  the  trader,  however,  was  much  less  than  earlier  in  the 
century,  for  in  1735  the  usual  gain  on  Indian  goods  sold  in  the 
French  market  was  about  95  per  cent,  and  on  Chinese  goods, 
about  140  percent;  in  1768,  the  last  year  of  the  old  Com- 
pany, these  margins  were  58  per  cent,  and  68  per  cent;  and  by 
1789  the  profit  on  Asiatic  commerce  as  a  whole  varied  from 
35  to  10  percent,  though  the  most  lucrative  branch  of  the 
trade,  the  exchange  between  various  Asiatic  ports  had  passed 
almost  entirely  into  English  hands.  A  supporter  of  the  Com- 
pany, writing  in  1793,  thought  6J  per  cent  all  that  could  then 
be  expected.  The  Company  had  not  prospered,  and  Asiatic 
commerce  was  looked  on  by  many  as  an  unwise  venture; 
expenses  had  been  enormous,  the  successive  wars  had  cost 
much,  the  reckless  finances  of  the  period  had  brought  in  lax 
methods,  and  maladministration  was  common  both  in  France 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  2J 

and  India.  The  critics  pointed  out  these  facts  and  said  that 
Asia  was  a  hopeless  investment  for  Frenchmen ;  their  oppon- 
ents and  those  who  believed  that  France  might  yet  re-establish 
a  great  domain  in  India  acknowledged  previous  mistakes,  but 
maintained  that  reform  and  sound  policy  would  made  the 
rapidly  increasing  trade  a  source  of  real  profit  to  France.1 

1  Bonnassieux:  Grandes  compagnies  de  commerce,  pp.  271,  275  et  seq.  In 
1687  the  capital  of  the  Cotnp.  des  Indes  orient,  was  2,100,000  livres  ;  between  1687 
and  1691  it  paid  a  dividend  of  30  per  cent.  According  to  a  memoire  written  in 
1685,  the  prospect  of  equalling  the  Dutch  and  outdoing  English  trade  in  India 
was  brilliant.  {Arch.  nat.  Mem.  cote  K  1368,  No.  128,  quoted  in  op.  cit.  p.  272.) 
Cf.  also  Castonnet-Desfosses  :  Francois  Bernier,  documents  inedits  sur  son  sejour 
dans  Plnde,  pp.  n-30.  Cordier:  La  France  en  Chine  au  XVIIF  siecle,  i.  p.  42. 
Dictionnaire  du  Commerce  {Encyclopidie  Methodique),  i.  p  584.  The  lessening 
profit  in  Asiatic  trade  is  well  shown  by  the  following  table.  "  Comparaison  des 
dividends  de  la  Compagnie  des  Indes,  calcule  sur  le  revenu  libre  :  1725,  148  livres; 
1736,  136  livres;  1743,  135  livres;  1756,  85  livres;  1769,  65  livres."  In  addition 
to  these  dividends  there  was  a  fixed  interest  per  share  ;  pp.  609,  610,  614 :  "  Etat 
du  produit  des  ventes,  faites  par  la  Compagnie  des  Indes  depuis  1726  jusqu'en 
1756  en  marchandises  de  lTnde,  deduction  faite  des  frais  des  vente,  des  marchan- 
dises  saisies  dans  le  royaume  et  marchandises  achetes  chez  l'etranger  pendant 
les  annees  1749,  1750,  et  1751." 

Feb.  1,  1725-June  30,  1736 90,157,112  livres.     14s.  $d. 

Average  year       9,014,282  livres.     19J.  $d. 

July  1,  1736-June  30,  1743 88,043,523  livres.     15*4^. 

Average  year 12,577,646  livres.      $s.od. 

July  1,  1743-June  30,  1756 118,046,  217  livres.    iSs.  $d. 

Average  year 9,837,184  livres.     i6j.  6d. 

Total  returns  from  India  (not  the  net  profit)  305,246,852  livres. 

Average  year,  1725-56 9,846,672  livres. 

Total  expense  of  maintaining  the  monopoly  376,802,517  livres. 

Normal  average  yearly 8,586,420  livres. 

Real  average  yearly  owing  to  war  expenses '  10,500,000  livres. 

The  bias  of  the  writer  is  clear,  as  there  is  obvious  juggling  with  figures,  for  he 
includes  war  expenses  on  the  debit  side  of  the  Company's  ledger,  yet  refuses,  in 
striking  an  average  for  the  returns,  to  make  any  allowance  for  the  losses  of  war, 
for  which  the  Company  was  not  directly  responsible.  These  statements  are  given 
here  in  full  as  they  have  been  often  cited  by  other  writers,  who  have  accepted 
them  in  good  faith.  More  reliable  figures  are  given  below.  Vuitry:  Disordre 
des  finances,  pp.  237  et  seq.  (on  the  real  value  of  the  livre,  see  especially  note  I, 
p.   250),   271   et  seq.   (the  connection  of  the   Company   with    Law's    System). 


28  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Returning  to  the  colonies  as  a  whole,  the  question  of  their 
size  and  population  requires  a  few  words.     The  area  of  the 

Daubigny :  Choiseul  et  la  France  d'outre-mer,  pp.  190  et  seq.y  202  et  seq.  Morellet : 
Memoire  sur  la  situation  actuelle  de  la  compagnie  des  hides  (1769).  The  views  of 
the  writer  are  given  in  the  Diet,  du  Commerce  (cited  above) ;  but  his  figures  on 
the  profits  of  the  Company  are  significant  and  are  given  in  Appendix  I.,  as  com- 
piled by  Daubigny:  op.  cit.  p.  339;  they  have  been  verified.  Morellet  and 
Necker  had  a  vigorous  pamphlet  war  in  1769  over  the  dissolution  of  the  Com- 
pany. Vide  the  Bibliography ;  also  the  notices  in  Stourm :  Bibliographic  hist,  des 
finances  de  la  France  au  XVIII  sitele.  Cf.  also  on  this  point  Grimm  et  Diderot : 
Corr.  litteraire,  vi.  p.  237,  April  15,  1769.  Galiani :  Lettres  (ed.  by  Perey  and 
Maugras).  Letters  of  Aug.  14,  1769  ;  July  6, 1771  ;  June  15, 1776.  Bachaumont: 
Memoires  (Oct.  16, 1769).  Henry  :  Corr.  de  Condorcet  et  de  Turgot,  p.  8.  Doneaud 
du  Plan :  La  comp.  des  Indes,  in  R.  maritime  et  colon.,  June  and  July,  1889.  An- 
other error  must  be  noted  in  the  matter  of  imports  to  France  in  Bonnassieux : 
op.  cit.  p.  313.  The  yearly  average  for  1725-69  is  there  given  at  8,276,337  francs 
(no  authority  cited) ;  corresponding  figures  are  found  in  Chaptal :  Industrie 
francaise,  i.  p.  129  (again  no  authority  given).  But  a  contemporary  writer,  who  in 
1786  was  bitterly  opposed  to  the  re-establishment  of  the  Company's  privilege,  and 
who  in  a  brilliant  monograph  makes  a  powerful  attack  on  privileged  companies 
in  general  and  the  Comp.  des  Indes  in  particular,  sheds  some  light  on  the  matter. 
He  is  the  last  one  to  over-estimate  the  trade  of  those  years  when  the  old  Com- 
pany was  supreme.  MSmoire  contre  la  Compagnie  des  Indes,  p.  29 :  "  II  resulte 
de  ces  trois  tableaux  compares  [two  tables  are  given  in  App.  I.] :  — 

"  1.  Que  le  total  des  importations  de  la  Compagnie,  pendant  trente-quatre 
annees,  dont  vingt-quatre  de  paix  &  dix  de  guerre,  a  ete  de  443,796,189  livres.  Que 
le  total  des  importations  de  commerce  libre,  pendant  douze  annees,  dont  six  de 
paix  &  six  de  guerre,  a  ete  de  140,788,647  livres. 

"  2.  Que  l'annee  commune  des  trente-quatre  de  la  Compagnie  est  de  13,052,799 
livres,  us.  gd.  fa.  Que  l'annee  commune  des  douze  du  commerce  libre  est  de 
11,732,387  livres. 

"3.  Qu'a  prendre  les  neuf  annees  de  la  derniere  paix  de  1663  [1763],  dont  trois 
ont  appartenu  a  la  Compagnie,  &  six  au  commerce,  &  oil  la  situation  de  la  France 
a  ete  la  meme  pour  l'une  &  pour  l'autre  ;  la  plus  forte  annee  de  la  Compagnie  a 
ete  de  21,719,354  livres,  &  la  plus  forte  du  commerce  de  32,846,226  livres. 

"  4.  Que  Ton  trouve  pour  annee  commune  des  trois  de  la  Compagnie,  environ 
dix-sept  millions,  &  pour  annee  commune  des  six  du  commerce,  vingt-deux  mil- 
lions. Ainsi,  sous  tous  les  rapports,  le  commerce  libre  a  eu  un  grand  avantage 
sur  celui  de  la  Compagnie.  Cependant  le  Gouvernement  vient  d'instituer  une 
nouvelle  Compagnie  des  Indes.  Ici,  toute  la  confiance  que  nous  avons  montree 
dans  les  faits  &  les  raisonnements  qui  viennent  d'etre  presentes,  se  change  en  une 
juste  defiance  sur  nos  lumieres,  en  une  prevention  respectueuse  pour  les  vues  du 
Gouvernement.  Sans  doute  il  s'est  decide,  d'apres  des  considerations  assez 
importantes  pour  l'emporter  sur  celles  que  nous  venons  d'offrir." 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  2$ 

French  colonial  empire  in  1789  may  be  estimated  at  82,000 
square  miles,  with  a  population  of  nearly  one  million,  of  whom 
100,000  were  white,  about  48,000  were  free  colored,  and  780,- 
000  were  slaves.  The  size  of  the  colonial  domain,  as  well  as 
of  the  French  spheres  of  influence  in  India  and  North  America, 
had  greatly  lessened  during  the  century,  yet  the  white  popu- 
lation had  nearly  doubled  ;  for  in  1700  there  were  at  the  highest 
estimate  only  60,000  Frenchmen  living  in  French  colonies.1 

This  opposition  to  the  Company  was  almost  incessant.  Cf.  Villars  :  Mimoires,  iv. 
p.  265  (1723) ;  d' Argenson ':  Journal,  vii.  p.  65.  More  evidence  will  be  cited  in  a  sub- 
sequent paragraph  when  the  question  of  general  policy  is  treated.  The  figures  for 
the  years  directly  prior  to  the  Revolution  are  based  partly  on  Hernoux  :  Rapport 
fait  &  I'Assemblee  National,  March  18,1790.  (The  original  pamphlet  was  used, 
as  there  are  a  few  mistakes  in  the  official  report.)  Cf.  Chaptal :  op.  cit.  i.  p.  131 
(table) ;  and  the  table  from  Arnould :  Balance  du  Commerce,  given  above  (footnote 
to  page  22),  and  also  i.  pp.  281-87.  Deschamps:  Colonies  pendant  la  Revolution, 
pp.  6,  28,  101  et  seq.,  113  et  seq.  The  new  company  was  authorized  by  decrees  of 
April  14,  1785,  and  of  Sept.  21,  1786.  Capitalized  at  40  millions,  its  privilege  of 
exclusive  commerce  was  finally  given  for  15  years.  Its  shipments  from  France 
were  (1786-87)  19,560,982  livres  ;  (1787-88)  10,667,750  livres  ;  (1788-89)  14,823,409 
livres.  These  statements  do  not  interfere  with  those  of  Arnould,  as  they  refer 
only  to  the  new  Company ;  they  explain  the  figures  of  Goudard :  Rapport,  p.  7 
(exports  to  East  Indies  in  1789, 16  millions  as  against  19  millions  of  several  years 
previous);  the  liabilities  of  the  company  for  1792  were  40  millions;  assets  50 
million  livres  ;  for  1793  they  were  40  and  48  millions  respectively.  This  on  the 
authority  of  a  me/noire  {Arch.  Nat.  reg.  coti  F1.2  65943)  which  Bonnassieux 
quotes  on  pp.  315-319.  (There  is  a  typographical  mistake  on  page  318, 
where  the  liabilities  for  1792  are  given  at  only  14  millions.)  Auckland  :  Corr.  ii. 
451  (Huber  to  Auckland,  Oct.  4,  1792).  The  French  East  India  Co.  is  spoken 
of  as  "  the  only  safe  establishment  and  investment  of  one's  property  in  France, 
because  independent  of  Government,  though  not  of  robbers."  Prkis  pour  la 
Compagnie  des  hides  (1793),  P-  6.  Cf.  for  this  subject  the  statistical  tables  given 
in  Appendix  I. 

1  Deschamps  :  Les  Colonies,  etc.,  pp.  1-3,  288-296.  The  figures  given  in  totals 
are  —  area,  136,966  sq.  kilometres,  population  1,030,000.  Ibid. :  Question  coloniale, 
p.  188.  Avalle  :  op.  cit.  Cf.  the  tables,  which  give  slightly  different  figures  for 
the  Antilles.  Levasseur  :  Population  franc,  iii.  pp.  281  (note  1),  337  (in  1800 
there  were  nine  and  one-half  million  of  people  of  European  blood  living  outside 
of  Europe);  pp.  410,  411,  419  (a  table  giving  the  area  and  population  of  every 
French  colony  and  protectorate  in  1789,  1840,  and  1891).  Ibid.:  La  France  et  ses 
colonies,  iii.  pp.  177  et  seq.,  191  et  seq.,  343  (the  above  table  is  also  given  here), 
355.     According  to  the  Statesman's   Year  Book   (1899)  the  estimated  area  of 


30  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

The  economic  influence  of  these  people  upon  the  inhabitants  of 
France  was  direct  and  strong;  the  capital  invested  in  the  col- 
onies in  1789  was  then  estimated  at  three  milliards  of  francs, 
and  the  dependence  of  home  industries  upon  colonial  produce 
was  reiterated  by  many  writers.  This  was  often  overstated,  as 
by  La  Rochefoucauld-Liancourt,  who  declared  in  1791  that  the 
ruin  of  colonial  commerce  would  affect  more  than  three  mil- 
lion people ;  nevertheless  the  imports  from  both  East  and  West 
were  a  large  ifem  in  many  trades,  as  for  example  the  silk  man- 
ufactories of  France,  which  did  an  annual  export  trade  of  over 
21  million  livres,  got  half  of  their  raw  silk  from  the  East  Indies  ; 
the  sugar  also  which  came  from  the  French  Antilles  brought  a 
profit  of  over  20  million  francs  to  French  home  merchants  be- 
fore it  left  their  hands.  But  leaving  the  strictly  commercial 
results,  great  and  varied  as  they  were,  the  relation  of  the  colo- 
nies to  the  French  merchant  marine  brings  up  a  large  field  of 
political  influence  as  well.  The  development  of  a  merchant 
marine  was  a  sine  qua  non  in  a  colonial  empire ;  for  the  navigation 
laws  of  the  eighteenth  century  were  still  strict,  and  foreign  ship- 
ping had  no  chance  in  colonial  trade.  The  large  increase  in 
that  commerce  during  the  latter  half  of  the  century  had  affected 
the  French  merchant  service;  whereas  before  1765  there  were 
in  the  French  commerce  with  the  West  Indies  200  ships  of 
100  to  250  tons,  within  fifteen  years  the  number  of  ships  had 
doubled,  and  by  1789  their  number  was  600.  The  East  Indian 
exchange  was  by  no  means  so  lively,  yet  there  was  an  increase 
of  from  ten  to  thirty  ships  sent  annually  from  France  to  the 
East.  By  1793  the  total  figures  were  900  ships  of  300,000 
tons  burthen  engaged  in  the  direct  colonial  trade ;  thus  the 
total  advance  in  this  branch  of  French  shipping  between  1763 

French  colonies  and  protectorates,  including  Algeria,  was  3,630,327  sq.  miles, 
with  a  population  of  over  52,000,000.  In  1897  France  did  a  colonial  trade  of 
399,321,037  francs,  imports  ;  and  358,230,360  francs,  exports.  Though  the  colo- 
nies were  prosperous  in  1789,  it  seems  to  be  an  exaggeration  for  Deschamps  to 
say  that  they  were  of  greater  international  value  than  the  colonial  domain  of 
France  to-day,  and  equal  to  it  intrinsically. 


COLONIAL  QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  31 

and  1793  may  be  reckoned  at  over  200,000  tons.  Moreover, 
the  close  relation  between  the  merchant  service  and  sea  power, 
especially  in  supplying  trained  sailors  for  the  navy,  was  a 
favored  theme  to  those  who  pleaded  for  a  wise  colonial  policy 
or  a  reform  in  the  French  navy ;  the  connection  of  colonial 
empire  and  sea  power,  which  would  alone  enable  France  to 
meet  Great  Britain  with  success,  brought  the  entire  matter  home 
to  the  hearts  of  Frenchmen  as  perhaps  nothing  else  would  have 
done,  and  thus  made  the  colonial  question  a  vital  one  in  the 
midst  of  revolutionary  turmoil.1 

The  last  aspect  of  the  colonial  question  in  which  statistics 
have  a  place  is  that  of  expense  of  administration.  Our  only 
reliable  source  of  information  is  the  exhaustive  report  made  by 
Montesquiou  on  December  8,  1789;  as  the  result  of  careful  in- 
vestigation the  total  expenses  of  French  colonial  administration 
were  given  as  17,647,748  livres.  Of  this  sum  1,106,000  should 
be  classed  as  general  expenses  which  could  riot  be  charged  to 
the  account  of  any  special  colonies ;  the  remainder  is  divided 
between  the  American  establishments,  which  took  11,247,586 
livres;  the  African  colonies,  283,010;  and  the  lie  de  France, 
Bourbon,  and  India,  which  required  the  balance,  5,1 52,744  livres. 
Dividing  the  total  expenses  under  the  heads  of  civil  adminis- 

1  Mosneron  de  Launay,  in  a  speech  on  Feb.  26,  1790,  gives  the  figures  for 
capital  invested.  Aulard  :  Societe  des  Jacobins,  i.  p.  9.  Chaptal :  op.  cit.  i.  p.  131, 
ii.  p.  179.  Cf.  also  the  tables  in  Appendix  I.  Beausobre:  Politique,  i.  p.  412. 
A  cargo  of  a  120-ton  ship  was  worth,  in  1765,  about  1400  livres.  Morellet  in 
Diet,  du  Comm.  i.  p.  610.  Cunningham  :  op.  cit.  ii.  p.  517,  note,  citing  from  Rein- 
hard  :  op.  cit.  Arnould  :  op.  cit.  ii.  p.  35.  S.  Mery :  Opinion,  etc.  p.  19 :  "  Les 
colonies  donnent  le  mouvement  a  un  grand  nombre  de  vos  manufactures,  &  a  des 
millions  de  bras ;  elles  soudoyent  &  font  vivre  une  foule  immense  d'artisans, 
d'ouvriers,  de  journaliers ;  elles  sont  une  des  sources  les  plus  fecondes  des 
richesses  de  la  France,  &  dans  un  Siecle  ou  il  est  reconnu  que  la  preponderance 
des  Jitats  se  regie  sur  leur  commerce,  les  Colonies  ont  droit  d'attendre  qu'elles 
seront  appreciees  a  leur  juste  valeur."  Gouly :  Plan  de  la  rigeniration  de  la 
marine,  p.  5.  De  Lattre:  Rapport  sur  facte  de  navigation  (Sept.  22,  1791),  in 
Arch.  pari.  xxxi.  pp.  203-235,  and  Begouen  on  Sept.  24,  p.  290 ;  also  La  Roche- 
foucauld. Cf.  Deschamps  :  Colonies  pendant  la  Revol.  pp.  7,  28.  Bonnassieux: 
op.  cit.  pp.  253*/^.,  315. 


32  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

tration,  army,  and  navy,  the  distribution  is  7,548,553  livres  for 
the  civil  budget;  9,195,131  livres  for  the  army;  and  907,184 
livres  for  the  navy.  The  bulk  of  this  amount  was  spent  ir}  large 
salaries  for  high  officials ;  but  the  most  serious  item  is  that  of 
3,951,462  livres  in  1789  for  extraordinary  and  miscellaneous 
expenses.  It  was  the  same  in  colonial  finances  as  in  national ; 
the  multiplication  of  sinecures,  official  corruption,  and  lax 
methods  had  caused  a  steady  leakage  of  money,  which  only 
vigorous  reform  and  sound  economic  policy  could  check. 
There  were,  however,  certain  revenues  from  the  colonies  which 
amounted  to  7,173,333  livres  in  1789, —  6,613,333  fr°m  the 
West,  and  560,000  livres  from  Africa  and  the  East;  this 
made  the  deficit  in  the  colonial  budget  10,484,415  livres.  But, 
as  M.  Deschamps  points  out,  it  is  fair  to  look  upon  custom 
duties  laid  upon  colonial  produce  as  an  income  to  the  govern- 
ment which  should  be  added  to  colonial  revenue ;  for  the  re- 
ceipts of  the  state  would  have  been  smaller  by  that  amount  if 
no  colonial  empire  had  existed.  These  taxes  were  two  —  du 
domain  d 'Occident ',  levied  on  imports  from  the  colonies,  and  de 
consommation,  on  colonial  produce  which  was  not  exported  at 
all.  Montesquiou  claimed  that  these  taxes  wiped  out  the 
deficit  in  the  colonial  budget  and  that  consequently  the  colo- 
nial domain  was  of  no  expense  to  the  government,  but  with  all 
its  profitable  commerce  was  a  means  of  gain  to  thousands  of 
Frenchmen.1 

1  Rapport  de  Montesquiou,  in  Arch.  pari.  x.  pp.  437-51.  Vief  ville  des  Essars 
(Jan.  14,  1 791),  in  Ibid.  xxii.  p.  241.  Proc.-verb.  No.  142,  ix.  pp.  1-59.  The 
Bourbon  government  had  employed  in  the  colonies  1,673  officials  (1,041  civil 
and  632  military),  exclusive  of  ungraded  assistants,  soldiers,  and  sailors.  Cf. 
Deschamps:  Les  colonies,  etc.  pp.  8-10,  299  et  seq.  The  tables  made  by  M. 
Deschamps  are  based  on  Montesquiou's  report  and  are  most  useful.  Arnould  : 
op.  cit.  i.  p.  45.  The  sum  of  17  millions  for  colonies  does  not  seem  large  when 
Necker's  budget  of  610  million  livres  for  total  expenses  is  recalled.  Stourm : 
Les  finances  de  VAncien  Regime  et  de  la  Revolution,  ii.  pp.  355  et  seq.  In  view  of 
the  effort  to  learn  the  true  economic  condition  of  France  prior  to  the  Revolution 
it  is  interesting  to  note,  in  passing,  testimony  to  official  corruption  which  has 
rarely  been  cited,  but  is  worthy  of  credence.  Vorontzov  :  Arkhiv,  xxix.  (1883),  p.  69 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  33 

We  have  seen  that  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century  was  a  period  of  great  prosperity  for  French  colonies. 
It  was  also  a  period  in  which  great  interest  was  taken  in  them 
by  Frenchmen,  still  strongly  imbued  with  the  old  theory  of 
colonial  dominion :  that  colonies  were  rightly  at  the  beck  and 
call  of  the  mother  country,  existing  primarily  for  her  benefit, 
and  strictly  subordinate  to  all  her  social  theories.  This  interest 
in  the  French  colonies  has  received  full  and  admirable  treat- 
ment at  the  hands  of  M.  Deschamps  in  his  book,  Histoire 
de  la  Question  Coloniale  en  France;  all  that  demands  no- 
tice here  is  the  debate  on  the  larger  question  of  colonial  ex- 
pansion, a  debate  which  engrossed  many  men  at  this  period. 
The  two  sides  joined  issue  sharply ;  on  the  one  hand  some  were 
contemptuous  as  Voltaire  when  he  referred  to  "  quelques  arpents 
de  neige  vers  le  Canada  ;  "  others  like  Mercier  predicted  the 
ruin  of  the  home  land  by  the  colonies,  much  as  the  city  dwell- 
ing was  apt  to  suffer  because  of  the  attention  paid  to  the  coun- 
try place ;  and  others  still,  like  Bernardin  de  Saint-Pierre,  said 
the  object  of  their  books  of  travel  and  description  was  to  pre- 
vent Frenchmen  from  settling  in  the  colonies :  on  the  other 
side  were  men  like  Raynal,  who  preached  of  colonies  and  sea 
power  as  the  foundation  of  a  people's  greatness ;  Gouy  wrote 
that  the  European  was  destined  to  rule  the  world,  and  that 
France  owed  her  pivotal  position  in  Europe  to  the  commercial 

(Pictet  to  Count  A.  R.  Vorontzov,  London,  Sept.  20,  1788) :  "  Peut-6tre,  si  on 
Pexaminait  attentivement,  trouverait-on,  que  sous  d'autres  formes  et  par  d'autres 
motifs,  il  y  a  autant  de  dissipation  dans  les  finances  de  TAngleterre  que  dans 
celles  de  la  France ;  ce  qui  fait,  que  l'individu  en  France  est  accable  par  un 
impot  qui  n'est  cependant  qu'a-peu-pres  le  tiers  de  celui  que  paye  un  Anglais 
sans  en  etre  incommode ;  c'est  cette  foule  de  charges,  de  places  venables  qui 
arrachent  a  l'agriculture,  a  l'industrie  et  au  commerce  les  capitaux,  qui  devraient 
etre  employes  a  les  faires  prosperer.  On  serait  effraye,  si  Ton  calculait  tout  le 
mal  que,  pour  se  procurer  quelques  petites  ressources,  on  a  fait  par  la  au  royaume. 
Jusqu'au  moment  ou  toutes  les  charges,  toutes  les  places  venables  seront  abolies, 
ou  par  cela  meme  l'argent  sera  rappele  a  sa  veritable  destination,  la  France  sera 
bien  eloignee  de  pouvoir  pretendre  au  role,  auquel  la  nature  semblait  Pavoir 
destinee :  .  .  ." 


34  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

prosperity  of  her  colonies ;  Tolosan  declared  the  colonies  had 
placed  all  Europe  in  debt  to  France.1  Both  the  theory  and 
practice  of  "imperialism,"  of  colonial  expansion,  were  thus 
argued  ;  the  majority  of  the  intellectual  leaders  of  France  were 
against  colonial  domain ;  but  the  verdict  of  the  nation  as 
given  in  the  Cahiers  in  1789  is  for  expanding  commerce  and  a 
strong  colonial  policy.  There  is  not  a  word  to  be  found  in  them 
which  reflects  blame  on  the  colonies  or  which  attacks  the  pro- 
gram of  trans-oceanic  empire ;  and  this  is  the  more  remark- 
able when  it  is  seen  what  a  place  the  colonial  question  occupied 
in  the  mind  of  the  people.  One  reason  for  this  was  the  atten- 
tion attracted  by  the  successful  rebellion  of  the  thirteen  British 
colonies  in  America.  Another  cause  which  brought  these 
questions  to  the  front  was  the  debate  on  economic  theory,  an 
argument  that  had  enlisted  the  energies  of  the  foremost  think- 
ers in  France;  the  old  universal  theory  of  exclusive  trade  be- 
tween the  colony  and  the  mother  country  had  been  boldly 
attacked  by  these  men,  and  the  example  of  Turgot  had  been  a 
powerful  factor  to  their  aid.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  this 
subject,  as  well  as  that  of  chartered  companies  with  exclusive 
trading  privileges,  should  be  included  among  the  many  topics 

1  Deschamps :  Quest,  colon,  pp.  292  et  seq.,  and  Ibid. :  Les  Colonies  pendant  la  Revo- 
lution, p.  321  (an  instructive  note  on  the  phrase  " perissent  les  colonies.''')  Voltaire  : 
Siecle  de  Louis  XV.,  ch.  35,  and  Candide :  ch.  23.  Bernardin  de  Saint-Pierre : 
Voyage  &  Vtle  de  France,  preface.  Mercier  :  L'An  2^1,  ch.  40  (p.  322).  Raynal  : 
Histoire  pkilosophique  et  politique  des  itablissemenls  et  du  commerce  des  Europicns 
dans  les  deux  Jndes.  (For  the  features  of  this  book  and  its  influence  upon  Napo- 
leon, vide  Chapter  III.)  Gouy  :  Vues  generates,  pp.  1-5,  41.  De  S.  Mery  :  Opinion, 
pp.  18,  19.  Tolosan:  Commerce  de  la  France,  p.  116.  Levasseur:  Population 
francaise,  iii.  p.  412,  note  3.  In  the  Bibliography  there  is  included  a  number  of 
titles  which  have  been  selected  from  among  many  bearing  upon  the  colonial 
question  of  1789.  The  general  "expansion  "  and  "anti-expansion  "  attitudes  are 
therein  illustrated ;  and  also  more  particularly  the  economic  and  political  ideas 
regarding  the  African  and  Indian  possessions  or  those  domains  which  France 
coveted  in  Asia.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  include  any  of  the  anti-slavery 
literature,  nor  those  books,  reports,  or  pamphlets  which  dealt  especially  with  the 
domains  of  France  in  other  portions  of  the  globe.  But  very  few  of  the  publica- 
tions dealing  with  the  tariff  treaties  with  England  are  given,  as  that  literature  is 
so  well  known. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  35 

of  which  the  Cahiers  treated.  Some  323  of  these  mentioned  colo- 
nial affairs.  The  central  idea  in  nearly  all  of  them  was  that 
commerce  depended  on  the  colonies,  and  that  sea  power,  a  ne- 
cessity to  the  state,  could  exist  only  with  the  aid  of  the  merchant 
marine,  whose  larger  ventures  must  in  turn  derive  from  colo- 
nial prosperity.  Slavery  as  the  foundation  of  the  colonial 
system  in  the  tropics  received  a  large  share  of  their  attention ; 
but  this  topic  and  the  action  of  the  Assemble  in  abolishing 
slavery  cannot  be  discussed  in  these  pages ;  though  the  human- 
itarian but  unpractical  decision  regarding  it  was  responsible 
in  great  measure  for  the  disaster  which  overtook  so  many 
French  colonial  possessions  within  a  decade.  The  matter  has 
been  treated  from  every  point  of  view  in  the  past,  and  to  enter 
the  field  here  would  involve  a  much  longer  chapter  on  colonial 
affairs  than  is  expedient.  Turning,  therefore,  to  the  questions 
of  the  colonial  compact,  privileged  companies  and  tariff  trea- 
ties, the  economic  aspect  of  each  and  their  international  feat- 
ures are  the  subjects  to  be  noted.1 

The  rapid  increase  in  the  commercial  output  of  the  colonies 
had  not  effected  the  growth  of  the  merchant  marine  in  an 
equal  ratio,  and  the  French  colonies  were  at  a  disadvantage  as 
compared  with  those  of  Great  Britain ;  for  the  colonial  com- 
pact for  exclusive  trade  with  the  home  country  bound  them  to 
depend  on  the  transport  offered  by  ships  from  her  ports,  and 
limited  their  supplies  to  those  which  she  could  give  them. 
The  growing  resources  of  the  colonies  enforced  the  inadequacy 
of  the  theory  and  practice  as  regards  France,  and  these  facts, 
combined  with  the  influence  of  the  new  school  of  economists, 

1  Cunningham :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  510,  511.  Stourm :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  i-n.  Stephens : 
French  Revolution,  i.  p.  529.  Deschamps  :  Les  colonies  pendant  la  Revolution, 
pp.  15,  38.  I  am  indebted  to  this  writer  for  an  analysis  of  283  Cahiers  which 
treated  the  subjects  in  the  following  proportion :  privileged  companies  and 
monopolies,  154;  the  arret  of  1784,  24;  colonial  administration  in  general,  4; 
free  ports,  18;  slavery,  34;  slave  trade,  10;  debts  of  the  colonists  (amounting  in 
178910  nearly  500  millions)  and  colonial  produce,  12;  the  treaty  of  1786,  49; 
colonial  representation  in  the  Stats,  17  ;  participation  in  colonial  trade,  3. 


36  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

led  to  an  "Arret  du  Conseil"  of  Aug.  30,  1784,  which  author- 
ized foreign  ships  to  import  certain  commodities  from  alien 
countries  to  the  French  Antilles.  A  storm  of  protest  from 
the  maritime  cities  of  France  showed  how  deeply  the  old  ideas 
were  imbedded  in  the  minds  of  the  people ;  the  deputies  of 
Havre,  Nantes,  and  Bordeaux  declared  that  it  was  "  an  uncon- 
tested principle  that  the  colonies  are  created  by  and  for  the 
parent-state;  they  have  not  the  right  to  buy  their  provisions, 
nor  can  they  sell  the  produce  of  their  soil,  save  in  France." 
Tolosan,  a  much  cited  authority  of  the  period,  says  in  the  same 
vein :  "  The  colonies  have  been  established  for  the  benefit  of 
the  mother  country ;  they  cannot  completely  fulfil  their  destiny 
save  in  adding  to  the  product  of  her  lands  and  of  the  industry 
of  the  nation  under  whose  immediate  power  they  are,  and  in  con- 
tributing to  the  increase  of  her  commerce  with  other  nations. 
If  they  could  dispense  with  the  mother  country  and  had  the 
means  to  maintain  direct  foreign  connections  for  their  imports 
as  well  as  for  their  exports,  they  would  no  longer  be  of  use." 
This  was  the  view  of  the  French  merchant  to  whom  the 
colonist  was  in  debt;  it  was  also  that  of  the  petitioners  to  the 
Etats  generaux  in  1789,  for  they  begged  the  interdiction  to 
the  foreigner  of  all  trade  in  their  colonies.  It  was  the  theory 
of  Colbert  to  the  letter.1 

The  complicated  question  of  chartered  companies,  endowed 
by  the  state  with  a  monopoly  of  trade  in  certain  regions,  was 
not  a  new  one;  the  foundation  of  the  French  colonial  empire 
had  been  in  great  part  through  their  aid ;  and  the  principles 
which  had  guided  Richelieu  and  Colbert  in  their  endeavors  to 
make  of  France  the  greatest  colonial  power,  could  not  have 

1  Beausobre  :  Politique,  i.  pp.  279-280.  Gomel :  Causes  financih-es,  ii.  pp.  223 
et  seq.  Bachaumont:  Memoires,  xxviii.  p.  84;  xxviii.  pp.  14  et  seq.  Deschamps  : 
op.  cit.  pp.  21  et  seq.,  32.  Tolosan:  op.  cit.  pp.  117,  118.  Arch.  pari.  ii.  p.  472. 
Senichaussee  de  Brest.  Commerce.  Art.  5 :  *  L'interdiction  aux  etrangers  des 
ports  et  de  nos  colonies  fran9aises ;  "  iii.  p.  534,  Tiers  £tat  de  Lille  ;  cf.  i.  p.  213 ; 
vi.  p.  85,  Tiers  £tat  du  Baillage  de  Troyes.  Art.  142;  p.  109,  Tiers  Etat  de 
Vannes.    Art.  87  ;  p.  343,  Martignes.    Art.  17  ;  p.  53,  Tours.     Art.  27. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  37 

been  effective  without  the  commercial  company.  For  com- 
merce was  then  looked  down  on  in  France,  and  private  impulse 
would  not  have  realized  the  ideal  of  colonial  empire,  had  not 
the  state  interfered  to  ensure  government  support  to  new  ven- 
tures. But  while  these  companies  were  needed  at  the  first,  it 
was  possible  for  their  control  to  become  a  tyranny  and  to  check 
the  healthy  growth  of  general  commerce;  this  was  the  idea 
which  prompted  the  various  complaints  against  them,  even 
during  the  seventeenth  century.  The  matter  was  argued  in 
England  as  well,  and,  as  the  contending  economists  of  the  fol- 
lowing century  evolved  their  theories  and  pleaded  their  reforms, 
the  facts  to  which  they  could  refer,  at  least  in  France,  gave 
authority  to  those  who  opposed  the  monopoly  of  a  company. 
It  is  not  within  our  province  to  give  the  history  of  any  of  these 
corporations ;  and  the  statistics  for  Asiatic  trade  which  have 
been  cited  record,  as  far  as  is  necessary,  the  influence  that  the 
great  Compagnie  des  Indes  had  on  East  Indian  commerce  in 
France  prior  to  the  Revolution.  Rather  it  is  the  company  as 
a  factor  in  the  colonial  problems  in  the  days  of  Louis  XVI. 
that  demands  notice.  The  old  Company  had  had  its  critics 
from  the  first;  its  financial  condition  threatening  bankruptcy 
had  strengthened  them ;  and,  as  has  been  seen,  the  expiration 
of  its  monopoly  in  1769  was  well  received.  The  private  traders 
between  1769  and  1785  sent  annually  to  India  twenty-one  ships 
°f  9>3°9  total  tonnage,  as  compared  with  seven,  of  4,258,  sent 
by  the  Company  ;  they  imported  to  France  nearly  forty  million 
livres  annually,  as  against  about  twenty  million  brought  in  by  the 
Company.  The  re-establishment  of  the  monopoly  for  a  new 
Company  was  therefore  bitterly  opposed  by  them  ;  but  Calonne 
insisted,  and  the  decree  was  issued  April  14,  1785.  The  stock 
of  this  Company  was  eagerly  sought  for,  and  in  1786  was 
increased  from  twenty  to  forty  million  livres,  and  the  term  of 
the  privilege  from  seven  to  fifteen  years.  The  details  of  its 
trade  have  already  been  given ;  that  it  prospered  was  due  in 
great   measure  to  the  increased  demand  for  Asiatic  goods. 


38  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

At  the  same  time  the  pamphlet  war  over  its  existence  was 
carried  on  with  zeal;  and  it  was  a  subject  of  interest  to  the 
deputies  in  the  Assemble  constituante,  —  an  interest  reflected 
from  that  taken  by  the  people  at  large,  who  in  154  Cahiers  had 
discussed  its  affairs.  Some  of  the  arguments  used  are  quoted 
below.  The  Company's  monopoly  finally  shared  the  fate  of 
other  like  privileges ;  and  in  April,  1790,  free  trade  to  the  east 
of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  was  decreed  by  a  majority  of  one 
hundred  and  ten.  As  in  the  case  of  the  colonial  compact,  self- 
interest  was  a  large  factor  in  the  decision  reached ;  that  this 
was  in  accord  with  the  teaching  of  the  economists,  while  the 
other  was  in  opposition  to  the  logical  conclusions  of  those  who 
upheld  commercial  liberty,  is  not  to  be  doubted ;  on  the  one 
hand,  it  was  a  repudiation  of  Colbert,  and,  on  the  other,  confir- 
mation of  his  system.  In  both  cases  the  financial  interests  of 
the  French  merchant  were  recognized  and  supported.1 

1  The  view  that  participation  in  commerce  was  ignoble  was  opposed  by  several 
writers,  e.  g.  [Le  Monnier]  :  Le  commerce  honorable  ou  considerations  politiques  con- 
tenant  les  motifs  de  nice s sit i,  d'honneur  et  de  profit  qui  se  trouvent  d,  former  des  com- 
pagnies de  personnes  de  toutes  conditions  pour  Ventrelien  du  nigoce  de  mer  en  France, 
compose  par  un  habitant  de  la  ville  de  Nantes.  Nantes,  1646,  4to.  Coyer:  La 
noblesse  commercante,  Paris,  1756,  i2mo.  Clement:  Colbert,  i.  p.  515.  Colbert 
referred  to  the  **  necessite  indispensable  de  le  [commerce]  restreindre  dans  les 
mains  d'une  compagnie  ou  de  quelques  particuliers."  Bielfeld :  Lnstitutions  poli- 
tiques, i.  p.  302 :  *  Les  Concessions  et  les  Privileges,  que  les  Souverains  des 
principales  Nations  de  l'Europe  accordent  a  des  Compagnies  exclusives  ne 
doivent  point  etre  envisages  comme  des  Monopoles,  ou  comme  une  infraction 
faite  a  la  liberte  du  Commerce.  Ce  sont,  au  contraire,  de  nouvelles  branches  de 
Commerce  qu'on  ouvre  au  Public,  chaque  particulier  pouvant,  a  proportion  de 
l'interet  qu'il  y  prend,  participer  au  profit  general  de  l'association.  Les  objets 
que  ces  Compagnies  embrassent  sont,  d'ailleurs  si  grands,  si  vastes,  si  dispen- 
dieux,  qu'un  simple  Citoyen,  quelque  opulent  qu'il  soit,  ne  scauroit  y  atteindre. 
II  est  vrai  que  ces  Octrois  privent  ce  raeme  Commerce  de  la  concurrence,  ce  qui 
est  une  perte  immense,  comme  nous  l'avons  deja  remarque.  Mais  y  a-t-il  dans  le 
monde  un  etablissement  qui  ne  porte  avec  soi  quelque  inconvenient  ?  C'est  dans 
la  choix  des  moindres  que  consiste  la  prudence  politique."  Child:  Trade, 
pp.  78-80 :  "  1.  That  ^restrained  limited  companies  are  not  alone  sufficient 
to  preserve  and  increase  a  trade.  2.  That  limited  companies,  though  established 
by  act  of  parliament,  may  lose  a  trade.  3.  That  trade  may  be  carried  on  to  any 
part  of  Christendom,  and  increased  without  companies.    4.  That  we  have  de- 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  39 

Closely  linked  to  these  matters  was  the  commercial  treaty 
with  Great  Britain,  which  had  been  negotiated  in  1786.     Along 

clined  more,  or  at  least  have  increased  less,  in  those  trades  limited  to  companies, 
than  in  others,  where  all  his  Majesty's  subjects  have  had  equal  freedom  of  trade." 
Saint-Pierre :  Fives  d'un  homme  de  bien,  pp.  206-207  :  "  C'est  pour  des  com- 
merces lontaines  il  faut  des  etablissements,  et  de  grandes  depenses  qui  ne 
peuvent  produire  que  plusieurs  annees  apres.  II  faut  done  un  premier  fonds 
tres  considerable."  A  company  alone  could  gather  the  capital.  Dareste  :  Hist, 
de  P administration,  ii.  p.  268 ;  pp.  397  et  sea.  A  memoire  by  a  depute  of  Dun- 
kerque  in  1654  complains  of  the  monopoly  of  certain  trades  by  special  cities,  and 
especially  of  that  of  the  Compagnie  d' Orient.  409  et  sea.  A  depute  of  Nantes 
argues  strongly  against  all  companies.  412.  A  deputi  of  La  Rochelle,  says  :  "  La 
liberte  est  le  premier  mobile  de  commerce."  Vignon :  Expansion  de  la  France, 
pp.  50  et  sea.  Uztariz :  Theory,  etc.  i.  pp.  18,  176  et  sea.,  180-192.  Accarias  de 
Serionne :  Les  interets  des  Nations  de  I'Europe,  i.  pp.  88,  352  :  "  On  a  souvent 
reclame,  surtout  en  France  et  en  Angleterre  la  liberte  du  commerce  contre  les 
compagnies  des  Indes.  On  n'a  pas  fait  attention  qu'on  reclamait  une  liberte 
inutile  et  qu'aucun  negotiant  particulier  ne  serait  en  etat  d'en  faire  usage,  si  elle 
etait  accordee."  Montesquieu  :  Esp.  des  lois,  1.  xx.  c.  10.  Villars :  Memoires, 
iv.  p.  265.  Bonnassieux:  Grandes  compagnies,  pp.  166-168,454  (a  company  was 
formed  at  Paris  in  1787  under  the  Sardinian  flag  for  Indian  trade  in  order  to  avoid 
French  monopoly  laws),  481-485.  (An  interesting  memoire  of  about  1715  is  here 
quoted  from  Arch.  nat.  liasse  F.  502.)  D'Argenson  :  Journal  et  memoires,  v.  p.  331 
(Dec.  21,  1748);  vii.  p.  138  (March,  1752).  Gomel:  op.  cit.  ii.  p.  151.  Condillac  : 
Le  commerce  et  le  gouvernement,  in  Melanges  d £con.  pol.  p.  431.  "  Ce  privilege 
exclusif  etait  une  atteinte  portee  a  la  liberte,  puisqu'il  donnait  a  une  seule  com- 
pagnie un  droit  qui  appartenait  a  tous  les  citoyens.  Les  negotiants  recla- 
merent  mais  inutilement.  La  nouvelle  compagnie  [1785]  donna  de  l'argent 
et  le  privilege  fut  confirme."  Morellet :  Article  in  Diet,  du  commerce,  i. 
pp.  587,  596,  598.  Memoire  contre  la  Compagnie  des  Indes,  pp.  1,2:  "La 
nouvelle  Compagnie  des  Indes  s'est  rendu  un  objet  d'inquietude  &  d'alarme 
tout  a  la  fois  dans  le  commerce  maritime  &  dans  le  commerce  interieur  du 
Royaume.  Par  l'etendue  de  son  privilege,  elle  retranche  a  l'industrie  &  a  l'acti- 
vite  nationale  le  commerce  des  deux  tiers  du  globe.  .  .  .  Et  c'est  avec  vingt 
millions  de  capital  qu'elle  veut  faire  un  commerce  qui  exigeroit  un  millard, 
&  dans  lequel  les  particuliers  du  Royaume  pourroient  verser  deux  cents 
millions !  Elle  a  surpris  au  Gouvernement  une  permission  de  faire  elle  seule 
l'approvisionnement  de  la  France,  pendant  deux  ans,  de  toutes  les  marchan- 
dises  des  Indes,  en  les  prenant  dans  les  ports  de  l'Europe.  C'est  un  commerce 
au  moins  de  cinquante  millions,  qui  excede  les  forces  de  son  capital.  C'est  de 
plus  un  monopole  etranger  a  son  propre  privilege  ;  lequel  lui  accordoit  assez,  en 
lui  donnant  le  droit  exclusif  de  faire  des  expeditions  dans  les  Indes,  a  la  Chine, 
dans  la  mer  Rouge,  sur  les  cotes  d'Afrique,  &c.  Ce  monopole  pesera  a-la-fois 
sur  la  Nation,  qui  aura  moins  de  ce  genre  de  marchandise,  qui  les  payera  plus 


40  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

with  the  military  struggle  between  the  two  countries  a  tariff 
war  had  been  waged ;  discriminations  in  custom  duties  had  led 
to  reprisals  and  prohibitions;  since  1690  almost  every  decade 
had  seen  changes  in  the  duties  levied  by  one  or  the  other  on 
the  imports  from  its  rival,  till  in  1779  the  English  tariff  attained 
an  average  of  seventy-five  per  cent  ad  valorem  on  all  French 
manufactures  which  were  not  in  the  first  place  contraband ; 
and  France  had  on  her  side  taken  proportionate  measures  for 
protection.  This  policy  was  based  on  the  theory  of  the  balance 
of  trade,  which  has  already  been  explained ;  the  principle  of 
action  being  the  idea  that  it  was  to  a  nation's  advantage  to 
purchase  little  and  sell  much  in  the  international  market  The 
new  school  of  economists,  however,  declared  that  a  balance  in 
money  was  futile  to  determine  the  real  profit  to  a  nation  of  her 
international  trade,  and  that  entire  liberty  of  commerce  was  the 

cher,  &  sur  le  commerce  interieur,  a  qui  il  enleve  un  approvisionnement  qu'il 
feroit  avec  plus  d'abondance  &  d'economie.  Pour  se  soutenir  dans  ce  monopole, 
la  Compagnie  a  fait  prononcer  contre  le  commerce  les  plus  dures  prohibitions,  les 
peines  les  plus  severes,  les  precautions  les  plus  inquietantes."  Cf.  Tessier: 
Inventaire  des  Archives  hist,  de  la  chambre  de  commerce  de  Marseilles,  p.  304  (Pro- 
test of  April  9,  1786).  For  the  statistics  of  this  period  (1769-89),  vide  the  tables 
previously  cited  in  App.  I.  Daubigny :  Choiseul,  pp.  236  et  sea.  Levasseur :  France 
et  ses  colonies,  iii.  pp.  177  et  sea.,  191  et  sea.  Deschamps:  op.  cit.  pp.  26,  28,  101 
et  sea.,  113  et  sea.,  123.  Cf.  passim.  Hernoux:  Rapport  sur  le  privilege  de  la  Com- 
pagnie des  Indes  (March  18,  1790).  Arnould:  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  270,  280,  286,  287: 
ii.  p.  156.  (The  author  is  very  bitter  against  East  Indian  trade;  his  favorite 
phrase  is  "le  gouffre  d'Asie.")  Pricis  pour  la  Compagnie  des  Indes,  pp.  6,  7. 
Arch*  pari.  ii.  p.  472  (Art.  4) ;  iii.  pp.  606,  607 ;  iv.  pp.  342  (Ballainvilliers,  tit.  5, 
Art.  9),  56,  57  (Montpellier ) ;  v.  pp.  68  (Saint  Cloud,  Art.  27) :  "  Que  tous  privi- 
leges exclusifs,  comme  ceux  accordes  a  la  Compagnie  des  Indes,  seront  aussi 
abolis ; "  281  (Noblesse  de  Paris,  Art.  10);  354  (Clerge  de  Peronne,  Montdidier  et 
Roye)  :  "  Nous  demandons  une  loi  en  vertu  de  laquelle  un  negotiant  ne  deroge 
pas  lorsqu'il  est  noble  .  .  .  que  le  privilege  exclusif  de  la  nouvelle  Compagnie 
des  Indes  soit  revoque,  et  que  ce  commerce,  qu'il  n'est  pas  possible  d'empecher, 
soit  declare  libre  pour  tous  les  sujets  du  Roi  .  .  .  ;"  384  (Senech.  de  Ploermel ; 
Art.  67),  549  (Senech.  de  Rennes,  Art.  2q8),  596  (Noblesse  de  Rouen,  Art.  65),  739 
(Tiers  E\tat  de  Senlis,  Art.  3);  vi.  pp.  53,  85,  109  (Senech.  de  Vannes,  Art.  86): 
"  Interdiction  de  tout  privilege  exclusif  pour  quelque  branche  du  commerce  que 
ce  soit,  notamment  celui  de  la  Compagnie  des  Indes.  .  .  ."  These  references 
might  be  continued  to  greater  length  were  it  necessary. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR   OF  1793  41 

true  maxim  of  finance.  But  this  teaching  had  not  affected 
the  conduct  of  foreign  trade  till  the  treaty  of  1786  marked  a 
sharp  advance  toward  this  position,  for  the  treaty  was  "so 
radical  that  none  as  liberal  has  since  been  negotiated  between 
the  two  nations.  The  violence  of  the  attack  upon  it  was  due 
to  a  variety  of  reasons ;  one  in  particular  was  significant  of  the 
controversy  in  France  over  Asiatic  matters.  The  French 
market  was  a  profitable  one  to  importers  of  East  Indian  goods, 
and  as  English  success  in  India  had  supplied  London  mer- 
chants with  the  means  to  assist  French  luxury,  the  new  treaty 
broke  the  last  barrier  down ;  it  opened  up  the  whole  question 
of  the  wisdom  of  further  endeavor  to  compete  with  Great  Britain 
in  Indian  waters ;  if  France  were  to  leave  this  field,  a  large 
share  of  Asiatic  goods  which  ultimately  reached  her  cities 
would  do  so  only  at  the  profit  of  a  British  middleman.  As 
we  have  seen,  the  quarrel  between  those  who  supported  a 
monopoly  and  those  who  advocated  free  trade  with  India  was 
an  important  one  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  and  this  aspect 
of  the  Asiatic  question  had  a  distinct  effect  on  the  reception 
of  the  English  treaty  in  France.  Thus  many  Cahiers  asked 
on  one  page  both  for  the  abolition  of  monopoly,  a  tenet  of  the 
physiocrats,  and  for  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  of  1786,  a 
return  to  the  old  school  of  Colbert  and  Forbonnais.  In  Eng- 
land the  opposition  to  the  treaty  was  based  somewhat  on 
economic,  but  chiefly  on  wider  political  grounds ;  the  antago- 
nism of  the  two  nations  is  nowhere  made  clearer;  and  yet  it 
was  the  plan  of  Pitt  and  Eden  to  proceed  from  the  negotiation 
of  this  treaty  to  the  statement  of  a  common  principle  of  action 
between  the  two  countries,  which  would  settle  their  difficulties 
in  India  and  Holland.  These  negotiations  we  will  not  even 
sketch  here,  for  their  place  as  an  index  of  the  tendency  of 
national  policy  in  the  immediate  future  is  not  important.  The 
history  of  the  period  is  so  crowded  that  in  this  brief  summary 
of  the  situation  in  France  much  has  been  omitted  which  would 
enter  into  a  more  detailed  account,  but  which  can  scarcely  add 


s/ 


42  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

to  the  strength  of  the  point  here  made  that  the  French  colonies 
were  prosperous,  and  that  their  fate  and  all  the  great  issues  of 
colonial  expansion  and  administration  were  at  stake  in  the 
Revolution.  The  influence  which  colonial  ideas  exerted  on 
continental  policies  will  be  estimated  later;  at  present  the 
examination  of  the  British  interest  in  Asia  must  be  under- 
taken.1 

The  history  of  British  India  throws  light  upon  many  anom- 
alies, none  perhaps  stranger  then  the  extension  of  English 
control  in  India  at  a  period  when  the  mind  of  the  nation  was 
largely  engrossed  in  other  matters.  The  theory  of  an  absent- 
minded  conquest  of  India  by  Englishmen  is  based  on  this 
situation ;  Sir  John  Seeley  has  sent  this  generalization  far  and 
wide,  and  many  elements  of  truth  are  to  be  found  in  it,  for  the 
growth  of  British  power  in  that  region  is  certainly  not  the 
result  of  an  early  decision  by  the  nation  at  large,  or  by  its 
rulers,  to  make  Great  Britain  the  sovereign  power  in  all  India. 
On  the  other  hand,  blind  acquisition  was  not  the  policy  of  the 
Company  or  of  its  servants  ;  the  extension  of  British  control  was 
in  part  the  result  of  local  conditions  in  India  ;  but  there  is  also 
evident  the  definite  purpose  to  prevent,  if  possible,  the  enjoy- 
ment of  Asiatic  wealth  by  other  European  organizations,  and  as 

1  Gomel :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  213  et  seq.  Adam  Smith  :  op.  cit.  Bk.  iv.  chaps.  2,  3,  6. 
Fitzmaurice  :  Shelburne,  iii.  pp.  323,  386.  Morellet  had  given  Shelburne  his  ideas 
on  free  trade,  which  were  embodied  in  the  negotiations.  Stourm  :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  12 
et  seq.,  60.  Du  Quesnay :  Maximes  genirales  du  gouvemement,  Nos.  xxiv.,  xxv.  in 
Daire  :  Les  physiocrates,  i.  p.  101.  Melon  :  Essai  politique  sur  le  commerce,  pp. 
130  et  seq.,  150  et  seq.,  265  et  seq.  Auckland  :  Corr.  i.  pp.  86  et  seq.,  123,  149,  154, 
158,  163,  191,  220  et  seq.,  245-249,  277,  279  et  seq.  Lecky :  Hist,  of  England  in 
the  XVIIIth  Century,  v.  pp.  37-46.  Hansard  :  Pari.  Hist.  xxvi.  413  et  seq.,  488. 
Anquetil  du  Perron  :  Dignite  du  commerce,  pp.  157  et  passim  to  the  end.  A  long 
series  of  extracts  from  the  Cahiers  are  there  given.  Arch.  pari.  iii.  p.  534,  606 ; 
v.  p.  548,  600  (Art.  57  et  seq.) ;  vi.  p.  109  (Art.  88).  Cf.  Anisson-Duperon :  Essai 
sur  les  traites  de  conimerce  de  Methuen  et  de  1786  in  Journal  des  Economists,  ier  ser. 
xvii.  (April,  1847).  Dupont  de  Nemours:  Lettre  a  la  Chambre  de  commerce  de 
Normandie,  Rouen,  1788.  Boyetel :  Recueil  de  divers  mimoires  relatifs  au  traite 
de  commerce  avec  FAngleterre.  Versailles,  1789.  Morellet  in  Diet,  du  commerce, 
i.  p.  587,  596.     Beausobre  :  Politique,  i.  p.  282. 


COLONIAL  QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1798  43 

the  interest  of  the  people  was  aroused  expansion  became  a  fixed 
policy.  At  first  in  the  direction  natural  to  a  trading  company, 
and  later  along  other  lines,  drawn  by  political  exigency  and 
the  genius  of  the  race,  the  power  of  England  in  India  grew  ; 
fitfully  in  the  beginning,  then,  under  the  impulse  of  expanding 
empire  and  dread  of  French  attack,  the  work  was  pressed  on. 
The  political  and  administrative  history  of  this  progress  would 
carry  us  too  far  afield ;  and  as  the  scope  of  this  investigation 
shuts  out  the  study  of  the  general  colonial  question  in  Great 
Britain  at  this  period,  as  one  involving  interests  in  every 
quarter  of  the  globe,  our  scrutiny  into  the  problem  of  British 
dominion  in  India  must  likewise  be  confined  to  economic  and 
international  aspects.1  Our  examination  of  English  trade  with 
India,  while  it  has  the  same  object  as  that  of  the  French  colo- 
nial trade,  must  also  be  somewhat  limited,  as  is  natural  in  the 
affairs  of  a  mercantile  adventure,  where  the  interference  of  the 
state  is  almost  as  rare  and  late  as  it  was  both  usual  and  early 
in  the  history  of  French  enterprises.  The  value  of  the  results 
must  be  measured  not  only  by  the  information  gained,  but  also 
by  the  bearing  it  may  have  on  the  theory  which  was  universal 
in  France,  that  the  wealth  and  power  of  Great  Britain  rested 
in  great  measure  on  her  Asiatic  trade  and  possessions  ;  but  of 
this  more  may  be  said  later.  The  period  studied  must  again 
be  the  eighteenth  century  only ;  a  time  when  the  United  Com- 

1  Seeley:  Expansion  of  England,^.  207  :  "Our  acquisition  of  India  was  made 
blindly.  Nothing  great  that  has  ever  been  done  by  Englishmen  was  done  so 
unintentionally,  so  accidentally,  as  the  conquest  of  India."  Since  the  view  of 
Indian  history  which  is  given  in  the  text  was  adopted  by  the  author,  the  second 
volume  of  Hunter's  History  of  British  India  has  appeared  ;  on  p.  4  of  the  Intro- 
duction, the  Editor,  Mr.  P.  E.  Roberts,  expresses  Sir  William  Hunter's  ideas  on 
this  matter  and  gives  additional  evidence  to  support  the  statements  in  this  text, 
criticising  Sir  John  Seeley  and  the  "  notion  that  our  Indian  Empire  was  an  un- 
conscious lapse  into  greatness."  Cf.  p.  273,  —  Letter  to  Fort  St.  George,  Dec.  12, 
1687 :  "  The  Directors  look  \  in  a  most  especiall  manner '  to  the  Madras  Council 
to  *  establish  such  a  Politie  of  civill  and  military  power,  and  create  and  secure 
such  a  large  Revenue  as  may  bee  the  foundation  of  a  large,  well-grounded,  sur 
English  dominion  in  India  for  all  time  to  come.' " 


44  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

pany,  benefiting  by  the  commercial  advances  of  the  old  Lon- 
don Company,  was  able  both  to  increase  trade  and  to  extend 
sovereignty.  That  trade  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury was  by  no  means  small,  nor  was  the  political  importance 
attached  to  its  progress  the  fancy  of  a  pamphleteer.  The  ser- 
vice of  that  commerce  in  helping  to  a  favorable  balance  of 
trade,  and  its  use  in  supporting  naval  power  and  giving  to 
Great  Britain  a  paramount  place  in  international  politics  were 
recognized  by  men  like  Davenant,  the  best  writer  of  his  day  in 
matters  of  trade  and  politics.  He  declared  in  1698  that  what- 
ever country  got  "  the  full  and  undisputed  possession  "  of  the 
East  India  trade  would  "  give  law  to  all  the  commercial  world," 
and  later  he  continues :  this  trade  "  has  extended  and  enlarged 
our  concerns  and  interest  abroad,  begot  new  traffic  to  us; 
and  .  .  .  this  commerce,  with  the  growth  of  the  West  India 
plantation,  have  principally  contributed  to  put  of  our  side  the 
general  balance  between  us  and  other  countries  ;  from  whence 
follows,  that  we  shall  be  confined  to  a  narrow  compass,  and 
must  no  more  pretend  to  the  dominion  of  the  sea,  if  by  ill- 
conduct,  in  these  two  important  branches,  we  should  be 
reduced  to  deal  only  in  our  native  product  and  home  manu- 
factures." The  conduct  of  this  trade,  after  the  Earl  of  Godol- 
phin's  award  (1708),  settling  the  claims  of  rival  companies  and 
ushering  a  new  period,  was  both  sober  and  profitable  till  the 
attack  of  the  Bourbons  roused  a  band  of  merchants  to  new 
duties,  and  won  for  them  the  support  of  the  state  in  a  struggle 
for  Asiatic  dominion.1 

1  Davenant :  Works,  i.  pp.  126,  138  etseq.  (In  Lyall :  Rise  of  British  Dominion 
in  India,  pp.  41-43,  a  mistake  is  made  in  saying  that  Sir  William  Davenant  wrote 
the  Essay  on  the  East  India  Trade  ;  it  was  Charles  Davenant,  his  son.)  For  the 
Award,  cf.  Bruce:  Annals  of  the  Honourable  East  India  Company,  iii.  pp.  667-771. 
Cf.  Hunter :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  382,  383.  The  literature  of  this  subject  is  rich.  One 
pamphlet  (1681 )  is  particularly  worthy  of  note  —  Philopatris :  That  the  East  Indian 
Trade  is  the  most  national  of  all  Foreign  Trades  (publ.  in  Somers :  First  Collection, 
iv.  pp.  34  et  sea.).  The  main  propositions  are  as  follows  :  "  I.  That  the  East 
India  Trade  is  the  most  National  of  all  Foreign  Trades.  II.  That  the  clamours, 
Aspersions,  and  Objections  made  against  the  present  East  India  Company,  are 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  45 

A  statistical  inquiry  into  the  Asiatic  trade  of  Great  Britain 
and  its  ratio  to  her  total  trade  at  various  times  during  the 
eighteenth  century,  will  illuminate  the  economic  aspect  of  the 
problem  of  Asia,  and  will  at  the  same  time  open  up  the  ques- 
tion of  foreign  policy  in  these  matters.  The  prosperity  of 
Great  Britain  began  to  show  itself  clearly  in  the  closing  years 
of  the  seventeenth  century  ;  British  commerce  had  doubled 
in  the  thirty  years  prior  to  1699,  when  it  amounted  to  over 
12,000,000  pounds  sterling.  The  war  which  broke  out  in  1702 
injured  it  somewhat,  so  that  in  17 10  it  did  not  quite  touch 
11,000,000  according  to  the  official  figures,  but  as  the  rates  of 
value  were  still  those  of  1696,  the  sale  amount  was  slightly 
larger ;  and  in  the  language  of  the  day,  a  favorable  balance  of 
trade  was  created  to  the  extent  of  £2,679,487.  In  this  com- 
merce the  imports  of  the  East  India  Company  after  1708 
averaged  annually  £758,042,  and  the  exports  about  £575,000, 
carried,  in  1710,  in  ten  ships  sailing  from  England  ;  it  may  be 
noticed  in  passing  that  the  imports  from  the  West  Indies 
averaged  at  this  time  a  little  over  £600,000.  The  years  that 
followed  were  full  of  action  and  the  resources  of  the  Company 
were  heavily  taxed  by  the  costs  of  war,  though  the  Govern- 

Sinister,  Selfish,  or  Groundless.  III.  That  since  the  discovery  of  the  East  Indies, 
the  Dominion  of  the  Sea  depends  much  upon  the  Wane  or  increase  of  that  Trade, 
and  consequently  the  Security  of  the  Liberty,  Property  and  Protestant  Religion 
of  this  Kingdom.  IV.  That  the  Trade  of  the  East  Indies  cannot  be  carried  on 
to  National  advantage,  in  any  other  way  than  by  a  General  Joynt  Stock. 
V.  That  the  East  India  Trade  is  more  profitable  and  necessary  to  the  Kingdom 
of  England,  than  to  any  other  Kingdom  or  Nation  in  Europe."  The  opposition 
published  tracts  trying  to  prove  the  East  India  Trade  prejudicial  to  the  manu- 
facturers of  England.  Cf.  Somers  :  op.  cit.  iv.  pp.  56  et  seq.  Pollexfen :  England 
and  East  India  inconsistent,  etc.,  London,  1697;  and  Ibid.:  A  discourse  of  trade, 
coin,  paper  credit  and  of  ways  and  means  to  gain  and  retain  riches.  London,  1696. 
On  this  subject  cf.  Fortrey:  England 's  Interest  and  Improvement,  London,  1673; 
H.  T. :  Britannia  Languens,  London,  1689 ;  and  Child :  Discourse  on  Trade 
(previously  quoted).  Fifty  years  later  a  bitter  attack  was  made  by  a  foreigner 
under  the  pseudonym  of  Nickolls:  Advantages,  etc.,  pp.  160,  191.  He  prophesies 
the  ultimate  and  complete  ruin  of  all  East  Indian  trade,  and  the  uselessness  of  all 
settlements  in  that  region  so  far  as  the  English  are  concerned,  pp.  176,  177.  He 
presents  the  strongest  arguments  of  the  day  against  Trading  Companies. 


46  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

ment  bore  a  large  share  of  them  in  order  to  defeat  French 
ambition.  Yet  in  1780,  in  the  heart  of  a  period  when  the 
French  were  making  a  successful  stand  in  India  and 
the  American  colonies  were  slowly  toiling  toward  victory,  the 
sales  at  the  India  house  in  London  were  over  £3,000,000, 
the  exports  to  the  East  Indies  and  China  were  nearly  half  a 
million,  and  the  shipping  owned  by  the  Company  was  measured 
at  over  60,000  tons.  The  general  commerce  of  the  nation 
had  also  increased,  though  not  in  such  proportion;  in  1780  the 
total  imports  to  Great  Britain  were  valued  at  £11,664,967,  of 
which  £2,612,910  came  from  the  West  Indies;  and  the  total 
exports  were  £13,554,093.  Of  the  foreign  commerce  of  the 
kingdom  the  Asiatic  branch  was  therefore  not  quite  15  per  cent. 
With  the  peace  of  Versailles  in  1783  an  even  greater  rate  of 
increase  began,  for  the  strain  of  the  war  in  India  had  been 
harder  than  many  English  writers  have  cared  to  confess  ;  it 
appears  to-day,  however,  that  had  it  not  been  for  the  arrival  in 
India  of  the  news  of  peace,  the  French  would  have  gained  all 
of  southern  India,  the  British  forces  being  in  sore  straits ;  but 
the  status  quo  of  176 1  was  all  France  had  asked  for  in  the 
treaty,  and  that  opportunity  was  lost.  A  change  had  also 
been  made  in  the  character  of  the  British  power  in  India; 
essentially  an  organization  chartered  for  trading  purposes,  the 
political  functions  of  the  Company  were  first  clearly  recog- 
nized in  1773;  in  1784,  after  a  hot  fight  in  Parliament,  a  new 
constitution  was  drawn  up ;  and  it  was  in  the  course  of  these 
debates  that  the  "  English  nation  first  began  to  realize  their 
responsibilities  for  the  government  of  India."  The  Charter 
act  of  1793  embodied  in  its  provisions  the  most  vital  parts  of 
Mr.  Pitt's  famous  India  Bill ;  and  the  monopoly  of  trade  was 
encroached  on  to  the  extent  of  3,000  tons  annually  of  private 
trade  authorized  by  law.  It  is  under  these  new  conditions, 
therefore,  that  Asiatic  trade  must  be  studied.1 

1  In  Appendix  II.  statistical  tables  will  be  found  to  support  the  figures  given 
in  the  text.     The  early  history  of  the  East  India  Company  is  noteworthy  for  the 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  47 

Beginning  in  1783,  when  the  exports  of  the  United  Kingdom 
were  £14,681,494  and  the  imports  £13,122,235,  the  East  India 

enormous  profit  on  comparatively  small  investments,  —  the  voyage  which  lasted 
from  1611  to  1615  bringing  a  profit  of  218  per  cent;  after  the  reconstruction  of 
the  Company  in  1657  the  dividends  paid  between  that  date  and  1691  were  nearly 
25  per  cent  per  annum.  Cf.  Craik:  History  of  British  Commerce,  ii.  p.  15. 
Chandler  :  History  of  the  House  of  Commons,  iii.  p.  86.  Report  of  Pari.  Committee, 
June  13,1698.  (Quoted  by  Hunter:  op.  cit.  ii.  p.  279.)  In  1681  stock  in  the 
Company,  of  a  par  value  of  one  hundred  pounds,  was  quoted  at  280.  Philopatris  : 
op.  cit.  p.  40.  For  matters  treated  in  the  text,  cf.  also  Bastable  in  Diet,  of  Political 
Economy,  p.  344.  Hunter :  Indian  Empire,  pp.  664,  665.  M'Arthur  :  Financial 
Facts,  pp.  29,  274  (App.,  Table  III.).  Chalmers  :  Estimate,  etc.,  p.  207  and  table. 
Cunningham  :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  532-537.  Malleson :  Dupleix,  pp.  177  et  sea.,  and 
Final  French  Struggles,  pp.  70  et  sea.  Mill :  Hist,  of  India,  iv.  p.  292  (note  by  H. 
H.  Wilson).  Rapson  :  Struggle  Between  France  and  England  for  Sitpremacy  in 
India,  p.  120.  For  the  documents  of  an  administrative  nature,  cf.  Auber  :  Analy- 
sis of  the  Constitution  of  the  East  India  Company.  The  Acts  of  importance  are  : 
13th  of  George  III.,  cap.  63 ;  21st  of  George  III.,  cap.  65  ;  24th  of  George  III., 
cap.  25  ;  33d  of  George  III.,  cap.  52.  Kaye  :  Hist,  of  the  Administration  of  the 
East  India  Co.  pp.  123  et  sea.  Cf.  also  Encyclopedic  methodique.  Diet,  du  Commerce, 
i.  pp.  96-117.  (Statistics  of  English  Trade  (1752-73),  supposed  to  be  based  on 
Whitworth.)  Vorontzov :  Arkhiv,  ix.  p.  51  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov.  London, 
May  29  (June  9),  1786):  "  Apres  le  commerce  des  Indes  orientales,  celui  de  la 
Russie  est  celui  qu'il  importe  le  plus  a  l'Angleterre  de  conserver  dans  l'etat  oil  il 
se  trouve.  .  .  ."    This  is  interesting  testimony  to  the  role  of  Asiatic  trade. 

Note  on  the  Condition  of  Dutch  trade  with  the  East  Indies.  The  Dutch  East 
India  Company  had  been  very  prosperous,  paying  high  dividends  until  about 
1670,  since  which  date  a  steady  decline  had  ensued,  which  nearly  became  a  rout 
after  the  war  of  1780.  In  1606  a  dividend  of  75  per  cent  is  noted  ;  and  from  that 
date  to  1661,  25  to  30  per  cent  was  a  maximum  dividend.  Shares  worth  3000 
florins  at  par  went  as  high  as  18,000.  In  1670  a  40  per  cent  dividend  was  declared. 
At  that  time  about  150  merchant  ships  and  40  men-of-war  employing  25,000 
sailors  and  12,000  troops,  were  used  in  the  trade  and  its  protection.  By  1740 
these  numbers  had  been  cut  nearly  in  half,  though  shortly  before  this  time 
Uztariz  thought  France,  Spain,  and  England  should  unite  to  overcome  the  Dutch 
in  Asia.  The  war  with  England  in  1780,  however,  seriously  injured  them.  The 
Company  between  1780-90  became  a  burden  to  the  government  and  received  a 
subvention  of  68,000,000  florins;  in  1784  the  Company's  debts  amounted  to  85 
million  and  the  goods  on  hand  to  20  million  florins  ;  by  1791  the  debt  had  become 
95  million  ;  and  on  May  31,  1794,  the  total  liabilities  stood  at  127,553,280  fl.,  and 
the  assets  at  15,287,832  fl.  The  invasion  and  conquests  of  the  French  as  well  as 
losses  to  the  English  still  further  ruined  the  Company,  which  soon  ceased  to  exist. 
Uztariz :  Theory,  i.  p.  49.  Clement :  Hist,  de  Colbert,  i.  p.  342.  Beausobre  :  Poli- 
tique, i.  pp.  266  et  seq.     Castonnet-Desfosses :  Rivaliti  de  Dupleix  et  de  La  Bourdon- 


48  EASTERN    PROBLEMS 

trade,  including  China,  amounted  to  £1,301,495  imports,  which 
were  sold  in  the  London  market  for  about  sixty  per  cent  above 
this,  their  official  value,  and  £701,473  exports.  The  continent 
expected  at  this  time  to  see  a  decline  of  British  power;  it 
hoped  that  her  debt  would  prove  too  heavy  a  burden,  that  her 
losses  in  America,  and  her  struggle  with  the  native  powers  in 
India,  secretly  aided  by  the  French,  would  exhaust  her  vitality 
and  leave  her  commerce  and  her  colonies  a  prey  to  others. 
As  has  been  shown,  this  opinion  was  common,  and  a  prophet 
of  Great  Britain's  immediate  success  and  financial  progress 
was  obliged  to  plead  the  statistics  of  her  increasing  wealth  to 
enforce  his  belief  in  her  destiny;  thus  a  correspondent  of 
Count  A.  R.  Vorontzov,  the  Russian  ambassador  at  London, 
declared  that,  though  few  might  share  his  opinion,  the  condition 
of  English  trade  warranted  his  statement.  Mr.  Pitt's  speech 
on  the  Budget  in  1790  is  to  this  point,  for  he  said,  "  The  country 
at  this  moment  is  in  a  situation  of  prosperity  far  greater  than 
at  any  period  the  most  flourishing  before  the  last  war."  The 
imports  in  1789  had  risen  to  £17,828,000,  of  which  Asiatic 
trade  had  supplied  £3,453,897  of  goods  to  be  valued  in  the 
home  market  at  £6,000,000,  and  the  West  Indies  nearly  £4,000,- 
000  (official  value)  ;  the  exports  were  of  a  value  of  £18,5 13,000 
(Macpherson's  figure  is  £19,340,548),  of  which  about  £13,000,- 
000  were  British  manufactures,  — a  gain  of  over  one  million  in 
the  latter  item  since  1787,  and  a  gain  of  three  million  over  the 
annual  average  of  the  six  years  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the 
American  war.  Such  welfare  was  in  part  the  result  of  peace. 
The  condition  of  trade  in  1793,  before  the  Revolutionary 
struggle  was  thoroughly  started,  affords  a  comparison  with 
that  at  the  end  6"f  the  American  war,  by  which  to  determine 
the   effect   that   was   really   had   on   Asiatic    commerce    and 

nais,  p.  14.  Leroy-Beaulieu :  Colonisation,  pp.  64,  74-75.  Van  Lijnden  :  Dissertatio 
de  commercio,  p.  174.  "  Majoris  prosperitatis,  qua  per  breve  spatium  ante  bellum 
Anglicum  gavisi  sumus,  idem  bellum,  anno  1780  nobis  illatum,  finem  fecit,  et 
sequens,  quod  nobis  ab  eodem  populo  bellum  suscitatum  est,  toti  fere  mercaturae 
nostrae  minam  paravit/'    Bonnassieux :  Grandes  compagnies,  p.  60. 


COLONIAL  QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR    OF  1793  49 

trade  in  general.  The  total  foreign  commerce  of  the  United 
Kingdom  in  1793  was  £39,643,944,  of  which  the  exports  were 
£20,388,828,  leaving  a  balance  of  trade  of  over  a  million  pounds. 
These  exports  included  nearly  sixteen  million  (official  value) 
of  British  produce  and  manufactures  and  £2,719,246  in  bullion 
and  merchandise  sent  to  the  East  Indies.  The  returns  from 
that  region  were  valued  at  the  custom  house  at  three  and  a 
half  million  pounds,  but  were  sold  at  a  gross  profit  of  over  sixty 
per  cent.  The  West  Indies  sent  over  four  million  pounds,  but 
the  increase  of  sale  value  over  official  value  was  not  so  great. 
Thus  the  total  foreign  commerce  of  Great  Britain  had  increased 
over  seventy  per  cent  within  a  decade,  and  the  East  India  branch 
had  more  than  trebled.  (The  imports  from  the  West  Indies 
had  not  quite  doubled,  the  figures  for  1783  having  been  £2,- 
820,387.)  The  shipping  to  carry  this  wealth  had  increased 
accordingly :  as  against  8,342  British  vessels  of  669,802  tons 
manned  by  less  than  60,000  sailors  in  1783,  Great  Britain  and 
Scotland  had,  in  1793,  12,901  vessels,  of  1,367,420  tons,  and  the 
British  dominion  had  16,329  vessels,  of  1,564,520  tons,  manned 
by  nearly  120,000  sailors.  The  East  India  Company  had  been 
obliged  to  double  its  fleet,  and,  though  in  1788  not  one  tenth 
of  the  general  export  trade  from  Great  Britain  was  carried  in 
foreign  bottoms,  the  service  of  foreign  ships  was  required  in 
India  to  carry  the  product  of  individual  ventures  back  to 
Europe.  British  prosperity,  as  Lord  Auckland  wrote,  "  sur- 
passed all  idea."  "  A  degree  of  opulence  is  now  circulating 
through  the  country  with  an  unexampled  energy  and  activity 
both  in  agriculture  and  manufactures,"  he  wrote  to  another 
friend;  exultation  was  thus  the  justifiable  note  of  Mr.  Pitt's 
speech  of  February,  1792,  when  he  gave  account  of  the  nation's 
health.  Furthermore  the  ratio  of  the  business  done  in  1780 
between  England  and  the  East,  to  the  grand  totals  for  foreign 
commerce  in  1780,  as  has  been  shown,  was  not  quite  15  per 
cent ;  that  proportion  was  kept  up  in  spite  of  the  degree  of 
prosperity  to  which  Mr.  Pitt  bore  witness,  so  that  in  1793  the 

4 


50  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

corresponding  ratio  was  nearly  sixteen  per  cent,  calculated 
entirely  on  official  values,  and  without  attention  to  the  greater 
demand  for  Asiatic  produce  and  the  higher  prices  of  the  Lon- 
don market.1 

1  Vide  Appendix  II.  The  ideas  of  Emperor  Joseph  II.  on  the  decadence  of 
Great  Britain  are  typical  of  opinion  on  the  continent.  Arneth  :  Joseph  II  und 
Leopold,  i.  p.  152  (J.  to  L.  Jan.  23,  1783)  :  M  Voila  done  cette  grande  puissance 
[England]  qui  tenait  en  balance  la  France,  tombee  entierement  et  pour  toujours; 
toute  consideration  et  force  perdue,  et,  par  un  sacrifice  volontaire  descendue  au 
rang  de  puissance  de  second  ordre,  semblable  a  la  Suede  et  au  Danemarc  et 
probablement  elle  ne  tardera  pas  a  etre  egalement  commandee  par  la  Russie, 
commes  ces  dernieres."  Vorontzov :  Arkhiv,  xxix.  pp.  13  et  seq.  (Pictet  to  A.  R. 
Vorontzov.  London,  June  9,  1787).  Hansard:  Pari.  Hist,  xxviii.  698-700 ; 
xxix.  816-838.  Auckland:  Corr.  ii.  p.  457  (Auckland  to  Sir  Morton  Eden, 
Oct.  19,  1792).  Smyth :  Memoirs  of  Sir  Riehard  Keith,  ii.  p.  377  (Auckland  to 
Keith,  Feb.  9,  1791).  Cornwallis:  Corr.  i.  p.  197  (Ewart  to  Carmarthen,  Berlin, 
Sept.  10,  1785).  Report  of  Cornwallis's  address  to  King  of  Prussia:  "That 
although  the  finances  of  England  had  suffered  by  the  late  expensive  war  [Amer- 
ican], yet  that  had  not  been  in  greater  proportion  than  those  of  her  rivals ;  and 
by  the  plan  of  strict  economy,  which  was  adopted,  and  the  flourishing  state  of 
her  commerce,  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  England  would  be  able  to  support 
her  weight  and  dignity  with  the  other  powers  of  Europe."  Macpherson  :  Annals 
of  Commerce,  iv.  pp.  39,  135,  287.  Report  of  Select  Committee  of  East  India 
Company,  1792  (p.  243)  :  "All  the  foreign  companies,  except  the  Dutch,  have 
failed  or  are  in  a  very  declining  state.  Their  trade  can  no  longer  come  under 
the  description  of  commercial  adventure ;  it  depends  chiefly  upon  conveying  to 
Europe  the  fortunes  of  British  individuals ;  .  .  .  "  Arnould :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  35, 
36.  Bowles:  Retrospect,  pp.  113  el  seq.  The  revenue  of  the  Government  from 
the  Company  was  another  item  which  could  not  be  included  in  the  trade  statis- 
tics, yet  was  an  element  in  the  general  value  of  Asiatic  connection.  In  1773  it 
amounted  to  ,£2,000,000,  annually.  Annual  Register,  1773,  p.  76.  M'Arthur: 
op.  cit.  pp.  31  et  seq.  During  the  eighteenth  century  the  trade  between  Great 
Britain  and  her  "  plantations  "  had  increased  so  that  at  its  close  the  trade  with 
Jamaica  was  considerably  larger  than  that  with  all  the  plantations  in  1700.  Rose : 
Increase  of  the  Revenue,  Commerce,  and  Manufactures  of  Great  Britain,  pp.  40  et  seq. 
Anderson:  History  of  Commerce,  iv.  p.  666.  M'Arthur:  op.  cit.  pp.  259  et  seq. 
(figures  for  shipping).  Chalmers:  op.  cit.  pp.  xxvi,  cix  et  seq.,  142  et  seq.,  207 
et  seq.,  240  et  seq.  The  share  of  the  China  trade  in  the  East  India  commerce  is 
worthy  of  note.  In  1783  £120,000  were  exported  from  England  in  ships  of  6,000 
total  tonnage;  in  1792  the  figures  were  ,£626,000  and  17,981  tons  respectively. 
Tea  had  increased  from  an  annual  importage  to  England  of  5,605,074  pounds  in 
1784  to  18,108,533  in  1792.  The  stock  of  the  United  Company  had  also  risen; 
in  December,  1783,  India  stock  was  quoted  at  120,  and  in  1792  at  191.     (Cf.  p.  250 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  5 1 

The  importance  of  political  problems  awaiting  solution  dur- 
ing these  years  in  India  would  induce  the  belief  that  the  mind 
of  the  English  people  was  struggling  with  theif  intricacy  and 
vastness  ;  but  though  at  certain  junctures  the  fate  of  a  political 
party,  hanging  on  the  success  or  failure  of  a  bill  for  the  admin- 
istration of  India,  roused  the  nation  to  a  sense  of  responsibility, 
the  general  ignorance  shown  in  England  of  the  real  course  of 
events  in  Asia  forced  Burke  to  the  opinion  that  "  if  the  whole 
Gentoo  race  had  but  one  neck,  [our  countrymen]  would  see  it 
cut  with  the  most  perfect  indifference."  The  national  attitude 
of  the  British  people  toward  India,  however,  must  not  detain 
us  here;  and  the  study  of  financial  aspects  must  now  be  fol- 
lowed by  a  consideration  of  foreign  policy.  The  period  between 
1765  and  1785  was,  on  the  whole,  not  one  of  expansion  for  the 
British  in  India ;  rather  were  they  forced  to  fight  for  their 
authority,  to  intrigue  in  order  to  separate  their  rivals  by  mutual 
jealousy,  even  to  face  the  menace  which  they  hoped  they  had 
removed,  —  that  of  French  control  in  regions  of  great  area  and 
wealth,  a  hazard  to  their  safety  and  a  source  of  aid  to  their 
enemies.  But  the  collapse  of  the  Mughal  Empire  and  the  rise 
of  Sikh  power  in  the  North  freed  the  hands  of  the  English  for 
a  time,  and  they  were  enabled  to  deal  singly  with  forces  which, 
if  united,  might  have  changed  their  history  in  Asia.  The 
increasing  strength  of  the  connection  between  India  and  the 
British  government,  as  well  as  the  widening  scope  of  European 

for  figures  of  shipping.)  The  industrial  inventions  that  crowded  the  closing  years 
of  the  century,  though  at  first  a  stimulus  to  unhealthy  speculation  and  rash  in- 
vestment, soon  proved  their  value.  Cotton  manufacture  was  installed  at  a  critical 
period,  when  the  American  colonies  had  been  lost ;  but  it  was  a  source  of  great 
strength  for  the  Napoleonic  struggle,  the  total  exports  of  cotton  between  1793 
and  1815  amounting  to  £225,954,439,  official  value,  and  250,000,000,  real  value. 
Baines  :  Cotton  Manufacture,  pp.  503,  504.  Some  differences  are  to  be  noted  in 
the  figures  given  by  various  authorities  and  also  a  variation  in  the  financial  year. 
An  examination  of  the  tables  in  the  Appendix  will  show  the  estimates  which 
seemed  to  be  most  trustworthy ;  and  a  reference  will  be  found  there  to  the  dif- 
ference between  the  official  and  real  or  sale  value  figures  which  at  first  sight  seems 
to  be  misleading. 


52  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

politics,  gave  rise  to  speculation  on  the  continent  as  to  the  real 
effect  of  these  struggles.  Mirabeau  was  among  the  first  to 
prophesy  the  interest  of  Russia  in  Indian  matters,  and  to  augur 
the  storm  which  England  would  be  called  to  brave  should 
Russia  press  to  their  logical  end  her  plans  for  control  in  Central 
Asia.  Of  Russian  plans,  more  will  be  said  later;  but  it  is 
interesting  to  find  in  this  connection  that  memoranda  were 
drafted  urging  on  the  Russian  government  the  opportunity  for 
trade  with  India  by  the  Black  and  Red  Seas  as  well  as  by  land 
routes.  The  same  policy  dictated  the  political  mission  of  the 
Jesuit  priests,  sent  in  the  Russian  interest  to  China,  when,  in 
1793,  Lord  MacCartney  was  sent  out  by  the  British.  While 
it  was  not  decisive  action  on  the  part  of  Russia,  it  clearly 
showed  the  trend  of  her  policy.1 

1  Auckland:  Corr.  i.  pp.  77  (Burke to  Eden,  May  17,  1784),  342,  343.  (H. 
Elliot  to  Eden,  Dec.  26,  1783) :  "  Foreigners  in  general  think  we  are  in  danger  of 
losing  our  East  India  possessions  entirely  by  the  intrigues  of  the  French  and  the 
strength  of  their  allies  in  Hindostan,  and  are,  consequently,  more  solicitous  to 
learn  what  military  force  will  be  left  for  the  defense  of  those  distant  provinces, 
than  to  follow  the  different  modes  of  civil  government  we  are  so  anxious  to  estab- 
lish. I  am  not  a  little  tainted  with  the  same  principles,  and  am  persuaded  that 
the  nations  of  Europe  are  perhaps  more  desirous  to  see  us  driven  out  of  Hin- 
dostan than  they  were  to  divest  us  of  the  sovereignty  and  exclusive  trade  of  our 
colonies  in  America.  Our  empire  in  the  East  was  not  originally  founded  upon 
justice  ;  it  was  acquired  by  force  and  by  force  I  believe  it  must  be  maintained  .  .  . 
[he  pleads  for  a  strong  government]  for  ensuring  the  possession  of  a  distant 
province,  the  envy  of  our  rivals,  and  the  last  remaining  source  of  trade  and 
opulence."  Teignmouth  :  Life,  i.  p.  68.  Mirabeau :  Histoire  de  Berlin.  Lettre 
No.  29,  Dresden,  Sept.  26,  1786.  During  the  war  between  the  English  and 
Hyder  Ali,  Bengal  traded  with  Russians  to  the  north;  Russia  in  1783  had  sent  a 
fleet  to  seize  Astarabad,  but  was  not  successful.  "  Cette  enterprise  a  echouee  ; 
mais  elle  n'est  pas  abandonee,  et  si  peu,  que  Ton  voit  en  ce  moment  a  Peters- 
bourg  un  plan  en  relief  des  ouvrages  dont  on  veut  fortifier  Astrabat.  De  tous 
les  projets  gigantesques  de  la  Russie,  celui  ci  est  peut-etre  le  moins  deraisson- 
nable  puisque  la  nature  des  choses  le  lui  a  indique  et  qu'il  y  a  deja  une  navigation 
interieure  completement  etablie  depuis  Astracan,  par  le  Volga,  la  Mita,  le  lac 
Jemen,  le  Wologda,  le  canal  de  Ladoga  et  la  Newa,  jusqu'a  Petersbourg.  Si 
jamais  ce  plan  etait  suivi  avec  succes  et  activite,  il  faudrait  une  de  ces  deux 
choses  ou  que  PAngleterre  songeat  serieusement  a  une  coalition  avec  nous  contre 
le  systeme  du  Nord,  ou  qu'elle  laissat  prendre  toutes  sortes  d'avantages  sur  elle  a 
Petersbourg ,  car  on  y  aurait  alors  des  interets  tout-a-fait  contraires  aux  siens, 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  53 

The  period  between  1786  and  1793,  during  which  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  Governor-General  of  India,  is  an  important  one 
in  administrative  history  by  reason  of  what  is  known  as  the 
permanent  settlement  of  the  land  revenue  of  Bengal ;  by  it  the 
Zaminddrs,  or  hereditary  government  tax  farmers,  were  recog- 
nized, the  assessment  on  land  was  fixed,  at  first  for  ten  years 
and  later  permanently,  and  the  right  of  the  Zaminddr  to  col- 
lect it  was  established.  Proprietary  government  was  thus  the 
principle  of  action,  though  appeal  was  made  to  native  tradition 
and  custom.  Trade  was  brisk  and  the  Company  prosperous, 
yet  Great  Britain  was  not  the  sovereign  power  nor  even  the 
paramount  power  in  India;  and  when  the  second  war  with 
Mysore  came  on  in  1790  the  British  allied  themselves  with 
two  native  sovereigns  —  the  Nizam  of  Haidarabad  in  the  Dec- 
can,  and  the  head  of  the  Maratha  Confederacy  —  against  Tipu 
Sultan.  It  will  be  remembered  that  two  years  previously  this 
ruler  had  sent  an  embassy  to  France,  and  that  his  chief  aim 
in  foreign  policy  was  to  unite  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain 
under  his  leadership.  His  defeat,  therefore,  in  1792  may  be 
regarded  as  a  blow  to  French  interests  in  Asia  as  well  as  a 
strengthening  of  English  hands.  Of  his  subsequent  career 
more  will  be  said  in  another  chapter.  The  success  of  the 
British  in  the  war  which  had  ended  in  1783  had  proved  the 
security  of  British  sea  communications  with  India ;  that  of  the 
second  Mysore  war  (1792)  showed  that  as  long  as  they  could 

et  il  pourrait  s'y  former  de  terribles  orages  contre  sa  puissance  aux  Indes.'* 
Vorontzov:  Arkhiv,  xxiv.  pp.  180-187 ;  ix.  pp.  229  et  seq.  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov,  13 
(24)  Jan.  1792).  He  writes  of  the  necessity  of  Russia's  keeping  on  friendly  terms 
with  China,  and  at  the  same  time  to  "traverser  les  projets  des  Anglais  a  la 
Chine  "  [MacCartney's  mission].  He  proposes  to  send  a  mission  of  Jesuits  and 
Russian  officials,  nominally  a  scientific  expedition,  to  remain  in  Pekin,  thus  keep- 
ing Russia  well-informed,  and  enjoins  great  secrecy.  Cf.  pp.  253,  288.  Plans 
of  the  English  mission  dwarf  those  of  Russia :  "  Je  vous  avais  marque  le  dommage 
que  cela  fera  a  nous  si  mylord  Macartney  reussit  a  Pekin  " ;  there  is  need  of  a 
good  Russian  ambassador  there,  of  clever  Jesuits,  etc.  Cornwallis :  Corr.  i. 
p.  315.  The  plan  of  sending  a  British  envoy  to  China  was  suggested  by  Dundas 
in  July,  1787,  in  order  to  improve  trade  and  forestall  the  French,  who  were  sus- 
pected of  plans  in  that  direction,    ii.  pp.  1  et  seq.    Further  plans  in  1789. 


54  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

deal  with  the  native  states  singly  little  was  to  be  feared ;  the 
combination  to  be  dreaded  by  them  was  that  of  a  union  of 
native  rulers.  Such  an  event,  however,  as  invasion  from  the 
north,  or  effective  attack  by  an  enemy  independent  of  Europe 
as  a  base,  if  attended  with  war  in  India  on  the  part  of  the 
Nizam,  the  Maratha  powers,  or  Mysore,  could  prove  equally 
dangerous  to  them.  The  policy  of  England,  therefore,  was  to 
prevent  either  of  these  contingencies;  that  of  her  enemies  was 
both  to  strike  at  her  sea  power,  thus  threatening  her  line  of 
communication  with  the  East,  and  to  foster  in  India  whatever 
conditions  would  imperil  her  security  there.1 

If  such  were  the  state  of  the  British  connections  with  Asia 

1  Kaye:  op.  cit.  pp.  162  et  seq.  Cornwallis:  Corr.  (Administration)  i.  pp.  211 
et  seq.,  270  et  seq.,  298,  304,  448,  532  et  seq.,  540  et  seq.,  552  et  seq. ;  ii.  pp.  13  et  seq., 
191  et  seq.,  459  et  seq.,  542.  Idem :  i.  pp.  333  et  seq.  (Cornwallis  to  Malet,  Calcutta, 
March  10,  1788).  On  the  close  connection  between  Mysore  and  France,  the 
alliance  of  the  English  with  the  Maratha  powers  and  the  Nizam,  cf.  343-345,  352, 
390,  423  et  seq.,  536  et  seq. ;  ii.  pp.  112  et  seq.,  117-120,  475  et  seq.  Idem  :  i.  pp.  462 
et  seq.  (the  attack  by  Tipvi  Sultan  on  the  Rajah  of  Travancore,  1790,  and  the 
alliance  of  the  English  with  the  Marathas  against  Mysore)  ;  ii.  pp.  8,  68  et  seq., 
92  et  seq.,  134  et  seq.,  175  et  seq.,  490  et  seq.,  501-540  (the  campaign  against  Tipii. 
Peace  signed  1792);  Baird:  Life,  i.  pp.  51  et  seq.,  104  et  seq.  (the  war  with 
Mysore,  1790-1792) ;  Teignmouth :  Life  and  Corr.  i.  pp.  97,  148  (Shore  [Teign- 
mouth]  to  Cornwallis,  Oct.  4,  1787):  "[If  we  merely  act  on  the  defensive] 
Tippoo  will  destroy  our  resources,  by  ravaging  the  Carnatic,  and,  when  he  has 
driven  us  to  the  last  distress,  call  in  the  assistance  of  the  French  to  complete  it/' 
163,  169,  175  et  seq.;  Mackintosh:  Memoirs,  i.  pp.  194,  195  (Mackintosh  to 
Gentz,  Feb.  5,  1804).  The  quality  of  British  rule  in  India.  He  refers  to  "our 
ill-gotten,  but  well-governed,  Asiatic  empire."  A  curious  and  significant  com- 
ment on  the  lack  of  ability  in  English  generals  and  on  the  light  in  which  Eng- 
land's position  in  India  was  viewed  by  Europeans  is  given  by  S.  Vorontzov  in  a 
letter,  dated  Nov.  17  (28)  1794,  to  Count  A.  Razumovski.  Wassiltchikow :  Les 
Razoumowski,  ii.  Part.  4,  p.  217 :  "Les  gene*raux  anglais  ne  sont  pas  faits  pour  con- 
duire  des  armees ;  c'est  bien  eux-memes,  qui  devraient  etre  subordonnes  a  des 
generaux  allemands,  dont  le  moins  capable  sait  plus  de  tactique  que  tous  les 
Anglais  ensemble.  Leux  fameux  Cornwallis  n'est  bon  qu'a  faire  la  guerre  aux 
Indiens,  oil  encore  il  n'aurait  jamais  reussi  a  vaincre  Tippo-Saib  sans  le  secours 
puissant  des  Marattes."  Cf.  Dirom:  Narrative  of  the  Campaign  in  India  which 
terminated  the  war  with  Tippoo  Sultan  in  1792 ;  and,  in  the  "  Rulers  of  India 
Series,"  Seton-Karr :  The  Marquess  Cornwallis  ;  and  Bowring :  Haidar  Ali  and 
Tipii  Sultdn. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  55 

in  1793,  in  what  light  were  they  viewed  by  Frenchmen;  what 
were  the  ideas  current  in  France  regarding  Great  Britain's 
power  as  related  to  India ;  and  what  influence  did  questions  of 
sea-power,  colonies,  and  Asiatic  dominion  exert  at  the  time 
when  the  struggle  between  the  two  rivals  was  to  be  renewed? 
The  work  of  Raynal  in  spreading  the  belief  that  England's 
power  was  based  on  her  Asiatic  commerce  and  that  her  posi- 
tion in  India  was  unstable  and  open  to  attack  on  all  sides  was 
important.  More  must  be  said  later  of  his  influence,  through 
the  mind  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  on  the  history  of  the  world 
during  the  next  quarter-century.  The  author  of  the  Histoire 
philosophique  et  politique  des  etablissements  et  du  commerce  des 
Europeens  dans  les  deux  Indes  estimated  the  English  occupa- 
tion of  Bengal  to  be  one  of  the  great  events  in  the  economy  of 
history;  but  he  refused  to  credit  any  force  save  that  of  chance 
with  its  accomplishment  and  prophesied  the  overthrow  of  the 
British,  and  the  return  of  the  French  to  power  in  India. 
"  The  very  circumstances,"  he  wrote,  "  which  have  opened 
this  career  of  glory  and  power  to  the  English,  far  from  prom- 
ising a  continuance  of  their  success,  foretell  for  them  the 
most  fatal  disasters."  He  painted  the  r61e  of  France  as  the 
liberator  of  India  in  equally  vivid  colors.  A  disciple  of  his 
writes  in  the  same  terms  several  years  later,  —  that  India  is  the 
Achilles  heel  of  the  British  Empire;  for  Great  Britain,  stripped 
of  the  wealth  she  gained  from  her  Asiatic  possessions,  could 
"  lead  but  a  precarious  existence "  and  would  "  no  longer 
excite  the  alarm  of  France  and  of  Europe."  Arnould,  the 
statistician,  with  all  his  prejudice  against  the  East  India  trade, 
wrote  that  India  meant  annually  about  250,000,000  livres  of 
commerce  and  revenue  to  the  English ;  and  the  oratory  of 
the  Revolution,  forgetful  also  of  the  large  figures  of  French 
colonial  trade,  magnified  this  statement  till  the  very  vitality  of 
England  seemed  to  them  to  rise  from  an  Asiatic,  source. 
When  the  West  Indies  were  included  in  their  speeches,  the 
commerce  of  these  possessions  was  proclaimed  as  the  founda- 


5^  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

tion  of  British  power  on  the  ocean.  Indeed  the  negotiations 
which  looked  to  peace,  and  even  an  alliance,  between  England 
and  France  were  based  on  the  French  idea  that  the  words 
"  colonies,"  "  sea-power  "  and  "  India  "  were  magic  terms  by 
which  the  British  mind  could  be  controlled.  This  plan,  for 
which  Talleyrand  stood  sponsor,  sprang  from  his  strong  belief 
regarding  the  utility  of  a  colonial  domain,  which  he  expressed 
several  years  later  in  his  well  known  MJrnoire  on  this  subject; 
he  advocated  colonial  expansion  as  a  source  of  strength,  in  the 
case  of  France  as  a  safety  valve  to  rid  the  home  country  of 
men  whose  political  passions  were  too  violent,  and  in  general 
to  call  popular  attention  to  matters  beyond  the  sea;  in  a  word, 
colonial  expansion  was  to  be  for  the  modern  world  what  a 
foreign  war  had  been  to  the  classic,  —  a  remedy  for  internal 
disorder.  These  views  were  embodied  in  a  report  which 
Talleyrand  made  early  in  1792  urging  an  alliance  between 
France  and  Great  Britain  on  the  basis  of  a  division  of  colonial 
empire  by  which  their  mutual  commercial  prosperity  would  be 
secured  and  their  naval  power  would  be  used,  in  conjunction  with 
that  of  the  United  States,  to  free  the  Spanish  colonies  in  South 
America,  thus  opening  them  to  their  trade;  to  create,  in  fact,  an 
international  syndicate  whose  monopoly  would  be  in  colonial 
estates.  The  instructions  given  to  Chauvelin  and  Talleyrand  in 
April  of  that  year  included  a  proposal  for  a  reciprocal  guarantee 
of  the  possessions  of  both  countries  in  Europe,  Asia,  and 
America,  and  a  scheme  of  attack  on  Spain  should  that  state 
continue  hostile.  Talleyrand,  on  his  previous  visit  to  Eng- 
land, had  talked  with  Lord  Grenville  on  these  matters,  and  in 
his  account  of  the  conversation  to  M.  Delessart  he  sounded 
the  note  familiar  to  Frenchmen  by  pointing  out  that  by  the 
terms  of  his  plan  Great  Britain  would  be  protected  as  to  Ire- 
land and  India,  —  the  two  weak  spots  in  her  imperial  armor.1 

1  Raynal:  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  196,  483,  493.  Legoux  de  Flaix:  U lndoustan,  i. 
pp.  395-96.  The  writer  is  inspired  by  Raynal,  who,  he  says,  foresaw  the  further 
aggrandizement  of  Great  Britain ;  he  wrote  five  memoirs  on  this  subject,  1790- 


ONiVEFrsrr 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND  THE    WAR   OF  1793  57 

When  this  dream  of  defensive  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
vanished,   and    when   the    scope   of   the   Revolution   became 

1800.  "  La  France  seule,  beaucoup  plus  interessee  dans  ces  resultats  que  les 
autres  puissances  europeennes,  devait  employer  toutes  ses  forces  pour  s'opposer  a 
ces  conquetes  des  Anglais  dans  l'lndoustan.  Et  s'il  est  vrai  de  dire  que  les  corps 
politiques  ont  une  partie  plus  sensible,  ainsi  que  les  corps  humains,  sur  laquelle 
doivent  etre  diriges  touts  les  coups  d'un  ennemi  eclaire,  c'est  sur  les  possessions 
britanniques  de  l'lnde  que  touts  nos  efforts  auraient  du  se  porter.  Privee  des 
ressources  immenses  que  l'Angleterre  obtient  de  ces  possessions,  et  livree  a  celles 
de  son  pays,  son  existence  etait  precaire,  et  les  justes  sujets  des  alarmes  de  la 
France  et  de  l'Europe  se  seraient  naturellement  et  graduellement  evanouis." 
Arnould  :  Balance  du  commerce,  i.  p.  285.  Gouy :  Vues  ginerales,  p.  2  :  "  C'est 
parle  commerce  des  deux  Indes  que  l'Angleterre  et  la  Hollande  ont  eleve,  tour-a- 
tour,  leur  trone  sur  l'Ocean.  Si  naguere  la  France  tenoit  le  balance  entre  les 
Souverains  de  l'Europe,  si  elle  a  aneanti  pendant  un  temps  les  pretentions  d'une 
rivale  toujours  jalouse  de  sa  splendeur,  c'est  a  la  prosperite  de  la  culture  des 
colonies.  .  .  ."  Nairac  :  Speech  in  the  Assemblee,  June  28,  1790:  "  Jetez  les 
yeux  sur  l'Angleterre  ;  son  commerce  de  l'lnde  est  immense.  II  produit  annuelle- 
ment  plus  de  80  millions  de  retours.  II  fournit  presque  toutes  les  nations  de 
l'Europe ;  il  fournit  a  ses  propres  besoins  et  cependant  les  manufactures  n'y 
languissent  pas."  Also  the  speeches  of  Begouen  and  Mirabeau,  at  the  same 
time,  on  Indian  Trade,  Marseilles,  and  the  Levant.  Talleyrand :  Essai  sur  les 
avantages  a  retirer  de  colonies  nouvelles,  in  Memoires  de  Vlnstitut,  etc.,  ii.  pp.  300, 
301.  After  recommending  Northern  Africa,  various  neighboring  islands,  and 
Egypt  as  fit  to  replace  French  losses  in  America,  he  concluded :  "  De  tout 
ce  qui  vient  d'etre  expose,  il  suit  que  tout  presse  de  s'occuper  de  nouvelles 
colonies ;  l'exemple  des  peuples  les  plus  sages,  qui  en  ont  fait  un  des  grands 
moyens  de  tranquillite  ;  le  besoin  de  preparer  le  remplacement  de  nos  colonies 
actuelles  pour  ne  pas  nous  trouver  en  arriere  des  evenements ;  la  convenance  de 
placer  la  culture  de  nos  denrees  coloniales  plus  pres  de  leurs  vrais  cultivateurs ; 
la  necessite  de  former  avec  les  colonies  les  rapports  les  plus  naturels,  bien  plus 
faciles,  sans  doute,  dans  les  etablissements  nouveaux  que  dans  les  anciens ; 
l'avantage  de  ne  point  nous  laisser  prevenir  par  une  nation  rivale,  pour  qui 
chacun  des  nos  oublis,  chacun  de  nos  retards  en  ce  genre  est  une  conquete  ; 
1' opinion  des  hommes  eclaires  qui  ont  porte  leur  attention  et  leurs  recherches 
sur  cet  objet;  enfin  la  douceur  de  pouvoir  attacher  a  ces  enterprises  tant  d'hommes 
agites  qui  ont  besoin  de  projets,  tant  d'hommes  malheureux  qui  ont  besoin 
d'esperance."  The  plan  of  the  English  alliance  had  much  in  common  with  the 
diplomatic  policy  of  General  Dumouriez.  Cf.  Sorel :  Un  general  diplomatique. 
Dumouriez,  etc.,  in  the  R.  de  D.  M.  3  ser.  Ixiv.  (1884),  pp.  302-332,  575-606, 
798-829.  Pallain:  Talleyrand  et  le  Directoire,  pp.  xlii.  et  seq.,  lv.  (Memoir  by 
Talleyrand)  :  "...  les  vaisseaux  de  la  France  et  de  l'Angleterre  reunis  iront 
ouvrir  dans  la  mer  Pacifique,  dans  la  mer  du  Sud,  et  dans  l'Ocean  Meridional  le 
commerce  libre  de  cette  immense  partie  des  Indes  occidentales.  .  .  .  Apres  une 
revolution,  il  faut  ouvrir  de  nouvelles  routes  a  l'industrie,  il  faut  donner  des 


58  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

apparent  in  the  politics  of  both  nations,  the  ideas  which  had 
prompted  plans  for  co-operation  to  a  common  end  revived 
among  the  French  the  old  outcry  against  England.  The 
period  of  confusion  and  disorganization  in  the  French  colo- 
nies, which  was  in  part  the  legacy  of  the  Ancien  Regime 
and  in  part  incidental  to  the  radical  policy  of  the  Revolution, 
had  been  profitable  to  Great  Britain,  and  as  her  enmity  to  the 
extreme  phases  of  the  Revolution  became  known,  the  furious 
hatred  of  her  which  had  been  inbred  in  the  subjects  of  the 
Bourbons  was  renewed  in  the  French  mind  in  its  new  national 
self-consciousness.  Early  in  January,  1793,  Kersaint  had  de- 
clared that  the  struggle  between  the  two  great  rivals  would  be 
to  the  death ;  and  Brissot,  in  his  speech  on  the  war  with  Eng- 
land, asked  "  if  it  were  possible  that  she  could  withstand  well 
directed  onslaughts  in  India " ;  he  then  drew  a  picture  of 
Frenchmen  "  restoring  independence  "  to  India  with  the  help 
of  native  rulers,  re-establishing  the  India  trade  "  on  a  sound 
basis,  the  basis  of  fraternitf"  driving  out  the  English,  and  thus 
making  it  easy  to  undermine  "  a  power  whose  colossal  figure 
revealed  weakness  and  invited  ruin."  This  explosion  of  feeling 
was  the  natural  result  of  the  same  thought  which  had  prompted 
the  attempt  to  concert  a  plan  of  action  with  Great  Britain  ; 
for,  if  it  were  true,  as  Burke  had  said,  that  no  combination  of 
the  powers  which  did  not  include  Great  Britain  as  leader 
could  expect  to  make  any  impression  on  France,  the  object  of 
France  must  be  to  isolate  Great  Britain,  and  to  regard  war 
with  her  as  a  means  to  gain  sea-power  and  colonies :  "  Angle- 
terre  —  B4U  a  exterminer"  were  the  terse  words  of  a  secret 

debouches  a  toutes  les  passions."  Pallain  :  Talleyrand  h  Londres  en  1792,  pp.  98 
et  sea.,  106.  (Talleyrand  to  Delessart,  London,  Feb.  17),  report  of  a  conversation 
with  Lord  Grenville.  Talleyrand  said  :  "  [I  desire]  qu'il  s'etablit  entre  nos  deux 
nations  une  garantie  reciproque  de  toutes  nos  possessions  orientales,  occidentales, 
et  Europeennes  (M.  Delessart  verra  surement  la  qu'en  ecartant  toute  idee  de 
cession  j'ai  touche  les  deux  cordes  sensibles  pour  l'Angleterre :  lTnde  oil  est  la 
guerre,  et  l'lrlande  qui  est  menacee  de  troubles)  ;  pp.  219-242  (instructions  of 
April  20),  and  especially  232.     Cf.  Lecky :  op.  cit.  vi.  pp.  5-12,  47-54. 


COLONIAL    QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  59 

note  written  in  the  summer  of    1794.      In  crude  outline  the 
sentence  anticipated  the  history  of  the  next  twenty  years.1 
This  policy,  itself  a  bequest  of  the  Ancien   Regime,  got 

1  Barral-Montferrat :  Dix  Ans,  i.  p.  8.  (The  despatches  given  by  this  writer 
are  taken  almost  entirely  from  the  Public  Record  Office,  London.)  (Hailes  to  the 
Duke  of  Dorset,  Paris,  January,  1784) :  H  France  is  so  impoverished  that  we 
shall  do  well  to  profit  by  this  and  sap  her  influence,  enfeeble  and  humiliate  her, 
though  preserving  toward  her  at  the  same  time  an  outward  frankness  and  cor- 
diality." Malouet :  Memoires  sur  les  colonies,  iii.  p.  244.  Villele :  Memoires, 
i.  p.  52.  In  1 791  "  l'empressment  de  nos  eternels  rivaux,  les  Anglais,  a  faire 
tourner  au  profit  de  leur  puissance  l'etat  de  disorganisation,  de  demence  et  de 
faiblesse  ou  nous  avait  jetes  la  Revolution."  Page  53 :  "  L'influence  franeaise 
allait  etre  aneantie  dans  ces  contrees  [East  Indies],  ou  elle  avait  tant  grandi 
pendant  la  guerre  precedente  par  les  brillants  exploits  maritimes  de  M.  de  Suffren 
et  par  l'accroissement  de  l'empire  de  notre  puissant  allie  Hyder-Ali."  Stephens  : 
op.  cit.  ii.  p.  495.  Le  Moniteur,  Jan.  15,  1793.  Brissot's  speech  :  "Ilfaut  dejouer 
le  cabinet  anglais  comme  nous  avons  dejoue  Leopold  et  Frederic-Guillaume ;  il 
faut  le  forcer  de  nous  donner  une  explication  precise  qui  nous  tranquillise  a 
jamais,  ou  tirer  l'epee  contre  les  Anglais ;  et,  croyez-en  le  genie  de  la  liberte,  les 
matelots  francais  ne  le  cederont  point  aux  vainqueurs  du  Brabant,  et  la  mer  aura 
aussi  son  Jemmapes.  .  .  .  Dites-nous  s'il  est  possible  qu'elle  [England]  puisse  y 
[India]  soutenir  des  attaques  bien  dirigees,  combinees  avec  les  princes  de  ce  pays, 
et  dans  un  nouveau  systeme  ;  dites-nous  si,  lorsque  les  republicains  francais  se  pre- 
senteront  dans  ces  parages,  non  pour  remplacer  les  Anglais  en  les  chassant,  mais 
pour  rendre  l'Inde  a  son  independance,  pour  y  rappeler  le  commerce  a  la  vraie  base, 
la  base  de  la  f  raternite,  dites-nous  si  des-lors  ils  ne  trouveront  pas  et  dans  les  princes 
et  dans  les  peuples  autant  d'allies,  et  s'il  ne  leur  sera  pas  facile  de  renverser  une 
puissance  dont  la  statue  colossale  accuse  la  faiblesse  et  appelle  la  ruine  ? " 
Documents  inedits  in  La  Revolution  franeaise,  xiv.  p.  11 12:  "Diplomatic  de  la 
Republique  franeaise  conf ormement  au  plan  trace  par  le  Comite  du  Salut  public," 
Tan  II.  Burke:  Heads  for  Consideration,  in  Works,  iii.  p.  406  (written  in  Nov., 
1792) :  "That  there  never  was,  nor  is,  nor  ever  will  be,  nor  ever  can  be,  the  least 
rational  hope  of  making  an  impression  on  France  by  any  continental  powers,  if 
England  is  not  a  part,  is  not  the  directing  part,  is  not  the  soul  of  the  whole  con- 
federacy against  it."  Le  Moniteur,  Jan.  16,  1793.  Speech  of  Kersaint  in  the 
National  Convention  on  Jan.  13:  "  Citoyens,  je  crois  avoir  prouve,  le  ier  Janvier, 
que  nousetionsen  situation  d'opposer  a  la  Nation  Anglaise  une  resistance  ferme, 
et  de  reduire  enfin  au  moins  a.  l'incertitude  cette  ambition  des  Anglais,  de  dominer 
toutes  les  puissances  maritimes  de  l'Europe,  et  de  lui  faire  sentir  que  si  elle  nous 
force  a  la  combattre,  cette  guerre  qu'on  lui  a  presentee  comme  tres-facile,  sera 
une  guerre  terrible ;  car  un  combat  entre  deux  Nations  qui  veulent  etre  libres, 
est  un  combat  a  mort,  et  ne  peut  finir  que  par  la  destruction  de  l'une  ou  de 
1'autre." 


60  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

ready  support  in  France,  for  it  appealed  to  the  people  both  as 
brave  politics  and  sound  economics ;  it  was  good  military  strat- 
egy to  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  communication,  to  attack  his 
weak  point  and  to  strike  at  the  supposed  base  of  his  supplies. 
For  it  was  by  protecting  these  from  attack,  by  pledging  their 
security,  that  Talleyrand  had  hoped  to  win  Great  Britain  to 
the  side  of  France,  and  the  same  details  counted  now  in  war 
as  they  had  the  year  before  in  peace.  Then  Spain  was  to  pay 
the  costs  for  the  aggrandizement  of  the  two  allies ;  now  the  pro- 
gram of  France  included  her  as  an  ally  chiefly  in  order  to  pre- 
vent her  from  being  of  use  to  Great  Britain.  The  Frenchmen 
who  thought  of  colonial  expansion  reckoned  on  the  colonies 
to  draw  away  the  soldiers  and  plotters  who  endangered  the 
young  Republic;  they  planned  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana, 
Spanish  Santo  Domingo,  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  while 
rebellion  instigated  in  India,  Ireland,  and,  if  need  were,  South 
America  should  distract  the  enemy;  they  hoped  to  keep  the 
Spanish  colonies  from  becoming  naval  bases  for  the  English 
fleets,  to  increase  their  own  sea-power  by  forcing  an  alliance  with 
Spain ;  in  a  word,  to  isolate  and  maim  Great  Britain.  They  were 
acting  on  Burke's  maxim  :  "  Spain  is  not  a  substantive  power ; 
she  must  lean  on  France  or  on  England ;  "  and  Spain  was  es- 
sential to  the  Republic,  which  had  succeeded  a  Louis  XIV.  and 
had  inherited  his  plans  for  a  Spanish  succession,  a  Latin  Med- 
iterranean and  a  French  colonial  Empire.  As  the  coalition 
against  France  began  to  show  signs  of  breaking  up,  the  signa- 
ture of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain  became  a  matter  of  impor- 
tance to  the  French  who  were  influenced  by  such  considerations 
as  the  above.  Such  a  treaty,  providing  for  an  alliance  between 
the  two  nations  and  looking  to  common  action  against  England, 
was  therefore  hailed  with  joy  (August,  1796).  The  instruc- 
tions to  the  French  diplomats  had  been  to  increase  the  naval 
force,  to  plan  for  control  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  to  strike  at 
Great  Britain  with  Spanish  arms.  In  addition  to  the  treaty  of 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  the  negotiations  dealt  with 


COLONIAL    QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  6 1 

such  matters  as  united  naval  action  and  the  cession  of  Louisi- 
ana to  France  when  Gibraltar  should  have  been  won  from  Great 
Britain.  It  was  proposed  that  Sweden,  Denmark,  the  Batavian 
Republic,  and  the  Ottoman  Empire  should  be  invited  to  join 
the  alliance.  When,  therefore,  a  few  months  later  the  Span- 
ish fleet  arrived  at  Toulon  it  was  greeted  by  verses  which, 
though  crude,  clearly  reflected  the  French  policy :  — 

"  Salut,  enfants  de  la  Castile, 
A  nos  voix  meles  vos  accents; 
Formons  une  seule  famille 

Aux  yeux  des  Anglais  palissants.   {Sung  twice.) 
L'inteVet  commun  nous  dclaire, 
Nos  mains  porteront  desormais 
Pour  nous  l'olivier  de  la  paix 
Et  la  foudre  pour  PAngleterre. 

{Chorus :)  Espagnol  et  Francais,  nos  drapeaux  sont  unis ; 

Jurons,  jurons :  paix  entre  nous,  guerre  a  nos  ennemis."1 

1  Verses  written  by  Poupinet  to  the  air,  "  Allons,  enfants  de  la  patrie,"  and 
sung  in  the  theatre  at  Toulon.  Quoted  by  Grandmaison  :  V  Ambassade  francaise 
en  Espagne,  p.  114.  Cf.  pp.  110-113,  314-317 >  320-321.  De  Clercq:  Recueil, 
i.  pp.  245,  287.  Martens  :  Recueil  generate,  vi.  pp.  45  et  sea.,  124  et  sea.  Aulard : 
Politique  e'trangere,  m  Revol.  franc.,  xiv.  pp.  iin-1113.  Pallain :  Talleyrand  h 
Londres,  pp.  157  et  seq.  (Biron  to  Dumouriez,  Valenciennes,  March  19,  1792.) 
"...  Vingt  vaisseaux  armes  et  prets  a  mettre  a  la  voile  pour  lTnde  en  impose- 
ront  a  toutes  les  intrigues  royales  anglaises,  et  la  nation,  je  le  repete,  ne  permettra 
pas  au  ministere,  au  Parlement  meme,  de  courir  le  risque  d'une  guerre  avec  la 
France;  une  telle  guerre  peut,  en  effet,  presenter  des  suites  desastreuses  et 
probables  a  une  nation  qui  n'a  d'autre  hypotheque  a  donner  a  une  dette  immense 
que  son  credit.  Personne  ne  peut  calculer  le  bouleversement  que  produirait  a 
Londres  la  chute  de  la  Compagnie  des  Indes,  et  tout  le  monde  le  sait."  La 
diplomatic  revohttionnaire,vs\  Rev.  de  la  Revol.,  ii.  p.  361.  (Merlin  to  Goupilleau, 
March  7,  1795),  propositions  regarding  Spanish  treaty:  "En  resume  la  Repub- 
lique  desire  dominer  sur  la  Mediterranee  et  augmenter  ses  forces  sur  l'Ocean." 
Sorel :  France  et  Espagne,  in  Rev.  hist.,  xiii.  p.  271  (instructions  to  French  repre- 
sentative, Perignon,  March  16,  1796)  :  "  L'Angleterre  est  Tobjet  principal  de  la 
politique  de  la  France.  C'est  pour  atteindre  l'Angleterre  que  la  Republique  a 
traite  avec  l'Espagne."  Burke:  op.  cit.  iii.  p.  397.  Bailleu :  Preussen  und  Frank- 
reich,  i.  p.  80.  Report  by  Sandoz-Rollin  of  a  conversation  with  Delacroix,  Paris, 
July  12,  1796.  Delacroix  said:  " .  .  .  Le  systeme  en  est  arrete;  nous  chasserons 
les  Anglais  de  la  Mediterranee,   et  nous   y  reussirons   infailliblement,  ou  en 


62  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

This  general  theory  of  politics  and  commerce,  which  looked 
on  sea-power  as  the  object  in  the  attack  on  Great  Britain,  had 
eloquent  supporters  at  this  period  and  in  the  years  which  saw 
the  rise  of  Bonaparte.  The  mission  of  France  was  to  "  wreak 
vengeance  on  the  tyrant  of  the  seas,"  a  state  whose  "  power 
was  purely  artificial,"  based  on  ill-gotten  wealth  and  stolen  colo- 
nies, whose  policy  aimed  at  the  commercial  ruin  of  all  others 
by  depriving  them  of  their  foreign  establishments  and  wrecking 
their  prosperous  colonial  trade ;  the  Revolution  had  been  their 
opportunity,  and  battle  must  be  joined  with  them  till  France 
was  again  possessed  of  her  empire  over-seas.  Poet  and  pamph- 
leteer joined  in  the  outcry  against  a  state  whose  downfall  was 
their  dearest  hope,  and  clamored  for  colonial  conquest  as  the 
crown  of  victory  and  the  ideal  of  an  imperial  republic.  Whether 
their  efforts  met  with  failure  or  success  is  a  matter  beside  the 
mark;  whether  their  belief  in  the  Asiatic  source  of  Great 
Britain's  power  was  true  or  false  is  not  important,  if  it  can 
be  shown  that  their  ideas  influenced  the  course  of  events,  and 
that  their  teaching  imbued  Napoleon  Bonaparte  with  theories 
and  purposes  which  were  to  move  Europe  and  Asia.1 

mettant  garnison  francaise  dans  lesdits  ports,  ou  en  exigeant  leur  fermeture  a 
tout  batiment  anglais.  .  .  ."  Ibid.  i.  p.  107.  Report  of  Sandoz-Rollin  on  the 
discussion  as  to  the  destiny  of  the  Brest  fleet,  Paris,  Dec.  30,  1796:  "Toute 
Tattention  du  public  se  porte  dans  le  moment  present  sur  l'expedition  de  Brest : 
on  cherche  a  en  penetrer  le  secret  et  on  se  perd  en  conjectures  inutiles.  Tantot 
on  veut  que  ladite  flotte  soit  destinee  pour  la  Jamaique,  et  qu'elle  ait  le  projet 
d'armer  et  d'insurger  les  noirs  qui  s'y  trouvent  contre  les  colons  anglais  :  tantot 
on  veut  qu'elle  soit  destinee  a  reprendre  le  Cap  de  Bonne-Esperance  et  Trinque- 
male ;  tant6t  on  veut  qu'elle  soit  dirigee  contre  l'etat  de  l'Eglise,  afin  de  forcer 
le  Pape  a  la  paix  et  d'exiger  de  lui  des  contributions  considerables.  L'Irlande  est 
toujours  pour  moi  [Sandoz]  le  point  qui  concentre  le  plus  de  probabilites  pour 
cette  expedition."  Baumgarten :  Gesch.  Spaniens,  i.  p.  72:  "Von  der  Ausbrei- 
tung  der  britischer  Seemacht  wurde  kein  europaischer  Staat  directer  betroffen 
als  Spanien,  dessen  Existence  an  seiner  maritimen  Selbstandigkeit  hing,  an  der 
dadurch  bedingten  Sicherheit  seines  ungeheuren  Colonialbesitzes,  dessen  Hafen 
jeder  fremden  Macht  zu  versperren  fiir  ein  Axiom  der  spanischen  Handelspolitik 
gait,"  pp.  7$et  seq. 

1  Villers  :  Rapport  relatif  aux  Marchandises  anglaises,  p.  17.     Dubroca :  op.  cit 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  63 

It  remains  to  examine  opinion  in  England  and  to  trace  the 
evolution  in  her  policy.  The  pleasure  that  Englishmen  felt  at 
the  disorder  in  France  was  natural,  for  Mr.  Storer  expressed 
the  common  idea  when  he  wrote  to  Lord  Auckland :  "  As  long 
as  France  will  but  continue  in  her  present  ridiculous  and  mis- 
erable situation,  old  England  is  perfectly  safe  " ;  indeed  the  ex- 
pectation in  England  was  that  France  would  "  soon  cease  to 
be  an  object  of  alarm  to  other  nations,"  and  would  "  sink  with- 
in herself  into  an  abyss  of  horrors  of  every  kind  —  famine,  civil 
war,  rapine,  massacres,  and  ultimately  a  separation  of  govern- 
ments and  various  dismemberments."  The  very  policy  of 
neutrality  to  which  Great  Britain  at  first  clung  was  guided, 
according  to  Mr.  Burges,  by  such  firm  belief  in  "  the  immense 
advantages  to  be  derived  by  this  country  [England]  from  such 
a  state  of  anarchy  and  weakness  as  France  is  at  present  [1790] 
plunged  in  "  that  it  seemed  to  him  madness  "  to  interfere  in 
any  measure  which  may  even  remotely,  tend  to  put  France  into 

pp.  v-vii,  xi,  15-17.  Chenier:  CEuvres,  iii.  pp.  186,  187,  Eligie,  La  Mort  du 
General  Hoche :  — 

"  L'heure  approche  ou  la  France 
Du  vainqueur  des  Anglais  remplira  l'esperance. 

Debout  sur  des  debris,  l'orgueilleuse  Angleterre, 
La  menace  a  la  bouche,  et  le  glaive  a  la  main, 
Reclame  encore  la  guerre,  et  veut  du  sang  humain. 
Elle  dont  le  trident,  asservissant  les  ondes, 
Usurpa  les  tresors  et  les  droits  des  deux  mondes ; 
Rendons  aux  nations  l'heritage  des  mers ; 
Entendez,  mes  enfants,  la  voix  de  1'univers 
Deleguer  aux  Frangais  la  vengeance  publique, 
Voyez  Londres  palir  au  nom  de  Vltalique  "  [Bonaparte]. 

Wassiltchikow :  Les  Razoumowski,  ii.  Part  4,  p.  80.  (Dietrichstein  to  A.  Razu- 
movski,  London,  April  6,  1802.)  In  speaking  of  the  mistakes  made  by  England, 
charging  her  with  having  attempted  to  make  use  of  the  Revolution  to  her  own 
ends,  he  also  speaks  of  the  value  which  the  possession  of  Santo  Domingo  would 
have  been  to  England,  for  France  would  have  surrendered  the  Netherlands,  Hol- 
land, Switzerland,  Piedmont,  or  the  Cisalpine  Republic  in  order  to  regain  it.  This 
judgment,  though  very  possibly  at  fault,  shows  the  realization  of  the  importance 
attributed  to  colonial  territory  by  many  statesmen  of  the  period. 


64  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

the  situation  where  a  long  and  terrible  experience  has  taught 
us  she  had  the  power  to  injure  us."  It  was  with  calm  interest 
and  amusement,  according  to  Lord  Auckland,  that  the  average 
Englishmen  regarded  the  Revolution ;  even  an  Under-Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  wrote  in  1792  that  England 
had  no  concern  in  foreign  politics.  She  was  too  busy  taking 
her  profits  from  her  increasing  commerce  and  manufactures. 
There  was  joy  over  the  news  from  India  of  Tipu's  defeat,  for 
"  now  the  temple  of  Janus  could  be  closed  "  without  prospect 
of  its  being  opened  soon  again.  These  were  the  views  of  men 
who  regarded  only  the  interest  of  Great  Britain,  and  who, 
though  they  might  acknowledge  with  Burke  "  that  France  by 
its  mere  geographical  position,  independently  of  every  other 
circumstance,  must  affect  every  state  of  Europe,"  nevertheless 
watched  the  course  of  events,  not  for  the  checking  of  this 
philosophy  or  that  democracy,  but  for  opportunity  to  increase 
the  wealth  and  prosperity  of  Great  Britain,  whether  by  peace 
or  war.  That  this  could  be  done  better  by  neutrality  than  by 
intervention  in  the  affairs  of  France  at  first  seemed  probable ; 
to  "  let  well  enough  alone  "  was  the  maxim.  But  Mr.  Pitt  was 
charged  with  hypocrisy,  with  fomenting  the  hot  spirits  of  the 
French  to  new  orgies  of  blood ;  he  would  have  acted  with 
greater  honor,  wrote  Count  Pinto,  the  Portuguese  minister,  had 
he  "  declared  war  against  France,  demolished  Cherburg,  de- 
stroyed her  navy,  and  seized  her  colonies."  Yet  the  policy  of 
Pitt,  whether  it  commended  itself  to  Englishmen  or  to  Conti- 
nental critics,  was  wise  beyond  doubt ;  "  he  served  his  coun- 
try well,"  even  Pinto  wrote,  and  waited  till  popular  opinion 
should  bear  him  out  in  moving  against  France,  and  until  the 
necessity  of  checking  her  plans  in  the  Low  Countries  seemed 
greater  than  the  profit  to  be  gained  by  quietly  waiting  till  un- 
wise legislation  and  economic  disorder  in  the  French  colonies 
should  complete  their  work.  The  very  aims  which  were 
attributed  to  English  policy  by  friends  and  foes  before  the 
declaration  of  war  go  far  to  indicate  the  general  idea  regarding 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  6$ 

the  ends  to  be  gained  by  Great  Britain  in  the  event  of  hostil- 
ities. While  the  allied  powers  fancied  themselves  as  carving 
up  France  and  indemnifying  themselves  in  Europe  for  the  cost 
of  the  war,  the  only  points  on  the  Continent  which  the  English 
spoke  of  getting  were  Dunkirk  and  perhaps  Calais,  for  their 
spoils  were  acknowledged  to  be  in  Asia,  the  West  Indies,  and 
on  the  Ocean.  This  was  only  a  recognition  of  the  quality  of 
Great  Britain's  power  —  "  la seul puissance vraiment  maritinie" 
as  Count  Vorontzov  said  —  and  of  the  trend  of  Pitt's  policy; 
in  1 789  he  had  pushed  a  plan  to  fortify  in  the  West  Indies  and 
to  add  to  the  fleets  stationed  in  the  East  Indies  and  the  Med- 
iterranean. But,  though  Lord  Grenville  may  have  consented 
to  the  inevitableness  of  war  when  in  conversation  with  Count 
Simon  Vorontsov,  and  listened  interestedly  in  1792  to  De 
Curt  and  his  scheme  for  an  English  occupation  of  Guadeloupe, 
the  ministry  did  not  move  until  it  was  thought  the  right  time 
had  come  for  war  with  the  French ;  a  time  in  which,  as  Lord 
Sheffield  wrote  (Oct.  21,  1792)  "there  would  be  a  complete 
opportunity  for  annihilating  their  marine  and  their  colonies." x 

1  Cornwallis :  Corr.  i.  p.  349  (Grenville  to  Cornwallis,  Dec.  20,  1787),  Auck- 
land MSS.  (B.  M.  Additional,  34,434),  J.  B.  Burges  to  Lord  Auckland,  Dec.  28, 
1790.  Quoted  by  Clapham :  Causes  of  the  war  of  1792,  p.  16.  Gower  :  Despatches, 
p.  155  (Paris,  Feb.  10,  1792)  :  "Upon  the  whole,  the  rapid  increase  of  anarchy, 
not  only  in  the  metropolis  but  in  every  municipality  of  this  disjointed  kingdom, 
renders  a  war  of  some  sort  necessary,  and  if  a  bankruptcy  should  insue  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that  France  will  not  remain  entire."  Burke  :  Works,  iii.  p.  394 ;  Auckland : 
Corr.  ii.  pp.  377  (Storer  to  Auckland,  Nov.  28,  1790),  398  (Auckland  to  Lord  H. 
Spencer,  March  20,  1792) :  "  This  indifference  as  to  foreign  affairs  is  general 
through  the  kingdom ;  you  may  find  it  even  in  our  newspapers ;  perhaps  it  may 
be  justly  attributed  to  the  great  prosperity  of  the  country,  which  confines  all  at- 
tention to  inferior  and  insular  details;"  413  (J.  B.  Burges  to  Auckland,  July  3, 
1792),  439  (Sept.  4,  1792),  443-444  (Auckland  to  Morton  Eden,  Hague,  Sept.  18). 
England's  answer  to  requests  for  intervention  had  been :  "  that  our  neutral  con- 
duct gives  us  no  claim  to  interfere  either  with  advice  or  opinions  unless  solicited ; 
and  that  our  general  wishes,  on  the  one  hand,  are,  that  France  may  never  again 
resume  the  same  restless  and  troublesome  system  which  has  so  often  been  fatal  to 
the  peace  of  nations ;  and,  on  the  other,  that  an  executive  government  may  exist 
there  so  as  to  restrain  the  present  lawless  and  atrocious  spirit;"  458  (Lord  Shef- 
field to  Auckland,  Oct.  21);   464  (Grenville  to  Auckland,  Nov.  6),  485  (Auck- 

5 


66  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Thus  when  the  war  did  begin  in  1793  it  was  nominally  over 
the  French  invasion  of  Dutch  territory ;  apparently  the  motive 
was  strictly  European,  an  infringement  of  rights  which  Great 
Britain  claimed  in  the  light  of  continental  treaties  and  inter- 
national law.  But  the  importance  of  Holland  as  a  neutral  or 
friendly  state  to  England  had  been  of  steady  growth ;  the  mat- 
ter had  become  more  distinctly  a  "  British  interest,"  as  the 
colonial  affairs  of  England  had  become  more  and  more  vital  to 
the  welfare  of  the  nation.  For  as  France  gradually  lost  her 
own  ability  to  injure  British  establishments  abroad,  the  con- 
venient weapons  which  she  might  use  for  this  purpose,  namely 
Dutch  sea  power  and  colonial  posts,  became  correspondingly 
more  important  to  her;  and  the  English  policy  of  keeping  the 
Republic  free  from  French  control  became  more  determined 
and  essential  to  the  peace  and  growth  of  the  British  Empire. 
Indeed  English  diplomacy  in  Holland  had  aimed  continuously 
at  checking  the  maritime  strength  of  France,  while  that  of 
France  had  as  consistently  directed  its  efforts  to  employment 
of  the  Dutch  colonies  in  Africa  and  Asia  as  bases  from  which 


land  to  Lord  Loughborough,  Jan.  6,  1793) ;  488  (Storer  to  Auckland,  Jan.  11, 1793) : 
iii.  pp.  43  (Crawfurd  to  Auckland,  Brussels,  April  29,  1793);  79  (Auckland  to 
Grenville,  July  14),  "  It  is  a  question  worth  consideration,  whether,  in  supposing 
the  feasibility  of  such  a  conquest,  we  ought  not  to  insist  on  holding  Dunkirk  (and, 
perhaps,  also  Calais)  "  ;  86  et  seq.  (Memoir  of  M.  Jarry,  on  the  "  Line  of  Somme"). 
Burke :  Corr.  iii.  pp.  224,  265,  266,  268,  274,  336,  343,  347  (on  Pitt's  neutrality). 
Rose :  Diaries,  i.  p.  85.  Pitt  wrote  in  Sept.  1788,  that  the  state  of  France  "  seems 
to  promise  us  a  considerable  respite  from  dangerous  projects.''  Cf.  p.  108.  Mal- 
mesbury:  Corr.  ii.  pp.  437,  438,  441.  Hansard:  Pari.  Hist.,  xxix.  pp.  44,  170, 
767,  919,  929,  940  (the  neutrality  program  in  the  House) ;  xxx.  250-256  (Corr.  of 
Chauvelin  and  Grenville  in  1793  just  before  the  war).  Vorontzov :  Arkhiv,  Count 
S.  Vorontzov,  writing  in  1796  of  his  relations  with  Lord  Grenville  before  the  war 
of  1793.  He  had  a  chance  "  de  lui  parler  souvent  sur  la  necessite  de  rompre  avec 
la  France.  II  a  ete  longtems  sans  en  convenir  et  a  la  fin  il  avoua  que  le  ministere 
sent  cette  necessite,  mais  que  la  nation  n'est  pas  encore  disposee  a  cette  rupture, 
ce  qui  etait  vrai  aussi";  ix.  pp.  226  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov,  Dec.  2(13),  I79J)>  272 
{Idem  Nov.  7  (18),  1792) ;  xi.  p.  296  (Pinto  to  A.  Vorontzov,  1792).  Lecky :  op. 
cit.  v.  pp.  200,  206, 560  et  seq. ;  vi.  pp.  I  et  seq.,  105-106,  123.  Wassiltchikow  :  Les 
Razoumowski,  ii.  Part  4,  p.  80. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR   OF  1793  67 

to  strike  at  British  prestige,  to  sow  seeds  of  insurrection  and 
war  among  the  native  populations  of  India,  and  to  interrupt  the 
progress  of  English  control  in  that  region.  In  1787,  when  an 
ascendency  of  France  in  the  Dutch  states  had  seemed  im- 
minent the  English  had  shown  their  determination  to  prevent 
it,  by  war  if  necessary ;  and  the  triple  alliance  of  Great  Britain, 
Prussia,  and  the  Netherlands  had  been  in  part  the  result  of 
that  feeling.  The  character  of  such  a  war,  in  which  France 
would  have  had  the  support  of  the  provinces  of  Holland,  Gron- 
ingen  and  Overyssel,  was  clearly  foreseen  by  Mr.  Pitt  in  1787 
when  he  wrote  to  Lord  Cornwallis,  then  Governor  General  in 
India,  that  "in  this  situation,  the  first  struggle  will  actually  be 
for  the  foreign  dependencies  of  the  Dutch  Republic ;  and  if  at 
the  outset  of  a  war  we  could  get  possession  of  the  Cape  and 
Trincomale,  it  would  go  further  than  anything  else  to  decide 
the  fate  of  the  contest."  The  despatches  of  Sir  James  Harris, 
afterwards  Lord  Malmesbury,  and  of  Mr.  Eden,  afterwards 
Lord  Auckland,  had  been  urgent  in  declarations  that  the 
policy  of  France  in  Holland  was  directed  against  England  in 
Asia,  and,  as  Count  Simon  Vorontzov  reported,  that  the  "  ex- 
istence of  the  English  in  the  Indies  depended  on  the  success 
of  his  [Pitt's]  plan  for  getting  the  Dutch  out  of  the  hands  of 
France,  and  for  allying  the  Republic  to  England.  "  The  Dutch 
affair  was,  as  Lord  Grenville  said,  the  bond  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  Continent.  The  motives  which  had  led  the 
English  government  to  oppose  the  plan  of  an  exchange  by 
Austria  of  her  territory  in  the  Low  Countries  for  Bavaria  were 
the  same  which,  in  1793,  led  her  to  object  to  any  scheme  that 
would  settle  France  with  a  weak  rather  than  a  strong  neighbor 
on  her  northern  frontier;  they  also  at  one  time  gave  some 
reason  to  suppose  that,  in  the  event  of  any  seizure  of  French 
territory  by  the  allies,  England  might  agree  to  a  partition  that 
would  lessen  the  power  of  France  on  that  part  of  her  border. 
But  the  successes  of  the  French  armies  soon  led  to  a  proposal 
in  England  that,  after  supporting  Holland  to  the  utmost  of  her 


68  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

power,  Great  Britain  should  withdraw  from  continental  inter- 
ference, should  gain  the  surrender  of  the  Dutch  colonies  in 
both  hemispheres,  and  should  press  with  undivided  energy  a 
naval  war  destined  to  ruin  the  commerce  of  France  and  to 
strip  her  of  her  colonies,  "either  till  the  course  of  events 
might  leave  us  masters  of  the  sea,  or  till  the  French  system 
might  break  to  pieces  under  its  own  extent  and  weight."  The 
hope  of  the  French,  according  to  English  lights,  was  to  create 
in  the  Netherlands  a  subservient  state  ready  to  their  hand  in 
every  attack  on  Great  Britain;  the  marine  and  commerce  of 
England  were  thus  to  be  destroyed,  "  her  colonies  taken  from 
her  and  ultimately  the  standard  of  anarchy  displayed  over  the 
ruins  of  London."  Naturally  there  were  those  both  in  England 
and  France  who  saw  no  wisdom  in  such  far-fetched  schemes. 
To  those  who  regarded  republicanism  as  a  greater  enemy  than 
France  herself,  "  the  distraction  of  the  efforts  of  England  from 
the  heart  of  French  power  to  its  extremities  "  was  looked  on 
with  great  disfavor.  Yet  the  very  criticisms  of  Pitt's  policy 
are  full  of  meaning ;  as  Sheridan  put  it  in  1808,  "  the  various  gov- 
ernments which  this  country  had  seen  during  that  period  were 
always  employed  in  filching  for  a  sugar  island,  or  some  other 
object  of  comparatively  trifling  moment,  while  the  main  and 
principal  purpose  was  lost  and  forgotten."  "  This  war  upon 
sugar  islands,"  in  the  words  of  Mr.  Windham,  thus  met 
with  disapproval  from  those  who  failed  to  see  that  but 
for  such  islands  and  the  questions  connected  with  them 
Great  Britain  might  not  have  gone  to  war  at  all.  Indeed 
Mr.  Wilberforce  believed  that  Pitt  was  persuaded  by  Dundas, 
that  arch-expansionist,  whose  influence  was  later  destined 
to  have  such  great  effect  in  the  growth  of  British  India,  that 
England  might  "at  a  small  expense"  seize  and  keep  all  of 
the  French  West  Indian  colonies ;  in  short,  that  Dundas  had 
incited  in  Pitt  "a  thirst  for  colonial  conquest."  To  accept 
this  as  the  only  explanation  would  be  both  unwise  and  un- 
necessary, for  the   desire   for  colonial  expansion  as  a  motive 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  69 

to  war  is  strong  enough  without  seeking  to  displace  all  other 
causes  of  hostility.1 

1  Auckland  :  Corr.  i.  pp.  195  (Pitt  to  Eden,  Sept.  14,  1787  ;  on  the  importance 
of  opposing  the  French  in  Holland) ;  205  (Carmarthen  to  Eden,  Sept.  28,  Idem) ; 
iii.  pp.  5  (Grenville  to  Auckland,  April  3,  1793) ;  7, 8  (Loughborough  to  Auckland, 
April  3) ;  15,  16  (Bentinck  to  Auckland,  reporting  Count  Mercy,  April  10) ;  all  on 
the  question  of  the  future  of  the  Netherlands  as  related  to  France ;  23-26  (Dundas 
to  Sir  James  Murray,  April  16),  a  strong  letter  declaring  the  policy  of  England; 
274  (Auckland  to  Pitt,  Nov.  28,  1794,  proposing  an  aggressive  colonial  policy); 
286  (Auckland  to  Spencer,  Feb.  20,  1795  on  the  naval  program) ;  290-91  (Craw- 
furd  to  Auckland,  Frankfort,  March  3,  giving  the  plans  of  France) ;  397  (H.  Elliot 
to  Auckland,  Dresden,  1798,  giving  the  real  purpose  of  France  against  England). 
In  an  anonymous  brochure  of  1799,  entitled  " Les  nouveaux  intSrits  de  V Europe" 
pp.  58-59,  the  writer,  who  is  a  royalist,  declares  that  in  order  to  completely  rob 
France  of  her  colonies,  the  United  States  should  be  induced  to  seize  Santo  Do- 
mingo. Pallain :  Talleyrand  &  Londres,  pp.  xxii,  374-381.  Vorontzov  :  Arkhiv,  ix. 
p.  121  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov,  London,  May  2  (13),  1788).  Barral-Montferrat :  op.  cit. 
p.  301.  Malmesbury  :  Diaries,  ii.  pp.  355, 367,  372  ;  on  Pitt's  policy  in  1787.  Corn- 
wallis  :  Corr.  i.  pp.  321-325  (Pitt  to  Cornwallis,  Aug.  2,  1787).  The  success  of 
France  in  Holland  would  be  a  serious  matter  for  the  British  in  India,  and  was  much 
to  be  apprehended.  "...  if  things  unfortunately  should  come  to  extremities,  we 
shall  be  engaged  in  a  contest  in  which  France  will  probably  for  a  time  have  the  sup- 
port  of  the  province  of  Holland,  and  perhaps  that  of  Groningen  andOveryssel ;  while 
we  shall  have  on  our  side  the  remaining  provinces,  making  the  majority  of  the 
States-General.  In  this  situation,  the  first  struggle  will  actually  be  for  the  foreign 
dependencies  of  the  Republic ;  and  if  at  the  outset  of  a  war  we  could  get  posses- 
sion of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  and  Trincomale,  it  would  go  further  than  any- 
thing else  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  contest.  We  should  certainly  be  justified  in 
taking  possession  of  these  posts  on  behalf  of  the  majority  of  the  States,  and  to 
secure  them  against  France.  It  is  therefore  much  to  be  wished  that  on  the  first 
news  of  hostilities  you  should  find  the  means  of  striking  a  blow  at  Trincomale. 
If  anything  can  be  tried  against  the  Cape  it  must  of  course  be  from  hence."  Cf. 
PP-  327>  328»  337.  352  (Dundas  to  Cornwallis,  March  31,  1788)  :  "A  connection 
between  Holland  and  us  in  India,  and  the  dissolution  of  the  French  connection 
with  that  Republic,  are  most  important  events  with  a  view  to  the  strength  and 
permanency  of  our  possessions  and  power  in  Hindostan.  .  .  .  Our  principal  and 
indeed  our  only  object  in  an  alliance  with  the  Dutch  respecting  India  must  be  to 
secure  ourselves  against  the  danger  of  our  ever  being  deprived  of  the  use  of  the 
harbor  of  Trincomale  in  the  event  of  a  future  war."  Cf.  Lecky :  op.  cit.  vi.  pp. 
72-79,  132.  Sorel :  V Europe  et  la  Revolution,  iii.  p.  276.  "Moore:  Sheridan,  ii. 
pp.  203-204  (1793)  :  "The  distraction  of  the  efforts  of  England  from  the  heart 
of  French  power  to  its  remote  extremities,  in  what  Mr.  Windham  called  'a  war 
upon  sugar  islands,'  was  a  waste  of  means  as  unstatesmanlike  as  it  was  calami- 
tous, and  entitled  Mr.  Pitt  to  the  satire  on  his  policy  conveyed  in  the  remark  of  a 


yo  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

On  the  continent  the  course  of  the  Revolution  and  the  for- 
tunes of  war  obscure  for  a  time  the  trend  of  French  public 
opinion ;  in  the  changes  of  her  government  and  the  victories 
of  her  armies  France  was  profoundly  interested,  but  when  op- 
portunity arises  to  judge  of  her  relations  to  Great  Britain, 
apart  from  strictly  European  complications  and  local  affairs, 
the  prominence  of  the  colonial  issue  is  again  made  evident. 
The  lesson  which  was  to  be  learned  from  the  events  of  1792  to 
1797  bore  out  the  judgment  of  Burke  when  he  wrote  in 
November,  1792,  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  internal  state 
of  things  in  France  which  altered  "  the  national  policy  with 
regard  to  the  exterior  relations  of  that  country ;  "  but  that,  on 
the  contrary,  there  were  "  many  things  in  the  internal  circum- 
stances of  France  "  which  rendered  the  "  active  assertion  "  of 
the  fundamental  principles  in  her  former  policy  more  pressing 
than  at  any  previous  time  in  her  history.  Thus  the  central 
fact  in  the  history  of  France  as  a  world  power,  had  been  the 
often  conflicting  interests  of  her  continental  and  her  colonial 
dominions.  The  Republic,  which  was  determined  to  emulate 
Louis  XIV.  and  to  attain  her  "  natural  limits  "  in  Europe,  was 
met  with  the  same  difficulties  which  had  checked  the  Bourbons 
in  their  desire  to  fill  the  r61es  of  both  a  land  and  a  sea  power. 
The  triumph  of  the  old  policy  would  have  required  the  defeat 
of  England;  and  the  realization  of  French  republican  ideals 
demanded  the  recognition  by  Great  Britain  of  a  French  state, 
larger  and  more  powerful  than  that  which  she  had  gone  to  war 
to  despoil,  and  insisted  on  her  acquiescence  in  the  supremacy 

certain  distinguished  lady,  who  said  to  him,  upon  hearing  of  some  new  acquisition 
in  the  West  Indies, '  I  protest,  Mr.  Pitt,  if  you  go  on  thus,  you  will  soon  be  master 
of  every  island  in  the  world,  except  just  these  two  little  ones,  England  and  Ireland/  " 
Wilberforce :  Life,  ii.  pp.  10,  391.  He  thinks  Dundas  influenced  Pitt  to  the 
French  war,  —  "  his  persuasion  [was]  that  we  should  be  able  with  ease  and  promp- 
titude, at  a  small  expense  of  money  and  men,  to  take  the  French  West  India 
Islands,  and  keep  them  when  peace  should  be  restored ;  in  truth,  but  for  Mr.  Dun- 
das's  persuasion  that  the  war  would  soon  be  over,"  the  war  would  never  have  been 
begun.  Burke  said  to  Dundas,  "  You  must  indeed  go  to  war ;  but  you  greatly  mis- 
take in  thinking  it  will  soon  be  over."    Cf .  pp.  92, 332.     Cf.  also  above,  p.  17,  note. 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND    THE    WAR  OF  1793  fl 

of  France  as  a  world  power.  The  events  which  brought  about 
so  different  a  situation  from  that  expected  by  Englishmen 
when  they  embarked  on  a  career  of  colonial  conquest  at  the 
expense  of  France  are  part  of  a  political  history  which  need 
not  be  retold  here.  The  attention  of  the  English  to  their 
policy  had  resulted  in  such  advances  in  both  Asia  and  America 
that  they  alone  of  the  allies  had  gained  in  territory ;  but  the 
intention  of  France  to  isolate  them  had  well  nigh  been  accom- 
plished, and,  in  spite  of  an  increased  commerce,  the  burdens  of 
the  war  and  the  popular  wish  for  peace  forced  Pitt  to  agree  to 
negotiations  with  the  French  government.  The  tortuous  prog- 
ress of  diplomacy  at  Lille  would  not  be  worth  study  for  our 
purposes  did  it  not  show  to  what  extent  the  plans  of  France 
clashed  with  those  of  England,  and  above  all  to  what  degree 
the  hopes  of  peace  were  ended  by  disagreement  on  colonial 
affairs.  The  results  of  the  war  had  given  France  the  control 
of  the  Netherlands  and  the  alliance  of  Spain,  together  with  the 
disposal  of  many  ports  of  entry,  which  she  proposed  to  shut  to 
English  commerce.  England  had  captured  in  the  West  Indies 
—  Martinique,  Santa  Lucia,  Guadeloupe,  with  its  dependent 
islands,  Tobago,  St.  Vincent,  Grenada,  Trinidad,  and  on  the 
mainland,  Demerara,  Essequibo,  and  Berbice  (Guadeloupe  was 
recaptured  by  the  French  in  1794);  in  Asia  —  Pondicherri, 
Ceylon,  with  its  fine  harbor  of  Trincomali,  Malacca,  Cochin, 
several  smaller  ports  in  India,  the  Bandas,  and  Amboina ;  and, 
most  important  of  all,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The  English 
came  to  Lille  prepared  to  acknowledge  the  new  boundaries  and 
spheres  of  influence  of  France  in  Europe,  to  restore  all  the 
French  colonies  captured  since  1793,  and  to  keep  only  Trinidad, 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  Ceylon,  and  Cochin,  which  was  to  be 
exchanged  for  Negapatam  in  Tanjore.  But  the  French  soon 
met  this  proposal  with  a  demand  that  all  the  conquests,  made 
not  only  from  her  but  from  Spain  and  the  newly  formed  Bata- 
vian  Republic,  should  be  surrendered  by  Great  Britain.  Lord 
Malmesbury,  while  continuing  to  negotiate,  in  hope  that  the 


72  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

differences  among  the  French  representatives  would  profit  him, 
was  further  disappointed  by  the  news  of  the  Portuguese  treaty 
with  France,  which  left  England  in  total  isolation.     The  real, 
though  extravagant,  hopes  of  the  French  were  better  expressed 
in  a  memoir  which  was  not  presented  at  the  time,  but  which 
has  since  come  to  light.     This  demanded,  in  addition  to  what 
has  been  stated,  the  cession  of  the  Channel  Islands,  the  resto- 
ration of  Canada,  and  of  the  Indian  possessions  of  France 
prior  to  1754,  together  with  a  resumption  of  the  Newfoundland 
fishery,  and  the  cession  of  Gibraltar  to  Spain.     This  document, 
of  which  Mr.  Lecky  has  made  use,  is  valuable  in  so  far  as  it 
shows  the  political  aspirations  of  France.     Peace  might  easily 
have  been  consummated  on  terms  easier  to  Great  Britain  than 
these;  but  the  determination  of  Pitt  to  keep  Ceylon  and  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  free  from  French  intrigue,  to  strengthen 
the  English  control  in  Asia  and  on  the  route  thither,  was  suf- 
ficient to  forbid  a  treaty  in  the  present  temper  of  France.     She 
had  no  idea  of  agreeing  to  half-way  measures,  and,  even  though 
the  West  Indian  captures  should  be  nullified,  the  importance 
of  the  Asiatic  position  of  Great  Britain  weighed  heavily  on  her 
mind.     Whatever  additional  causes,  therefore,  may  have  helped 
to  bring  on  the  war  of  1793  and  may  have  prevented  its  early 
conclusion,  the  influence  of  the  colonial  question  was  great 
and  lasting,  both  in  exciting  hostilities  and  in  prolonging  the 
struggle;  whatever  had  been  the  conflicting  interests  of  France 
and  Great  Britain  in  Europe,  and  however  mistaken  were  the 
opinion  and  policy  of  the  two  powers  as  to  the  objects  and 
results  of  the  war,  the  problem  of  Asiatic  dominion  had  had 
much  to  do  in  fixing  its  character.     The  war  failed  to  secure 
the  desires  of  the  allies,  but  it  served  to  reveal   them ;   the 
wishes  of  France  were  realized  in  Europe,  but  her  larger  hopes 
were  still  unfulfilled.     The  course  of  the  Revolution,  far  from 
fastening   the   attention    of   all    men    on    Paris,    opened   new 
avenues  for   ambition  and  was  destined  to  turn  the  eyes  of 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  toward  Asia,  as  the  source  of  power  and 


COLONIAL   QUESTION  AND   THE    WAR  OF  1793  73 

the  seat  of  empire ;  the  movement  was  already  well  on  its  way 
to  turn  the  Mediterranean  into  a  French  sea,  to  make  the 
Levant  the  scene  of  action,  and  to  bring  the  Eastern  Question 
into  close  relation  with  that  of  rule  in  further  Asia.  The 
progress  of  that  movement  is  still  to  be  traced.1 

1  Wassiltchikow :  Les  Razoicmowski,  ii.  Part  4,  p.  218  (S.  Vorontzov  to  A. 
Razumovski,  Nov.  17  (28),  1794),  on  the  temper  of  the  English  people  as  re- 
gards the  war;  p.  254  {Idem,  Nov.  28,  1796),  on  the  purpose  of  France  to 
injure  England.  Burke:  Works,  iii.  p.  394.  Cornwallis  :  Corr.  ii.  pp.  222 
et  seq.  Auckland:  Corr.  iii.  pp.  137,  et  seq.,  371,  372.  Teignmouth :  Life, 
i.  p.  244.  Bailleu :  Preussen  und  Frankreich,  i.  p.  102,  Report  of  Sandoz-Rollin. 
Zusammenkunft  und  Gesprach  mit  Malmesbury  iiber  die  Friedensunterhandlung 
zwischen  Frankreich  und  England.  Okt.  31,  1796:  "Lord  Malmesbury  ne  disait 
rien  des  pretentions  de  l'Angleterre  :  je  Ten  fis  convenir.  '  Vous  sentirez  bien,' 
repliqua-t-il,  '  que  notre  intention  est  de  rendre  a.  la  France  quelques-unes  de  nos 
conqu6tes  dans  les  Indes  occidentales,  pour  contrebalancer  les  restitutions  a 
faire  a.  l'Empereur  :  mais  on  ne  saurait  exiger  que  l'Angleterre  renoncat  au  Cap 
de  Bonne-Esperance  et  a  quelques  autres  etablissements  dans  les  Indes  orientales  : 
cela  serait  trop  injuste.' "  Malmesbury:  Correspondence,  iii.  pp.  369,  397,  430, 
434,  464,  489-497,  554,  561-569,  576,  580-589.  MSS.  in  Tome'SuppIementaire,  xv., 
Dipt  des  off.  Strang.,  quoted  by  Lecky:  op.  cit.  vii.  p.  397.  Mahan  :  Sea  power 
and  the  Revolution,  i.  pp.  1 1 5-1 18.  Sorel :  op.  cit.  iv.  pp.  460  et  seq.,  469.  Vorontzov : 
Arkhiv,  viii.  p.  289. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND  THE  REVOLUTION 

The  Problem  of  Asia;  its  Character  —  Religion  and  Politics  —  The  Influence 
of  Asia  on  Europe  —  The  Evolution  of  the  Eastern  Question  —  The  Situation 
in  1774  — The  First  Partition  of  Poland  and  the  Treaty  of  Kutchuk-Kainardji 
—  The  Attitude  of  Russia ;  panslav  and  Slavophile  —  The  Policy  of  Russia, 
of  Prussia,  of  Austria,  of  France,  of  Great  Britain — The  Con4ki<wi^of  the 
ntf"TP°"  Eaajai&JS!  r774^~  The  Eastern  Question  and  the  American  War  — 
The  Austro-Russian  Alliance  of  1781  —  Catherine's  "  Greek  Plan  "  —  Prussia, 
France,  and  the  Porte,  1780-87  — The  Policy  of  Great  Britain —The  Triple 
Alliance:  Prussia,  England,  and  Holland,  1788  —  Hertzberg's  Plan  —  Revolu- 
tion at  Paris  —  The  Congress  at  Reichenbach  —  Russia  and  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance, 1790-91 — The  Treaties  of  Sistova  and  Jassy  —  Catherine  and  Europe 
in  1791  —  The  Condition  of  Poland,  1772-91  —  The  Constitution  of  May  3, 
1791  —  The  War  of  1792  —  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Poland,  1791-93  —  The  Second 
Partition  of  Poland  —  The  Attitude  of  Austria  —  Tnugut  and  Razumovski  — 
Kosciuszko  —  The  Third  Partition  of  Poland  —  The  Austro-Russian  Agree- 
ment of  1795  —  The  Peace  of  Bale  —  Russia  and  the  Porte,  1792-96  —  The 
War  with  Persia — French  Diplomacy  at  Constantinople,  1787-97 — The 
Economic  Aspect  of  the  Eastern  Question  —  French  Trade  in  the  Levant  dur- 
ing the  Eighteenth  Century  —  The  British  Levant  Trade  —  The  Importance 
of  the  Mediterranean  in  World  Politics  —  France  and  Rome. 

The  continuity  and  importance  of  the  Eastern  Question  are 
due  in  large  part  to  geography ;  its  complexity  is  increased  by 
differences*  of  race  and  religion.  It  is  above  all  in  the  East 
that  commerce  joins  with  race  and  religion  to  stir  the  greed  of 
peoples  and  to  guide  the  policy  of  states.  There  are,  therefore, 
few  problems  in  history  which  so  present  the  cumulative  force  of 
great  human  motives  as  does  the  Eastern  Question ;  not  many 
other  political  problems  of  the  present  depend  so  largely  on  the 
past.  The  Eastern  Question  is  an  epitome  of  history.  It  pro- 
ceeds from  conflicting  interests  representing  the  full  variety  of 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      J$ 

human  endeavor ;  it  tells  of  movements  epochal  in  the  life  of 
the  world ;  and  it  includes  affairs  both  small  and  great,  which 
are  themselves  vital  in  the  history  of  widely  scattered  peoples 
and  states.  The  form  which  the  larger  problem  of  Asia  takes 
in  modern  history  both  shows  its  origin  and  exemplifies  its 
character;  in  its  essence  it  is  caused  by  the  attempt  of  Europe 
to  impress  her  thought  and  civilization  on  Asia.  In  the  past 
the  question  might  well  have  been  called  the  problem  of 
Europe,  for  the  object  of  Eastern  statesmen  has  been  to  make 
Europe  a  part  of  Asia;  to  this  end  labored  Persian,  Arab, 
Tatar,  and  Turk.  Whether  this  attempt  will  be  renewed  in 
the  future  is  "  on  the  knees  of  the  gods " ;  but  even  if  the 
active  power  of  Asia  be  spent,  the  record  of  history  must  be 
that  the  influence  of  Asia  on  Europe  has  been  greater  than 
that  of  Europe  on  Asia.  The  religion  of  Europe  comes  from 
the  East,  though  Western  standards  of  judgment,  such  as  cos- 
mopolitan feeling  and  the  objectiveness  of  life,  have  greatly 
modified  it.  The  spirit  of  Asia  is  one  of  religious  faith ;  her 
standards  of  measurement  are  not  of  this  world:  that  of 
Europe  is  material ;  her  gauge  is  of  "  things  done  that  took 
the  eye  and  had  the  price."  And  many  of  even  these  material 
conquests,  on  which  Europe  so  prides  herself,  are  due  to  Asia 
in  the  first  place.  In  secular  affairs,  also,  the  influence  of  Asia 
on  Europe  has  been  of  more  continued  value  than  that  of 
Europe  on  Asia;  the  building  of  Constantinople  was  in  itself 
an  acknowledgment  of  the  power  of  the  East ;  the  capture  of 
that  city  by  the  Ottoman  Turks  was  only  the  final  step  in  a 
long  process  which  had  been  going  on  since  the  death  of  Alex- 
ander the  Great ;  it  sealed  with  victory  the  plan  to  make  Asia 
Minor  once  more  an  Asiatic  province.  In  itself  it  was  not  an 
abrupt  change,  for  the  Empire,  of  which  Constantinople  must 
always  be  the  head,  had  been  growing  more  and  more  oriental 
in  character.  The  final  invasion  of  Europe  by  the  Turks  may 
therefore  be  regarded  merely  as  the  active  assumption  by  a 
Sulaiman,  an  Amurath,  a  Muhammad  of  the  mission  which 


76  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Darius  and  Xerxes  had  failed  to  carry  out.  Furthermore,  the 
position  of  an  Asiatic  ruler  in  Europe  is  significant.  He  keeps 
his  Eastern  character.  On '  the  other  hand,  the  attempts  of 
Europeans  to  rule  in  Asia  have  been  unsuccessful  unless  their 
system  had  more  of  the  East  than  of  the  West  in  its  structure 
and  method.  Thus  Alexander's  genius  guided  him  to  orien- 
talize his  rule  in  Persia  and  Central  Asia  in  order  to  consolidate 
his  power.  And  in  British  India,  though  this  may  seem  to  be 
an  exception  to  the  rule,  only  the  special  conditions  of  do- 
minion in  that  region  enable  the  British  to  govern  as  they  do. 
The  measure  of  their  power  is  set  by  non-interference  in  things 
oriental,  by  the  divisions  of  their  Asiatic  subjects,  and  by  the 
strength  of  the  British  army.  The  Englishman  in  India  has 
been  forced  to  leave  behind  him  much  that  is  essentially 
European  in  government  and  institutions.  Were  it  not  for 
this  fact  and  for  more  important  racial  differences,  an  interest- 
ing analogy  might  be  drawn  between  the  position  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire  in  Europe  and  that  of  the  British  Empire  in  India.1 
The  upshot  of  the  whole  matter  is,  that  so  far  the  Asiatic  has 
shown  greater  static  force  than  the  European  has  dynamic 
force;  his  conservative  power  is  stronger.  He  can  believe, 
and  he  can  wait. 

On  turning  to  history  again  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  Asiatic 
with  such  characteristics  has  had  the  opportunity  to  exercise  a 
direct  influence  on  European  affairs  for  many  centuries,  and 
that  in  the  Eastern  Question  Asia  has  had  a  political  tool 
ready  to  its  hand.  In  the  zenith  of  its  power  the  Ottoman 
Empire  took  tribute  from  Hapsburg  Emperors  and  received 
French  embassies  asking  for  its  alliance.  It  fought  Persia  in 
the  East  and  Spain  in  the  West ;  the  Mediterranean  was  a 
Turkish  sea,  and  the  forces  of  Islam  controlled  the  trade  routes 
between  three  continents.  During  the  period  of  Ottoman 
decline  this  influence  on  European  history  was  increased,  for 

1  Odysseus :  Turkey  in  Europe ',  p.  91. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      77 

the  political  system  of  Europe,  its  diplomacy  and  its  law  of 
nations  were  in  many  ways  guided  by  the  necessities  of  the 
Eastern  Question.  Thus  the  policy  which  raised  Prussia  to 
the  rank  of  a  first-class  power  had  as  one  of  its  main  supports 
a  defensive  alliance  with  the  Porte;  in  like  manner  France, 
who  had  called  in  the  Sultan  to  re-adjust  the  balance  of  power 
in  southern  Europe  and  the  Mediterranean  and  later  urged 
him  to  intervene  in  Poland  to  restore  that  of  the  North,  was 
impelled  by  situation  and  tradition  to  consider  more  carefully 
her  policy  in  the  East ;  in  the  case  of  Russia  and  Austria  their 
relations  to  each  other  and  to  every  state  in  Europe  have  been 
controlled  in  great  part  by  the  varying  aspect  of  the  Eastern 

.  Question ;  and  finally,  Great  Britain  renewed  her  acquaintance 
with  that  problem  and  found  in  the  closing  years  of  the 
eighteenth  century  that  her  interests  in  it  were  also  those  of 
her  imperial  future.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  those  who 
fix  such  and  such  a  date  in  modern  times  for  the  beginning  of 

\the  Eastern  Question  not  only  ignore  one  of  the  oldest  and 
greatest  factors  in  world  history,  but  also  forget  important 
events  in  the  history  of  western  Europe.  In  beginning  a 
review  of  that  question  at  the  year  1774  such  an  idea  is  particu- 
larly objectionable,  for  all  that  can  be  claimed  for  that  date  is 
that  it  marks  an  important  development  in  the  problem.  The 
purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  review  the  history  of  Asiatic 
influence  on  Europe  by  means  of  the  Eastern  Question  during 
the  last  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  diplomacy  of 
the  period  has  been  a  subject  of  study  for  many  historians,  and 
in  the  present  investigation  both  time  and  method  forbid  an 
exhaustive  treatment  of  that  aspect  of  the  matter,  though 
newly  published  despatches  or  neglected  material  may  here 
and  there  be  of  service.  Attention  must  also  be  paid  to  the 
economic  side  of  the  question  and  to  the  'nature  of  the 
Mediterranean  problem.  It  may  then  be  possible  to  show 
the  relation  between  the  Eastern  Question,  the  colonial  prob- 
lem, and  the  still  larger  matter  of  Asiatic  dominion  at  a  time 


if 


78  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

when  each  was  taking  the  character  it  was  destined  to  keep 
till   the   closing   years   of   the   nineteenth  century. 

The  first  partition  of  Poland  (1772)  and  the  treaty  of  Kut- 
chuk-Kainardji  (1774)  between  Russia  and  the  Porte,  were  in 
themselves  matters  to  give  men  pause;  yet  they  were  the 
logical  result  of  a  system  with  which  Europe  was  already 
familiar,  and  dealt  with  affairs  which  had  long  troubled  di- 
plomacy. The  jealousies  of  Western  nations  and  in  particu- 
lar those  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  required  that  no 
one  of  them  should  gain  in  power  by  expansion  of  territory 
unless  there  were  a  proportionate  increase  on  the  part  of  the 
remaining  states.  Thus,  unable  to  expand  singly,  all  must 
agree  to  do  so  together ;  and  the  elaborate  system  of  indemni- 
fication, of  alliance  for  partition,  which  marks  eighteenth-cen- 
tury history  was  utilized  by  them  in  various  attempts  to  solve 
the  Eastern  Question  and  its  corollary,  the  Polish  Question. 
It  was  the  balance  of  power  in  motion.1  The  changes  which 
these  events  of  1772  and  1774  effected  in  the  state  of  Europe 
were  slight  compared  with  those  to  come,  of  which  they  were 
a  sign;  instead  of  establishing  peace  or  maintaining  the  in- 
tegrity of  states,  they  showed  the  'way  to  war  and  conquest. 
Frederick  the  Great  had  written  of  a  "  fire  which  lurked 
beneath  the  ashes  " ;  but  such  treaties  failed  to  quench  it ;  it 
was  soon  to  set  Europe  ablaze.2 

Although  the  limits  of  this  study  hinder  us  from  looking 
closely  at  the  matter,  a  review  of  the  various  policies  followed 

1  The  "balance  of  power  "  is  an  equilibrium  in  which  no  one  state  or  alliance 
of  states  secures  a  preponderant  position  to  menace  the  proper  and  natural  political 
policy  of  any  other  state  or  alliance  of  states.  Political  ambition  required  a  com- 
plement to  such  a  system ;  and  there  arose  a  system  which  we  may  call  that  of 
"  concurrent  partition,"  by  which  the  territory  of  some  politically  isolated  or 
weakened  state  was  divided  by  mutual  agreement  among  two  or  more  other  states 
in  shares  proportionate  to  their  several  interests  and  positions.  Cf.  Montes- 
quieu :  Esprit  des  lots,  x.  c.  2  ;  xiii.  c.  7.  Favier  :  Doutes  et  questions,  in  Segur : 
Politique,  iii.  p.  318.     Sorel :    U  Europe  et  la  Revolution,  i.  pp.  39  et  seq. 

2  Frederic  II. :  CEuvres,  iv.  p.  98. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      79 

by  the  great  powers  will  not  lead  too  far  afield  and  should 
give  a  starting-point  from  which  to  trace  the  future  course  of 
affairs. 

The  rise  of  Russia  and  her  advent  into  the  political  arena 
where  the  Eastern  Question  was  under  discussion  have  been 
among  the  most  important  factors  in  the  development  of  that 
question.  At  that  same  time,  in  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, the  Ottoman  Empire  began  to  decline  in  power;  neither 
movement  has  been  continuous,  for  the  policy  of  Russia  has  not 
presented  the  irresistible  and  evenly  victorious  aspect  which 
some  writers  delight  to  give  it,  nor  have  the  gradual  losses  of 
the  Turks  been  so  uniform  and  destructive  as  the  casual  ob- 
server might  suppose.  Indeed  the  vitality  of  an  oriental  state 
is  beyond  the  mind  of  the  average  European  diplomat,  and  the 
frequent  renewals  of  strength  that  have  evidenced  the  real 
might  of  the  Turk  have  in  every  instance  taken  the  West  by 
surprise.  The  expansion  of  Russia  has  usually  been  along  the 
line  of  least  resistance ;  but  on  the  whole  it  has  been  none  the 
less  natural  and  justifiable.  In  Europe  the  endeavor  of  Russia 
to  realize  the  former  ethnic  boundary  of  the  Slav  race  has  led  to 
conflict  with  the  Germans  and  Magyars;  and  the  attempt 
to  prove  a  title  to  Constantinople  and  to  unite  under  one 
political  head  the  various  branches  of  the  Orthodox  com- 
munion has  placed  Russia  as  the  power  whose  interest  in  the 
Eastern  Question  is  second  to  none.  These  two  sides  of  her 
policy  have  had  much  influence  in  linking  central  Europe  with 
the  East ;  for  Russia's  efforts  to  .satisfy  her  economic  desires 
and  to  realize  her  religious  and  national  ideals  have  greatly 
modified  the  policy  of  Austria,  and  since  the  Seven  Years'  War 
have  also  made  the  policy  of  Prussia  a  distinct  factor.  In  late 
years  two  movements,  the  panslavic,  and  the  Slavophile  move- 
ments, have  had  much  to  do  with  the  interpretation  of  Russia's 
mission :  panslavism  aims  to  unite  all  Slav  populations  under 
one  political  head,  and  has  had  a  varying  but  nevertheless  im- 
portant effect  on  the  peoples  of  the  German  Empire,  Austria- 


80  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Hungary,  and  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  nationalist  or 
Slavophile  movement  has  as  its  basis  a  conception  of  the  des- 
tiny of  Russia  and  of  the  meaning  of  world  history  which  is 
foreign  to  the  mind  of  the  rest  of  Europe.  It  supposes  three 
elements  in  the  history  of  the  Eastern  Question  :  Europe, 
Asia,  and  Russia.  The  greatest  Slav  state  is  thus  placed  in 
antagonism  both  to  the  dominant  ideas  of  that  world  which 
was  once  ruled  from  Rome  and  Aachen,  as  well  as  to  those  of 
a  world  which  held  to  Asiatic  standards.  That  Russia  will 
prove  the  amalgam  between  Europe  and  Asia,  and  by  being 
the  greatest  power  in  both  continents  will  guard  her  Slavic 
traditions,  is  the  hope  and  belief  of  these  nationalists.  The 
Slav  extends  Hegelianism  ;  he  looks  on  the  Latin  and  Teuton, 
in  whom  the  Weltgeist  of  Hegel's  philosophy  is  successively 
manifested,  as  dying  peoples  whose  mission  is  nearly  over. 
This  Weltgeist  is  to  pass  to  the  Slav,  whose  rule  is  to  be 
world-wide  and  whose  interpretation  o(  life  is  the  final  one ;  in 
this  Slav  world  the  community  is  to  be  sovereign  and  autoc- 
racy the  highest  political  concept.  Whether  this  process  be 
one  for  all  Slav  peoples  or  whether  Russia  alone  will  enshrine 
this  power  is  a  separate  question.  During  the  eighteenth 
century  history  was  in  the  making  which  later  was  to  justify 
to  the  mind  of  the  Russian  of  to-day  such  philosophies  and 
political  theories.     By  1774  much  had  been  accomplished.1 

The  way  had  been  prepared  for  Russian  advance  in  the 
West  by  the  state  of  affairs  in  Poland.  That  country,  by  its 
geographical   situation  and  the  character  of  its  government, 

1  Klaczko  :  Le  congrh  de  Moscou  et  la  propagande  panslavite,  in  R.  de  D.  M., 
Sept.  1,  1869.  Leroy-Beaulieu :  Les  reformes  de  la  Turquie  —  La  politique  russe 
et  le  panslavisme,  in  Ibid.,  Dec.  I,  1876;  and  V Empire  des  Tsars,  i.  pp.  208  et  seq. 
Wallace  :  Russia,  pp.  414,  580, 598  et  seq.  Holmstrem  :  "  Ex  Oriente  Lux"  in  No. 
Am.  Rev.,  July,  1899,  especially,  pp.  9,  15,  26.  Washburn:  The  Coming  of  the 
Slav,  in  Contemporary  Review,  lxxiii.  (1898),  pp.  1-13.  Cf.  Foulke :  Slav  or  Saxon, 
N.  Y.  1898.  Pobyedonostseff :  Reflections  of  a  Russian  statesman,  London,  1898. 
Leger:  Russes  et  Slaves,  Paris,  1897.  Honegger  :  Russiche  Literatur  und  Kultur, 
Leipzig,  1 880. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      8 1 

lent  itself  to  the  designs  of  greedy  neighbors  ;  the  war  of  fac- 
*e_  tions  at  home,  together  with  complicated  questions  of  religious 
r*y£\tolerance,  only  emphasized  the  anarchy  of  mediaeval  feudalism 
and  the  inability  of  native  rulers  to  solve  the  problems  of 
modern  life.  Poland  was  ready  for  the  butcher.  Her  unrest 
was  the  opportunity  of  rival  powers,  who  determined  that  no 
reform  should  be  allowed  within  her  borders.  As  was  said  in 
1767  :  "  Russia  is  too  keen  to  help  in  the  slightest  degree  the 
aggrandizement  and  augmentation  of  the  sovereign  power  in 
Poland,  —  for  the  interests  of  Russia  as  well  as  those  of  all  the 
neighboring  states  would  not  permit  that  that  power  should 
escape  from  her  present  state  of  feebleness  and  inertia."  *  In 
the  southeast  the  recurring  outbursts  of  ancient  Ottoman  valor 
and  the  jealousies  of  powers  such  as  Prussia  and  Austria, 
together  with  the  prospect  of  decided  opposition  by  France,  the 
traditional  ally  of  the  Sultan,  had  combined  to  check  Russian 
advance  in  the  past.  Under  Catherine  II.,  who  in  her  earlier 
years  had  been  inspired  by  Count  Miinnich  with  dreams  of 
Eastern  dominion,  the  march  to  Byzantium  was  renewed. 
The  outbreak  of  war  in  1768  complicated  Polish  affairs,  ulti- 
mately offering  a  solution  to  some  of  their  perplexities,  for  the 
prospect  of  Poland's  downfall  had  had  much  to  do  with  the 
Turkish  declaration  of  war,  and  the  cost  of  that  war  was  finally 
sought  in  Poland  that  Turkey  might  preserve  the  Danubian 
principalities  from  the  hands  of  Russia,  or  of  a  Poland  domi- 
nated by  Russia.  Instead  of  Turkey  saving  Poland,  Poland  was 
used  to  save  Turkey.  Thus  Austria,  giving  a  querulous  assent 
to  a  policy  which  was  at  best  an  expedient,  was  freed  from  the 
danger  of  Russian  control  on  the  lower  Danube  ;  Prussia  was 
able  to  strengthen  and  enlarge  her  eastern  borders,  and  the 
Ottoman  Empire  preserved  to  a  great  extent  her  territorial 
integrity,  though  she  let  an  insidious  enemy  gain  treaty  rights 
to  interfere  in  her  own  internal  affairs.     Russia  in  four  short 

1  Finckenstein  and    Hertzberg  to   Solms   (Prussian  Amb.  at    Petersburg), 
Berlin,  Sept.  19,  in  Sbornik,  xxxvii.  p.  92. 

6 


82  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

hours  won  a  battle  by  skilful  diplomacy  which  has  since 
profited  her  as  no  war  she  ever  fought.  In  the  hasty  negotia- 
tions at  Kutchuk-Kainardji  Russia  was  recognized  as  the  pro- 
f  tector  of  the  Danubian  principalities  and  guarantor  for  Tatar 
\  independence.  She  gained  a  strong  foothold  on  the  Black  Sea, 
Vbut  gave  back  her  most  important  conquests.  She  had  inter- 
fered in  Poland  to  protect  the  Orthodox  Poles  from  Roman 
Catholic  persecution,  and  she  became  the  protector  of  Greek 
Christians  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  thus  using  religious  matters 
to  further  political  purposes.  The  interpretation  of  vaguely 
worded  articles  gave  her  rights  which  she  has  since  used  with 
ever  increasing  latitude.  But  she  freed  no  Christians  from 
Muslim  dominion,  and  within  a  few  years  added  largely  to  her 
Muhammadan  population  by  including  the  Tatars  of  the 
Krimea  within  her  Empire.  However  uncertain  may  seem 
her  claims  as  based  on  this  treaty,  their  tendency  was  foreseen 
at  the  time,  and  though  the  territory  of  the  Turks  was  pre- 
served, the  Austrian  diplomat,  Thugut,  wrote  that  the  Ottoman 
Empire  bid  fair  to  become  a  Russian  province  as  the  result  of 
that  document.  There  could  no  longer  be  any  question  as  to 
the  determination  of  Russia  to  realize  her  ideals  of  expansion 
in  the  Balkan  peninsula.  It  remained  for  the  other  great 
powers  either  to  sell  their  acquiescence  in  that  movement  or 
to  concert  measures  in  order  to  prevent  it.1 

1  Favier:  Conjectures  raisonnies,  in  Segur:  Politique,  i.  pp.  y^oet  seq.,  363-364. 
Rambaud:  History  of  Russia  (trans,  by  Lang,  Am.  ed.),  ii.  pp.  87-96.  Bruckner: 
Katharina  II,  pp.  269  et  seq.  Castera:  Histoire  de  Catherine  II,  ii.  pp.  17,  171 
(Cath.  to  Henry  of  Prussia):  "  J'epouvanterai  la  Turquie ;  je  flatterai  1'Angle- 
terre;  chargez-vous  d'acheter  l'Autriche,  pour  qu'elle  endorme  la  France";  174, 
183*/  seq.,  265.  Boukharow:  La  Russie  et  la  Turquie,  pp.  14  et  seq.  Moltke: 
Poland  (trans,  fr.  German),  pp.  75  et  seq.  Holland :  A  Lecture  on  the  Treaty 
Relations  of  Russia  and  Turkey,  London,  1877.  Hammer:  Gesch.  des  osmanischen 
Reiches,  viii.  pp.  562  et  seq.  (documents).  Martens  :  Receuil  des  traites  conclus 
par  la  Russie.  Prusse,  vi.  p.  65.  Martens :  £tude  historique  sur  la  politique 
russe  dans  la  Question  cT  Orient  (1877).  Sorel :  The  Eastern  Question  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century,  passim,  and  pp.  240  et  seq.  Zinkeisen  :  Gesch.  des  osmanischen 
Reiches,  v.  pp.  918  et  seq.     Dohm  :  Denkwiirdigkeiten,  i.  pp.  433  et  seq.     Cor  res- 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      83 

The  policy  of  Prussia  at  this  period  is  too  intricate  an  affair 
to  follow  with  any  detail,  but  the  relation  of  that  power  to 
the  Eastern  Question  is  clearly  to  be  seen  a  century  before 
Bismarck  deceived  half  Europe  by  declaring  that,  as  far  as 
Germany  was  concerned,  the  solution  of  that  problem  was  not 
worth  the  bones  of  a  Pomeranian  grenadier.  At  the  time  of 
the  Seven  Years*  War  a  defensive  alliance  with  the  Ottoman 
Empire  was  one  of  Frederick  the  Great's  foremost  plans.  His 
ambition  for  Prussia  forced  him  to  reckon  with  Russia,  Austria, 
and  France ;  but  by  means  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the 
Eastern  Question  he  was  enabled  to  carry  on  his  policy  of 
aggrandizement.  The  increase  of  Russian  power  in  central 
Europe  placed  him  in  a  dilemma:  should  he  oppose  that  state 
he  would  incur  a  costly  war;  should  he  submit  to  her  pleasure 
he  would  have  a  still  stronger  neighbor  to  contend  with  in  the 
future.  The  way  out  of  his  difficulty  was  to  try  to  profit  by 
her  very  advance.  As  he  wrote  himself,  "  it  was  not  to  the 
interest  of  Prussia  to  see  the  Ottoman  power  crushed,  for  if 
necessary  it  could  be  useful  to  make  diversions  in  Hungary  or 
in  Russia,  according  to  which  of  the  two  states  might  be  at 
war."  In  Poland,  therefore,  the  bargain  must  be  made  by  which 
Prussia  would  gain  most  useful  territory,  Russia  would  be 
repaid  for  the  costs  of  her  Turkish  war,  and  Austria  appeased 
and  relieved  from  the  fear  of  seeing  Russia  on  the  Danube. 
To  this   end  Frederick   directed  his  diplomacy.      Before  the 

pondence  between  Frederick  the  Great  and  Count  von  Solms,  in  Sbornik,  xxxvii. 
pp.  2-$$etseq.  (Solms  to  the  King,  Petersburg,  June  16  (27),  1769).  The  plans 
of  Orlov  in  Greece;  364  (Solms  to  the  King,  Jan.  28  (Feb.  8),  1771).  He  thinks 
Russia  will  insist  only  on  the  independence  of  the  Tatars,  the  possession  of 
Asov,  and  free  navigation  in  the  Black  Sea ;  365  {Ibid.)  }  380  et  seq.  (Prince  Henry 
to  Finckenstein,  Petersburg,  Jan.  23,  1771) ;  408,  409  (Solms  to  the  King,  March 
4  (!5)>  J77i).  Suggests  that  Poland  be  indemnified  by  the  restoration  to  her  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia;  419,  448,  449,  {Ibid.)',  461,  462  (Panin's  views  on 
Turkey,  April,  1771),  497.  Cf.  also  de  Smitt:  FrSderic  II,  Catherine  et  le  par- 
tage  de  la  Pologne,  Paris,  1861.  Khrapovitski :  Journal  of  Catherine  (ed.  Barsukov. 
In  Russian).  Vide  Bilbassov:  Katharina  II. ,  Kaiserin  von  Russland  im  Urtheile 
der  Welt-literatur,  trans,  fr.  Russian  by  Pezold. 


84  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Porte  had  determined  on  war  with  Russia  he  had  done  his  best 
to  allay  the  fears  of  the  Turks  regarding  Russian  aggression  in 
Poland  by  explaining  that  the  entire  matter  was  only  a  quarrel 
between  various  Christian  Churches  —  Greeks,  Latins,  and 
Lutherans  —  in  which  the  Porte  could  have  no  interest.  After 
the  Porte  had  declared  war  and  was  threatened  with  serious 
loss  of  territory  by  Russia,  his  policy  became  involved  still 
more  closely  with  events  in  the  East.  Above  all  things  he 
dreaded  a  general  European  war,  in  which  by  his  treaty  of 
alliance  with  Catherine  he  would  be  obliged  to  take  the  part  of 
Russia ;  opposed  to  him  he  would  undoubtedly  find  Austria, 
France,  and  Turkey.  Thus  the  problem  before  him  was  to  get 
the  Polish  territory  he  desired,  to  save  the  Ottoman  Empire 
from  dismemberment,  to  strengthen  his  position  in  Germany 
against  his  rival  at  Vienna,  and  at  the  same  time  to  avoid  a  war. 
His  solution  of  this  problem  proved  acceptable  not  only  to 
himself,  but  also  to  Austria  and  Russia.  Poland  alone  suffered. 
The  Porte  refused  to  make  peace  at  a  time  when  she  might 
have  got  help  from  Prussia  and  by  that  delay  incurred  the 
dangers  which  the  treaty  of  Kainardji  brought  on  her.  But 
the  partition  of  Poland,  while  it  relieved  Frederick,  made  the 
influence  of  the  great  Slav  power  still  greater  in  central 
Europe,  and  brought  heavy  burdens  on  his  successors.  At 
Constantinople  he  had  held  in  check  the  forces  making  for  the 
partition  of  Turkey,  and  though  his  immediate  interest  in  the 
Eastern  Question  lessened  in  the  remaining  years  of  his  life, 
the  usefulness  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  to  Prussia  had  been 
clearly  shown.  In  the  future  Prussia  and  the  Porte  were  to 
be  parts  in  the  same  political  system.1 

1  Corr.  of  Frederick  and  von  Solms,  in  Sbornik,  xxxvii.  pp.  38,  59,  80,  81  (Finck- 
enstein  and  Hertzbergto  Solms,  Berlin,  July  r8,  1767).  The  Porte  "  a  conclu  que 
ne  s'agissant  en  Pologne  que  d'un  diff erend  de  religion  il  n'etait  pas  necessaire  que 
la  Porte  s'en  melat  et  qu'il  serait  assez  temps  qu'elle  y  prit  un  parti,  lorsque  l'on 
verrait  que  son  interet  et  sa  gloire  l'exigeaient  "  ;  109  (Frederick  to  Solms,  Pots- 
dam, Nov.  6,  1767) :  "II  pourrait  arriver,  qu'a  l'occasion  d'une  guerre  intestine  en 
Pologne,  la  Porte  ottomane  s'en  melat,  ou  alors,  la  Russie  aurait  sur  les  bras  la 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      85 

In  tracing  the  policy  of  Austria  the  Eastern  Question  be- 
comes a  matter  of  peculiar  interest,  for  both  history  and 
political  prophecy  declare  that  the  future  of  Austria  is  closely 
linked  to  that  of  the  Ottoman  Empire;  and  that  the  solution 
of  the  Turkish  question  will  at  once  raise  that  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  Russian  program  has  operated  to  produce  dis- 
order in  the  Dual  Monarchy,  where  racial  and  religious  antag- 
onisms incite  the  ambition  of  every  neighbor.  The  varied 
interests  of  Austria  in  the  eighteenth  century  had  much  to 

guerre  contre  les  Turcs,  et  moi  une  contre  les  Autrichiens  et  contre  les  Francais  " ; 
144, 145,  150,  164-172.  205  (the  King  to  S.,  Potsdam,  Feb.  1,  2769).  The  plan  at- 
tributed to  Count  Lynar  for  the  partition  of  Poland  is  here  given.  Cf.  also  209- 
211  (S.  to  the  King  on  the  same  subject),  and  215-218;  278  (the  King  to  Solms, 
April  22,  1770)  on  the  matter  of  the  Russian  alliance;  301  et  seq.  (the  Russian 
demands  on  Turkey  in  1770)  ;  317  (the  hatred  of  Austria  for  Russia  will  profit 
Prussia) ;  323-334  (conversations  of  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  and  Count  Panin 
in  1770  over  the  pacification  of  Poland) ;  353,  354  (Russia  and  the  Porte  in 
January,  1771) ;  394  <tf  ^.(negotiations  in  February,  1771,  over  the  partition); 
432-434  (the  King  to  Solms,  Potsdam,  March  24,  1771).  Prussia's  share  in 
Poland;  478  (Finckenstein  to  the  King,  Berlin,  May  14,  1771) :  "  L'envie  d'avoir 
un  dedommagement  pour  les  frais  de  la  guerre  et  les  difficultes  que  la  cour  de 
Vienne  suscitera  pour  les  prendre  [by  Russia]  sur  la  Moldavie,  la  Valachie,  et  la 
Crimee  fourniront  Toccasion  de  lui  faire  sentir  qu'un  demembrement  de  la 
Pologne  est  le  seul  moyen  de  couper  le  nceud  gordien  et  que  V.  M.  est  tres-dis- 
posee  a  y  donner  les  mains,  pourvu  qu'on  lui  fasse  sa  convenance  " ;  479,  498- 
502  (dangers  of  war  and  the  Prussian  system  in  Sept.  1771);  506,  512,  558-661 
(Frederick  urges  action  in  Poland,  Nov.  1771).  Favier :  Conj.  raisonnies,  in 
Segur:  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  288,  307.  Vergennes  :  Memoire,  in  Ibid.  iii.  p.  123.  De 
Rohan :  Mes  decouvertes,  in  Ibid.  iii.  pp.  247,  248.  Frederic :  GLuvres,  iv.  (Me- 
moires  (1763-1775),  pp.  34  et  passim.  The  Prussian  side  of  the  negotiations  is 
well  treated  in  Reimann :  Neuere  Geschichte  des  preussischen  Staates,  i.  pp.  305 
et  seq.  Duncker:  Aus  der  Zeit  Friedrichs  des  Grossen,  pp.  113  et  seq.  (Die 
Besitzergreifung  von  Westpreussen),  and  Ranke :  Die  Deutschen  Machte  und  der 
Fiirstenbund,  Leipzig,  1872.  Consult  also  Zinkeisen  :  Die  orientalische  Frage  in 
vier  Stadiony  in  Hist.  Taschenbuch,  1855  ;  Nottebohm  :  Die  preussisch-iiirkische 
Defensivallianz,  1763-1765 ;  Wissowa :  Friedrich  der  Grosse  und  die  Turkei ; 
Dopsch :  Zur  Orientpolitik  Friedrichs  des  Grossen  vor  Beginn  und  beim  Ausbruck 
des  siebenjdhrigen  Krieges  ;  Kleinast :  Konig  Friedrich  II,  von  Preussen,  und  die 
Ungarn,  and  the  Politische  Correspondenz  Friedrichs  des  Grossen  when  the  vol- 
umes covering  this  period  are  published.  Cf.  especially  Porsch :  Die  Beziehung 
Friedrichs  des  Grossen  zur  Turkei  bis  zum  Beginn  und  wdhrend  des  siebenjdhrigen 
Krieges.    Marburg,  i.  H.  1897. 


86  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

do  with  the  vacillation  of  her  policy  in  the  Eastern  Question, 
and  with  her  attitude  toward  Russia.  In  Germany,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands,  Poland,  and  the  Balkans,  Austrian  interests  were 
at  stake.  At  home,  two  parties  with  different  policies  made 
the  confusing  situation  still  harder  to  obviate.1  The  conser- 
vative party  of  Maria  Theresa  dreaded  fresh  expansion,  that 
of  Joseph  and  Kaunitz  played  for  high  stakes  in  every  quarter, 
though  German  affairs  were  more  to  its  liking  than  other 
matters.  The  alliance  of  1756  with  France  had  been  in  part 
designed  to  keep  Prussia  in  check  and  thus  to  enable  Austria 
to  retain  her  leadership  within  the  Empire.  Thus  when  the 
courts  of  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg,  who  both  had  historic 
claims  in  Poland,  began  to  show  intention  of  interfering  in 
that  country,  Austria,  fearful  lest  she  might  not  profit,  ordered 
her  troops  to  cross  the  Polish  border  and  to  seize  territory  to 
which  the  political  imagination  of  the  most  patriotic  Austrian 
could  scarce  find  title.  In  regard  to  the  Turkish  war,  Austria 
stood  ready  to  take  up  arms  for  the  Porte,  signed  an  alliance 
with  the  Turks,  received  a  subsidy  from  them,  and  then,  satisfied 
that  Russia  would  not  gain  final  possession  of  the  Danubian 
provinces,  bargained  for  a  large  accession  of  territory  from 
Poland,  and  with  Russian  acquiescence  also  took  Bukovina 
from  the  Ottomans.  Maria  Theresa  might  deplore  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which  Austria  was  placed  and  regret  the  shame- 
less chaffering  of  the  diplomats,  but  she  was  forced  to  agree  to 
the  plans  of  Kaunitz  and  Joseph.    As  Frederick  the  Great  wrote, 

1  The  geographical  and  political  situation  of  the  house  of  Austria  required 
that  the  aggrandizement  of  any  other  power  should  be  balanced  by  an  equivalent 
or  proportionate  increase  in  her  own  strength  and  size.  The  partition  of  Poland 
might  not  be  welcome  to  Austria,  but  that  she  should  have  a  share  in  it  was  a 
sine  qua  non.  As  Metternich  said  in  1808  regarding  the  solution  of  the  Eastern 
Question :  "  Nous  devions  beaucoup  sacrifier  pour  la  conservation  de  la  Porte ; 
mais  notre  existence  reelle  et  notre  consideration  politique,  les  principaux  ele- 
ments de  la  vie  d'un  grand  Etat,  doivent  mettre  des  bomes  a  nos  vceux.  Nous 
ne  pouvons  sauver  la  Turquie ;  il  faut  done  aider  a  la  partage,  et  tacher  d'en  avoir 
le  plus  grand  lot  possible."  Nachgelassene  Papieren/xi.y.  153.  Cf.  also  Sorel: 
V Europe  et  la  Revolution  francaise,  i.  p.  444. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      87 

"  Still  she  wept,  but  still  she  took."  On  the  other  hand,  Aus- 
tria, by  her  insistence  on  the  continued  life  of  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire, retained  her  important  position  in  the  southeast  and 
postponed  the  day  when  Russia  might  prove  a  far  more  danger- 
ous neighbor  than  had  the  Porte  in  recent  years.  By  a  policy  of 
delay  and  hesitation  she  carried  her  point  and  increased  her 
territory.  It  remained  to  be  seen  if  this  disgraceful  episode  in 
her  diplomatic  history  would  aid  or  hinder  her  in  the  future.1 

Closely  linked  with  the  policy  of  Austria  was  that  of  France. 
The  alliance  of  1756  between  the  two  powers  had  brought 
about  a  great  change  in  the  diplomatic  system  of  France; 
prior  to  1756  the  Bourbons  had  sought  in  the  Porte  an  ally 
whose   armies  would   effect   a  diversion  in  the  southeast  of 

1  The  documents  are  to  be  found  in  Beer :  Erste  Theilung  Polens,  Wien,  1873. 
Cf.  especially  pp.  11-32.  Arneth :  Geschichte  Maria  Theresias  I.  vii.  and  viii., 
Wien,  1877  ;  and  Maria  Theresa  und  Joseph  II,  Wien,  1867  ;  in  Arneth  and  Gef- 
froy :  Correspondance  entre  Marie-Thertse  et  le  Cotnte  de  Mercy- Argenteau,  Paris, 
1874;  and  in  Hammer  :  Gesch.  des  osman.  Reiches,  viii.  Cf.  also  Corr.  of  Frede- 
rick the  Great,  in  Sbornik,  xxxvii.  pp.  233,  234,  242,  293  el  seq.,  309,  358,  359,  371 
et  seq.,  469-472*,  518,  564,  565,  575,  641.  Favier :  op.  cit.,  in  Segur:  op.  cit.  i. 
pp.  20,  21,  38,  39.  Austria  would  not  let  Russia  take  too  much  from  the  Turks, 
for,  as  Joseph  II.  said  to  Segur:  "  If  Austria  has  been  endangered  many  times  by 
the  turbans,  she  would  have  been  in  a  much  more  perilous  situation  if  the  Russian 
caps  were  at  Constantinople,"  p.  253,  note.  Castera:  Catherine  II.  ii.  pp.  216 
et  seq.  Beer :  Orientalische  Politik  Oesterreichs  seit  1774,  PP-  23  et  seq.  Arneth  : 
Zwei  Denkschritfen  Maria  Theresias,  in  Archiv  fiir  Oesterr.  Gesch.  vol.  47,  Wien, 
187 1.  Beer:  Denkschriften  des  Fursten  Wenzel  Kaunitz-Rittberg,  in  Archiv  fiir 
Oesterr.  Gesch.  vol.  48,  Wien,  1872.  And  Aufzeichnungen  des  Grafen  Williams 
Bentinck  uber  Maria  Theresia,  Wien,  1871.  Arneth  :  Die  Relationen  der  Bot- 
schafter  Venedigs  uber  Oesterreich  im  18  Jahrhundert,  in  Archiv  fiir  Oesterr.  Gesch. 
Part  2,  vol.  22,  Wien,  1863.  Wolf  und  Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst :  Oesterreich  unter 
Maria  Theresia,  Berlin,  1884.  General  books  on  the  first  partition  are :  Ponia- 
tovski :  Memoires  and  Correspondance  avec  Madame  Geoffrin  ;  Viomesnil :  Lettres 
sur  les  affaires  de  Pologne  ;  Dumouriez :  Memoires  ;  Angeburg  :  Recueil  des  traites 
concernant  la  Pologne  ;  Kareef :  Les  causes  de  la  chute  de  la  Pologne,  in  Rev.  his- 
torique  (1891).  Beer  :  Friedrich  II  utid  von  Swieten  ;  Von  der  Bruggen  :  Polens 
Auflosung ;  Schlozer:  Friedrich  der  Grosse  und  Kathearina  die  Zweite ;  Janssen: 
Zur  Genesis  der  ersten  Theilung  Polens ;  Gross-Hoffinger :  Die  Theilung  Polens; 
Ropell:  Polen  urn  die  Mitte  des  XVIII  Jahrhunderts ;  Rulhiere :  Hisloire  de 
Panarchie  de  Pologne,  continued  by  Ferrand :  Les  trois  demembrements  de  la 
Pologne.     Vide  the  bibliography  in  this  thesis  for  further  details. 


88  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Europe,  and  who  would  thus  distract  the  hostility  of  the  house 
of  Hapsburg  from  France.  The  court  of  Versailles  had  de- 
signed Turkey,  Poland,  Sweden,  and  Prussia  to  hold  in  check 
Russia  and  Austria,  should  France  again  engage  in  war  with 
her  old  rival,  England.  To  this  end  Vergennes,  the  French 
minister  at  Constantinople,  had  been  instructed  in  1755  to 
prevent  the  Turks  from  risking  a  war  with  Persia  which  would 
call  off  their  attention  from  western  affairs  and  to  hold  the 
threat  of  interference  by  Turkey  over  the  heads  of  the  two 
imperial  courts  in  Europe,  thus  making  it  evident  that  France 
held  the  Ottoman  armies  in  leash  at  the  Danube  and  kept  the 
peace  in  eastern  Europe  only  so  long  as  Russia  and  Austria 
refrained  from  menacing  her  or  her  allies.  This  was  the  old 
French  plan  for  maintaining  the  status  quo  on  the  continent. 
The  treaties  of  1756,  which  reversed  this  policy  and  ranged 
Prussia  with  Great  Britain  against  France  and  Austria,  worked 
great  loss  to  French  influence  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  for  the 
Porte  could  not  see  its  old  ally  bound  with  Austria,  a  power 
whose  plans  for  aggrandizement  at  Turkish  expense  had 
brought  them  to  war  many  times  in  the  past,  without  feeling 
that  French  advice  must  now  be  discounted  and  that  the 
Ottoman  power  must  henceforward  turn  elsewhere  for  a  friend 
in  Christendom.*  That  he  might  pose  as  that  friend  became 
the  wish  of  Frederick  the  Great,  as  has  been  already  indicated. 
Thus  France  was  compelled  to  reverse  her  policy  at  Constan- 
tinople; to  urge  that  the  Austrian  alliance  could  in  no  sense 
be  regarded  as  a  menace  to  Turkey,  that  Prussia  instead  of  a 
trusted  ally  was  an  insidious  enemy,  and  that  the  Turks  would 
do  well  to  turn  their  military  energies  toward  Persia,  and  above 
all  leave  Austria  and  Russia  free  to  co-operate  with  France 
against  Prussia  and  Great  Britain.  For  these  objects  France 
was  ready  to  exert  her  utmost  powers  by  diplomacy  and  orien- 
tal bribery.1    This  policy  was  destined  to  last  only  as  long  as 

1  On  the  alliance  of  1756,  cf.  Broglie  :  Le  sicret  du  Roi,  Paris,  1879.     Boutaric  : 
Corr.  de  Louis  XV,  Paris,  1886.     Rousset :  Corr.  de  Noailks et  de  Louis  XV,  Paris 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      89 

the  artificial  system  of  which  it  was  a  part.  By  the  defection 
of  Russia  and  her  alliance  of  1764  with  Prussia,  and  by  the 
treaty  of  peace  with  England  in  1763,  the  entire  system  suf- 
fered a  great  blow.  With  the  resurrection  of  the  Polish  ques- 
tion the  inherent  interests  of  France  in  the  East  again  came 
to  the  front ;  and  Vergennes,  still  the  French  representative 
at  the  Porte,  was  called  on  to  propose  to  the  Turks  a  third  line 

1865.  Broglie  :  V alliance  autrichienne.  Waddington  :  Louis  XV.,  et  le  renverse- 
ment  des  alliances.  Masson  :  Memoir es  et  lettres  de  Bernis.  Vandal :  Louis  XV. 
et  Elisabeth  de  Russie.  MSS.  of  M.  Bourges  quoted  by  Bonneville  de  Marsangy : 
Ambassade  de  Vergennes  h.  Constantinople,  i.  p.  120  :  "  Dans  le  systeme  de  politique 
et  d'alliance  qui  constituait  alors  l'equilibre  europeen,  la  Turquie  devait,  avec  la 
Pologne  et  la  Suede,  balancer  au  profit  de  la  France  l'alliance  de  l'Angleterre  et 
de  la  Russie."  Ibid.  i.  pp.  197  et  sea.  (instruction  to  Vergennes  in  1755  in  Arch, 
des  aff.  Strait.,  Turquie,  vol.  129).  204  (Rouille  to  Vergennes,  May  11,  1755) ;  215 
(Vergennes  to  Rouille,  Aug.  17)  ;  335  et  seq.  (Rouille  to  Vergennes,  June  1, 1756) : 
"  Le  traite  de  Sa  Majeste  [Louis  XV.]  avec  PImperatrice  [Maria  Theresa]  n'ayant, 
comme  je  vous  l'ai  mande,  d'autre  objet  que  le  maintien  de  la  paix,  ne  change 
rien  aux  principes  de  Sa  Majeste  qui  l'ont  toujours  eue  pour  objet.  Nous  n'avons 
jamais  excite  les  Turcs  a  entreprendre  la  guerre  contre  aucune  puissance  chre- 
tienne;  vos  instructions  le  portent  precisement.  Si  nous  leurs  avons  fait  des 
representations  sur  le  procede  de  la  Russie,  elles  etaient  autant  fondees  sur  leur 
interet  que  sur  celui  de  la  Pologne,  dont  la  liberte  est  aussi  chere  a  Sa  Majeste 
qu'elle  doit  etre  a  la  puissance  ottomane.  .  .  .  Les  clauses  de  l'alliance  defensive 
entre  Sa  Majeste  et  l'lmperatrice  pourront  deplaire  au  nouveau  Grand  Vizir 
[Mustafa  Pasha],  si  par  des  raisons  tirees  de  sa  situation  de  celle  de  l'interieur  de 
1'Empire  ottoman  ou  peut-etre  excite  par  le  roi  de  Prusse,  il  determinait  le  Grand 
Seigneur  [Othman  III.]  a  declarer  la  guerre  a.  la  cour  de  Vienne.  Vous  pouvez, 
en  ce  cas,  faire  entendre  que  ces  clauses,  ordinaires  dans  tous  les  traites  defen- 
sifs,  ne  doivent  point  alarmer  les  Turcs  " ;  pp.  343,  note,  350;  ii.  pp.  31,  42  (Bernis 
to  Vergennes,  Nov.  29, 1757.  Arch.  aff.  etran.,  Turquie,  vol.  133) :  "  Vous  deviez 
tacher  de  les  [Turks]  engager  a  tourner  leurs  armes  contre  la  Perse,  les  divisions 
dont  ce  royaume  est  agite  et  le  nombre  des  pretendants  au  trone  leur  ouvrant  un 
chemin  facile  a  des  conquetes  assurees."  (This  is  the  opposite  of  the  instructions 
given  in  1755,  c^  *•  P-  l9%)  5  74  (Choiseul  to  Vergennes,  June  11,  1759,  Turquie, 
vol.  135);  77  et  seq.  {Memoire  of  Vergennes  to  the  Porte,  Aug.  15,  1759);  86. 
Cf.  on  French  policy  during  the  century,  Bailleu :  Preussen  und  Frank- 
reich,  i.  pp.  ix,  x.  Favier  :  Conjectures  raisonnees,  in  Segur  :  Politique,  i.  pp.  338, 
339,  344  (note  by  Segur) :  "  La  destruction  de  1'Empire  Ottoman  est  le  coup  le 
plus  funeste  qui  puisse  arriver  a  la  France";  ii.  pp.  2,  13.  Idem:  Doutes  et 
questions,  in  Ibid.  iii.  pp.  334,  335.  Memoire  de  M.  de  Vergennes  sur  la  Porte  otto- 
mane, in  Segur:  op.  cit.  iii.  pp.  115,  116,  119,  126,  142;  Castera :  Catherine  II. 
ii.  p.  229. 


90  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

of  action.  This  was  to  regard  any  interference  with  Poland 
by  Russia  and  Prussia  as  a  cause  for  Turkish  intervention  to 
preserve  the  liberty  and  integrity  of  Poland.  As  has  been 
shown,  the  endeavors  of  both  Catherine  and  Frederick  were 
to  allay  the  alarms  of  the  Porte  regarding  Poland,  and  to  oppose 
the  policy  of  France  in  these  respects.  When  finally  the 
Turks  did  declare  war,  the  French  tried  to  bring  about  an 
alliance  between  Austria  and  the  Porte ;  but  the  attitude  of 
Austria,  shown  in  her  seizure  of  Polish  territory  and  her  be- 
trayal of  the  Turks,  baffled  French  efforts  to  bring  about  a 
successful  intervention  to  save  Poland.  The  French  them- 
selves were  lacking  in  power,  and,  though  urging  on  the  Turks 
to  war,  offered  to  bargain  with  Prussia  over  Polish  affairs. 
Their  much  talked  of  interest  in  Poland  was  thus  suffered  to 
die  away  in  a  diplomacy  whose  r61e  was  entirely  passive,  while 
their  ineffective  protests  had  shown  to  Europe  how  divergent 
had  become  the  policies  of  France  and  Austria,  the  allies 
of  1756.1 

1  Saint-Priest:  Mimoires  sur  Vambassade  de  France  en  Turquie,  pp.  150-177. 
Favier  :  Doutes  et  questions,  in  Segur  :  op.  cit.  iii.  pp.  338 :  *  Le  traite  de  Versailles 
ruine  egalement  a  la  Porte  et  dans  toutes  les  cours  voisines  de  la  Porte  le  credit 
de  consideration  que  la  France  y  avoit  relativement  a  la  puissance  federative  ; " 
Memoire  de  Vergennes  in  Segur  :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  140  et  seq.,  154.  Memoire  du  comte 
de  Broglie  (March,  1775),  in  Idem,  i.  p.  195.  Bonneville  :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  226  et  seq. 
(Praslin  to  Vergennes,  Oct.  18,  1763.  Arch.  off.  etran.,  Turquie,  vol.  139).  France 
is  opposed  to  a  partition  of  Poland,  wishes  to  secure  the  help  of  the  Porte,  and 
prefers  the  Elector  of  Saxony  for  King  of  Poland,  but  is  not  ready  to  support  him 
by  force,  p.  241.  The  Porte  answers  that  the  entrance  of  the  Russians  into  Po- 
land does  not  affect  it ;  pp.  277  et  seq.,  304  (Choiseul  to  Vergennes,  April  21, 1766), 
"  Le  moyen  le  plus  certain  de  rompre  ses  projets  [Russo-Prussian  alliance  as 
assisted  by  Great  Britain  and,  in  particular,  Russia],  et  peut-etre  de  culbuter  de 
son  trone  usurpe  l'imperatrice  Catherine,  serait  de  lui  susciter  une  guerre.  II  n'y 
a  que  les  Turcs  a  portee  de  nous  rendre  ce  service.  Je  n'ignore  pas  Tetat  de 
faiblesse  et  decadence  de  l'Empire  ottoman,  la  faiblesse  encore  plus  grande,  s'il 
est  possible,  de  son  administration ;  mais  serait-il  de  toute  impossibilite  de  pro- 
poser et  de  suivre  des  moyens  qui  portassent  le  Divan  a  une  guerre  dont,  d'ail- 
leurs,  le  succes  definitif  ne  nous  interesse  pas  vivement,  mais  dont  la  declaration 
et  le  sort  nous  mettront  a  portee  de  detruire  les  mauvaises  intentions  de  Cath- 
erine?" 329  et  seq.;  375  (Choiseul  to  Saint-Priest,  Nov.  14,  1768,  Turquie,  vol. 


^ 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      91 

The  relation  of  Great  Britain  to  these  matters  was  decided 
in  large  measure  by  her  antagonism  to  France ;  whatever  the 
system  of  politics,  there  were  few  occasions  in  the  latter  half  of 
the  eighteenth  century  when  these  two  powers  were  not  ranged 
on  opposite  sides.  Thus  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  at  first 
scarce  regarded  by  Englishmen  as  an  object  of  interest  to 
them,  either  politically  or  commercially,  save  as  it  entered  into 
the  scheme  of  French  diplomacy  and  trade.  The  partition  of 
Turkey,  it  was  felt,  would  deprive  France  of  an  ally,  and,  while 
there  might  be  other  reasons  why  it  should  not  be  hoped  for 
or  participated  in,  yet  on  the  whole  it  was  not  an  event  which 
need  call  for  vigorous  action  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  J 
avert.  Russia  was  a  most  profitable  customer;  the  Baltic 
trade  was  almost  entirely  in  British  hands ;  and  any  measures 
which  would  strengthen  the  Northern  powers  against  the 
Bourbons  in  the  South  were  regarded  as  likely  to  be  favorable 
to  Great  Britain.  Furthermore,  the  sincere  desire  of  the  Eng- 
lish people  was  for  peace;  the  condition  of  their  domains  in 
America  and  Asia  called  for  earnest  attention ;  and  the  leaders 
at  home  were  not  the  best  fitted  to  solve  hard  diplomatic  prob- 
lems or  deal  successfully  with  great  international  crises.  The 
Seven  Years'  War  had  added  largely  to  British  territory  in 
other  continents,  but  the  effect  of  the  war  in  England  had  not 
been  wholly  good.  The  tide  of  politics  ran  high,  and  disorder 
threatened  in  every  quarter ;  the  dissensions  of  a  people  work- 
ing out  the  problems  of  free  government  were  not  calculated 

145)  :  "La  guerre  [between  Turkey  and  Russia]  est  done  declaree;  e'etait  le  pre- 
mier objet  de  nos  vceux,"  385  et  seq.,  Corr.  of  Fre4erick  and  Solms,  in  Sbornik, 
xxxvii.  pp.  127-128.  French  emissaries  were  working  against  Russia  in  the  Kri- 
mea(i767);  184,  the  hostility  of  Russia  and  France,  Nov.  1768,  224,  312,  334, 
335.  Rambaud  :  Instructions,  Russie,  i.  pp.  liv,  lviii.  Beer :  Erste  Theilung  Pol- 
ens,  Documente  {Memoire  of  Choiseul  to  Mercy,  1769),  pp.  5-7.  Saint-Priest: 
Partage  de  la  Pologne,  passim.  Sorel :  Instructions,  Autriche,  pp.  439-446,  449, 
485  (instructions  to  Breteuil,  Dec.  28,  1774) :  "  On  ne  peut  se  dissimuler  que 
diffe rents  evenements  relatifs  a  la  guerre  das  Turcs  et  au  partage  de  la  Pologne, 
n'aient  un  peu  altere  l'esprit  de  Punion  des  deux  cours  "  [France  and  Austria] ; 
493.     Broglie  :  King's  Secret,  ii.  pp.  249  et  seq. 


92  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

to  make  for  a  strong  foreign  policy  ;  and  it  is  scarcely  surpris- 
ing that  the  statesmen  of  Europe  believed  Great  Britain  to 
be  travelling  toward  internal  anarchy  and  political  oblivion. 
Indeed  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  in  Polish  and  Turkish  affairs 
was  so  weak  and  ineffectual  that  a  keener  political  prescience 
and  a  more  thorough  understanding  of  the  British  character 
and  constitution  than  those  possessed  by  the  continental 
leaders  were  needed  in  order  to  give  a  more  hopeful  estimate 
of  England's  future.  The  clue  to  this  British  indifference  as 
to  matters  so  vital  to  all  Europe  is  to  be  found  in  the  pro- 
posals in  1766  for  an  alliance  of  England,  Russia,  Prussia,  and 
the  Northern  states  against  the  parties  to  the  Bourbon  family 
compact  in  the  South.  That  compact  then  in  union  with  the 
Austrian  Hapsburgs  was  declared  by  Sir  Andrew  Mitchell,  the 
English  ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  be  "  the  most  formidable 
combination  ever  formed,  and  the  most  dangerous  to  the 
liberties  of  Europe."  In  the  negotiations  for  this  alliance 
Turkey  appears  as  the  stumbling-block,  England  refusing  to 
consider  an  attack  by  the  Porte  on  Russia  as  a  "  casus  foederis" 
which  would  compel  her  to  assist  her  Russian  ally.  Thus 
Great  Britain  showed  her  determination  to  avoid  alliances 
which  would  entangle  her  in  Eastern  affairs ;  and  Englishmen 
in  general  were  indifferent  to  Russian  success  against  the 
Turks ;  some  even  rejoiced,  as  Lord  Chatham,  who  wrote  to 
Shelburne  in  1773  :  "  I  am  quite  a  Russ.  I  trust  the  Ottoman 
will  pull  down  the  house  of  Bourbon  in  his  fall."  On  the  other 
hand,  while  Catherine  was  cordial  in  her  feelings  toward  the 
English,  she  was  wiser  than  many,  for  she  wrote  to  her  ambas- 
sador in  London  (1769)  that,  though  the  English  then  thought 
but  little,  they  were  always  traders,  and  the  acquisition  by 
"A  Russia  of  territory  on  the  Black  Sea  might  arouse  their 
l>j  '  jealousy.  It  was  indeed  a  matter  of  trade  which  finally 
^  brought  Great  Britain  to  take  action,|andfor  a  time  threatened 
^,  war  between  her  and  Prussia.  This  was  the  question  of  the 
^       trade  of  Dantzic ;  while  the  English  ministers  confined  them- 


V 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      93 

selves  to  polite  expressions  of  disapproval  toward  the  entire 
matter  of  Polish  partition,  —  Lord  Suffolk,  the  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  terming  it,  with  insular  indifference,  "  a  curious 
transaction,"  —  they  endeavored  to  preserve  the  freedom  of 
Polish  trade,  and  in  this  secured  a  partial  victory.  The  trade 
of  England  with  Dantzic  was  to  be  on  the  same  basis  as  in  the 
past;  this  arrangement  was  concluded  in  1774;  and  with 
regard  to  all  else  Suffolk  contented  himself  by  writing  to 
Gunning  at  St.  Petersburg  :  "  The  Business  of  the  Partition  is, 
I  fear,  too  far  advanced  to  be,  in  any  great  degree,  revocable." 
It  was  indeed  by  August,  1774,  the  date  of  this  letter.1 

1  Chatham :  Corr.  iii.  pp.  30-32,  36  et  seq.  Mr.  Stanley,  English  ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg,  wrote  in  1766  that  "  the  court  of  Russia,  situated  at  a  great 
distance  from  the  Southern  powers,  possessed  of  no  colonies,  and  having  little 
trade  or  navigation,  consider  themselves  as  more  secure  from  dangers  of  every 
kind  than  any  other  state  in  Europe ;  *  83,  note,  174, 175,  298,  299  (Chatham  to  Shel- 
burne,  Oct.  20, 1773).  Martens  :  Traites  conclus  par  Russie,  Angleterre,  ix.  pp.  278. 
Rochefort,  English  Amb.  at  Petersburg,  to  Cathcart,  Nov.  24,  1769  (rejoicing 
over  Russian  victories),  280  (Catherine  to  Chernichev,  March  3,  1769).  Boutaric  : 
Corr.  de  Louis  XV.,  ii.  pp.  16  et  seq.,  176.  Sorel :  Eastern  Question,  pp.  78  et  seq. 
Beer:  Documente,  p.  11.  Michael:  Englands  Stellung  zur  ersten  Teilung  Polens, 
Leipzig,  1890,  passim,  and  especially  pp.  5,  85,  89-91.  Macaulay,  Essay  on  Lord 
Chatham,  writing  of  Great  Britain  in  1768-82,  says :  u  A  nation  convulsed  by 
faction,  a  throne  assailed  by  the  fiercest  invective,  a  House  of  Commons  hated 
and  despised  by  the  nation,  England  set  against  Scotland,  Britain  set  against 
America,  a  rival  legislature  sitting  beyond  the  Atlantic,  English  blood  shed  by 
English  bayonets,  our  armies  capitulating,  our  conquests  wrested  from  us,  our 
enemies  hastening  to  take  vengeance  for  past  humiliation,  our  flag  scarcely  able 
to  maintain  itself  in  our  own  seas,  such  was  the  spectacle  which  Pitt  lived  to  see." 
In  Sbornik,  xxvii.  p.  44  (Catherine  II.  to  Madame  Bielke,  July  30,  1775)  :  "Je 
souhaite  de  tout  mon  coeur  que  mes  amis,  les  Anglais,  s'accommodent  avec 
leurs  colonies ;  mais  tant  des  mes  proprieties  se  sont  accomplies,  que  je  crains 
de  voir  l'Amerique  se  detacher  de  l'Europe  de  mon  vivant ; "  also  p.  147,  (the 
same,  April  25,  1778)  :  "  Pour  vos  amis,  les  Anglais,  on  peut  leur  dire  ce  que 
Moliere  fait  tant  repeter  a  George  Dandin :  '  George  Dandin,  tu  l'as  bien  voulu/ 
Ces  gens-la  font  toujours  ce  dont  personne  ne  s'avise ;  il  y  a  15  ans  qu'ils  sont 
partis  du  pied  gauche.  Lorsque  toute  l'Europe  etait  attentive  a  voir  les  mesures 
de  vigueur  qu'ils  allaient  prendre,  que  vont-ils  faire  ?  ils  publient  un  jour  de 
jeune ;  le  beau  moyen  de  relever  le  courage  d'une  nation !  A  present  ils 
pronent  partout  leur  faiblesse."  Cf.  p.  153.  Castera:  Catherine  II.  ii.  p.  128; 
*"•  P-  55-  Arneth :  Joseph  II.  und  Leopold  von  Toscana,  i.  p.  152.  (Leop.  to  Joseph, 
Jan.  23,  1783),  on  England's  "downfall." 


94  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Such  was  the  relation  of  each  of  the  great  powers  to  the 
Eastern  Question  in  1774.  The  situation  of  the  Porte  was 
lamentable  indeed,  for,  as  Favier  wrote  :  "  Russia  crushes  her, 
Prussia  betrays  her,  and  Austria,  after  having  levied  a  contri- 
bution on  her,  seeks  the  division  of  her  spoils."  France  had 
used  her  as  a  tool  and  given  her  poor  advice,  and  Great  Britain 
was  at  best  indifferent  to  her  fate.  Yet  the  Ottoman  Empire 
was  destined  to  withstand  Russia  in  five  wars  within  a  century, 
to  see  Austria  and  Prussia  reach  their  nadir  of  political  exist- 
ence, to  watch  the  fall  of  the  Bourbons  and  of  two  Napoleons, 
and  to  number  Great  Britain  among  the  main  supports  to  her 
existence.  The  politics  of  the  nineteenth  century  have  been 
largely  involved  with  the  fate  of  the  Porte,  and  those  of  the  twen- 
tieth bid  fair  to  resemble  them.  In  1774,  however,  France,  the 
ancient  ally  of  the  Turks,  could  find  no  better  way  to  extricate 
them  from  the  difficulties  in  which  tne  execution  of  the  treaty 
of  Kainardji  had  plunged  them  than  to  advise  them  to  yield  to 
the  demands  of  Russia  rather  than  risk  annihilation  by  war. 
The  condition  of  affairs  in  Germany  offered  no  encouragement 
to  the  Turks,  for  the  rivalry  of  Austria  and  Prussia  had  been 
renewed,  and  the  question  of  the  Bavarian  succession  was  soon 
to  bring  these  two  powers  to  the  verge  of  war.  Frederick  the 
Great  had  been  developing  his  plans  for  the  Fiirstenbund ;  and 
Austria  had  turned  to  Russia,  hoping  to  displace  Frederick  in 
the  political  system  of  Catherine,  and  thus  gain  her  support  to 
check  the  growing  strength  of  Prussia  within  the  Empire. 
The  price  which  Austria  would  be  forced  to  pay  for  a  Russian 
alliance  had  already  been  assessed  by  French  diplomats,  who 
judged  that  Austria  would  be  called  by  Russia  to  join  in  a  plan 
for  the  joint  partition  of  the  Ottoman  dominions  in  Europe. 
The  French  were  free  in  their  declaration  to  their  ally  at 
Vienna  that  the  interests  of  France  were  irreconcilable  with 
those  of  Russia,  and  that  Austria,  in  entering  into  an  alliance 
with  Russia,  would  place  herself  in  opposition  to  all  that 
France  held  to  be  essential  in  her  policy  toward  the  Eastern 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      95 

Question.  "  We  would  regard,"  wrote  the  diplomats  of  Ver- 
sailles, "  the  destruction  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  its  invasion  by 
Russia,  or  its  partition  between  the  two  imperial  courts,  as  one 
of  the  greatest  political  calamities."  But,  however  serious 
such  a  catastrophe  might  appear  to  the  French,  it  soon  became 
evident  that  in  spite  of  their  brave  words  a  policy  of  obstruc- 
tion was  all  that  they  were  willing  to  attempt ;  the  resources 
of  the  kingdom  were  being  drained  by  the  war  against  Great 
Britain  in  behalf  of  the  American  Colonists  ;  and  the  French 
ambassadors  in  the  East  were  therefore  forced  to  use  their 
shrewdest  diplomacy  to  persuade  the  Turks  that  discretion 
was  the  better  part  of  valor.  The  Porte  could  scarcely  be 
expected  to  welcome  this  advice,  and  the  prestige  of  France 
continued  to  wane,  especially  so  as  it  became  evident  that  the 
^A-question  of  a  commerce  with  Russia  by  the  Black  Sea  ports 
was  working  in  the  minds  of  some  Frenchmen  to  lessen  their 
enmity  toward  Russia.  It  is  curious  to  note  in  this  connection 
that,  though  the  French  had  in  mind  to  develop  a  Russian 
I  trade  in  the  Mediterranean  and  Black  Seas,  the  English  were 
I  thinking  to  introduce  Russia  to  the  Mediterranean  as  a  political  \/ 

\force  and  as  their  ally.  This  proposal  was  discussed  between 
Sir  James  Harris,  Lord  Stormont,  and  Prince  Potemkin  early  in 
1 78 1.  The  Russians  were  to  end  the  war  between  France, 
England,  and  Spain  on  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  of  1762 
and  of  uti  possidetis,  and  to  secure  the  evacuation  of  North 
America  by  the  French.  The  American  Colonies  were  not  to 
be  mentioned  in  the  matter,  and  England  was  to  be  free  to  deal 
with  them  alone.  As  a  return  a  treaty  of  perpetual  defensive 
alliance  was  to  be  signed  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain, 
and  the  island  of  Minorca  was  to  be  ceded  to  Russia.  With  a 
naval  station  at  Port  Mahon  the  Russians  would  be  able  to 
hold  the  French  in  check.  This  suggestion,  for  in  the  end 
this  was  all  it  amounted  to,  was  first  made  by  Potemkin,  who, 
looking  to  the  future,  was  urgent  that  Russia  should  again 
attempt  the  Eastern  Question  by  sea  in  the  south  as  well  as 


96  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

by  land  in  the  north.1  This  idea  was  only  an  index  of  Russia's 
intention  to  raise  the  Eastern  Question  in  its  most  serious 
aspect.  The  plans  which  were  forming  in  the  minds  of 
Catherine  and  her  advisers  were  calculated  to  settle  once  and 
for  all  the  most  vital  points  in  the  entire  matter ;  they  included 
a  wholesale  partition  of  Ottoman  dominions  and  the  creation 
of  a  new  political  situation  in  southeastern  Europe.  These 
plans  could  not  be  carried  out  except  with  the  assistance  of  an 
ally  in  central  Europe.  Ten  years  earlier  Prussia  would 
undoubtedly  have  been  chosen  by  Russia,  but  now  Austria 
was  far  more  suitable  for  the  purpose.  Her  geographical  posi- 
tion and  the  character  of  the  new  Emperor,  Joseph  II.,  made 
her  a  more  likely  partner  in  schemes  for  expansion.  As 
Rumiantzov  wrote  in  1783,  Russia  and  Austria  had  a  common 
enemy  in  Asia  and  no  conflicting  interests  in  Europe.  Yet  the 
desires  of  Catherine  to  carry  out  this  program  of  aggrandize- 
ment were  not  at  first  welcome  to  Austria,  who  had  hoped  to 
keep  an  entirely  passive  attitude  as  regards  the  Eastern  Ques- 
tion, and  who  preferred  to  have  a  weak  eastern  neighbor  in  the 
Turks  rather  than  one  so  aggressive  as  the  Russians  were 
certain  to  prove.  It  was  with  this  in  mind  that  Louis  Cobenzl, 
the  Austrian  ambassador  at  Petersburg,  wrote  an  exhaustive 
paper  on  the  policy  of  Austria.  He  urged  that  it  was  Austria's 
interest  to  support  the  Ottoman  Empire  up  to  a  certain  point. 
When,  however,  such  a  policy  if  persisted  in  would  bring  about 
a  war  in  which  Austria  would  be  compelled  to  face  Russia, 

1  Beer:  Orientalische  Politik,  pp.  32-44.  Castera :  op.  cit.  p.  52.  Segur: 
Politique,  i.  pp.  140-145  (the  French  embassy  at  Constantinople,  1756-73)- 
Broglie :  Observations,  in  Segur,  i.  pp.  88,  89,  and  notes.  Favier :  Conj.  rais,  in 
Ibid.  ii.  p.  23.  Vergennes:  Memoire,  in  Ibid.  iii.  pp.  154,  198.  Rambaud :  In- 
structions, ii.  pp,  338-39,  361-62,  375.  Sorel :  Instructions,  pp.  503  (Instructions 
for  Breteuil,  March  2,  1777),  527.  Dearborn:  Black  Sea  Commerce,  i.  p.  107. 
Vide  Antoine  in  the  Bibliography.  Malmesbury :  Diaries  and  Correspondence, 
i.  pp.  299,  315  et  seq.,  323  et  seq.,  346  et  seq.  (Harris  to  Stormont,  Petersburg,  Dec. 
5,  1780);  (Stormont  to  Harris,  London,  Jan.  20,  1781),  439.  Saint- Priest :  La 
Guerre  de  Baviere  et  le  Congres  de  Teschen,  in  Mtudes,  i.  pp.  299  et  passim. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      g? 

Prussia,  the  Protestant  princes  of  Germany  and  possibly  Eng- 
land, Austria  should  reconcile  herself  to  the  doom  of  the 
Porte  and  take  steps  to  profit  by  the  partition  of  Turkish  terri- 
tory. To  be  sure,  Austria  would  enter  such  a  war  allied  with 
France,  Turkey,  Sweden  and  the  Catholic  princes  of  Germany, 
yet  the  risk  of  the  undertaking  would  be  too  great.  He  then 
enters  into  an  elaborate  study  of  the  possible  lines  of  partition  ; 
but  it  is  unnecessary  to  follow  him  further;  the  gist  of  the 
matter  as  regards  the  court  of  Vienna  has  been  shown.1 

Despite  these  considerations  Austria  was  nevertheless 
anxious  to  consolidate  a  Russian  alliance.  Prussia  was  hos- 
tile, France  might  fail  her,  but  united  with  Russia  she  could 
be  certain  that  she  would  receive  her  share  should  the  Otto- 
man Empire  at  last  be  partitioned.  The  letters  establishing 
this  alliance  were  exchanged  between  Catherine  and  Joseph  in 
May,  1 78 1.  Joint  action  with  respect  to  the  Porte  was  agreed 
on ;  and  in  September  of  the  following  year  Catherine  wrote 
to  Joseph  outlining  a  new  settlement  of  affairs  in  south- 
eastern Europe.  These  plans  included  the  creation  of  an 
independent  state  formed  of  Moldavia,  Wallachia,  and  Bes- 
sarabia, as  the  Kingdom  of  Dacia,  to  be  ruled  by  a  Greek 
Orthodox  prince;  in  the  event  of  Russian  successes  in  the 
Krimea  another  state  was  to  be  formed  south  of  the  Danube 
after  the  Turk  had  been  expelled  from  Europe ;  this  was  to  be 
a  new  Byzantine  Empire  under  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine. 
Russia  for  herself  desired  Oczakov  and  the  Black  Sea  coast 
between  the  Bug  and  the  Dniestr,  with  one  or  two  islands  in  the 
Archipelago  for  naval  and  commercial  purposes,  while  Austria 
was  to  increase  her  territory  on  the  southeast.  Joseph 
replied  very  cautiously,  pointing  out  many  difficulties  and  yet 
asking  for  himself  a  great  increase  in  power.     He  wished  to 

1  Vorontzov :  Arkhiv,  xxvii.  p.  92.  (N.  Rumiantzov  to  A.  Romanovitch, 
Frankfort,  March  10,  (21)  1783.)  Cobenzl's  memoir  is  given  in  abstract  in  Beer  :j 
Orientalische  Politik,  pp.  39-43.  For  Russian  progress  in  the  East,  1777-83,  c£. 
Herrmann  :  Gesch.  Russlands,  vi.  pp.  32-80. 

7 


98  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

gain  territory  which  would  strengthen  his  frontiers  in  Galicia 
and  Bukovina,  and  to  take  Wallachia  as  far  as  the  Aluta,  the 
cities  of  Nikopolis,  Widdin,  Orsova,  Belgrade,  together  with  a 
zone  of  three  leagues  breadth  on  the  banks  of  the  Danube ; 
from  Belgrade  he  proposed  that  a  line  should  be  drawn,  which 
could  include  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Istria,  Dalmatia,  and  parts 
of  Servia  and  Montenegro,  to  a  point  on  the  Adriatic  below  the 
Gulf  of  the  Drina.  Thus  Austria  was  to  regain  the  territory 
lost  by  the  treaty  of  Belgrade  in  1739  and  restore  the  boundary 
set  by  that  of  Passarovitz  in  171 8.  Furthermore,  Joseph  stipu- 
lated that  Austrian  trade  via  the  Danube  was  to  be  free ;  and 
he  proposed  to  indemnify  Venice  for  Istria  and  Dalmatia  by 
giving  that  state  the  Morea,  Crete,  and  Cyprus.  It  would  be 
hard  to  imagine  more  reckless  juggling  with  geography  than 
this,  and  yet  there  are  few  things  in  eighteenth-century  history 
which  better  illustrate  the  political  system  of  the  period.1 

The  difficulties  of  which  Joseph  had  written  were  serious 
ones,  for  he  feared  the  attack  of  France  and  Prussia.  Unless 
an  agreement  were  made  with  France  he  felt  that  the  scheme 
could  not  be  carried  through,  but  if  that  power  were  given 
Egypt  in  the  coming  partition,  and  Prussia  were  held  in  check 
by  a  display  of  force,  it  would  be  unnecessary  to  pay  the  court 
of  Berlin  the  high  price  he  was  certain  it  would  demand  for  its 
acquiescence  in  the  plan.     In  other  matters  he  agreed  with 

1  Tratchevski :  Das  russisch-osterreichische  Biindniss  vom  Jahre  1781,  in  Hist. 
Zeit.,  xxxiv.  pp.  361-396.  Martens  :  Traitis,  Autriche,  ii.  pp.  96  et  sea.  Malmes- 
bury :  Diaries,  i.  pp.  236,  238,  483.  Dohm  :  Denkwiirdigkeiten,  ii.  pp.  4  et  sea.,  16. 
Herrmann  :  Gesch.  Russ.  vi.  p.  461.  Ranke  :  Diedeutschen  Machte,  pp.  109  et  sea. 
Arneth  :  Joseph  II  und  Katharina,  pp.  67-92,  143  et  sea.,  170  et  sea.  Beer:  Ori- 
entalische  Politik,  pp.  47  et  sea.  Bruckner :  Katharina  II,  pp.  331  et  sea.  Zink- 
eisen  :  Gesch.  osman.  Reiches,  vi.  pp.  268  et  sea.,  350  et  sea.  Brunner  :  Corr.  intimes 
de  Joseph  II,  pp.  24,  29.  Castera :  op.  cit.  iii.  pp.  90  et  sea.  Wolf :  Oesterreich 
und  Preussen,  pp.  4  (Riedesel  writes,  March  17,  1780)  :  "  L'appetit  des  acquisitions 
dans  cette  cour  [Vienna]  est  insatiable,"  6,  9,  94.  Rambaud :  Hist,  oj  Russia, 
p.  113.  Sorel :  V Europe  et  la  Revolution,  i.  pp.  451,  519,  520.  Hassall :  The  Bal- 
ance of  Power,  1715-1789,  pp.  362,  363.  These  three  last  named  writers  all  differ 
from  each  other  and  from  the  account  given  in  the  text  above. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      99 

Russia,  though  he  wrote  to  his  brother  Leopold  in  Tuscany 
that  Catherine  was  so  possessed  with  her  "  Greek  plan  "  that 
she  greatly  underestimated  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome. 
Joseph  doubted  both  the  weakness  of  the  Turks  and  the 
strength  of  the  Russians;  and,  though  he  was  enthusiastic 
over  the  schemes  for  Austrian  expansion  and  the  acquisition 
of  southern  ports,  he  nevertheless  incessantly  harped  on  his 
fears  of  France  and  Prussia.  In  writing  to  Mercy-Argenteau, 
his  ambassador  at  Paris,  he  elaborated  these  statements,  es- 
pecially with  respect  to  the  value  of  Egypt  to  France,  both 
intrinsically  and  as  a  means  of  injuring  British  commerce. 
Indeed  at  one  time  he  hoped  that  the  continuance  of  the  war 
in  America  between  France  and  Great  Britain  might  keep  the 
Bourbons  from  interfering  with  his  plans,  and  if  it  had  not 
been  for  the  British  surrender  at  Yorktown  it  is  possible  that 
Joseph  and  Catherine  might  have  been  bolder  in  pressing 
their  schemes  for  partition.  Such  were  the  preliminaries  of 
this  plan,  which,  if  it  had  been  carried  out,  would  have  greatly 
changed  the  history  of  the  nineteenth  century.1 

1  Arneth :  Joseph  II.  und  Leopold  von  Toscana,  i.  pp.  140  et  seq.  (Joseph  to 
Leopold,  Nov.  24,  and  Dec.  16,  1782).  Arneth  and  Flammermont :  Mercy-Argen- 
teau, Joseph  II.,  et  Kaunitz,  i.  pp.  139  et  seq.  (Joseph  to  Mercy,  Dec.  7,  1782).  He 
writes  of  his  plans  with  Catherine  II.  and  of  the  services  of  Saint-Priest,  the 
French  ambassador  at  Constantinople,  in  persuading  the  Turks  to  yield  to 
Russian  demands.  He  inquires  whether  France  would  remain  neutral  if  he  and 
Catherine  should  attempt  to  partition  Turkey,  or  whether  "  la  France  fut  capable 
d'entrer  en  pour-parlers  avec  les  deux  cours  imperiales  et  de  leurs  donner  les 
assurances  necessaires  de  la  neutralite  et  en  meme  temps  de  se  stipuler  soit  des 
avantages  de  commerce  ou  une  partie  des  depouilles  de  l'Empire  Ottoman,  dont 
l'Egypte,  selons  mes  observations  faites  deja  depuis  quelques  annees,  surtout 
depuis  l'envoi  de  M.  de  Tott  dans  cette  province,  a  fait  l'objet  des  speculations  I 
de  la  France ;  et  effectivement  si  cette  province  riche,  fertile  et  commercante  par 
elle  meme,  devenait  une  colonie  francaise,  dans  peu  de  temps  la  France,  moyen- 
nant  le  port  de  Suez  sur  la  mer  Rouge  et  en  ouvrant  une  communication  bonne 
et  assuree  contre  les  brigands  sur  l'isthme;  serait  la  maitresse  de  tout  le  com- 
merce du  golfe  Persique  et  des  grandes  Indes,  qu'elle  ferait  par  le  chemin  le  plus 
court  et  le  plus  assure  savoir  par  la  Mediterranee.  Eclairez-moi,  mon  cher 
Comte,  sur  ce  que  vous  pensez  a  l'egard  de  tout  ceci,  et  si  la  France  prefererait 
dans  les  circonstances  actuelles  une  guerre  de  terre  avec  moi  et  de  rompre  les 


\ 


100  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

The  two  monarchs  were  not  as  yet  agreed,  Catherine  soon 
showing  her  disapproval  of  Joseph's  proposal  to  take  Istria  and 
Dalmatia.  She  wrote  to  him  that  the  acquiescence  of  Venice 
was  necessary  to  their  other  plans,  and  that  the  Greek  Empire 
would  be  much  injured  by  the  loss  of  the  Morea  and  the 
neighboring  islands,  which  would  have  to  be  used  to  indem- 
nify Venice.  In  fact  the  Empress  was  dissatisfied  that  Joseph 
should  wish  to  modify  her  proposals.  The  exchange  of  letters 
on  the  subject  continued,  but  other  more  pressing  matters  de- 
layed a  final  agreement.  These  were  the  affairs  of  the 
Krimea,  where  the  question  of  Tatar  independence  bid  fair  to 
bring  about  a  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey.  By  the  treaty 
of  Kainardji  these  tribes  had  been  freed  from  Turkish  rule, 
though  they  were  Muslim.  Catherine  now  proposed  to  incor- 
porate them  in  her  Empire.  The  Porte  protested,  but  both 
the  French  and  British  representatives  urged  submission, 
which  was  finally  though  unwillingly  yielded.  The  services  of 
France  were  guided  by  a  fear  of  a  final  catastrophe  for  the 
Ottoman  Empire  should  war  actually  break  out ;  but  those  of 
England  were  given  as  from  one  friendly  power  to  another. 
Mr.  Fox  offered  English  mediation  to  Russia,  and  even  spoke 
of  an  English  fleet  acting  with  that  of  Russia  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, but  this  was  only  to  be  on  condition  of  the  renewal 
of  an  Anglo-Russian  alliance.  In  the  mind  of  Catherine  the 
English  were  to  be  assigned  the  business  of  holding  France  in 
check  should  the  war  really  break  out  and  the  plans  for  parti-  • 
tion  materialize.  It  is  hard  to  say  what  France  could  better 
have  done,  but  the  results  were  certainly  unfortunate,  for  the 
Turks  were  greatly  irritated  by  the  French  advice  to  submit 

liens  qui  nous  unissent  pour  conserver  l'Empire  Ottoman  et  empecher  la  possi- 
bilite  de  sa  destruction.  L'acquisition  projetee  de  l'Egypte  porterait  le  coup 
le  plus  sensible  au  commerce  de  TAngleterre,  objet  qui  merite  a  tous  egards 
d'entrer  dans  la  balance  des  avantages  et  convenances  qui  le  Roi  et  son 
ministere  pourraient  se  procurer  a  cette  occasion."  Arneth  :  Joseph  und  Kath- 
arina,  pp.  170  et  seq.  (J.  to  K.  Nov.  13,  1782).  Wolf:  op.  cit.  p.  95  (Kaunitz  to 
Reviczky,  Oct.  31, 1783).     Beer :  Orientalische  Politik,  pp.  65  et  seq. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      1 01 


\ 


to  Russian  demands  in  the  Krimea  and  Kuban,  and  Ver- 
gennes  and  Saint-Priest  began  to  blame  each  other  for  having 
followed  a  policy  which  still  further  lowered  French  prestige 
at  Constantinople.  Indeed  a  curious  pamphlet  controversy- 
regarding  the  condition  of  Turkey  and  the  French  policy  be- 
came a  matter  of  talk  in  Paris;  and  the  lines  were  drawn 
between  the  admirers  of  Islam  and  the  Turks  and  their  de- 
tractors. The  literature  included  books  by  Peysonnel,  de 
Tott,  and  Volney.  It  is  only  fair,  however,  to  remember  that 
though  France  and  Great  Britain  had  but  just  ended  their 
war,  the  French  diplomats  stood  ready  during  the  year  1783 
to  form  an  Anglo-French  alliance  with  Turkey  to  stop  Russia 
and  Austria  in  their  plans  for  partitioning  the  Ottoman 
Empire;  but  England  was  unwilling.  On  the  whole  there 
was  a  national  feeling  of  relief  in  France  when  it  became 
apparent  in  October,  1783,  that  Catherine  was  satisfied  with 
the  Krimea,  at  least  for  the  time  being.  This  may  be  seen  in 
the  instructions  given  to  de  Noailles,  the  French  ambassador 
at  Vienna.  These  declared  that  the  Franco-Austrian  alliance 
was  seriously  threatened  by  that  of  Austrian  and  Russia. 
France  intended  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  by  every  means  in  her  power,  but  preferred  pacific  to 
hostile  measures  ;  she  would  continue  her  alliance  with  the 
Emperor  as  long  as  it  were  possible  without  exposing  the 
dignity  and  interest  of  the  state.  The  object  of  French  policy 
was,  therefore,  "to  keep  the  peace  between  the  Turks  and 
Russians  by  inspiring  the  Turks  with  a  spirit  of  conciliation 
and  by  insensibly  preparing  them  for  sacrifices."  A  more 
difficult  program  it  is  hard  to  conceive.1 

1  Rambaud:  Instructions,  Russie,  ii.  pp.  361,  362,  375,  392,  393.  Martens: 
op.  at.  Angleterre,  ix.  pp.  325-327.  (Cath.  to  Simoline,  Jan.  23,  1784.)  Russia 
must  thank  the  English  for  their  "  concours  amicale  en  empechant  les  Turcs  de 
se  lancer  dans  une  guerre."  Malmesbury :  Diaries,  ii.  pp.  22,  42,  47,  50.  Sorel : 
Instructions,  Autriche,  pp.  526,  534.  (Instructions  to  de  Noailles,  Oct.  4,  1783.) 
Le  Moniteur,  June  30,  July  1,  1855.  The  despatches  of  Vergennes,  Barthelemy, 
d'Adhemar,  Montmorin,  Choiseul,  d'Esterno,  and  Breteuil  from  Jan.  6  to  Oct.  30, 


102  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Other  matters  assisted  this  plan  of  postponing  the  final 
destiny  of  the  Turks ;  Austria  and  Russia  were  unable  as  yet 
to  take  aggressive  action.  At  the  time  when  it  still  seemed 
likely  that  the  Porte  would  show  by  war  her  resentment  against 
Russia,  Kaunitz  had  outlined  Austria's  situation,  showing  three 
possible  solutions  of  her  difficulty.  Either  *  she  could  remain 
passive,  or  she  could  oppose  Russian  views,  or  finally  she 
could  make  common  cause"  with  the  Empress.  He  advised 
for  the  last-named  line  of  action,  which  was  in  reality  that 
already  pledged  by  Cobenzl  at  St.  Petersburg.  But  Kaunitz 
and  Joseph  both  insisted  again  that  France  must  be  propitiated 
and  Prussia  must  be  put  "extra  statum  nocendi  "  as  far  as  Aus- 
tria was  concerned,  before  any  active  steps  could  be  taken  by 
the  two  imperial  courts  to  carry  out  their  plans.  The  Prussian 
diplomats  had  indeed  been  alarmed  at  the  prospect  both  of  the 
annihilation  of  their  former  ally,  Turkey,  and  of  the  increase 
in  the  power  of  their  rival,  Austria.  The  removal  of  Prince 
Nikita  Panin  from  power  at  St.  Petersburg  had  been  connected 
with  the  formation  of  the  Austro-Russian  alliance,  and  a  com- 
plete reversal  in  the  situation  of  the  past  twenty  years  had  thus 
taken  place.  Prussia  had  been  occupied  in  strengthening  her 
position  in  Germany,  while  her  relations  with  France  had 
somewhat  improved.  That  she  should  be  prepared  to  fight  for 
this  position  was  necessary,  owing  to  the  continual  desire  of 

1783,  regarding  a  Turko- Anglo- French  coalition  to  stop  Russia  and  Austria  from 
partitioning  Turkey.  Vorontzov  :  Arkhiv,  ix.  p.  4  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov,  Venice, 
March,  1784).  Stael-Holstein :  Corr.  pp.  3,  4  (Jan.  5,  19;  Oct.  11,  1784).  Les- 
cure  :  Corr.  secrete,  i.  pp.  578,  580,  581  et  seq.,  459.  (A  rhyme  which  appeared  in 
Paris,  in  Feb.  1782,  is  here  given.  In  part  it  was  as  follows  :  — 
"  La  France  entreprend  .  .  .  tout, 

L'Espagne  ne  fait  rien  du  .  .  .  tout, 

L'Angleterre  se  bat  contre  .  .  .  tout, 

L'Empereur  tire  parti  de  .  .  .  tout, 

La  Russie  voudroit  balancer  .  .  .  tout.") 
Eton :  Survey  of  Turkey,  pp.  5-7.    Ranke  :  Die  deutschen  Machte,  p.  106.   Sbornik: 
xxvii.  pp.  250-252  (Cath.  to  Potemkin,  April  14, 1783).    Commenting  on  Joseph's 
letter :     "  Quand  le  gateau  sera  cuit,  chacun  prendra  de  l'appetit."    Arneth : 
Joseph  und  Katharina,  pp.  193  et  seq.  (J.  to  C,  April  8,  1783). 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      103 

Joseph  to  secure  Bavaria  in  exchange  for  the  Austrian  Nether- 
lands. This  plan,  about  which  Joseph  consulted  his  ally  on  the 
Neva,  further  complicated  the  oriental  projects.  In  fact  the 
varied  interests  of  Austria,  as  well  as  the  radical  internal 
reforms  which  Joseph  was  pressing  throughout  his  dominions, 
were  destined  to  weaken  Austrian  foreign  policy  in  the  Balkans. 
Matters  thus  hung  fire,  though  a  brisk  interchange  of  letters 
between  Vienna  and  Petersburg  served  to  keep  the  diplomats 
of  both  states  busy  with  suggestions  and  modifications  of  their 
respective  plans.1 

The  opposition  which  Prussia  would  have  offered  to  Aus- 
trian expansion  in  the  Balkans  in  the  years  1780-86  was  prob- 
ably over-estimated  by  Kaunitz,  for  Frederick  declared  that  he 
had  no  intention  of  acting  as  "  the  Don  Quixote  of  the  Turks." 
Furthermore  the  relations  of  France  and  Russia  had  in  reality 
not  been  as  cool  as  some  would  think ;  the  League  of  Armed 
Neutrality  of  which  Russia  was  the  head,  had  shown  the 
French  that  it  might  be  possible  to  accommodate  their  desires 
to  those  of  Russia  and  yet  profit  in  economic  directions. 
Frederick  was  absorbed  in  his  Furstenbwid ;  France  was  tem- 
porizing ;  and  Great  Britain  was  friendly  to  the  imperial  courts 
in  spite  of  Russia's  attitude  during  the  American  war,  for  at 

1  Beer  :  Joseph,  Leopold  und  Kaunitz,  pp.  xi,  147  (Joseph  to  Kaunitz.  Persano, 
Jan.  16,  1784)  :  "  Les  affaires  turques  paroissent  encore  tres  embrouillees,  mais 
je  suis  parfaitement  de  votre  avis  que  la  Porte  finira  par  ceder.  II  faut  que  vous, 
intruisies  [sic]  bien  decidement  Herbert  [Austrian  minister  at  the  Porte]  a 
exiger  absolu merit  l'egalite  parfaite  avec  la  Russie  relativement  au  commerce  et 
a  la  libre  navigation  sur  le  Danube  et  par  les  Dardanelles.  .  .  ."  Ranke  :  op.  cit. 
p.  459  (P'rederick  to  Duke  Karl  Wilhelm  Ferdinand,  Jan.  7,  1782).  Lescure  : 
op.  cit.  pp.  460,461  (Feb.  5,  16,  1782).  Martens:  op.  cit.  Autriche,  ii.  pp.  134, 
135  (Kaunitz  to  Cobenzl,  1785),  188  (Ibid.  Nov.  28,  1788).  As  a  "  Caterum  cen- 
seo  "  he  wrote  :  "  tant  que  la  puissance  de  la  Prusse  ne  sera  pas  amoindrie,  toutes 
les  intentions,  les  plans  et  les  entreprises  des  deux  cours  imperiales  seront 
toujours  entraves  et  aneantis  par  elle."  Hausser:  Deutsche  Gesch.  i.  p.  223 
(based  on  Royal  Prussian  Archives).  Dietz,  the  Prussian  minister  at  the 
Porte  in  1784,  "hielt  es  fiir  Preussens  Pflicht  das  tiirkische  Reich  gegen  seine 
Bedranger  zu  schiitzen,  schon  vvegen  des  Zuwachses  an  Macht,  der  im  Falle  der 
Auflosung  Russland  und  Oesterreich  verstarkte." 


104  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

bottom  English  statesmen  were  anxious  lest  the  French  might 
supplant  them  at  St.  Petersburg  and  either  gain  in  the  Levant 
trade  or  share  in  Turkish  spoils.  The  Austrians,  however, 
were  not  ready  for  war;  they  wished  a  more  definite  assurance 
as  to  their  share  in  the  wreckage  of  the  Ottoman  Empire ;  and 
the  Russians  had  not  completed  their  acquisition  of  the  Krimea. 
Therefore  this  delay,  and  the  passing  of  the  critical  moment 
for  action ;  for  if  the  two  courts  had  attacked  Turkey  in  the 
midst  of  the  American  war,  it  is  doubtful  if  France  or  Great 
Britain  would  have  effected  much  either  for  or  against  the 
scheme  of  partition,  and  Prussia  would  never  have  acted  alone, 
especially  when  there  was  a  possibility  that  Austria  might 
become  more  of  a  Balkan  and  less  of  a  German  power,  thus 
giving  Berlin  greater  prestige  in  the  Empire.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Turks  might  have  made  a  strong  fight,  and  unless 
defeat  should  have  come  to  them  earlier  than  now  seems  possible, 
they  might  have  held  their  enemies  at  bay  till  time  and  chang- 
ing politics  should  assist  them.  It  had  so  happened  in  the 
past.  In  1787,  however,  conditions  had  changed;  Frederick 
the  Great  was  dead ;  disturbances  in  the  Netherlands  were 
tending  to  bring  Great  Britain  and  Prussia  together  in  order  to 
preserve  Holland  from  French  influence ;  Catherine  was  making 
her  oriental  progress  in  the  Krimea,  thereby  moving  the  Turks 
to  hostilities ;  and  Joseph  was  no  longer  hesitating  with  regard 
to  expansion  in  the  southeast.  The  war  between  the  imperial 
allies  and  the  Porte  finally  broke  out  in  1787.  These  events 
were  destined  to  renew  the  friendly  relations  between  Prussia 
and  the  Porte,  and  to  draw  England  into  Eastern  matters  almost 
against  her  will.  The  result  of  the  Dutch  troubles,  which  were 
treated  in  the  previous  chapter,  was  to  lead  the  Prussian  and 
British  representatives  at  Constantinople  to  oppose  French 
policy  there,  and  covertly  to  urge  the  Turks  on  to  war  against 
the  two  imperial  courts,  hoping  thus  to  distract  the  French 
from  their  interests  in  Holland.  The  British  government 
declared  with  respect  to  the  Turkish  question  that  its  wish  was 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      105 

to  take  no  part  in  the  matter,  but  that  if  France  should  decide 
to  reverse  her  policy  and  should  join  with  Russia  and  Austria, 
in  the  belief  that  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  now  doomed,  and 
should  take  steps  to  secure  Egypt  and  some  islands  in  the 
Levant  as  her  share,  Great  Britain  would  then  hold  herself  in 
readiness  to  take  action.  What  that  action  might  be,  not  even 
the  ministers  themselves  as  yet  knew.  In  the  meantime  the 
French  had  continued  their  efforts  to  strengthen  the  Turkish 
army ;  and  many  officers  and  engineers  had  been  sent  by  them 
to  serve  the  Sultan.  They  had  also  negotiated  a  treaty,  en- 
deavoring to  obtain  for  themselves  special  trading  privileges  in 
Egypt,  and  transit  via  the  Red  Sea  to  India.  Indeed  in  the 
memoirs  and  correspondence  of  the  period  constant  reference 
is  made  to  the  importance  both  of  the  Black  Sea  trade  and  of 
Egypt  as  a  station  on  the  road  to  India.  There  can  be  no 
question  that  France  also  was  uncertain  what  line  of  action  to 
take,  and  that  she  tried  to  play  for  Russian  favor  by  her  policy 
toward  the  Porte,  while  at  the  same  time  she  intimated  to  the 
English  that  it  might  be  wise  for  the  two  powers  to  forget  their 
differences  in  the  Netherlands,  and  to  stand  together  to  pre- 
serve the  status  quo  in  the  East.  The  Russians,  therefore, 
justly  distrusted  France,  and  though  willing  to  temporize  with 
her,  dreaded  any  break  with  Great  Britain,  since  Mr.  Pitt  had 
said  plainly  to  Count  Vorontzov,  the  Russian  ambassador,  that 
the  English  would  never  be  offended  at  any  conquests  that 
Russia  might  make,  but  that  they  would  never  permit  any 
aggrandizement  on  the  part  of  France.  Curiously  enough,  the 
British  government  seems  for  a  time  to  have  been  so  blinded 
by  its  dread  of  France  that  it  stood  ready  to  give  Russia  a  free 
hand  in  the  Levant,  reserving  India  for  England,  thus  dividing 
the  oriental  trade-world  between  the  two  powers.  Prussia, 
however,  was  destined  soon  to  point  the  way  for  England  in 
another  direction.1 

1  Rambaud  :    Instructions,   Russie,   ii.  pp.  376,  41 5,  430,  482.     Barral-Mont- 
ferrat :  Dix  ans,  etc.,  i.  pp.  143  et  seq.,  284,  300,  304,  319,  325,  346.   Masson :  Dipt. 


106  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

With  the  accession  of  Frederick  William  II.  to  the  throne  of 
Prussia  (1786)  there  was  for  a  short  time  a  lessening  of  hostility 
between  Berlin  and  Vienna ;  but  within  the  year  the  old  rivalry 
became  as  bitter  as  before;  and  Prussia  began  to  turn  to 
the  Porte  as  an  ally  against  Austria  and  Russia,  and  to  Great 
Britain  as  an  ally  against  France.  The  intricacies  of  European 
politics  and  the  ambition  of  Hertzberg,  the  Prussian  minister, 
were  soon  to  involve  first  Prussia,  and  later  Great  Britain  in 
the  tangle  of  oriental  diplomacy.  The  gist  of  Hertzberg's  plan 
was  that  Prussia  should  sign  a  treaty  of  defensive  alliance  with 
the  Ottoman  Empire  and  should  then  propose  that,  in  order  to 
escape  annihilation  at  the  hands  of  Russia  and  Austria,  the  Porte 
should  ask  Prussian  mediation  and  should  cede  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia  to  the  Emperor  Joseph,  and  Bessarabia  and  Oczakov 
to  the  Empress  Catherine.  Turkey  should  then  be  guaranteed 
its  integrity  south  of  the  Danube.  Austria,  under  threat  of 
rebellion  in  Hungary  and  Belgium,  should  return  part  of  Galicia 
to  Poland;  Poland  in  turn  ceding  some  territory  to  Prussia 
which  would  further  round  out  the  eastern  border.  This  was 
to  be  accomplished  by  a  union  of  Prussia,  Sweden,  Holland, 

des  affaires  Strangles,  p.  49.  De  Testa :  Recueil,  ii.  p.  76.  Zinkeisen  :  op.  cit.  vi. 
pp.  552  et  sea.,  582  et  seq.,  616  et  seq.  Arneth  :  op.  cit.  pp.  274  et  seq.  Ranke : 
Serbien,  p.  58,  note  1.  Bruckner:  op.  cit.  pp.  346  et  seq.  De  Ligne  :  Memoir es,  i. 
pp.  41-102.  Segur  :  Memoires  ou  souvenirs,  iii.  pp.  9  et  seq.  Sorel :  V Europe  et 
la  Resolution,  i.  pp.  528,  532.  Martens  :  Traitis,  Angleterre,  ix.  p.  341.  Voront- 
zov  :  Arkhiv,  ix.  pp.  in,  136,  139,  168;  xix.  p.  353.  Wolf:  Oesterreich  und 
Preussen,  pp.  148  et  seq.,  210  et  seq.  Sbornik :  xxvii.  pp.  377  et  seq.,  393"395>  4^3» 
472.  Auckland:  Corr.  i.  pp.  213,  217,  220-222,  231,  232,  235,  245-249,  262,  263, 
273,  280,  281,  290-296,  299-302.  Wassiltchikow :  Les  Razoumowski,  ii.  Pt.  4, 
PP-  x35»  *36  (Morkov  to  A.  Razumovski,  July  28,  1787)  :  "La  France  negocie, 
interpose  ses  bons  offices,  tache  d'effectuer  un  accommodement  et  de  prevenir  la 
rupture.  Son  credit  a  la  Porte  est  baisse  ;  les  insinuations  prussiennes  y  pre- 
valent. .  .  .  [Speaking  of  the  Dutch  complications  and  French  weakness] 
Pour  nous  je  crois,  que  c'est  ce  qui  nous  conviendrait  mieux  pour  rarrangement 
definitif  de  toutes  les  affaires  que  nous  avons  du  cote  de  l'Orient  et  de  l'Asie. 
L'Angleterre  parait  tout  a  fait  s'etre  jetee  dans  les  bras  de  la  cour  de  Berlin." 
Briickner :  Die  Reise  Katharines  II.  nach  Sudrussland  im  Jahre  1787,  in  Russ. 
Rev.  ii.  pp.  1-33 ;  97-132.  On  Prussia  and  England  in  1785,  cf.  Cornwallis  :  Corr. 
i.  pp.  201  et  seq. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      \0J 

Great  Britain,  and  the  Porte,  who  should  threaten  the  imperial 
allies  with  a  general  war.  Prussia  was  further  to  profit  by  a 
favorable  commercial  treaty  with  the  Porte.  This  was  not  a 
new  plan;  Hertzberg  had  suggested  at  the  time  of  the  first 
partition  of  Poland  that  Austria  should  be  given  her  share  of 
the  booty  at  the  expense  of  the  Turks.  But  on  the  whole  the 
proposition  was  manifestly  impracticable;  Russia  was  bent 
on  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  Porte,  and  wished  at  the 
same  time  to  keep  the  Danubian  provinces  free  from  Austrian 
control ;  Austria  was  unwilling  to  cede  Galicia,  and  would  have 
looked  with  great  disfavor  on  an  increase  of  Prussian  territory ; 
both  Sweden  and  Great  Britain  were  unprovided  for;  and 
above  all,  the  Ottoman  Empire  would  be  unwilling  to  accept 
the  Danube  as  a  frontier  unless  forced  by  the  necessities  of 
defeat.  Nevertheless  the  news  of  the  plan  alarmed  Austria 
greatly  since  the  Russian  troops  had  proved  themselves  inca- 
pable, and  the  Austrian  armies,  being  compelled  to  bear  the 
brunt  of  the  campaign,  had  been  defeated  by  the  Turks.  The 
outlook,  therefore,  seemed  dark  to  the  Emperor,  and  he  wrote 
in  a  despairing  tone  to  his  brother  Leopold  and  to  Kaunitz. 
The  very  success  of  the  Turks,  however,  made  them  less  trac- 
table and  more  unwilling  to  agree  to  the  Prussian  proposals  ; 
in  fact  they  outwitted  Hertzberg  by  persuading  his  agent, 
Dietz,  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  offensive  alliance, — something 
to  which  the  Prussian  government  was  by  no  means  willing  to 

subscribe.1 

• 

1  Wolf  :  op.  cit.  pp.  in,  112,  131  et  seq.,  162  et  seq.,  223,  226,  232  et  seq.  Hertz- 
berg: Precis,  in  Zeits.  fur  Geschichtswissenschaft,  i.  pp.  21,  24:  "  Lorsque  la 
guerre  s'alluma  en  1788  entre  les  deux  cours  imperiales  et  les  Turcs,  et  que 
ceux-ci  furent  menaces  d'etre  expulses  de  l'Europe,  ce  qui  auroit  pu  procurer  a 
la  maison  d'Autriche,  l'ancienne  rivale  de  celle  de  Brandenbourg,  un  aggrandise- 
ment trop  dangereux,  je  conseillois  au  roi,  que  la  Prusse  s'y  oppose  avec  ses  deux 
allies  [England  and  Holland]  et  tache  de  maintenir  l'equilibre  dans  l'orient  et  le 
nord,  d'abord  par  une  declaration  vigoureuse  et  en  case  de  besoin  par  une  inter- 
vention encore  plus  efficace,"  p.  26;  and  Receuil  des  deductions,  i.  p.  v;  iii. 
pp.  xiv,  8,  20,  44,  58,  63.  Vivenot:  i.  Kaunitz  und  Leopold  (Kaunitz  to  Mercy, 
Wien,  Jan.  6, 1790),  p.  479 :  "  Wir  haben  in  zuverlassige  Erfahrung  gebracht,  dass 


OF 

1 08  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

In  the  meantime  the  Russians  had  been  troubled  by  the 
prospect  of  war  with  Sweden  as  well  as  by  the  manoeuvres  of 

der  Berliner  Hof  seit  dem  Ausbruch  des  niederlandischen  Aufruhrs  seinen  bishe- 
rigen  Plan  ganz  abgeandert  hat  und  wirklich  entschlossen  ist,  die  kaiserlichen 
Hofe  zukiinftiges  Fruhjahr  mit  behilfe  der  Polen  anzugreifen ;  dass  derselbe  in 
dieser  Hinsicht  der  Pforte  einen  neuen  Offensiv-Allianz-Tractat  antragen  lasst, 
welcher  von  alien  vorigen  absurden  Bedingnissen  entledigt  ist  und  keine  andere 
Forderung  enthalt,  als  dass  die  Pforte  den  Krieg  fortsetze  und  keinen  Frieden 
ausser  einverstandlich  mit  Preussen  und  seinen  Alliirten  schliesse ;  dass  sich  end- 
lich  der  preussische  Hof  nicht  nur  des  dies  falligen  Beifalls  der  Seemachte  ver- 
sichert  halt,  sondern  auch  ihrer  Seits  Verheissungen  erhalten  haben  will,  dass 
sie  ihm  durch  thatige  Massregeln  freien  Rucken  verschaffen  werden."  Duncker  : 
Friedrich  Wilhelm  II.  und  Graf  Hertzberg,  in  Hist.  Zeit.  xxxvii.  (1877)  PP«  I-43« 
Zinkeisen :  Gesck,  des  osman.  Reiches,\i.  p.  674  (Hertzberg  to  Dietz,  Nov.  20, 
1787) :  "  Si  les  Turcs  se  trouvent  pousses  et  si  l'on  en  vient  a  une  negotiation  de 
paix,  alors  tachez  de  les  porter  a  demander  la  mediation  du  Roi  conjointement 
avec  celle  de  France,  qui  leur  convient  mieux  que  celle  de  l'Empereur,"  p.  676. 
(Hertzberg  to  Dietz,  Jan.  26and  Feb.  9,  1788.)  Hertzberg  regarded  his  plan  as 
"  fonde  sur  la  plus  saine  et  la  plus  juste  politique.  .  .  ."  "  Mir  scheint  dass 
kein  verniinftiger  Mensch  diesem  Plane  widerstehen  konnte:  Denn  da  er  das 
einzige  Mittel  ist  die  Pforte  zu  retten,  so  denke  ich  dass  jeder  nur  einigermassen 
aufgeklarte  turkische  Minister  sich  daf  iir  entscheiden  miisste."  Cf.  pp.  677  et  seq. 
Hausser:  Deutsche  Gesch.  i.  p.  224  (Hertzberg  to  Dietz,  Nov.  24,  1787).  Since 
Dutch  affairs  had  been  satisfactorily  settled,  u  so  mochte  ich  wohl,  was  in  meinen 
Kraften  liegt,  thun,  um  den  gegenwartigen  Turkenkrieg  zu  einer  Verherrlichung 
meines  Ministeriums  zu  benutzen.  .  .  .  Frankreich  wird  fiir  Sie  wenig  thun  und 
kein  anderer  Hof  wird  sich  ohne  Hoffnung  auf  grosse  Vortheile  fiir  Sie  exponiren 
wollen :  .  .  .  Glauben  Sie,  man  konnte  die  Pforte  dazu  bringen,  dem  Kaiser  die 
Moldau  und  Wallachei  und  den  Russen  die  Krim,  Oczakow  und  Bessarabien 
abzutreten ;  jedoch  unter  der  und  andere  Machte,  die  ich  beiziehen  wiirde,  dem 
osmanischen  Reich  seine  dauernde  Existenz  jenseits  der  Donau  in  der  Weise 
garantiren,  dass  die  Donau  und  die  Unna  die  ewige  Grenze  zwischen  dem  osma- 
nischen Reiche  und  der  Christenheit  bilden  wiirden  ?  Ich  sollte  glauben  es  ware 
zugleich  dahin  zubringen,  dass  um  diesen  Preis  Russland  auf  die  Vassallenschaft 
Georgiens  und  alles  dessen,  was  jenseits  des  Flussen  Cuban  liegt,  verzichte,  sich 
nicht  mehr  in  die  inneren  Verhaltnisse  der  Turkei  einmische  und  seine  Handels- 
und  Schifffahrts-  privilegien  auf  Grenzen  zurvickfuhre,  die  billig  und  mit  der 
osmanischen  Souveranitat  vertr'aglich  sind.  Zugleich  habe  ich  die  Idee  eines 
guten  Aequivalents,  welcrfts  von  Seiten  der  beiden  kaiserlichen  Hofe  Preussen 
erhalten  wiirde  ;  die  Turkei  wiirde  dabei  kein  Opfer  bringen,  sie  hatte  Preussen 
nur  einen  recht  giinstigen  Handelsvertrag  zu  bewilligen  und  die  freie  Schifffahrt 
im  Mittlemeere  vor  den  Barbareskenstaaten  zu  schutzen."  Ibid.  i.  p.  227,  Dietz 
thought  on  March  8,  1788,  that  it  was  opportune  "  den  vereinten  Vergrosserungs- 
entwiirfen  Oesterreichs  und  Russlands   entgegenzutreten ;  Preussen  meinte  er 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      109 

Hertzberg  and  by  the  prospect  that  Great  Britain  might  become 
hostile.  Catherine  urged  Count  Simon  Vorontzov,  at  London, 
to  secure  England's  withdrawal  from  her  Prussian  alliance. 
This  was  in  vain,  for  Pitt  was  more  and  more  inclined  to  view 
eastern  matters  with  a  jealous  eye.  The  treaty  with  Prussia 
had  been  signed  on  August  13,  1788,  and  Great  Britain  was 
now  committed  to  a  policy  which  must  soon  place  her  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  two  imperial  courts.  These  two  powers  had 
renewed  their  treaty  of  1781,  and  thus,  in  1789,  in  the  very 
month  when  the  Etats  Gmeraux  met  at  Paris,  Russia  and 
Austria  signed  an  agreement  to  continue  the  war  in  the  East 
and  to  press  their  schemes  for  Turkish  partition.  In  fact  the 
two  allies  could  not  but  regard  the  internal  condition  of  France 

musse  sich  mit  Schweden,  Polen,  und  Grossbritannien  zur  Erhaltung  der  Turkei 
verbinden  und  die  osterreichische-russische  Allianz  mit  ausserste  Energie  bekamp- 
fen."  Arneth :  Joseph  II.  und  Leopold  von  Toscana,  ii.  pp.  165, 178, 195.  Beer:  Joseph, 
Leopold  und  Kaunitz,  pp.  305  et  seq.  (Joseph  to  Kaunitz,  Aug.  26,  1788).  Upon 
the  receipt  of  " inter ceptes"  revealing  Hertzberg's  plan  and  his  instructions  to  Dietz 
the  Emperor  was  much  alarmed.  He  protested  "  que  de  resister  a  deux  ennemis  a 
la  fois  comme  la  Porte  et  le  Roi  de  Prusse  qui  environnent  toute  la  Monarchic 
est  chose  impossible,  et  d'autant  plus  impossible  que  la  foiblesse  et  la  nullite  des 
moyens  de  la  Russie  sont  evidens,  et  que  de  la  France,  ni  d'aucune  autre  part  je 
n'ai  rien  a  attendre  mais  bien  au  contraire  je  suis  sur  de  la  plus  mauvais  volonte 
a  mon  egard.  Couvrir  et  defendre  seulement  nos  frontieres  contre  les  Turcs, 
qui  s'etendent  depuis  la  mer  Adriatique  jusqu'au  Dniester,  et  defendre  la 
Boheme,  la  Moravie  et  une  partie  de  la  Galicie  contre  le  Roi  de  Prusse  en  meme 
terns  [sic]  est  de  toute  impossibilite.  ...  Si  avec  cela,  le  Roi  de  Prusse  et  l'An- 
gleterre  viennent  a  s'en  meler  comme  il  est  clairement  exprime  dans  les  intercep- 
tes  .  .  .  en  nous  obligeant  a  leur  faire  en  meme  terns  la  Guerre  alors  ...  la 
Monarchie  est  perdue,  parcequ'il  faudroit  diminuer  le  nombre  de  troupes  qui  se 
trouvent  actuellement  contre  la  Porte  pour  empecher  seulement  le  Roi  de  Prusse 
de  ne  pas  occuper  toute  la  Boheme  et  la  Moravie  et  marcher  sur  Vienne." 
Herrmann  :  Gesch.  Russlands,  vi.  pp.  199-209 ;  Phillipson  :  Gesch.  des  preuss. 
Staatswesens,  i.  pp.  177,  291  ;  Sybel :  Gesch.  der  Revolutionzeit,  i.  pp.  157  ;  Sorel : 
op.  cit.  i.  p.  524;  Arneth :  Joseph  und  Katharina,  pp.  298  et  seq.  (J.  to  C.  Aug.  30, 
1787);  Martens:  Traitis, Autriche,  ii.  p.  186;  Beer:  Ortentalische Politik,  pp. 80- 
110.  It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  oriental  plans  of  the  present  expansion 
party  in  Berlin  with  those  of  Hertzberg.  Cf.  Vambery  :  Germany  and  Turkey,  in 
the  Independent,  Aug.  17,  1899 1  Asia  Minor,  in  Edinburgh  Review,  vol.  189,  es- 
pecially p.  529 ;  Deutschlands  Anspriiche  an  das  tiirkische  Erbe,  Munich,  1896. 
(Publ.  by  the  All-Deutschen  Verband.)  Cf.  also  Moltke  :  Gesam.  Schriften,  ii.  pp. 
279  et  seq.,  306,  307,  313 ;   viii.  pp.  239,  257-260. 


110  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

as  useful  to  them.  France  "  could  be  looked  on  as  non-exist- 
ent "  as  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  wrote  the  Russian  am- 
bassador in  Paris.  Austria  was  likewise  convinced  that,  instead 
of  an  ally  whose  wishes  might  hamper,  she  had  in  France  an 
enfeebled  enemy,  whose  protests  might  be  disregarded  and 
whose  acquiescence  was  not  worth  buying.1  Prussia  also  wel- 
comed the  fall  of  the  Bourbons,  since  her  plans  for  the  East 
might  now  progress  without  fear  of  France;  indeed  it  seemed 
possible  at  one  time  that  the  new  French  government,  in  its 
hostility  to  Marie  Antoinette  and  the  Austrian  alliance,  might 
join  with  Prussia  to  attack  the  Hapsburgs.  Encouraged  by 
these  prospects,  Hertzberg  negotiated  a  treaty  with  Poland  by 
which  Austria  was  to  be  compelled  to  return  part  of  Galicia  to 
the  Poles,  who  were  in  turn  to  cede  Thorn  and  Dantzic  to 
Prussia.  But  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Joseph  II.  and  the 
accession  of  his  brother  Leopold  were  the  first  steps  to  impede 
Hertzberg's  plans ;  Leopold  proposed  to  separate  the  allies  of 

1  Vorontzov  :  Arkhiv,  ix.  p.  163  ;  xvi.  pp.  255  et  seq.,  262  et  seq. ;  xxviii.  pp.  79 
et  seq.  Martens  :  op  cit.  Angleterre,  ix.  pp.  338  et  seq.  Allemagne,  iv.  p.  137  ; 
Autriche,  ii.  pp.  189, 190.  Ranke  :  Die  deutschen  Mdchte,  pp.  330  et  seq.,  336,  536. 
Beer  :  Leopold  LI.,  Franz  LL,  und  Katharina,  pp.  13,  44-45.  Arneth  :  Joseph  und 
Katharina,  pp.  333-335-  Revue  de  la  Revolution,  vii.  Documents  inedits,  pp.  2,  3. 
Beer :  Joseph,  Leopold,  und  Kaunitz,  p.  349.  Sorel :  op.  cit.  i.  p.  454.  Wertheimer : 
Marie  Antoinette,  in  Revue  historique,  xxv.  p.  331.  Mercy-Argenteau  wrote, 
Aug.  17,  1789:  "  [Cette  monarchic  (France)]  craque  de  toutes  parts;  la  nation 
manifeste  une  cruaute,  une  sauvagerie  qu'on  ne  lui  connaissait  pas  jusqu'ici. 
Les  decrets  de  l'Assemblee  temoignent  un  veritable  affolement,  d'une  complete 
ignorance  des  choses  du  gouvernement ;  ils  produisent  un  despotisme  et  des 
injustices  qui,  par  suite  de  Immigration,  de  Tentiere  disparition  du  com- 
merce et  des  arts,  doivent  mener  peu  a  peu  la  France  au  neant  .  .  ."  Beer : 
Orientalische  Politik,  pp.  m,  121,  135.  Wassiltchikow  :  op.  cit.  ii.  pt.  i.  pp.  104, 
108-110,  120,  122  (Razumovski  from  Stockholm,  Sept.  7  (18),  1788):  "II  en 
resulterait  l'affaiblissement  de  1'influence  francaise,  cette  veritable  vermine,  si 
j'ose  me  servir  de  ce  terme,  puisqu'elle  se  glisse  dans  tous  les  rangs,  et  sans  la 
destruction  de  laquelle  nous  ne  verrons  jamais  ce  royaume  [Sweden]  adopter 
une  politique  conforme  aux  liens  qui  devraient  assurer  la  paix  du  Nord,"  p.  126, 
and  Pt.  4,  p.  150,  note  3.  Bruckner  :  Russia,  England,  and  Prussia  in  1789-91,  in 
Ruski  Vestnik,  Oct.  and  Nov.  1887.  (In  Russian)  and  Schweden  und  Russland, 
1788,  in  Hist.  Zeit.,  xxii.  pp.  356-386.  Sbornik,  xv.  p.  152  (Cath.  to  Paul,  Aug.  25, 
1788). 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      III 

Prussia,  and  so  worked  on  the  British  government  by  threaten- 
ing to  cede  Belgium  to  France,  that  Mr.  Pitt  decided  Great 
Britain  could  not  follow  Hertzberg's  lead  much  longer ;  in  fact 
the  treaties  Prussia  had  signed  with  Poland  and  Turkey  were 
seriously  objected  to  in  Great  Britain.  As  long  as  Austria 
would  consent  to  a  congress  where  the  status  quo  ante  should 
be  the  basis  for  peace  negotiations  with  the  Porte,  England  was 
satisfied.  To  this  Leopold  agreed.  Thus  at  the  congress  at 
Reichenbach  in  1790  Hertzberg  was  checkmated  as  far  as  his 
plans  for  Prussian  expansion  were  concerned,  and  Leopold, 
who  had  been  preparing  for  a  war  with  Prussia,  was  enabled  to 
hold  his  own  with  dignity.  The  English  people  were  relieved, 
and  upon  hearing  of  the  final  treaty  of  peace  between  Austria 
and  the  Porte,  signed  at  Sistova  the  year  following,  they  felt 
themselves  well  rid  of  an  unwelcome  burden.1 

1  Artois  to  King  of  Prussia,  Turin,  Feb.  14,  1790,  in  Hist.  Zeit.  (1895)  P-  2&l : 
**  V.  M.  veut  affaiblir  la  maison  d'Autriche,  c'est  le  voeu  de  mon  cceur,  .  .  . 
En  secourant  le  Roi  de  France,  V.  M.  etouffe  dans  l'instant  jusqu'aux  germes 
des  horreures  qui  ravagent  un  si  beau  royaume ;  et  s'occupant  avant  tout  d'un 
objet  si  pressant,  elle  s'acquiert  des  droit  immortels  a  la  reconnaissance  et  a 
l'alliance  de  mon  frere  ;  elle  porte  a  la  maison  d'Autriche  le  coup  le  plus  mortel." 
Stael-Holstein :  Corr.  p.  153,  Jan.  7,  1790.  It  is  hard  to  judge  what  French 
policy  will  be,  "mais  si  Ton  pouvait  juger  les  evenements  futurs  d'apres  la 
disposition  des  esprits  du  moment,  il  ne  serait  point  douteux  que  la  nation  ne 
rompit  l'alliance  avec  la  maison  d'Autriche.  Rien  n'est  plus  marque  que  l'aver- 
sion  des  Francais  contre  cette  alliance.  Les  Turcs,  les  Prussiens,  et  les  Suedois 
sont  les  peuples  avee  lesquels  on  voudrait  etre  lie  et  pour  lesquels  on  ne  cesse  de 
former  des  voeux."  Neumann  :  Recueil,  i.  p.  454.  Clapham  :  War  of  1192,  pp.  72, 
73.  Smyth:  Memoirs  of  Keith,  ii.  pp.  267  et  seq.  Kalinka:  Der  Polnische 
Reichstag,  i.  pp.  624  et  seq.  ;  ii.  chaps.  1,  2,  4.  Stern:  Das  Leben  Mirabeaus,  ii. 
p.  256.  Buckingham :  Courts  and  Cabinets,  ii.  p.  96.  Ranke :  Die  Deutschen 
Machte,  pp.  407,  418,  note,  548  et  seq.  Beer  :  Joseph  II,  Leopold  II,  und  Kaunitz, 
P-  345-  Sybel  :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  161  et  seq.  Sorel  :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  22,  25,  34,  67  et  seq. 
Phillipson  :  op.  cit.  i.  p.  177.  Vivenot :  Gesch'tsquellen,  i.  Kaunitz  und  Leopold, 
PP-  3>  477  &  seq.,  484,  491.  (Spielmann  and  Reuss  to  Kaunitz,  Reichenbach, 
June  29,  1790) :  "  Es  ist  unnothig  und  wurde  eben  so  zeitversplitternd  als  beinahe 
unmoglich  sein,  die  wahre  Hollenmarter  zu  beschreiben,  welche  une  wahrend  der 
bisherigen  Unterhandlung  die  Grobheit,  der  Stolz,  die  Aufgeblasenheit,  die 
Zudringlichkeit  und  die  unglaubliche  Irraisonnabilitat  des  Grafen  Hertsberg 
ausstehen  gemacht  hat.     Wolf :    op.  cit.   pp.    182  et  seq.     Beer :    Orientalische 


1 1 2  EAS TERN  PROBLEMS 

There  could  now  no  longer  be  question  of  pressing  the  larger 
plans  for  a  complete  partition  of  the  Ottoman  territories  in 
Europe;  since  the  new  Emperor  Leopold  by  his  acceptance  of 
the  Reichenbach  decisions  had  returned  to  the  passive  attitude 
which  Austria  had  so  often  taken.  The  truth  is,  Leopold 
realized  more  clearly  than  Joseph  that  a  Russian  Grand  Duke 
ruling  on  the  Bosphorus  could  never  be  handled  as  an  Ottoman 
Sultan,  and  that  however  advantageous  to  Austria  might  be 
the  gain  of  Bosnia  and  Servia,  it  could  not  be  equal  to  that 
which  would  accrue  to  the  Slav  peoples  by  the  extension  of 
Russia's  political  influence  to  the  iEgean  and  Mediterranean. 
In  the  words  of  Vergennes,  "  Une  partition  de  FEmpire-otto- 
man  n'est  pas  difficile,  mais  je  ne  vois  pas  la  compensation 
pour  Constantinople."  This  feeling,  with  a  fear  of  Prussia's 
interference  in  Poland  and  the  prospect  of  trouble  with  France, 
were  strong  motives  to  check  Austria ;  yet  they  did  not  prevent 
her  from  continuing  to  support  her  ally  Russia  in  the  fresh 
crisis  which  arose  in  1790-91.  This  was  caused  by  Russia's 
,1  refusal  to  accept  Anglo-Prussian  mediation  to  end  the  Turkish 

Vwar  on  the  basis  of  the  status  quo  ante  bellnm.  Russia  had 
early  made  known  her  intention  to  hold  part  of  her  conquests 
and  at  least  to  retain  Oczakov  and  the  neighboring  Black  Sea 
coast  as  the  fruits  of  her  war  with  the  Turks.  The  demands 
of  .the  Triple  Alliance  (Prussia,  England,  and  Holland),  that 
she  should  surrender  these  and  accept  the  same  conditions  as 
had  Austria,  were  peculiarly  galling  to  Catherine;  and  her 
preparations  for  war,  as  well  as  her  firm  reply  to  the  allies, 
showed  that  the  integrity  of  Turkey  could  be  maintained  only 
at  the  cost  of  a  European  war.  For  a  time  Mr.  Pitt  seemed 
ready  to  meet  even  this  eventuality;  nor  was  this  a  sudden 
decision  on  his  part.  The  English  suspicions  of  a  Franco- 
Russian  agreement  had  had  a  strong  effect  in  bringing  about 
the  change  in  British  policy;  and  since  1788  the  government 

Politik,  pp.  135,  144.  Cf.  also,  Creux  :  Pitt  et  Frideric-Guillaume  IL,  Paris, 
1886. 


( 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      113 

had  interested  itself  in  Sweden  as  well  as  Turkey.     With  a 
view  to  the  Levant  trade,  Catherine's  Mediterranean  ventures  of 
sftt    1789  had  been  closely  watched;  and  Mr.  Pitt  finally  took  the 
stand  that  on  the  grounds  both  of  the  alliance  with  Prussia 
and  of  Great  Britain's  political  and  commercial  interests  the 
expansion  of  Russia  at  the  expense  of   the   Porte_  must  be    f 
checked.     This  position  is  of  especial  interest  because  later  it 
became  the  traditional  policy  during  the  latter  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.     There  were  indeed  a  few  writers  who  then 
prophesied  Russia's  advance  to  the  great  sphere  she  fills  to- 
day.    Her  endeavors  to  cultivate  the  good  wishes  of  the  Italian 
*  states  with  the  hope  that  she  might  increase  her  influence  in 
I    the  Mediterranean,  and  her  wish  to  extend  her  frontier  toward 
I    Constantinople  were  then  said  to  be  part  of  her  general  scheme 
to  obtain  an  opening  to  southern  waters  and  the  Levant  trade ; 
in  Sweden  it  was  thought  she  was  preparing  another  Poland ; 
and  upon  the  prospect  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  an  overland 
invasion  of  India  in  order  to  strike  at  British  power  in  the 
East  was  discussed.     It  was  declared  that  the  realization  of  » 

Catherine's  plans  involved  a  Russian  Empire  stretching  from       • 
the  Baltic  to  the  Pacific,  and  from  the  Arctic  to  the  Medi-     ~~T 
terranean.     But  these  shrewd  prophecies  were  not  valued  in  * 

London  and  the  Opposition  in  Parliament  attacked  Mr.  Pitt's 
proposals  to  enforce  the  British  demands  on  Russia.  There 
was  indeed  a  strong  pro-Russian  party,  among  whom  were 
many  city  merchants  engaged  in  the  Baltic  trade;  the  influence 
of  these  men  and  of  leaders  such  as  Fox  and  Burke,  together 
with  the  lack  of  interest  shown  by  the  nation  at  large,  revealed 
to  the  government  that  the  country  was  not  ready  to  fight  for  - 
the  Turks.  The  advice  of  Lord  Auckland  that  Oczakov  was 
not  worth  a  war,  had  weight  with  Mr.  Pitt,  who,  convinced 
that  Parliament  would  not  support  him,  decided  to  moderate 
his  demands,  and  finally  to  let  the  matter  take  its  own  course.  .. 
This  step  was  not  as  unwelcome  to  Britain's  ally,  Prussia, 
as  might  be  supposed,  for  she  was  not  so  desirous  for  a  war 


fi 


1 14  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

with  Russia  as  she  had  been  for  one  with  Austria.  There  was 
far  less  to  be  gained.  Nevertheless,  she  had  stood  ready  to 
support  Great  Britain  in  the  event  of  hostilities,  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Porte.  After  Great  Britain  had  thus  receded  before 
the  threat  of  war  and  the  protests  of  Parliament,  it  is  scarcely 
surprising  that  Prussia  should  turn  again  to  Russia  to  secure 
territory  in  Poland  which  all  her  combinations  with  Great 
Britain  had  failed  to  give  her.  But  before  sixty  years  should 
pass,  the  British  public  would  change  its  views,  and  the  pro- 
Russian  speeches  of  Fox  and  Burke  be  recalled  with  a  derision 
greater  even  than  the  approval  which  they  had  originally 
excited.  These  speeches  were  extreme  even  for  the  occasion ; 
and  declarations  from  Mr.  Burke  that  he  then  for  the  first  time 
heard  it  maintained  that  the  Turks  had  anything  to  do  with 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  showed  a  disregard  both  for 
history  and  geography  of  which  Mr.  Pitt  was  quick  to  take 
advantage  in  the  defence  of  his  policy.1 

1  Martens  :  TraitSs,  Autriche,  ii.  p.  194.    Angleterre,  ix.  pp.  345,  353.    Auckland: 
Corr.  i.  p.  221  ;  ii.  pp.  381,  383.      Browning  :  Leeds,  pp.  150  et  seq.     Herrmann  : 
Gesch.  Russlands,  vi.  pp.  278-2S9,  552  et  seq.      Hansard :  Pari.  Hist.  xxix.  39,  44, 
52-76,  170,  767,  816-838,  919,  929,  932,  940,   996.      Morris:   Diaries,  ii.  p.  266, 
Feb.  3,  1797.     Elliot  told  Morris  that  "  in  the   Russian  business  [of  1790-91]  if 
Pitt  had  not  been  frightened  he  would  have  gone  through.     He  says  that  in  the 
1   beginning,  viz.,  inciting   the  Turk  to  war,  Pitt  was  the  tool  of  Hertzberg,  and 
j  afterwards  was  prevailed  on  by  Lord  Auckland  to  commit  the  treachery  of  aban- 
doning the  Turk.     This,  I  have  formerly  heard,  was  the  prime  cause  of  coldness 
]  on  the  part  of  Prussia,  who  has  ever  since  thought  herself  justifiable  in  retaliating 
\  upon  England."     On  the  possibility  of  Russia's  taking  Corsica,  cf.  Revue  de  la 
^l?evol.  vi. :  Documents  inedits,  p.  185  ;  and  Malmesbury :  Diaries,  ii.  p.  409.     Eton  : 
Survey  of  Turkey,  pp.  xi.  501.      Masson  :    Memoires,  iii.  pp.   20  et  seq.     Cf.  on 
general  Russian  schemes,   Boulger :  Central  Asian   Question,  p.  40 ;   Schuyler  : 
Peter  the  Great,  ii.  p.  512;   and  Berkholtz  :  Das   Testament  Peters  des  Grossen,  in 
Russische  Revue,  x.  (1877)  pp.  1-33.    Geffroy  :   Gustave  III.,  ii.  pp.  65  et  seq.    Hertz- 
berg :  Recueil,  iii.  pp.  50  et  seq.     Russell :  Life  of  Fox,  ii.  p.  208.     Stanhope :  Pitt, 
ii.  pp.  115  et  seq.     Vorontsov :  Arkhiv,  ix.  p.  190  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov,  March  29, 
1791);  xvi.  pp.  z^etscq.,  262  et  seq.,  2$$  (Russian  attitude  is  here  very  clearly 
shown);  xviii.  p.  59  (Kotchubey  to  S.  Vorontzov,  Oct.  3,  1792.     The  legacy  of 
hard  feeling  between  Russia  and  England)  ;  xx.  pp.  13  (Morkov  to  S.  Vorontzov, 
Jan.  4,  1788.      The  relations  of  France,  England,  and  Prussia  to  Russia),   15 
(Idem,  March  31) :    "  La  nouvelle  que  vous  nous  avez  annoncee  des  mauvaises 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      1 15 

rv   The  victories  of  the  Russian   armies  over  the  Turks  had 
strengthened  Catherine  in  her  determination  to  permit  no  in-        * 
terference  with  her  plans  by  Great  Britain.     These  successes 
had  been  desperately  won,  however,  and  the  Ottoman  Empire, 

\i  which  had  begun  the  war  in  a  much  enfeebled  condition,  had 
made  a  stand  surprising  to  Europe.  The  Porte  was  fighting 
for  existence,  and  managed  to  emerge  from  the  war  with  a 
comparatively  slight  loss  of  land.  Austria  secured  old  Orsova 
and  the  territory  of  the  Unna  (treaty  of  Sistova,  1791) ;  and 
fRussia  by  the  treaty  of  Jassy  (1792)  retained  only  Oczakov 

'H^nd  the  Black  Sea  coast  between  the  Bug  and  the  Dniestr. 
Guarantees  were  also  stipulated  for  the  favorable  treatment 
by  the  Turks  of  the  Danubian  Principalities.^  Turkish  affairs, 
however,  could  not  monopolize  the  attention  of  Russia.  The 
anarchy  in  France,  if  it  spread  in  Europe,  was  bound  to  help 
the  Turks,  Catherine  had  written  in  1790;  her  fear  of  liberal- 
ism was  undoubtedly  genuine,  but  she  also  dreaded  any  inter- 
ference in  her  own  plans  by  complications  in  western  Europe. 
Her  views  of  the  French  Revolution  were  singularly  acute,  yet 
she  was  destined  by  her  policy  in  the  East  to  assist  that  cause 

dispositions  des  Anglais  a  notre  egard,  a  cause  ici  Timpression  la  plus  vive.  On 
les  regarde  comme  une  boutade  qu'a  peine  le  caractere  connu  de  cette  nation 
peut  excuser."  19  {Idem,  June  6,7791,  the  Russian  answer  to  Pitt);  xxviii. 
pp.  79  et  seq.  (Cath.  to  S.  Vorontzov,  Dec.  9,  1788) ;  xxxiv.  pp.  466  et  seq. 
(The  work  of  S.  Vorontzov  in  1791  to  prevent  English  interference  in  behalf  of 
the  Turks.)  Lecky  :  op.  cit.  v.  pp.  273  et  seq.  It  is  asserted  in  Kalinka  :  Austria's 
policy  in  the  Affairs  of  the  Polish  Constitution  of  May  3  (Polish),  p.  15,  that  Cathe- 
rine's agents  offered  to  pay  Fox's  debts  in  London.  Kalinka :  Der  Polnische 
Reichstag,  ii.  pp.  688  et  seq.  Beer :  Orientalische  Politik,  p.  146, 147.  Leopold  held 
strongly  that  the  Russian  alliance  was  a  necessity  to  Austria,  but  the  internal 
condition  of  Austria  would  not  have  let  him  continue  in  an  aggressive  eastern 
policy  had  he  so  wished.  Sbornik :  xxiii.  pp.  431,  434,  437,  485,  487  ;  xlii.  p.  162. 
Bruckner:  Katharina  II,  pp.  388  et  seq.  Castera:  op.  cit.  iii.  pp.  345  et  seq. 
Wassiltchikow :  op.  cit.  ii.  Pt.  1,  pp.  58,  59,  104,  125,  137 ;  Pt.  4,  pp.  146  (Morkov 
to  A.  Razumovski,  April  4,  1788).  BrUckner:  Russlands  Politik  im  Mittlemeer 
1788  und  1789,  in  Hist.  Zeit.  xxvii.  (1872)  pp.  85-115.  Cornwallis :  Corr.  i.  pp.; 
360, 361  (Grant  to  Cornwallis,  April  6,  1788),  England  still  hostile  to  Russia  because 
of  Armed  Neutrality.     Creux :  Pitt  et  Fred  eric -Guillaume  II,  pp.  102  et  seq. 


1 1 6  EAS TERN  PROBLEMS 

in  the  West,  which  she  so  thoroughly  detested.  She  wrote  in 
November,  1790,  that  France  had  twelve  hundred  legislators 
whom  no  one  obeyed  save  the  King,  and  added  later  that  the 
revolutionists  who  aimed  to  bring  back  the  Gaul  of  Csesar 
would  in  turn  be  laid  low  by  Caesar.  "  Caesar  will  surely 
appear,"  she  declared  ;  and  "  if  the  French  Revolution  takes 
in  Europe,  another  Jengis  or  Tamerlane  will  come  to  bring  it 
to  its  senses  ;  such  will  be  the  fate  "  of  Europe.  Only  "  a 
hundred  thousand  men  and  martial  law "  to  re-establish  the 
"  power  of  the  King  "  would  save  France  "  from  utter  ruin," 
she  wrote  in  1792.  To  her  mind  these  men  should  be  supplied 
by  Prussia  and  Austria;  she  wrote  later  in  1791 :  "Je  me 
casse  la  tete,  um  den  Berliner  und  Wiener  Hof  in  die  fran- 
zosischen  Angelegenheiten  hineinzubringen  ; "  and  on  March 
7,  1792,  to  Osterman,  "I  wish  to  have  them  busy  in  order  to 
have  a  free  hand  myself."  This  freedom  she  intended  to  use 
in  Poland.  She  wrote  to  Grimm  that  she  would  fight  the 
Jacobins  of  Paris  in  Warsaw,  and  protested  her  devotion  to 
the  cause  of  the  allies.  Yet,  as  Morkov  wrote  (May  14,  1792) 
to  Simon  Vorontzov,  "  the  interest  which  we  have  declared  in 
French  matters  will  no  longer  seem  exaggerated  to  you,  when 
you  know  that  we  have  thought  it  necessary  to  turn  all  the 
attention  of  the  neighboring  powers  to  France  to  leave  us 
elbow  room  in  Poland."  As  Catherine  wrote  to  Rumiantzov, 
"  My  post  is  taken  and  my  r61e  assigned.  I  charge  myself  to 
watch  over  the  Turks,  the  Poles,  and  the  Swedes."  In  ad- 
dition to  the  desire  she  had  to  see  Prussia  and  Austria  occu- 
pied in  the  West,  Catherine  was  ready  to  see  France  humiliated, 
but  not  dismembered.  She  still  hoped  to  fill  the  r61e  of  medi- 
ator and  to  end  her  reign  by  settling  the  affairs  of  Europe.1 

1  Rambaud:  Hist,  of  Russia,  ii.  pp.  116,  117.  Annual  Register,  1786,  pp.  151 
et  sea.  Sbornik,  xxiii.  pp.  503  (Cath.  to  Grimm,  Jan.  13,  1791),  520  (April  30),  555 
(Sept.  1),  567  (May  9,  1792) :  "  Apparemment  vous  ignorez  que  la  jacobiniere  de 
Varsovie  est  en  correspondance  reguliere  avec  celle  de  Paris  .  .  .  Enfin,  ces  Ja- 
cobins de  Pologne  cherchent  a  repandre  partout  la  confusion  des  langues,  car  tous 
ces  arrangements  polonais  vont  avec  leur  lois  sur  toute  matiere  comme  une  selle 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      WJ 

The  situation  in  Poland  during  the  years  between  1788  and 
1 79 1  was  in  many  ways  a  peculiar  one.     Earnest  efforts  to 

a  une  vache,  selon  le  proverbe  russe.  Et  vous  voulez  que  je  plante  la  mes  inte- 
rets  et  ceux  de  mon  allie  la  republique  et  mes  amis  republicans,  pour  ne  m'occu- 
per  que  de  la  jacobiniere  de  Paris?  Non,  souffre-douleur,  je  la  battrai  et 
combattrai  en  Pologne,  mais  pour  cela  je  ne  ni  en  occuperai  pas  moins  des  affaires 
de  France,  et  j'aiderai  a  battre  le  ramas  des  sans-culotte.  ..."  xlii.  pp.  117  (Cath. 
to  A.  Mordvinov,  Oct.  4,  1790),  126  (to  Prince  de  Ligne,  Nov.  16);  197  (to 
Schonberg);  229  (to  de  Meilhan,  July  8,  1792).  Forneron:  Les  Emigrees,  i. 
p.  292.  Khrapovitzkij :  Diary,  Dec.  14,  1791 :  March  7,  1792.  Quoted  in  Bruck- 
ner :  op.  cit.  p.  413.  Lariviere  :  Catherine  II.  etla  Revolution,  p.  106.  Beer  -.Joseph 
II.,  Leopold  II,  und  Katharina,  pp.  172-175.  Sybel :  Franz.  Revol.  i.  p.  478. 
Vivenot:  Quellen,  ii.  Cobenzl  und  Franz,  p.  105;  (Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  June 
21,  1792) :  "  Alle  Umstande  geben  klar  zu  erkennen  dass  der  russische  Hof  un- 
serem  und  dem  Berliner  Hof  so  vielen  Eifer  in  den  franzosischen  Anglegenheiten 
nur  darum  bezeugt  hat  um  beide  darinnen  ernstlich  zu  verwickeln  und  sich  in 
Polen  freie  Hande  zu  beschaffen.  Ebenso  klar  est  es,  dass  derselbe  mit  der 
angetragenen  eingeschrankten  Herstellung  Frankreichs  nicht  zufrieden  ist,  son- 
dern  eine  so  vollkommene  wiinschte,  dass  der  franzosische  Hof  mit  der  Zeit 
wieder  zu  einem  bedeutenden  Einfluss  in  dem  europaische  Systeme  gelange." 
Pallain :  Talleyrand  H  Londres,  p.  xiv,  de  Noailles,  French  ambassador  at  Vienna 
reported  on  Feb.  13,  1792  :  "  L'Imperatrice  de  Russie  cherche  toujours  a  echauf- 
fer  la  Roi  de  Prusse  pour  les  emigrees,  mais  je  crois  fermement  que  le  zele  de 
cette  princesse  pour  leur  cause  n'est  qu'un  voile  pour  couvrir  et  pour  servir  de 
plus  grandes  vues.  Elle  brule  d'engager  l'Empereur  et  le  Roi  de  Prusse  dans 
une  guerre  contre  nous,  parce  qu'alors  elle  serait  maitresse  d'agir  en  Pologne 
comme  elle  le  voudrait  et  d'y  reprendre  son  ancienne  influence.  Elle  craint,  si  la 
Pologne  devenait  puissante,  de  redevenir  elle-meme  une  puissance  asiatique.  En 
effet,  n'ayant  plus  de  chemins  ouverts  pour  le  passage  de  ses  troupes,  elle  per- 
drait  alors  son  influence  en  Empire  ;  .  .  . "  Rambaud  :  Instructions,  Russie,  ii. 
pp.  533  et  sea.  Genet  to  Dumouriez,  St.  Petersburg,  July  1,  1792,  tells  of  Cath- 
erine's plans  on  Poland ;  her  intention  to  check  partition  of  France,  to  prevent 
Prussia  or  Austria  from  gettng  too  much.  She  is  indifferent  to  France.  "  Ne 
croyez  pas  malgre  cela,  que  la  cour  nous  veuille  du  bien.  Ne  croyez  pas  non  plus 
qu'elle  souhaite  tout  le  succes  possible  au  projet  des  princes.  [Comtes  de  Pro- 
vence et  d'Artois]  ;  vous  seriez  dans  Terreur.  Elle  ne  veut  point  que  la  France  soit 
demembre ;  mais,  comme  elle  se  rapelle  que  la  France  a  ete  longtemps  sa  rivale, 
elle  n'a  nulle  envie  de  la  voir  se  relever  par  sa  Constitution  on  par  la  despotisme. 
Ce  qui  excite  son  ambition,  ce  qui  flatte  son  amour-propre,  c'est  de  se  venger  du 
roi  de  Prusse  en  le  librant  de  toute  maniere  au  mepris  public ;  c'est  de  s'opposer 
a  l'aggrandissement  de  l'Autriche  et  de  finir  glorieusement  son  regne  en  pacifiant 
l'Europe."  Vorontzov:  Arkhiv,  xx.  p.  27  (Morkov  to  S.  Vorontzov,  May  14, 
1792).  Wassiltchikow  :  Les  Razoumowski,  ii.  Pt.  1,  pp.  134,  137  ;  Pt.  2,  pp.  153 
(Morkov  to  Razumovski,  Russian  representative  at  Vienna,  Aug.  15,  1791),  158 


Il8  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

promote  a  Polish  renascence  after  1772  had  been  in  part  suc- 
cessful;  and  the  Diet  which  met  in  1788  continued  its  labors 
till  it  produced  the  Constitution  of  May  3,  179 1.  This  was 
designed  to  strengthen  the  power  of  the  Crown,  to  make  it 
hereditary,  and  to  do  away  with  the  liberum  veto,  the  "  legal 
anarchy "  which  had  made  Poland  a  prey  to  her  neighbors. 
The  Diet  became  a  Confederation  ;  the  army  was  raised  to 
60,000 ;  and  the  house  of  Saxony  was  declared  the  heirs  of 
Poniatovski.  Russia  was  at  war  with  Sweden  and  Turkey, 
and  at  odds  with  England  and  Prussia ;  Prussia  and  Austria 
were  alarmed  by  the  crisis  in  France :  might  not  the  Poles  be 
permitted  to  accomplish  a  revolution  in  favor  of  royalty  in  the 
East  while  the  French  in  the  West  wrought  one  in  favor  of 
democracy?  Anything  which  would  tend  to  strengthen  the 
central  power,  to  make  either  nation  once  more  a  force  in 
Europe,  was  distasteful  to  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria.  Cath- 
erine, who  had  guaranteed  the  old  and  inadequate  Constitution 
in  Poland  was  much  opposed  to  the  new  one,  which  had  been 
drafted  without  her  permission,  and  which  threatened  to  make 
Poland  a  nation,  thus  closing  to  Russia  her  road  to  central 
Europe.  As  soon  as  the  Turkish  war  was  ended  Catherine 
welcomed  the  Polish  party  who  were  also  against  the  new 
order  of  things,  and  at  their  request  ordered  her  troops  to 
invade  Polish  territory  to  assist  these  reactionaries,  who  wished 
for  a  feeble  republic  rather  than  a  strong  hereditary  monarchy, 
and  who   had  organized  themselves  into  a  Confederation  at 

{Ibid.,  Feb.  17,  1792)  :  "  L'objet  de  l'expedition  presente  porte  sur  les  affaires  de 
Pologne ;  celles-ci  sont  d'un  interet  bien  superieur  pour  nous  aux  affaires  fran- 
caises;"  166  (Dec.  8).  Herrmann:  Gesch.  Russ.  Erganzungs-Band,  pp.  15,  21, 
26,  32,  225  el  seq.  Vivenot :  Kaunitz  und  Leopold,  p.  358  (Kaunitz  to  Reuss, 
Aug.  25,  1792);  Polish  affairs.  The  plans  of  Russia :  "  .  .  .  macht  es  nicht  die 
Vermuthung  wahrscheinlich,  dass  derselbe  [Russia]  nur  wartete,  bis  sein  Friede 
mit  der  Pforte  geschlossen  sei  ?  —  bis  Oesterreich  und  Preussen  mit  den  fran- 
zosischen  Handeln  beschaftigt  w'aren,  um  alles  in  Polen  Geschehen  auf  die  eine 
die  andere  Art  wieder  iiber  den  Haufen  zu  werfen  ?  "  Beer  :  Leopold,  Franz,  und 
Katharina,  p.  146.  (Leopold  to  Katharina,  June  18,  1791 ;  promising  to  abide  by 
his  alliance  with  her.)     Eton  :  Survey  of  Turkey,  p.  193. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      119 

Targovicza.  At  the  same  time  negotiations  at  Berlin  and 
Vienna  dealt  with  Polish  matters  to  a  degree  which  was  soon 
to  show  that  of  the  three  questions  before  Europe  at  this  time 
—  the  French,  the  Polish,  and  the  Turkish  ■ —  that  of  Poland  was 
at  least  for  the  moment  the  most  interesting  to  the  three  con- 
tinental powers  in  the  north  and  east ;  each,  however,  requires 
attention.  Under  the  Emperor  Leopold,  Austria  had  at  first 
showed  herself  unwilling  to  interfere  in  France ;  he  had  said 
in  1790  that  no  sovereign  had  a  right  to  ask  another  nation  to 
give  account  of  her  own  constitution :  were  it  a  good  one,  so 
much  the  better  for  her ;  were  it  a  poor  one,  her  neighbors 
would  profit  by  it.  In  fact  a  study  of  the  historical  relations 
of  France  and  Austria  showed  clearly  to  the  mind  of  Kaunitz 
that  nothing  could  be  better  for  Austria  than  internal  compli- 
cations and  disorders  in  France.  The  spread  of  revolutionary 
opinion  throughout  Europe  was,  of  course,  to  be  checked,  and 
the  fear  of  such  principles,  as  well  as  the  danger  to  the  royal 
house  in  France,  did  much  to  bring  about  a  change  in  policy  at 
Vienna.  It  was  thought  that  unless  Prussia  and  Austria 
should  combine  against  France,  it  might  be  possible  for  France 
and  Prussia  to  combine  with  the  Porte  against  Austria. 
Furthermore  the  interests  of  Leopold  as  Emperor  were  con- 
cerned in  the  attitude  of  France  toward  the  States  of  Germany, 
and,  as  a  Hapsburg  ruler,  in  the  influence  of  France  in  Bel- 
gium. The  old  struggle  for  the  Rhine  border  and  the  Low 
Countries  was  to  be  renewed.  With  this  in  view  a  defensive 
and  offensive  alliance  was  negotiated  between  Austria  and 
Prussia.  The  strength  of  action  of  these  powers  against  France 
was  counterbalanced  to  a  certain  degree  by  the  neutrality  of 
Great  Britain  ;  it  was  rightly  supposed,  however,  that  she  could 
not  but  watch  with  relief  the  collapse  of  Bourbon  power.  At 
the  same  time  it  was  just  as  well  from  Austria's  point  of  view, 
bound  as  she  was  by  a  treaty  with  Russia,  that  Prussia  and 
Great  Britain  should  be  separated,  and  that  any  possibility  of 
such  a  situation  as  had  confronted  the  two  imperial  courts  in 


120  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

1790  should  be  obviated.  Another  restraining  thought  was 
that  if  France  should  be  utterly  crushed  there  would  remain 
no  maritime  power  to  hold  Great  Britain  in  check.  Now  in 
addition  to  these  perplexities  came  the  crisis  in  Polish  affairs.1 
The'death  of  the  Emperor  Leopold  on  March  1,  1792,  and 
the  declaration  of  war  by  France  against  Austria  on  April  20 
cleared  away  the  last  obstacles  to  an  aggressive  Russian  policy 
in  Poland.  On  May  18,  Catherine  published  her  protest 
against  the  new  Polish  Constitution,  and  soon  after  Suvorov 
invaded  Polish  territory  with  a  force  of  100,000  men.  While 
the  Poles  were  being  defeated  by  the  Russians,  negotiations 
were  going  on  at  Vienna  for  the  renewal  of  the  old  alliance 
between  the  two  imperial  courts.  The  new  Emperor  Francis 
II.,  a  pupil  of  his  uncle,  Joseph,  agreed  to  this  arrangement 
by  a  treaty  of  defensive  alliance  on  July  3.  On  July  27,  a  sim- 
ilar one  was  signed  at  Berlin  between  Russia  and  Prussia. 
Austria  was  bent  on  profiting  by  the  war  with  France  and 
particularly  on  the  acquisition  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and  the 
exchange  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands  for  Bavaria;  and  Philip 
Cobenzl  even  told  Razumovski,  the  Russian  ambassador  at 
Vienna,  that,  in  order  to  secure  Bavaria,  Austria  would  consent 

1  Kalinka :  Der  Polnische  Reichstag,  ii.  books  5  and  6.  Rambaud  :  Hist,  of 
Russia,  ii.  pp.  1 17  etseq.  Sbornik :  xiii.  pp.  280,  285,  288, 290  ;  xiv.  pp.  256,  263,  267 ; 
xxiii.  pp.  72,  519,  534;  xxvii.  p.  353  ;  xlii.  pp.  126,  and  especially  157  (Catherine's 
attack  on  the  Constitution  of  May  3).  Bruckner:  Katharina,  pp.  408  et  seq. 
Wassiltchikow,  Les  Razoumowski,  ii.  Pt.  1,  pp.  137,  138.  Augeard :  Mimoires, 
p.  240.  Interview  with  Leopold  at  Frankfort  in  1790.  Sorel :  V Europe  et  la 
Revolution,  i.  p.  258.  Sybel :  Franzbsische  Revolution,  i.  p.  281.  Beer:  Joseph  II, 
Leopold  II,  und  Kaunitz,  pp.  410,  420  (Kaunitz  called  the  Austro-Prussian  treaty 
the  second  volume  of  the  treaty  of  Versailles  (1756)).  Vivenot :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  7, 
187-192  (Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  July  8,  1791);  203  (July  23);  271  etseq.  (Nov. 
12).  Zinkeisen  :  op.  cit.  vi.  p.  814.  Lenz  :  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  Oct.-Nov.  1894, 
and  p.  294.  Arneth  :  Marie  Antoinette,  Joseph  II,  und  Leopold  II,  pp.  130  (Marie 
Antoinette  to  Mercy,  June  12,  1790);  148-150  (Mercy  to  the  Queen,  March  7, 
*79l)>  152—156,  163  (Ibid.,  March  29,  April  5,  April  21,  May  11,  1791  ;  and  the 
Queen  to  Mercy,  April  20),  181  (Leopold  to  the  Queen,  July  2).  The  Emperor 
here  promises  troops  and  money ;  186  (Mercy  to  the  Queen,  July  28).  Herr- 
mann :  op.  cit.  vi.  p.  390. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      121 

to  a  partition  of  Poland  which  would  give  Prussia  what  she 
wanted  there.  However,  until  the  war  with  France  had  fairly 
begun,  Austria  had  trusted  her  new  ally,  Prussia,  and  had 
even  suggested  to  her  that  each  power  should  have  a  force 
on  the  Polish  frontier  to  check  Russian  aggression  there. 
But  soon  the  jealousy  between  Berlin  and  Vienna  broke  out 
again;  the  allies  were  unsuccessful,  and  Austria  began  to 
vacillate  as  of  old.  Cobenzl  saw  that  Russia  was  trying  to  use 
the  mutual  rivalry  of  the  two  powers  to  her  own  advantage. 
From  the  Russian  side  the  situation  was  also  critical.  The 
old  and  feeble  Polish  Constitution  had  been  restored,  but  the 
results  were  still  uncertain.  Morkov,  writing  to  Vorontzov  in 
London  on  Nov.  8,  described  the  situation  well :  "  We  had 
scarcely  entered  on  these  questions,  when  our  old  ally 
[Austria]  and  our  new  ally  [Prussia],  incited  by  us  to  embark 
in  this  fine  French  business,  came  to  us,  the  one  with  her  old 
scheme  of  the  Bavarian  exchange,  and  the  other  with  a  new 
plan  for  the  partition  of  this  republic  [Poland]  which  we  have 
pretended  to  restore.  All  these  proposals  were  made  to  us 
when  it  was  possible  to  promise  ourselves  all  sorts  of  victories 
over  France.  The  reverses  which  have  taken  place  have 
neither  chilled  the  ardor  of  Prussia,  nor  lessened  her  appetite  ; 
on  the  contrary,  they  have  increased  it.  On  our  side,  we  are 
divided  between  the  desire  for  the  finest  acquisition  that  the 
Empire  has  ever  made  or  ever  can  make,  the  inconvenience  of 
the  expansion  of  a  dangerous  neighbor  [Prussia]  already  too 
formidable,  the  fear  of  (public)  opinion,  and  conscientious 
scruples.  Opinion  is  divided  and  nothing  is  as  yet  decided." 
In  the  mean  time  Austria  was  doing  all  in  her  power  to  dis- 
cover what  secret  negotiations  were  going  on  between  Berlin 
and  St.  Petersburg.  In  November,  Spielmann  had  written  to 
Philip  Cobenzl  that  every  one  expected  Prussia  would  soon 
leave  Austria  in  the  lurch.  In  reality  the  matter  of  the  Polish 
partition  was  decided.  In  October,  Goltz,  the  Prussian  am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg,  had  written  most  encouragingly  to 


122  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

his  King,  and  finally  on  January  12  (23),  1793,  the  treaty  was 
signed.  Russia  gained  Volhynia,  Podolia,  and  a  part  of  Lithu- 
ania ;  Prussia  gained  Dantzic,  Thorn,  the  territory  of  Posen, 
and  a  narrow  strip  of  land  near  the  Silesian  frontier.  Austria 
gained  nothing;  as  Morkov  said,  she  was  "  mired  in  her  affairs 
with  France."  When  Cobenzl  was  informed  by  Razumovski 
of  the  actual  facts  he  seized  a  map  and  on  understanding  the 
acquisitions  made  by  Prussia  and  Russia,  "  he  could  do  noth- 
ing in  his  distress  and  surprise  but  stammer  out  incoherent 
phrases.  '  The  entire  political  system  of  Europe  is  over- 
thrown,' he  said.  ■  The  French  revolution  is  nothing  but 
child's  play  compared  with  the  enormous  importance  of  this 
partition.' " l 

1  Arneth  :  Marie  Antoinette,  Joseph  II,  und  Leopold  II,  pp.  224  (Mercy  to  the 
Queen,  Nov.  21,  1791);  249-52  (Ibid.  Feb.  14,  1792);  262  (April  16),  264  (the 
Queen  to  Mercy,  April  30).  Neumann :  Recueil,  i.  p.  470.  Ranke :  Ursprung,etc. 
pp.  165  et  sea.,  276  et  sea.  Herrmann  :  Forschungen,  iv.  p.  429.  Schlitter  :  Briefe 
Marie  Christinas  an  Leopold,  in  Arch,  fur  Oester.  Gesch.  vol.  48,  p.  255  (Leopold 
to  Marie  Christine,  Feb.  18,  1792).  Clapham:  War  of  1792,  pp.  214-217,  230, 
238.  Chuquet :  Premiere  invasion  prussienne,  p.  145.  Massenbach  :  Memoires, 
i.  p.  32.  Vivenot :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  370,  406 ;  ii.  Cobenzl  und  Franz,  pp.  55  (Reuss  to 
Spielmann,  Berlin,  May  22, 1792).  "  Bei  dem  so  gliicklichen,  guten  und  so  vertrau- 
lichen  Einverstandniss  zwischen  unsern  beiden  Hofe  scheine  ihm  auf  keine  Art 
zu  besorgen  zu  sein,  dass  weder  Russland  zu  viel  alleinige  Gewalt  uber  Polen 
sich  anmassen  konne,  noch  einseitige  Eroberungen  werde  machen  konnen.  Aus 
mancherlei  Beobachtungen  werde  es  wahrscheinlich,  dass  Russland  grosse  Lust 
habe,  sich  die  Ukraine  zuzueigen,  und  endlich  mit  diese  versteckt  liegenden 
Absicht  wohl  hervorriicken  werde.  Sollte  sich  das  verificiren,  so  konne  vielleicht 
durch  ein  solches  Ereigniss  das  allerseitige  Dedommagement  wegen  der  Unkos- 
ten  fur  den  franzosischen  Krieg  gefunden  werden,  in  dem  Preussen  sich  ebenfalls 
in  Polen  zu  arrondiren  suchte,  und  wir  uns  am  Rhein  entschadigten.  Diesen  Plan 
aber  mussten  wir  freilich  ganz  in  Geheim  fiir  uns  behalten  und  bios  unter  uns 
einverstandlich  und  vertraulich  erwagen  und  festsetzen."  120-121  (P.  to  L. 
Cobenzl,  Wien,  July  2,  1792),  129-130  (Ibid.  July  16) :  "  .  .  .  Die  bisherige 
Spannung  Oesterreichs  und  Preussens  hat  dem  russischen  Hof  den  unschatz- 
baren  Vortheil  verschafft,  dass  beide  um  seine  Freundschaft  in  die  Wette  buhlten, 
derselbe  immer  in  Ermanglung  des  einen  auf  den  andern  zahlen  konnte  und 
dadurch  alle  Umstande  und  Gelegenheiten  zu  dem  Ende  beniitze,  um  seine  eige- 
nen  Vergrosserungplane  durch  Hilfe  eines  aus  ihnen,  meistens  einseitig,  auszu- 
fahren.    Einen  ahnlichen  Vortheil,  obschon  in  einem  weit  minderen  Grade,  fand 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      1 23 

The  partition  had  not  been  accomplished  save  at  the  expense 
of  the  coalition  and  the  gain  of  France.  Troops  sadly  needed 
at  the  front  had  been  diverted  to  Poland  by  the  Prussians ; 
and  the  Austrians,  fairly  caught  at  their  own  game,  turned  on 
their  allies  charging  them  with  bad  faith  and  ending  whatever 
pretence  of  good  feeling  existed  between  the  two  states.  Many 
Russians,  among  whom  was  Count  Simon  Vorontzov,  the 
Russian  ambassador  in  London,  regretted  the  partition.  He 
said  that  Russia  attacked  Poland  because  of  the  connection 
between  the  Republic  and  the  Porte;  and  that  the  partition 
was  very  irritating  to  Englishmen,  who  might  not  have 
objected  to  the  allies  reimbursing  themselves  for  the  cost  of 
the  war  at  French  expense;  but  who  certainly  looked  on 
Polish  complications  as  likely  to  divert  attention  from  mat- 
ters at  Paris.  In  fact,  as  Lord  Auckland  expressed  it,  one 
consolation  to  England  was  that  "  whatever  the  Emperor 
[Francis  II.]  may  be  seeking  to  acquire  must  be  more  or  less 
at  the  expense  of  the  strength  and  possessions  of  France." 
This  opinion  was  soon  found  to  be  mistaken,  though  the 
Bavarian  exchange  was  still  busily  argued  between  the  various 
courts.  Austria  had  set  about  retrieving  her  mistakes  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  and  was  pressing  the  Russians,  anx- 
iously hoping  to  oust  the  Prussians  from  their  newly  won 
point  of  vantage.     She  had  previously  sounded  England  by  a 

Russland  bei  mehreren  Gelegenheiten  in  der  Rivalitat  der  Kronen  England  und 
Frankreich.  Letztere  hat  durch  den  Untergang  der  franzosischen  Grosse  sein  Ende 
erreicht,  und  Russland  fangt  schon  an  zu  fiihlen,  dass  es  fur  seine  eigene  Vergros- 
serung  von  England  vielmehr  Hindernisse  als  Unterstutzung  zu  erwarten  haben 
wird.  Den  empfindlichsten  Stoss  aber  wiirde  der  Petersburger  Hof  erfahren, 
wenn  die  Freundschaft  zwischen  uns  und  Preussen  wirklich  Stich  hielte,  wie  sie 
nach  den  geanderten  Weltumstanden  in  der  That  sich  halten  konnte."  338 
(Spielmann  to  L.  Cobenzl,  Nov.  6).  Vorontzov :  Archiv,  xx.  pp.  28-29  (Morkov  to 
S.  Vorontzov,  May  14,  1792),  31-32  (Nov.  8),  34-36  (Jan.  17,  1793).  Herrmann: 
Gesch.  Russ.  Erganzungs-Bande,  pp.  319^  seq.,  335  et  seq.  Wassiltchikow :  Les 
Razoumowski,  ii.  Pt.  1,  pp.  139-144  ( Razumovski's  despatches  to  Ostermann,  July, 
1792— Jan.  1793);  Pt-  4»  PP-  J66  (Morkov  to  Razumovski,  Dec.  8,  1792);  and 
especially  167-170.  (Ibid.  Feb.  25,  1793.)  Cf.  a*so  PP-  78-79  (Dietrichstein  to 
Razumovski,  London,  April  6,  1802). 


124  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

proposal  to  unite  with  her  in  preventing  the  aggrandizement 
of  Russia  and  Prussia  in  Poland  on  condition  that  Austria  give 
up  the  plan  of  exchanging  Bavaria  for  the  Netherlands.  Lord 
Grenville  had  refused  to  commit  himself,  but  had  suggested 
that  since  Austria  was  so  alarmed  by  the  condition  of  affairs 
in  eastern  Europe,  she  should  ally  herself  with  the  Porte,  where 
Great  Britain  was  profiting  by  the  disorder  in  the  West  to 
usurp  the  place  formerly  held  by  France  in  the  councils  of 
the  Turks.  Stadion,  the  Austrian  minister,  had  replied  that  it 
was  impossible  for  Austria  to  break  so  completely  with  Russia. 
Thugut,  the  new  leader  at  Vienna,  continued  to  press  Russia 
for  some  compensation  and  delayed  the  ratification  of  the 
second  partition.  The  attempts  of  the  Poles  to  withstand  the 
mutilation  of  their  country  were  in  vain,  and  Austria  soon 
saw  that  she  must  also  accede  to  the  business  were  she  to  gain 
the  good-will  of  Russia.  Thugut  by  skilful  diplomacy  finally 
succeeded  in  persuading  Razumovski  himself  to  name  Italy  as 
a  region  where  it  might  be  possible  for  Austria  to  find  idemni- 
fication  for  the  aggrandizement  of  Prussia.  This  indeed  was  a 
favorite  scheme  of  Thugut's.  His  hopes  in  that  direction  were 
to  bear  fruit  later.  In  the  mean  time  the  quibblings  over 
Poland,  and  the  disorder  in  that  country  had  done  their  work 
in  creating  further  discord  between  the  members  of  the 
coalition.  Prussia  made  demands  for  further  Polish  territory 
as  the  price  of  her  services  in  the  war.  The  disturbances  in 
Poland  soon  became  so  serious  as  to  lead  both  Prussia  and 
Austria  to  be  sparing  of  the  troops  sent  against  France.  The 
King  of  Prussia  in  fact  openly  rejoiced  at  news  of  an  Austrian 
defeat,  and  before  the  year  1794  had  ended  it  was  rumored 
that  he  might  even  make  a  separate  peace  with  the  French, 
leaving  the  Austrians  to  continue  the  war.  Austria  fretted 
over  the  possibility  of  a  final  division  of  Poland  in  which 
she  again  would  be  ignored,  and  was  especially  fearful 
lest  her  plans  of  aggrandizement  in  Italy  should  become 
known.     The  "hatred  felt  toward  the  Prussians  refused  to  be 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      12$ 

modified  by  Russia's  mediation,  and,  rather  than  reach  an 
agreement  with  the  court  of  Berlin,  even  Austria  stood  ready 
to  sign  a  peace  with  France.  The  endeavors  of  the  English  to 
end  this  unfortunate  rivalry  were  also  useless.  In  truth,  the 
English  ministers  suspected  that  Russia  might  be  planning 
another  war  against  Turkey,  and  wished  to  renew  their  defen- 
sive alliance  with  Prussia  in  order  to  forestall  any  such  crisis  in 
the  East.  Furthermore,  it  was  imperative  for  England's  in- 
terests that  the  war  against  France  should  be  kept  up  by  the 
allies  in  order  that  her  plans  for  ruining  French  commerce 
and  gaining  French  colonies  might  be  pressed  with  energy  and 
success.  It  is  true  that  a  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  had  been  negotiated  by  which  the  coalition  was 
strengthened ;  but  Russia  in  turn  now  set  about  the  busi- 
ness of  separating  Prussia  and  Great  Britain.  There  can  be 
no  question  that  the  aggrandizement  of  Prussia  was  alarming 
to  Catherine,  and  that,  though  she  had  assisted  it,  the  step 
was  taken  largely  of  necessity ;  and  she  now  wished  to  have 
Great  Britain  on  her  side  rather  than  on  Prussia's.1 

1  Herrmann :  op.  cit.  pp.  340,  341  (Eden  to  Grenville,  Jan.  16,  March  2,  6, 
13,  1793),  365  (King  of  Prussia  to  Goltz,  Jan.  25,  1793),  383  (English  represent- 
ative in  Berlin  to  Grenville,  May  21,  1792),  396  (Volkersahms  writes,  Aug.  16, 
1793,  fr°m  St.  Petersburg),  397  (Goltz  to  King  of  Prussia,  Sept.  27,  1793).  Vo- 
rontzov :  Arkhiv,  ix.  pp.  286  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov,  Jan.  10  (21),  1793).  England, 
strongly  opposed  to  Polish  partition,  agrees  to  indemnification  of  the  powers  for 
the  French  war,  but  insists  that  it  should  be  at  the  expense  of  France  and  not  of 
Poland,  302  (May,  1793).  Vorontzov  thinks  Polish  partition  is  wrong,  and  says 
that  Russia  attacks  Poland  because  of  her  connection  with  Turkey;  xviii.  p.  75 
(Kotchubey  to  S.  V.,  Vienna,  Jan.  18,  1794).  The  policy  of  Russia  is  to  abide 
by  the  alliance  with  Austria,  to  manage  Prussia,  to  seek  a  close  concert  with 
Great  Britain,  and  to  keep  peace  with  Turkey,  she  being  too  poor  now  to  try  to 
do  anything  else  there.  Instructions  are  to  hold  the  Turks  to  their  treaties. 
"  Mais  nous  y  tenons-nous  ?  "  xiv.  pp.  253,  254  (Morkov  to  S.  V.,  April  23,  1793), 
xx.  pp.  38  (Morkov  to  S.  V,  April  12).  "  Elle  [Catherine]  s'accorde  avec  tout 
le  monde  dans  le  projet  de  reduire  la  puissance  de  France,  mais  elle  voudrait 
qu'on  n'y  employat  qu'un  seul  moyen,  auquel  elle  donne  la  plus  grande  latitude, 
et  non  pas  celle  de  l'abandonner  ensuite  a  une  inertie  de  gouvernement  qui 
la  rendit  tout-a-fait  nulle  dans  les  affaires  generates  de  TEurope.  Or,  comme 
elle  soupconne,  et  non  pas  sans  raison,  et  l'Angleterre  et  TAutriche  de  viser 


126  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Events  in  Poland,  culminating  in  a  revolutionary  outbreak 
on  April  17,  1794,  under  the  leadership  of  Kosciuszko,  forced 

a  ce  second  but,  elle  voudrait  le  parer,  s'il  est  possible,"  42  et  seq.  (April  18). 
An  important  letter  on  the  relations  of  Prussia  and  Austria  to  Russia,  46-54 
(July  27).  Ditto,  xxiv.  pp.  263,  264  (Rostoptchin  to  S.  V.,  March  9  (20),  1794). 
"II  parait  que  les  affaires  de  France  ont  deja  ennuye  lTmperatrice ;  car 
on  ne  parle  plus  des  evenements  de  ce  pays  et  on  ne  s'en  occupe  que  par 
bien  seance."  Cornwallis  :  Corr.  ii.  p.  232.  Windham  reported  to  Pitt,  Sept.  4, 
1794,  concerning  "the  dreadful  duplicity  of  the  Austrians,  and  the  unfeeling 
and  unprincipled  indifference  with  which  they  sacrifice  the  greatest  public  in- 
terests to  their  private  emoluments  and  animosities."  Cf.  pp.  244,  255.  Lede- 
bur :  Mittheilungen,  i.  p.  155.  Denkschrift  betreffend  die  Vergrosserungs-Projecte 
des  Wiener  Hofes,  etc.  Lucchesini  scripsit,  March,  1793.  Zeissberg:  Quellen 
zur  Gesch.  Oesterreichs, :.  pp.  65  (Lucchesini  to  Reuss,*May  15,  1793),  72  (Stadion 
to  Starhemberg,  London,  May  21),  85-95  (L.  Cobenzl  to  Thugut,  St.  Petersburg, 
May  31),  102,  134  {Ibid.  July  5) ;  ii.  pp.  65,  154,  216  etseq.,  355,  429  (Discussions 
in  1794  over  Polish  partition,  giving  Austrian  policy)  ;  iii.  p.  13  (Thugut  to  L. 
Cobenzl,  Nov.  4,  1794).  Prussia  is  negotiating  a  separate  treaty  with  France. 
The  infamy  of  this.  Tell  Russia  of  it  and  try  to  gain  advantage  in  this  matter 
for  Austria.  Malmesbury :  Diaries,  iii.  p.  34.  Dec.  28,  1793.  King  of  Prussia 
"told  me  of  bad  news  from  Wurmser's  army,  —  that  he  had  lost  two  battalions 
and  twenty-one  pieces  of  cannon.  He  seemed  rather  pleased  with  this  bad  news, 
but  admitted  it  would  do  harm  by  raising  the  spirits  of  the  Jacobins."  p.  73. 
Malmesbury  to  Grenville,  Berlin,  March  1,  1794:  "  The  most  difficult  and  hope- 
less part  of  the  important  measure  now  under  negotiation  is  to  keep  the  two 
courts  of  Berlin  and  Vienna  on  anything  like  even  terms  :  extreme  suspicion  and 
envy  pervade  them  both;  and  their  mutual  prejudices  are  so  strong  that  it  is 
impossible  to  believe  them  when  speaking  of  each  other."  Auckland :  Corr.  ii.  p. 
432 ;  iii.  pp.  35,  36,  40,  50,  53,  55,  57.  Aulard  :  Diplomatic  de  la  Com.  de  Salut 
Public,  in  Revol.  franc,  xviii.  p.  343.  Vivenot :  Vertrauliche  Brief e  Thuguts,  i. 
p.  35  (Thugut  to  Colloredo,  Aug.  26,  1793).  ..."  Nos  allies  prussiens  sont  vrai- 
ment  insupportables  dans  leur  intarissable  chicane  et  surtout  dans  leur  fureur 
actuelle  contre  Wurmser,  de  ce  qu'il  a  ose  chasser  l'ennemi  de  Jockrin.  Heu- 
reusement  il  a  reussi ;  il  faut  s'armer  de  patience,  car  nous  devrons  boire  jus- 
qu'a  la  lie  le  chalice  amer  de  notre  monstrueuse  alliance  avec  eux  .  .  ."  pp.  85,  87, 
SS,  107,  116,  117,  237.  The  plans  for  Poland  and  Italy  are  here  fully  discussed. 
Cf.  particularly  Vivenot :  Thugut  und  sein  politisches  System,  in  Arch.filr  oestcrr. 
Gesch.  xlii.  pp.  363-493;  xliii.  pp.  103-197.  Wassiltchikow :  Les  Razoumowski,  ii. 
Pt.  1,  pp.  152-163,  167,  170  (the  account  in  the  text  above  is  largely  based  on 
these  despatches):  Pt.  2,  pp.  14  (Rosenkrantz  to  Razumovski,  March  15  (26), 
1793),  177-180  (Morkov  to  Razumovski,  June  18,  1794),  214  (S.  Vorontzov  to 
Razumovski,  Aug.  14  (25),  1794).  "Mais  il  n'est  pas  de  l'interet  de  la  Prusse 
de  finir  ces  affaires  ;  elle  entretient  et  recrute  40,000  hommes  aux  depens  des 
Polonais :  c'est  un  pretexte  de  ne  pas  donner  des  troupes  contre  la  France  et  par 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      1 27 

the  interested  powers  to  take  action.  The  urgency  of  Prussia 
for  still  another  share  of  Poland  was  redoubled ;  the  Russian 
troops  captured  Parga  and  entered  Warsaw ;  and  the  Austrians, 
V again  panic-stricken  lest  Prussia  should  once  more  outwit  them, 
threatened  to  withdraw  their  troops  from  the  Netherlands  to 
Poland  in  order  to  prevent  Prussia  from  profiting  there.  The 
news  of  the  capture  of  Cracow  by  the  Prussians  still  further 
disturbed  them.  Defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  French  had 
driven  the  Emperor  and  Thugut  to  look  for  the  costs  of  the 
war  in  the  East  and  not  in  the  West  ;  and  Austrian  troops 
were  ordered  to  cross  the  Polish  frontier.  This  step  was  very 
irritating  to  the  Russians,  who  did  not  fail  to  show  it.  The 
intentions  of  Austria  remained  hid ;  Thugut  tried  to  draw 
Russia  into  active  operations  against  France,  postponing  action 
in  Poland  till  it  might  be  possible  to  oust  Prussia  from  the 
present  favorable  position ;  and  by  his  demands  for  the  with- 
drawal of  Prussian  troops  from  Polish  territory  brought  on 
himself  a  storm  of  anger  both  from  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg. 
At  the  same  time  the  Austrian  and  Russian  troops  in  Poland 
were  on  the  point  of  actual  collision.  On  Sept.  16,  1794,  the 
King  of  Prussia  added  fuel  to  the  flame  by  announcing  that  he 
must  recall  his  troops  from  the  Rhine  to  use  them  in  Poland. 
Thugut,  who  with  true  Austrian  vacillation  had  returned  to  his 
old  plans  of  getting  Alsace  and  Lorraine  and  exchanging  the 
Netherlands  for  Bavaria,  was  greatly  alarmed  at  the  thought  that, 
deserted  by  the  Prussians  and  unassisted  by  the  Russians,  the 
Austrians  would  face  the  French  alone.  He  told  Razumovski 
that  Austria  would  consent  to  the  immediate  partition  of 
Poland,  but  she  must  first  know  how  much  Prussia  was  to 
receive  ;  he  especially  insisted  that  the  Polish  question  was 
vitally  connected  with  French  affairs,  and  asked  that  Prussia  be 

la  continuation  de  ne  ces  maudites  affaires  qu'elle  prolonge  expres,  elle  nous  em- 
peche  de  donner  des  secours  effectifs  a  l'Autriche  et  a  l'Angleterre.  Je  ne  serait 
pas  etonne  du  tout,  qu'elle  ne  fomente  encore  sous  mains  la  Porte  contre  la 
Russie  et  l'Autriche.  En  un  mot,  si  l'Europe  perit  par  le  systeme  francais,  c'est 
la  Prusse  seule,  qui  en  sera  la  cause  unique." 


128  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

compelled  to  take  her  share  again  in  the  war.  Catherine 
finally  lost  patience  with  Austria,  and  threatened  to  carry  out 
the  partition  with  Prussia.  This  brought  Austria  to  terms, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  recall  of  the  Prussian  troops  from  the 
scene  of  disturbance  in  Poland  to  Prussian  Poland  showed  the 
Empress  that  she  could  not  depend  even  on  the  court  of 
Berlin  to  assist  her  in  crushing  the  insurgent  movement. 
The  final  treaty  was  then  drawn  up  in  December,  1794.  It 
was  now  Prussia's  turn  to  protest  ;  and  this  she  did  both  against 
the  evacuation  of  Cracow  and  the  size  of  Austria's  share  in 
the  partition.  But  Catherine,  having  other  matters  to  settle  in 
which  Austria's  aid  was  necessary,  upheld  her  ally  at  Vienna. 
The  work  which  began  in  1772  was  thus  finished  in  January, 
1795.  By  the  final  partition  of  Poland  Russia  gained  the  rest 
of  Lithuania  as  far  as  the  Niemen  and  of  Volhynia  to  the  Bug  ; 
later  Kurland,  old  Lithuania,  and  Samogitia  were  added. 
Prussia  gained  all  eastern  Poland,  including  Warsaw;  and  Aus- 
tria took  Cracow,  Sandomir,  Lublin,  and  Chelm.  The  terri- 
tories of  the  three  powers  now  had  a  common  point  of  contact.1 
The  fate  of  Poland  had  barely  been  settled  when  it  became 
certain  that  all  the  rumors  regarding  a  peace  between  Prussia 
and  France  were  to  be  verified.  The  treaty  of  Bale  was  signed 
on  April  5,  1795,  and  Prussia  confessed  to  all  the  world  that 
since  she  had  profited  by  the  territorial  revolution  in  the  East 

1  Wassiltchikow :  Les  Razoumowski,  ii.  Pt.  I,  pp.  170  et  seq.  to  195.  De- 
spatches of  Razumovski  to  Ostermann  of  March  22,  29,  May  10,  22,  July  5,  Sept. 
22  (to  Catherine),  Nov.  25,  1794.  Morkov  to  Razumovski:  Aug.  27,  Oct.  7, 
Dec.  24,  pp.  197  et  seq.  Razumovski  to  Morkov,  Jan.  13,  23,  1795.  Vorontzov : 
Arkhiv,  xx.  pp.  54-63  (despatches  of  Morkov  to  S.  Vorontzov,  Aug.,  Nov.  6, 
1793,  Aug.  T5>  l794>  Feb.  9,  1795).  Sbornik,  xxiii.  pp.  611,  617,  620,  626,  632, 
633,  647,  659,  and  xvi.  pp.  91  et  seq.  Cf.  Bruckner :  Katharina,  pp.  416  et  seq. 
Hiiffer:  Diplomatische  Verhandlungen,  i.  pp.  131  et  seq.;  i.  Erganzung,  pp.  81  et 
seq.,  233.  Cf.  for  correction  to  usual  dates  given  for  letters  of  this  period. 
Auckland:  Corr.  iii.  pp.  194  (Eden  to  Auckland,  March  24,  1794),  200  {Ibid. 
March  31)  :  "I  have  ever  thought  that  the  conduct  towards  Poland  did  more  to 
hurt  the  cause  of  Kings  than  the  most  violent  acts  of  the  Jacobins."  Page  288 
(H.  Spencer  to  Auckland,  Feb.  23,  1795).  Herrmann  :  op.  cit.  pp.  456  et  seq.,  497 
et  seq.  (the  third  partition).     Beer :  Orientalische  Politik,  pp.  149  et  seq. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      1 29 

she  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  social  and  po- 
litical revolution  in  the  West.  Count  Simon  Vorontzov  in 
London  had  recognized  the  inevitableness  of  this  step  in  the 
policy  of  Prussia.  That  power  felt  herself  relieved  of  all  obli- 
gation to  continue  the  war  because  of  the  jealousy  of  Austria 
and  the  aggressive  policy  of  Russia  in  eastern  Europe.  In 
truth,  the  near  approach  of  Russia  to  the  heart  of  Europe  had 
alarmed  the  court  of  Berlin ;  the  Prussians  required  time  and 
peace  to  assimilate  their  new  acquisitions  in  Poland ;  the  final 
partition  of  the  Polish  Republic  had  materially  altered  the 
political  situation,  and  Prussia  must  needs  end  her  half-hearted 
struggle  with  the  French.  It  was  not  for  love  of  the  French, 
however,  as  Caillard,  the  new  French  minister  at  Berlin, 
said,  but  to  accustom  herself  to  new  conditions  and  to  profit  by 
following  the  middle  road  in  her  political  relations.  Without 
a  Poland  to  partition  Prussia  must  learn  her  politics  anew.1 

1  Vorontzov  :  Arkhiv,  ix.  pp.  337,  338  (S.  to  A.  Vorontzov,  London,  April  21, 
1795).  Ledebur:  Mittheilungen,  i.  p.  285  (Lucchesini  to  Hardenburg,  Aug.  26, 
I795)'  Bailleu  :  Preussen  und  Frankreich,  i.  pp.  18  (Bericht  Hardenberg's,  Basel, 
Aug.  26,  1795).  "  Sans  entrer  avecla  France  dans  des  liaisons  offensives  ou  dans 
ses  vastes  plans  d'aggrandissement,  il  faudrait  toutefois  se  rapprocher  d'elle  afin 
d'etablir,  s'il  est  possible,  un  concert  sur  la  pacification  et  les  affaires  qui  vous 
interessent,  Sire,  afin  *de  maintenir  et  faire  respecter  la  neutralite  du  Nord  de 
l'Allemagne,  ou  d'abandonner  d'un  commun  accord  cette  mesure  ;  il  faudrait  du 
moins  menager  la  France  et  ne  rien  faire  qui  pourrait  contrecarrer  ses  vues," 
p.  27  (Instruction  fur  den  Gesandten  Preussens  in  Paris,  Sandoz-Rollin,  Berlin, 
1795,  Oct.  21).  "En  effet,  S.  M.  le  Roi  se  trouvant  en  alliance  avec  l'Angleterre, 
l'Autriche  et  la  Russie,  elle  est  resolue  de  maintenir  le  systeme  de  ses  anciennes 
liaisons,  a  moins  que  des  evenements  imprevus  et  invraisemblables  ne  la  forcent 
a  agir  en  sens  contraire.  Elle  compte  done  en  rester,  au  moins  pour  le  present, 
avec  la  France  aux  relations  de  bonne  intelligence  retablies  par  la  paix  et  que 
l'accord  effectif  des  interets  fondamentaux  des  deux  empires  pourra  affermir  de 
lui-meme  sans  aucune  stipulation  expresse  ;  influer,  autant  qu'il  dependra  d'elle, 
sur  la  pacification  de  l'Empire,  surtout  en  vue  du  recouvrement  de  ses  fitats 
d'outre-Rhin,  et  ne  contracter  des  engagements  formels  avec  la  France  que  pour 
les  rapports  de  commerce,"  p.  431  (Report  of  Caillard,  Berlin,  Dec.  5,  1795). 
Speaking  of  Prussia :  "  Mais  un  tresor  epuise,  une  guerre  a  soutenir  en  Pologne, 
des  rapports  politiques  entierement  nouveaux  amenes  par  le  voisinage  immediate 
de  la  Russie  et  qui  appelaient  la  majeure  partie  des  forces  militaires  de  la  Prusse 
a  son  extremite  la  plus  eloignee  de  la  France,  toutes  ces  raisons  ne  permettaient 

9 


130  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

This  formal  acceptance  by  Prussia  of  the  results  of  the 
French  Revolution  excited  the  greatest  indignation  among  the 
other  powers.  It  was  thought  possible  that  Prussia  might  now 
join  with  Sweden,  Denmark,  the  Porte,  and  France  in  a 
league  whose  direct  object  would  be  to  oppose  the  Austro- 
Russian  alliance.  If  this  had  been  done  it  would  have  been 
only  a  counterstroke  to  the  important  step  taken  by  the  two 
imperial  courts  in  a  secret  treaty  signed  by  them  at  the  same 
time  that  a  third  partition  of  Poland  had  been  consummated. 
This  "secret  declaration"  (Jan.  3,  1795)  was  based  on  the 
previous  defensive  alliance  against  the  Porte.  Prussia  was 
now  to  be  placed  in  the  same  category  with  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  and  in  the  event  of  Prussia's  attacking  either  of  the 
two  allies  the  other  was  pledged  to  give  all  its  support. 
Furthermore,  should  a  new  war  break  out  between  Austria, 
Russia,  and  the  Porte,  the  two  allies  should  endeavor  to  carry 
out  the  plans  agreed  between  Joseph  II.  and  Catherine  in  1782. 
A  Dacian  Kingdom  was  to  be  created  of  the  Danubian  prin- 
cipalities ;  and  Russia  agreed  to  Austria's  favorite  scheme  for 

pas  de  continuer  plus  longtemps  la  guerre  contre  nous.  La  paix  fut  done  faite, 
mais  ce  ne  fut  certainement  pas  pour  l'amour  de  la  France.  .  .  .  Mais  ce  mal- 
heureux  esprit  d'envahissement  qui  avait  determine  le  roi  de  Prusse  a  manquer  a 
ses  engagements  les  plus  solennels  envers  les  Polonais  ;  l'invasion  des  palatinats 
en  1793:  l'impossibilite  ou  la  guerre  contre  la  France  l'avait  mis  de  resister  aux 
progres  des  Russes ;  la  necessite  qui  en  resulta  de  les  favoriser  meme  et  d'acce- 
der  au  partage  general  de  ce  qui  restait  de  la  Pologne :  la  position  topographique 
oil  la  Prusse  se  trouve  par  le  contact  immediat  avec  la  Russie  et  la  Maison 
d'Autriche :  toutes  ces  circonstances  amenerent  des  elements  nouveaux  dans  le 
systeme  prussien  et  introduisirent  a  Berlin  une  influence  etrangere  qui  n'y  avait 
pas  ete  connue  jusqu'a.  present.  La  consideration  publique  se  partage  done  en- 
tre  le  ministre  de  la  Republique  et  celui  de  la  Russie  :  et  la  politique  prussienne, 
lorsqu'elle  est  obligee  d'obeir  a  la  fois  a  deux  impulsions  aussi  differentes  ne 
peut  guere  que  suivre  une  direction  moyenne,  qui  exprime  les  managements 
qu'elle  veut  avoir  pour  Pun  et  pour  Pautre,"  p.  448  (Report  of  Caillard,  Dec.  9, 
1798).  "  II  n'y  a  pas  a  Berlin  un  homme  de  sens  qui  ne  convienne  aujourd'hui 
que  le  dernier  partage  de  la  Pologne  a  ete  une  operation  desastreuse  pour  la 
Prusse,  et  on  se  rappelle  avec  amertume  la  maxime  connue  du  grand  Frederic 
que  l'existence  d'une  Pologne  quelconque  etait  necessaire  a  son  repos."  Sorel : 
op.  cit.  i.  p.  502. 


THE   EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      13 1 

the  seizure  of  Venetian  territory  in  case  Austria  failed  to 
secure  any  French  provinces.  Thus,  while  Prussia  made  peace 
with  the  Revolution,  Austria  and  Russia  turned  their  backs  on 
it  and  looked  for  new  territory  in  Poland,  Bavaria,  Venice, 
Servia,  and  along  the  Danube.  The  joy  of  the  Austrian  diplo- 
mats, Thugut  in  particular,  was  great.  Austria's  prestige  was 
restored ;  the  second  partition  was  forgotten ;  Prussia  was 
completely  outplayed,  and  Austria  might  now  look  to  desirable 
acquisitions  in  several  directions.  Lord  Whitworth  had  written 
to  his  government  from  St.  Petersburg  (Jan.  4)  that  in  the 
minds  of  the  continental  powers  Poland  stood  before  France. 
Now  it  was  not  only  Poland  but  the  entire  Eastern  Question 
that  claimed  the  first  place.  As  Catherine  told  Morkov  in 
1793,  the  peoples  of  the  West  had  forgotten  the  Turks.  Russia 
could  never  do  so,  and  Catherine  claimed  she  had  kept  them 
"  from  seizing  Austria  by  the  tail  "  by  her  policy  in  Poland  and 
on  the  Black  Sea.  The  Turks  had  been  quiet  for  a  year  or  so 
since  the  treaty  of  Jassy ;  but  rumors  had  been  frequent  that 
the  Porte  was  preparing  to  profit  by  the  crisis  in  western 
Europe;  and  urged  on  by  Prussia  she  had  even  offered  her 
mediation  between  Austria  and  France.  The  Russian  diplo- 
mats were  watching  the  situation  carefully,  and  pressing  on  the 
building  of  Odessa  and  the  strengthening  of  fortresses  on  the 
Black  Sea  coast.  Negotiations  were  also  kept  up  with  Mon- 
tenegrins and  other  disaffected  peoples  in  the  Balkan  peninsula. 
Rostoptchin  believed  that  the  Empress  was  bent  on  war,  and 
that  Zubov,  the  favorite  in  1794,  was  thus  to  be  given  his  chance 
to  win  military  fame.  She  had  recently  said  (March,  1794),  that 
"  some  day  she  would  lose  patience  and  would  show  the  Turks 
that  it  was  as  easy  to  go  to  Constantinople  as  to  the  Krimea." 
In  fact,  her  explanation  of  her  policy  in  Poland  was  a  frank 
statement  that  she  needed  to  strengthen  her  frontier  for  the 
next  war  against  the  Porte.1 

1  Vorontzov :  Arkhiv,  xx.  pp.  55,  63,  64,  65  (Morkov  to  S.  Vorontzov,  1793, 
and  Feb.  9,  May  5,  June  1,  1795),  33l  (Grimm  to  S.  Vorontzov,  March  11  (22), 


V 


132  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

The  end  of  Catherine's  reign  is  characteristic  of  the  woman. 
Poland  could  no  longer  threaten  to  bar  her  road  in  the  West ; 
and  she  turned  again  to  the  East,  looking  to  increase  her 
Asiatic  domain  and  to  hasten  the  day  when  her  troops  should 
enter  Constantinople.  The  instructions  given  to  Kotchubey, 
the  Russian  ambassador  at  the  Porte,  had  been  to  preserve  the 
peace,  though  insisting  on  the  execution  of  treaty  stipulations. 
In  common  with  the  British  representative  he  watched  the 
endeavors  of  the  French  to  induce  the  Sultan  to  join  with 
them  against  the  coalition,  and  also  interested  himself  in 
Persian  matters  ;  it  is  evident  he  expected  a  crisis  in  east- 
ern matters.  He  had  been  told  to  observe  the  treaties ;  but 
"will  we  abide  by  them  ourselves?"  he  questioned.  With 
the  establishment  of  the  alliance  with  Austria  (Jan.  1795) 
Catherine  was  ready  for  action.  Her  interest  in  France  was 
confined  to  the  formation  of  a  new  coalition  against  her  in 
which  Russia  would  have  but  light  burdens  to  bear.  Yet 
Catherine  was  not  satisfied  with  the  policy  of  her  ally.  The 
court  of  Vienna  seemed  incapable  of  adhering  to  a  definite  line 
of  action  for  six  months  at  a  time.  Should  she  choose  this 
opportunity  to  attack  the  Porte,  the  attention  of  Austria  would 
be  centred  in  the  East  and  South,  and  France  would  support 
the  Turks  and  urge  on  Prussia  the  necessity  of  fomenting  dis- 

1798);  xxiv.  pp.  260-264  (Rostoptchin  to  S.  Vorontzov,  March  9  (20),  1794); 
xxix.  pp.  334-338  (L.  Cazzioni  to  A.  Vorontzov,  June  25, 1792).  Vivenot,  Vertrau- 
liche  Briefe,  i.  pp.  175  (Thugut  to  Colloredo,  Jan.  22,  I79S)>  27&  {Ibid.  Dec.  15). 
Zeissberg:  Qaellen,  iii.  p.  79.  Bruckner:  op.  cit.  p.  413.  Hausser:  Deut.  Gesch. 
i.  p.  584.  Bailleu:  op.  cit.  i.  p.  123.  Miliutin :  Gesch.  des  Krieges  Russlands, 
i.  pp.  296  et  seq.  Martens  :  Recueil,  Autriche,  ii.  pp.  228  et  seq.  Herrmann :  op. 
cit.  pp.  508  (Whitworth  to  Grenville,  Jan.  6,  9,  I79S),  5J6  (Eden  to  Grenville, 
April  20,  and  Whitworth  to  Grenville,  July  7),  519-520  (Spencer  to  Grenville, 
April  11,  May  9),  521  (Gray  to  Grenville,  Aug.  18).  Sbornik,  xlii.  pp.  317,  318 
(Catherine  to  Zubov  about  the  treaty  of  Bale).  Wassiltchikow :  op.  cit.  ii.  Pt.  1, 
pp.  196-201  (Despatches  of  Razumovski  to  Catherine  and  to  Morkov,  Jan.  13  (23), 
Feb.  28,  April  5,  1795,  and  of  Morkov  to  Razumovski,  April  22) ;  Pt.  2,  pp.  38- 
42  (Ribas  to  Razumovski,  April  13,  1795),  197  (Morkov  to  Razumovski,  June  26), 
229,  230  (S.  Vorontzov  to  Ostermann,  March,  1795),  240,  241  (S.  Vorontzov  to 
Razumovski,  June  1  (12),  1795).     Eton  :  Survey  of  Turkey,  p.  438. 


<* 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      1 33 

turbances  in  Poland.  It  seemed  advisable,  therefore,  to  take 
advantage  of  the  attack  of  Persia  on  Georgia,  a  state  protected 
by  Russia,  to  begin  a  war  which  while  not  directed  against  the 
Turks  would  nevertheless  favor  the  growth  of  Russian  power 
in  their  direction.  Zubov  had  projects  of  pushing  the  Russian 
frontier  till  it  might  be  possible  not  only  to  attack  the  Turks  in 
the  rear  through  Anatolia,  but  also  to  gain  Northern  Persia  and 
Turkestan,  establishing  a  line  of  forts  in  Central  Asia  and 
along  the  Caspian,  and  drawing  the  caravans  which  now  made 
their  way  by  land  from  India  to  the  Mediterranean  to  Russian 
ports  on  the  Black  Sea.  This  program  might  well  have 
alarmed  the  Porte,  for,  as  Rostoptchin  wrote  in  respect  to 
Persian  affairs  :  "  On  veut  toujours  finir  par  aller  a  Constanti- 
nople ;  c'est  la  ou  tendent  les  voeux  de  notre  Imperatrice,  que 
l'Sge  a  transformed  en  conquerant."  The  program  was  that  of 
Peter  the  Great.1 

Till  now  our  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  attitude  of 
the  coalition  to  the  Eastern  and  the  Polish  Questions.  We  must 
examine  that  of  France.  As  far  as  the  power  of  France  and 
the  success  of  the  Revolution  were  concerned,  the  policy  of  the 
coalition  toward  these  more  eastern  matters  had  been  highly 
satisfactory.      France  had   profited   by  the  crisis  in   eastern 

1  Vorontzov:  Arkhiv,  viii.  pp.  137  (Rostoptchin  to  S.  Vorontzov,  Feb.  24, 
1796),  151  {Ibid.  Nov.  5  (16)),  132  {Ibid.  Feb.  22).  We  are  to  have  war  with 
Persia.  "  Si  vous  me  demandez  pourquoi  on  entreprend  cette  guerre,  on  serait  fort 
embarrasse  de  vous  donner  la-dessus  une  bonne  reponse.  Mais  voila  les  raisons  : 
i-ere,  pour  eluder  Particle  de  alliance  avec  l'Empereur,  auquel  nous  devons  four- 
nier  30,000  h.  de  troupes  ou  de  l'argent  en  cas  qu'il  en  demande  (cet  article  est  nul 
aussitot  que  nous  avons  guerre  nous-memes) ; "  2.  Desire  of  Platon  Zubov  to  be- 
come a  marshal.  Idem,  xviii.  The  despatches  of  Kotchubey  to  S.  Vorontzov 
from  1791  to  1797  are  to  be  found  in  pp.  1-128  of  this  volume.  Kotchubey  was 
under  appointment  to  go  to  the  Porte  in  1792,  and  finally  did  go  in  1794.  Nearly 
every  despatch  deals  with  matters  treated  above  in  the  text.  xx.  pp.  68  et  seq. 
(Morkovto  S.  Vorontzov,  April  19,  July  12,  Aug.  10,  1796).  Sbomik,x\\\.  pp.  125, 
126  (Catherine  to  de  Ligne,  Nov.  16,  1790).  Waliszewski :  Roman  d'une  impe- 
ratrice, p.  426.  Bruckner :  Peter  der  Grosse,  pp.  72,  73.  Herrmann  :  op.  cit.  pp.  536, 
(Whitworth  to  Grenville,  June  7,  1796),  599  (Eton  to  Grenville,  Dec.  21). 
Auckland:  Corr.  iii.  pp.  324,  347  (Eden  to  Auckland,  Dec.  7,  1795,  June  13, 
1796).     Wassiltchikow  :  op.  cit.  ii.  Pt.  1,  pp.  202  et  seq. 


134  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Europe,  and  had  turned  to  advantage  every  development  in 
the  situation  in  Poland  and  Turkey.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolution  her  prestige  in  the  Orient  had  been  greatly  injured; 
it  became  one  of  the  earliest  duties  of  her  diplomats  to  restore 
it.  The  French  Republic  was  now  to  carry  on  a  direct  and 
consistent  policy  as  regards  eastern  matters.  In  fact,  the 
Revolution  marked  a  return  to  traditional  French  policy  in 
the  Orient.  In  the  place  of  the  Austrian  alliance  of  1756  the 
French  leaders  of  1792  hoped  to  establish  one  with  Prussia, 
whereby  Prussia  was  to  attack  Austria  in  Bohemia  and  help 
the  Poles  against  Russia.  The  Turks  were  to  be  induced  to 
declare  war  against  Austria,  moving  on  the  same  lines  as  in 
1788.  While  French  armies  met  those  of  Austria  on  the  Rhine, 
in  Piedmont,  and  in  Lombardy,  a  French  fleet  was  to  support 
the  Turks  in  an  attempt  to  recover  the  Krimea  from  Russia. 
The  entrance  of  Prussia  into  the  coalition  prevented  the  fur- 
ther development  of  this  plan ;  but  from  this  time  on  French 
representatives  were  working  in  Poland  to  incite  trouble  there 
for  Russia  and  Austria,  and  in  Prussia  to  excite  jealousy  over 
Russia's  schemes  against  the  Porte.  Austria  and  Great  Britain 
were  regarded  by  France  as  implacable  enemies  for  whom  ex- 
termination was  the  only  end.  This  was  to  be  accomplished 
with  the  aid  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Russia  was  regarded 
as  unconsciously  playing  the  part  of  a  friend  to  France  by 
stirring  up  discord  between  the  members  of  the  coalition; 
against  her  a  league  of  Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Poland  was  to 
be  created.  The  post  of  French  ambassador  at  the  Porte  was 
therefore  a  most  important  one  for  the  success  of  the  entire 
scheme.  Choiseul-Gouffier,  who  filled  this  place,  had  acted  for 
the  two  imperial  courts  during  their  recent  war  with  Turkey, 
and  was  given  over  to  the  Bourbon  cause ;  in  his  place,  there- 
fore, was  appointed  Semonville,  a  devoted  Jacobin,  yet  imbued 
with  the  ideas  of  Favier.  His  instructions  now  tallied  with 
those  which  had  been  given  time  after  time  by  the  kings  of 
France  to  their  ambassadors" at   Constantinople;    both    Du- 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      1 35 

mouriez  and  Lebrun  wished  to  convince  the  Porte  that  the 
Revolution  was  irTessence  a  reaction  against  the  Austrian  al- 
liance of  1756,  and  that  France  was  now  ready  to  return  to 
her  traditional  policy  in  eastern  matters.  In  fact,  almost  an 
exact  parallel  can  be  drawn  between  these  plans  and  the  policy 
of  d'Argenson  in  1746  and  of  Rouil.le  in  1755.  Both  had  urged 
on  Turkey  the  necessity  of  supporting  France  against  Austria, 
and  both  had  planned  intervention  in  Hungary  to  distract  the 
house  of  Hapsburg  from  its  interests  in  Italy,  Germany,  and 
the  Low  Countries.  Semonville  v/as  sent  in  October,  1792. 
Beside  his  instructions  he  was  told  to  suggest  the  possibility 
of  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  Porte,  which 
would  also  include  Prussia,  Sweden,  and  Poland.  As  might 
have  been  expected,  when  the  representatives  of  the  other 
European  powers  in  Constantinople  received  news  of  Semon- 
ville's  commission,  they  united  in  protests  to  the  Porte  against 
his  reception.  Under  this  pressure,  and  with  the  connivance 
of  Choiseul-Gouffier,  the  Porte  refused  to  receive  Semonville. 
Shortly  after  he  was  officially  recalled;  and  a  secret  agent, 
Descorches,  formerly  the  Marquis  de  Sainte-Croix,  was  sent, 
under  the  alias  of  Daubry,  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  second  at- 
tempt to  secure  reception  for  a  French  ambassador.  Semon- 
ville was  in  fact  reappointed  May  11,  1793,  and  started  for  his 
post,  hopeful  that  he  might  overcome  the  hesitations  of  the 
Turks.  Unfortunately  he  and  his  papers  were  captured  by  the 
Austrians;  and  the  allies,  thoroughly  alarmed  by  what  they 
had  discovered  of  French  plans,  now  endeavored  to  secure  de- 
cided action  by  the  Porte  against  France.  In  this  they  failed, 
for  the  Sultan  would  pledge  nothing  save  neutrality.  Even 
that  soon  seemed  doubtful ;  by  September  Descorches  had  so 
far  overcome  the  prejudices  of  the  Grand  Vizier  that  an  out- 
line treaty  had  been  drawn,  pledging  joint  military  action  be- 
tween France  and  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  representatives 
of  Russia,  Austria,  and  Great  Britain  again  took  the  matter  in 
hand,  and  by  vigorous  protests   prevented  further  progress. 


136  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

With  the  fall  of  Robespierre  Descorches  was  succeeded  by 
Verninac.  This  representative  was  assisted  by  the  fact 
that  Prussia  was  about  to  leave  the  coalition  and  sign  the 
treaty  of  Bale  (April,  1795).  He  proposed  a  quadruple  alliance 
of  Prussia,  Sweden,  Turkey,  and  France,  and  strengthened 
his  assertions  of  French  interest  in  the  welfare  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  by  introducing  a  number  of  French  officers  to  reform 
the  Turkish  military  system.  This  matter  brought  to  light 
the  oriental  dreams  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  then  a  young 
artillery  officer.  The  extreme  Jacobinism  of  Verninac  had  im- 
peded his  success,  however,  and  within  the  year  he  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Aubert  Dubayet.  He  died  in  December,  1797,  and 
was  in  turn  succeeded  by  Ruffin,  as  secretary;  he  remained  till 
the  Egyptian  expedition  aroused  the  anger  of  the  Porte,  who, 
as  usual  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  imprisoned  this  diplomat  in 
defiance  of  all  comity.  The  work  of  these  later  agents  was 
helped  by  Knobelsdorf,  the  Prussian  minister,  who  hoped  to 
see  Austria  humiliated,  though  he  also  dreaded  the  effect  of 
Revolutionary  opinion  on  the  internal  politics  of  the  Empire. 
By  this  renewal  of  friendly  relations  with  Prussia,  France  had 
materially  changed  her  position  as  regards  Poland.  Though  in 
1 794  she  had  instructed  Parandier,  the  French  agent  in  Poland, 
that  she  was  working  with  the  Porte,  Sweden,  and  Denmark  to 
maintain  the  independence  of  Poland,  by  her  treaty  with  Prus- 
sia she  had  tacitly  acknowledged  the  validity  of  the  Polish  par- 
titions ;  and  in  the  instructions  to  Caillard,  who  was  sent  to 
Berlin  in  1796,  there  was  no  longer  serious  mention  of  guar- 
anteeing the  integrity  of  Poland,  but  only  of  that  of  Sweden, 
Denmark,  and  the  Ottoman  Empire ;  Poland  had  ceased  to  ex- 
ist. The  failure  of  the  committee  of  Public  Safety  to  consent 
to  the  end  of  Polish  integrity  may,  in  fact,  be  regarded  as  one 
reason  why  French  diplomats  at  Constantinople  were  not  more 
successful.  At  that  time  Prussia  had  great  influence  with  the 
Porte,  and  could  the  French  have  come  to  terms  earlier  with 
Prussia,  recognizing  the  inevitableness  of  Poland's  extinction 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION      1 37 

they  might  have  profited  by  Prussia's  prestige  to  create  a 
counter  demonstration  against  Austria  in  eastern  Europe. 
On  the  whole,  French  influence  at  the  Porte,  though  it  almost 
suffered  annihilation  under  Choiseul-Gouffier,  was  strengthened 
during  the  closing  years  of  the  century,  and  at  the  time  when 
Turkish  spies  were  working  in  Poland,  it  excited  great  alarm 
in  Austria  and  Russia.  In  fact,  after  the  final  Polish  partition, 
the  plans  had  been  drawn  up  in  St.  Petersburg  and  approved 
by  Catherine  for  a  third  war  against  the  Ottoman  Empire.1 

1  Masson  :  Dipt,  des  affaires  itranglres,  pp.  27,  267.  Dumouriez :  Vie,  liv.  iii. 
c.  6,  7;  iv.  c.  1.  Roland:  Memoires,  i.  p.  169.  Lescure:  Corr.  ii. p.  613  (Aug.  4, 
1792).  Thiirheim  :  Mercy-Argenteau  und  Stahremberg,  pp.  38,  39  (M.  to  S.,  Jan. 
19, 1793).  Anon. :  Diplomatie  revloutionnaire \  in  R.  de  la  Revo/,  iii.  p.  114.  Bailleu  : 
Preussen  und  Fran kreich,  i.  pp.  450,  474  (Instructions  and  reports  of  Caillard  and 
Sieyes  at  Berlin,  1796-97).  De  Testa:  Recueil,  i.  p.  542  ;  ii.  pp.  202-252.  (These 
despatches  of  French  representatives  at  the  Porte  are  useful. )  Daru :  Hist,  de 
Venise,  v.  p.  168.  Zeissberg :  Quellen,  i.  p.  340  (Thugut  to  Cobenzl,  Oct.  21, 
1793).  Vivenot:  Vertrauliche  Briefe,  i.  p.  35  (Thugut  to  Colloredo,  Aug.  27, 
I793)«  Cf.  pp.  380,  381.  And  Quellen,  ii.  Cobenzl  und  Franz,  pp.  224  (Memoire  of 
Choiseul-Gouffier  to  the  Porte,  Sept.  24,  1792),  225  (Herbert  to  P.  Cobenzl,  Sept. 
25).  Aulard:  Documents  inedits,  in  Revol.  franc,  xiv.  pp.  11 11  et  sea.  Pin  gaud  : 
Choiseul-Gouffier,  pp.  175  ^/  sea.,  200,  215,  217  et  sea.,  246  et  sea.  Bonneville  de 
Marsangy :  Vergennes,  i.  pp.  229  et  sea.  Bruckner  :  Katharina,  p.  422.  Cf .  Russ. 
Arkhiv,  1876,  i.  p.  218.  Farges:  La  Pologne,  ii.  pp.  326  et  seq.  Instructions  to 
Parandier,  1794.  "Le  gouvernement  de  la  Republique  se  dispose  a  agir  aupres 
de  la  Porte,  et  raeme  aupres  de  la  Suede  et  du  Danemark,  d'apres  un  systeme 
dans  lequel  le  soutien  de  l'independance  de  la  Pologne  sera  l'un  des  principaux 
objets  des  operations  politiques  et  militaires  dans  Pest  de  l'Europe."  Eton: 
Survey  of  Turkey,  p.  193.  Grosjean  :  Semonville,  in  Revol.  franc,  xiii.  pp.  888-921. 
This  is  a  long  and  satisfactory  article.  Masson :  Diplomates  de  la  Revolution, 
p.  165.  Zinkeisen :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  846  et  seq.,  859,  862  et  seq.,  875  et  seq.,  881. 
Aulard :  Dipl.  du  ComitS  de  Salut  Public,  in  Revol.  franc,  xviii.  p.  237  (a  plan 
drawn  up  in  Lebrun's  office,  Oct.  1792):  "  Les  Turcs  s'avanceraient  egale- 
ment  du  cote  de  la  Pologne  ainsi  que  dans  le  bannat  de  Temesvar  et  en  Croatie 
en  suivant  le  plan  de  leur  premiere  campagne  de  1788  et  a  l'aide  des  Valaques, 
qu'il  ne  serait  pas  impossible  de  faire  insurger.  .  .  .  Notre  flotte  de  la  Mediter- 
ranee  entrerait  dans  la  mer  Noire  et  faciliterait  un  debarquement  des  Turcs  dans 
la  Crimee."  Page  345  (Soulavie  to  Barere  and  Danton,  April  24,  1793) :  "  Celles 
puissances  qu'on  ose  appeler  neutres  sont  les  amies  naturelles  de  la  France,  des 
amies  de  tous  les  temps,  des  amies  sures,  des  amies  qui  ont  pris  les  armes  pour 
la  France,  toutes  les  fois  qu'elle  l'a  voulu :  Savoir,  la  Turquie,  la  Pologne,  la 
Saxe,  la  Suisse,  la  Danemark,  Genest  etc.,  etc."    Pages  434,  435,  456,  437  :  "  La 


\J 


138  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

The  diplomatic  aspect  of  the  Eastern  Question  has  been 
treated;  we  must  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  economic 
situation  which  in  large  part  constituted  the  importance  of  this 
diplomacy.  It  will  be  possible  to  show  the  commercial 
interests  of  France  and  England  in  the  Levant,  and  to  trace 
the  development  of  sea  power  as  a  modern  factor  in  the  history 
of  the  Eastern  Question.  The  evolution  of  this  problem  to  a 
marine  stage  was  largely  due  to  the  French  policy  aiming  at 
control  of  the  Mediterranean.  This  policy  was  not  a  new  one, 
but  its  connection  with  the  great  problem  of  Asia  was  now 
shown  for  the  first  time;  the  Mediterranean  became  the  scene 
of  combat  between  rival  powers  whose  interests  were  world- 
wide, and  whose  antagonism  then  seemed  implacable.  This 
struggle  between  France  and  Great  Britain  was  in  turn  given 
a  new  character  by  the  introduction  of  Levantine  questions ; 

Suede,  le  Danemark  et  la  Turquie  formaient  les  elements  principaux  du  systeme 
d' alliances  que  la  France  voulait,  en  1793,  opposer  aux  puissances  coalisees,  en 
vue  d'operer  une  diversion  puissante  sur  leurs  derrieres  ou  tout  au  moins  de  main- 
tenir  la  Russie  dans  l'inaction."  Sybel :  Propagande  revolutionnaire,  in  Rev.  Hist. 
xl.  p.  112.  Sorel :  V Europe  et  la  Revol.  iii.  pp.  301  et  sea.,  396,  403,  435  et  seq. ; 
iv.  pp.  67  et  seq.,  247  et  seq.,  393.  Auckland :  Corr.  iii.  pp.  200,  201  (Eden  to  Auck- 
land, Vienna,  March  31,  1794) :  "  It  is  a  most  alarming  business  [Polish  insurrec- 
tion] for  this  country  [Austria],  as  Galicia  is  not  without  its  malcontents,  and 
there  are  not  1,000  troops  left  in  the  whole  province,  of  which  old  Wurmser 
is  the  commander.  Indeed,  it  may  be  fatal  to  us  all  if  it  be,  as  is  suspected,  con- 
nected with  Descorches'  intrigues  at  Constantinople.  .  .  .  Perhaps  the  desire  of 
keeping  Poland  in  subjection,  a  jealousy  of  Prussia's  aggrandizement,  and  the  ap- 
prehensions of  the  machinations  carrying  on  between  the  French  and  the  Swedes, 
with  the  increasing  influence  of  France  and  Denmark,  may  show  her  Imperial 
Majesty  [Catherine]  the  expediency  of  at  least  deferring  the  execution  of  her 
designs  against  Turkey.  Should  this  be  the  case,  the  uneasiness  of  this  court 
would  be  removed."  Vorontzov :  Arkhiv,  xviii.  pp.  53-63,  67-79,  %3>  85,  87,  88, 
92,  94-96,  103,  105-108,  no,  113,  115,  1 17-120,  130,  132.  (Despatches  of  Kotchu- 
bey  to  S.  Vorontzov:  Oct.  3,  12  (23),  1792;  Jan.  18,  July  10,  Sept.  10,  14  (25), 
29  (Oct.  10),  1794;  May  30  (June  10),  July  30  (Aug.  10),  1795  5  Dec-  29  (Jan-  9). 
Jan.  14  (25),  Oct.  10,  30  (Nov.  10),  1796;  Feb.  10,  14  (25),  1797.)  These  letters 
are  invaluable  for  this  period.  Wassiltchikow :  op.  cit.  ii.  Pt.  1,  chaps,  xi.,  xii. 
Pesenti:  Diplomazia  Franco-Turca,  pp.  15-66.  This  very  interesting  pamphlet 
(1898),  based  on  the  despatches  of  Venetian  diplomats,  throws  light  on  several 
important  points.     Further  use  will  be  made  of  it. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      1 39 

the  prestige  of  each  nation  at  Constantinople  and  their  respec- 
tive commercial  interests  in  the  nearer  East  became  important 
to  their  general  welfare,  and  to  their  success  as  world  powers. 
The  alliance  between  France  and  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  a 
-^matter  of  history.  The  combinations  of  European  politics  had 
made  it  valuable  to  both  countries ;  tradition  and  ambition  had 
fostered  it;  geographical  situation  had  given  it  permanence. 
From  the  economic  point  of  view,  the  Levant  played  the  part 
of  a  colonial  empire  to  France ;  and  the  zenith  of  her  influence 
in  the  East  was  reached  at  the  treaty  of  Belgrade  in  1738-39, 
when  Villeneuve,  the  French  ambassador  to  the  Porte,  so  suc- 
cessfully negotiated  the  treaty  between  the  Ottoman  Empire 
and  Russia  and  Austria.  As  a  direct  result  of  this,  the  capit- 
ulations of  1740  gave  France  a  pre-eminence  that  lasted  till 
after  1756.1  The  Republic  clung  to  the  traditions  of  the 
Ancien  Regime  in  the  matter  of  Levantine  trade.  Indeed  the 
adoption  of  the  principles  of  war  against  Great  Britain,  and 
the  permanence  of  the  underlying  causes  in  foreign  policy 
required  that  the  protection  of  French  commerce  in  the  Levant 
should  follow  as  a  corollary  to  the  assumption  of  the  obligations 
of  monarchical  France  in  the  duel  against  her  maritime  rival 
for  world  empire  and  colonial  trade.  Henry  IV.  had  placed 
French  Mediterranean  commerce  in  the  front  rank ;  and  Fran- 
cis I.,  Louis  XIII.,  Vaubans,  Chauvelin,  and  d'Argenson  had 
followed  in  the  footsteps  of  Charles  VIII.  in  the  endeavor  to 
free  Italy  from  German  domination  that  a  road  to  the  Orient 
might  be  opened  to  them.  Under  the  numerous  capitulations 
with   the   Porte  French   mercantile   interests   had  prospered 

1  Vandal :  Villeneuve,  pp.  ix,  x,  16,  31,  50  et  seq.,  416  et  seq.  Saint-Priest : 
Ambassade  de  France,  pp.  269  et  seq.  De  Testa :  Recueil,  i.  pp.  186  et  seq.,  525, 
notes.  D'Argenson:  Memoires, i. pp.  190,  361  etseq.  Hammer :  Gesch. des osmani- 
schen  Reiches,  viii.  p.  I.  Segur  :  Politiques  de  tous  les  cabinets \'\.  pp.  18,  88  et  seq., 
140  et  seq.,  195,  344;  iii.  pp.  115,  116,  119,  *26.  Boutaric :  Correspondance  de 
Louis  XV.  i.  p.  386;  ii.  pp.  182  et  seq.  Sorel :  V Europe  et  la  Revolution,  i.  pp. 
246,  307  et  seq.  Delaville  de  Roulx :  La  France  en  Orient,  i.  p.  514  et  seq.  La- 
valee  :  Les  frontilres  de  France,  p.  119. 


\ 


\ 


140  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

greatly ;  but  under  Louis  XIV.  there  was  no  very  even  devel- 
opment.1 About  1740,  thanks  to  Villeneuve,  the  figures  began 
to  rise.  The  importations  from  the  Levant  increased  by  five 
million  livres  during  the  fifth  decade  of  the  century,  and  a 
total  French  trade  of  over  forty  million  (nineteen  export  and 
twenty-one  import)  grew  to  forty-eight  million  livres  just  prior 
to  the  treaty  with  Austria  in  1756.  Though  the  political  influ- 
ence of  France  waned  thereafter,  the  commercial  losses  of 
Austria  in  Italy,  the  suspension  of  Russian  trade  by  the  closing 
of  the  Black  Sea  by  wars,  and  the  steady  decrease  in  Venetian 
and  Dutch  mercantile  power  left  the  markets  open  to  her  in  a 
way  of  which  she  soon  took  advantage.  England's  trade  in 
the  Levant  had  suffered  greatly  between  1735  and  1745,  and 
her  representatives  and  agents  were  withdrawn  from  many 
ports;  ten  French  ships  were  seen  to  one  British.  The  total 
exchange  between  France  and  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  de- 
pendencies was  estimated  at  seventy  million  in  1788,  and  a  year 
after  the  Revolution  it  had  suffered  but  little,  though  French 
political  prestige  was  at  its  lowest  point.  From  171 5  to  1789 
the  imports  to  France  from  the  Levant  had  grown  thirteen  fold, 
and  the  exports  twelve  fold  ;  and  in  1787,  of  the  total  trade  of 
Smyrna,  the  largest  port  of  Western  Asia  Minor,  over  forty-two 
per  cent  was  in  French  hands,  a  figure  which  is  twenty-five  per 
cent  above  that  of  1885.  In  1700  it- had  been  supposed  by 
Savary  that  the  English  and  Dutch  held  seventy-five  per  cent 
of  the  total  trade  of  the  Levant,  and  the  French  only  twelve 
and  one-half  per  cent.      The  enormous  gain  of  France  is  thus 

1  Fagniez  :  Le  commerce  exterieur  de  la  France  sous  Henri  IV,  in  Rev.  Hist. 
xvi.  pp.  1-48.  Pouqueville  :  Commerce  de  la  France,  in  Mem.  de  VAcad.  des  inscrtp~ 
lions,  x.  pp.  573,  574.  Saint-Marc  Girardin  :  Les  origines  de  la  question  d?  Orient,  in 
R.  de  D.  M.  li.  pp.  40-72;  liii.  pp.  709-739;  lv.  pp.  671-71 1.  Phillipson :  Hein- 
rich  IV.  und  Philip  III.  i.  pp.  239,  279,  284  et  seq.,  290,  296;  iii.  p.  353.  Char- 
riere  :  Negociations  de  la  France  dans  le  Levant,  i.  pp.  69  et  seq.,  283  et  seq.  De 
Testa:  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  22  et  seq.,  43,  99  et  seq.,  113,  175.  Saint- Priest :  op.  cit.  pp. 
29  et  seq.  Pingaud  :  op.  cit.  p.  2.  Flassan  :  Hist,  de  la  dipl.  fran$.  i.  p.  360 ;  iii. 
p.  402  ;  iv.  p.  57.     Seeley  :  British  Policy,  i.  p.  147. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND   THE  REVOLUTION      1 41 

apparent.  The  Greek  trade  with  Europe  amounted,  in  1798, 
to  8,821,320  piastres  exports,  of  which  France  took  sixty-five 
per  cent  and  England  not  quite  seven  per  cent,  and  4,970,670 
piastres  imports,  of  which  France  supplied  about  twenty-two 
per  cent  and  England  sixteen  per  cent.1 

The  interests  of  English  trade  in  the  Levant  were  not  large 
in  1789,  though  they  had  greatly  increased  during  the  past 
few  years.  In  1783  imports  from  Turkey  and  the  Levant  had 
figured  in  the  customs  reports  at  £48,983  and  the  exports  to 
those  regions  from  the  United  Kingdom  at  £42,666.  By 
1789  the  imports  were  £223,424,  and  the  exports  £  136,207.  In 
1792  they  had  risen  to  £290,599  and  £273,785  respectively. 
These  figures,  however,  are  the  highest  in  a  period  of  nearly 
twenty  years,  from  1783  to  1800.  The  average  is  much  lower, 
and  for  Turkey  is  less  than  two  per  cent  of  the  corresponding 
annual  average  of  the  French  trade;  the  proportion  for  the 
entire  Mediterranean,  however,  is  only  a  little  over  three  to 
one  in  favor  of  the  French.  There  are,  furthermore,  frequent 
fluctuations  of  such  a  character  as  to  show-that  the  British  trade 
was  by  no  means  so  firmly  established  as  the  French.  The 
influence  of  war  naturally  was  great,  and  in  the  years  when 
Bonaparte  was  fighting   for   dominion   on   the   Adriatic   and 

1  Favier  in  Segur  :  op.  cit.  iii.  p.  303.  Saint-Priest :  op.  cit.  pp.  269  et  seq.,  327 
et  seq.,  335,  342.  Vandal :  op.  cit.  pp.  416  et  seq.,  430,  442.  Arnould  :  Balance  du 
Commerce,  i.  pp.  240  et  seq.,  249,  254.  Georgiades :  Smyrne  ct  I'Asie  Mineur,  pp. 
220  et  seq.  Zinkeisen  :  op.  cit.  v.  pp.  872  et  seq.  Beaujour  :  Commerce  de  la  Grfre, 
xx.  pp.  162  et  seq.,  229.  Beer  :  Geschichte  des  Welthandels,  3te  Abth.  ii.  H'dlfte,  1.  Th. 
p.  508.  Jackson  :  Commerce  of  the  Mediterranean,  pp.  ^etseq.,  48.  Holland  :  Travels 
in  Greece,  pp.  21, 36, 84,  149,  288.  Macpherson  :  Annals,  iv.  p.  135.  A  much  smaller 
figure  for  French  commerce  is  here  given.  Beausobre  :  Politique,  i.  pp.  330  et  seq. 
Diet,  du  Commerce,  pp.  637, 638.  In  1778  Holland  had  100  ships  in  the  Levant  trade, 
and  in  1779,  in  ships.  Mayer  :  Considerations politiques  et  commercials,  pp.  41-43. 
The  author  (1790)  gives  the  annual  trade  of  the  Port  of  Marseilles  as  follows :  — 

Exports  to  Levant 30,000,000  francs. 

Imports  from  Levant 50,000,000  francs. 

Exports  to  West  Indies,  etc 17,000,000  francs. 

Imports  from  West  Indies,  etc 21,000,000  francs. 

Commerce  of  East  Indies 3,500,000  francs. 


142  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Mediterranean,  British  trade  in  those  waters  was  lower  than  at 
any  time  since  1783.  Nelson's  victory  in  Abukir  Bay  effected 
a  corresponding  increase,  the  imports  to  Great  Britain  rising 
from  £42,285,  in  1798,  to  £i99>773>  in  1800,  and  the  exports 
from  £62,168  to  £166,804.  It  is  also  fair  to  say  that  the  exports 
for  1797  were  £23,532,  and  for  1799,  £226,078,  and  that  the 
imports  for  1799,  when  the  results  of  the  victory  had  not  been 
sufficiently  realized  to  affect  trade  in  Turkey,  were  only  £33,091. 
The  attempt  of  the  English  to  improve  their  Mediterranean 
commerce  and  to  utilize  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Isthmus  of  Suez 
as  a  route  for  their  Indian  trade,  had  met  with  serious  opposi- 
tion from  the  Porte.  A  decree  had  been  issued  (1779)  declaring 
that  the  Red  Sea  was  the  sacred  highway  of  Islam  to  the  holy 
city  of  Mecca,  and  was  therefore  barred  to  all  infidels.  With 
these  facts  in  mind,  it  can  be  clearly  seen  that  the  extent  of 
the  British  interest  in  the  Levant  was  not  due  to  the  economic 
value  of  that  trade,  at  least  on  its  positive  side.  On  the  nega- 
tive side,  however,  the  Eastern  Question  became  a  matter  of 
great  significance,  for  when  Great  Britain  expected  to  renew 
the  struggle  with  France,  as  in  1785-87,  the  importance  of  the 
Mediterranean  trade  to  France  aroused  British  endeavors  to 
injure  that  lucrative  source  of  their  rival's  wealth.     The  work 

rof  Saint- Priest,  the  French  ambassador  at  the  Porte,  in  stimu- 
lating trade  between  France  and  Russia  via  the  Black  and 
Mediterranean  Seas,  had  excited  alarm  in  the  ports  of  northern 
Europe.  The  conquests  of  Catherine,  at  the  expense  of  the 
Turks,  had  given  her  a  southern  littoral,  and  there  was  a  pros- 
pect that  she  might  gain  ports  in  the  -^Egean  and  open  the 
Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles  to  whom  she  would.  This  possi- 
bility is,  in  fact,  the  secret  of  French  vacillation  at  Constanti- 
nople. Should  a  trade  route  be  established  between  Russia  and 
the  south  of  Europe,  in  waters  where  English  shipping  was 
comparatively  weak,  a  serious  blow  would  be  struck  at  that 
most  profitable  branch  of  the  British  commerce,  the  Baltic 
V  trade.     Austria  had  declared  that  she  considered  free  access 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION     1 43 

to  eastern  markets  a  necessity,  and  was  expecting  to  share 
with  Russia  a  sudden  development  in  her  Adriatic  and  Black 
Sea  trade.  Under  these  circumstances,  France  was  not  pre- 
pared to  oppose  Russian  expansion  by  force.  On  the  other 
hand,  Frederick  the  Great  had  already  established  a  Levant 
Company,  and  Prussia  was  determined  that  she  would  utilize 
her  prestige  at  the  Porte  to  further  her  commercial  interests, 
while  at  the  same  time  she  increased  her  trade  with  Russia  in 
the  North.  The  Dutch  states  were  influenced  by  similar  con- 
siderations; and  Great  Britain's  interest  was  larger  than  both. 
That  France  should  secure  the  major  part  of  Russian  trade  was 
a  bitter  possibility  to  Great  Britain.  These  views  had  in  all 
probability  an  appreciable  effect  on  the  formation  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  of  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  and  Holland  (1788).  In 
the  event  of  war  against  Russia  and  Austria,  the  Turks  could 
be  counted  on  to  injure  Russian  commerce  in-4bo~ElackSea, 
and  thus  to  aid  the  three  Northern  powers,  who  could,  in  ad( 
tion,  expect  help  from  Sweden.  Such  a  war  would  have  a 
disastrous  effect  on  French  trade,  for  it  would  check  the  devel- 
opment of  that  very  branch  of  commerce, —  the  exchange  with 
Russia  via  the  Black  Sea,  —  which  Saint-Priest  and  Segur  had 
labored  so  hard  to  encourage.  France,  therefore,  opposed  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  in  the  East,  and  while  Prussian  and 
British  diplomats  strengthened  the  Turks  to  resist  the  de- 
mands of  Russia,  Choiseul-Gouffier,  then  at  Constantinople, 
was  instructed  to  persuade  the  Porte  to  yield  to  the  desires  of 
the  imperial  allies,  surrendering  some  small  portion  of  territory 
rather  than  risk  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  a  Euro- 
pean state  in  a  war,  which,  it  seemed  certain,  would  drive  the 
Turks  back  to  Asia.1 

1  For  English  trade  statistics,  cf.  App.  ii.  For  English  Levant  Company  in 
1720-40,  cf.  Plumard  de  Dangeul  [Nickolls]  :  Remarks  on  the  advantages  and  dis-  \ 
advantages  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  pp.  173,  174 ;  Dearborn  :  Black  Sea,  i.  pp. 
107,  116;  Bonnassieux :  Grandes  compagnies,  p.  467,  quoting  Gazette  de  France, 
July  1,  1765  ;  Beer  :  Oesterreiche  Handelspolitik,  p.  396;  Favier,  in  Segur  :  Politi- 
que, i.  pp.  288,  326,  365  et  sea.,  and  Vergennes  in  Ibid.  iii.  p.  154.     Cf.  Antoine : 


y 


144  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

The  proposal  to  increase  French  trade  in  the  Mediterranean, 
and  thus  to  indemnify  the  losses  of  France  in  America  and 
India,  was  practically  a  plan  to  make  Levantine  commerce  a 
national  monopoly  and  to  close  the  Mediterranean  to  English 
ships.  Favier  had  expressed  this  idea  as  a  redressal  of  the 
balance  of  economic  power ;  it  had  been  the  policy  of  Francis 
I.  and  of  Henry  IV.  when  engaged  in  their  struggle  with  Spain  ; 
and  it  found  its  most  eager  exponents  in  men  like  Arnould, 
whose  book  was  cited  on  every  hand  during  the  days  of  the 
First  Republic.  The  Revolution  then  seemed  destined  to  be 
coincident  with  the  solution  of  the  Eastern  Question.  It  had 
been  welcomed  by  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  before  they 
realized  that  it  was  to  become  a  movement  of  such  widespread 
importance  and  danger  to  them ;  each  had  hoped  that  under 
cover  of  the  Revolution  it  might  be  able  to  deal  with  oriental 
affairs,  whether  in  Poland,  Turkey,  India,  or  in  Eastern  waters, 
so  as  to  gain  in  territory  or  trade.  The  people  of  France, 
however,  far  from  obliterating  their  country  as  a  political  factor 
in  Europe,  handled  the  affairs  of  the  world  with  enthusiastic 
patriotism  and  successful  genius.  Realizing  the  vital  connec- 
tion of  sea  power  and  commercial  progress  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean with  the  Eastern  Question,  with  dominion  in  Asia,  and 
with  control  of  the  world's  trade  routes,  they  set  themselves  to 
the  task  of  creating  a  greater  France  abroad,  while  trying  to 
create  a  new  France  at  home.  The  city  of  Marseilles,  in 
whose  harbor  was  concentrated  the  French  trade  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, demanded  that  France  should  secure  the  major 
share  of  commerce  or  an  equable  proportion  of  territory  in  the 
coming  struggle  over  the  spoils  of  the  East;  and  that,  above 
all,  English  predominance  in  the  waters  which  that  rich  city 

Commerce de la  mer  Noire,  and  Ferrihres-Sauvebceut :  Memoires  historiques,politiques 
et  geographiques  des  voyages  f aits  en  Turquie,  en  Perse  et  eft  Arable  depuis  1782,  jus- 
qifen  1789,  Paris,  1790,  2  vols.;  Chattischerlf  osla  Rescrltto  Imperiale  di  Sultan 
Abdul  Hamid  emanato  latino  1779  per  proibire  agV  Ingle  si  ed  altre  nazioni  Europee 
il  commercio  delF  mare  rosso,  in  Hammer  :  Fundgruben  des  Orients,  i.  pp.  429*/  seq. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  AND    THE  REVOLUTION     1 45 

had  so  long  regarded  as  tributary  to  her  merchants,  should 
become  an  impossibility.  The  belief  in  France  was  that  Great 
Britain  aspired  to  the  commerce  of  the  whole  world ;  that  of 
the  Levant,  which  was  so  peculiarly  French  in  its  economic 
and  political  history,  must,  therefore,  be  preserved  to  France  at 
any  cost.  In  respect  to  the  fate  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
opinion  was  divided.  It  was  felt  that  the  realization  of  any 
plan  for  the  destruction  of  that  power  would  be  a  serious  blow 
to  France ;  but  in  case  the  day  had  come  when  a  final  partition 
of  Turkish  territory  was  to  be  accomplished,-  it  was  essential 
that  France  should  receive  a  just  share  of  that  territory ;  or,  to 
be  more  definite,  that  she  should  take  possession  of  Egypt  and 
several  Greek  islands,  —  a  share  which  diplomats,  scholars,  and 
travellers  had  tentatively  assigned  to  France  in  the  past.  If, 
however,  it  should  appear  that  more  was  to  be  gained  by  a 
firm  support  of  a  weakened  ally,  it  behooved  France  to  become 
a  bulwark  to  protect  the  Porte  from  the  aggression  of  the  rest 
of  Europe.  In  the  mean  time  greater  power  on  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  along  its  coasts  was  necessary,  whichever  policy 
France  might  eventually  decide  to  follow.  The  pamphleteers 
discussed  these  points  and  debated  the  character  of  Turkish 
rule  and  the  vitality  of  Islam.  Yet,  however  they  might 
differ  as  to  the  method,  they  united  as  to  the  object.  France 
had  interests  in  the  Orient  which  must  be  cherished  and  pro- 
tected from  Great  Britain.  It  was  the  opinion  of  Frenchmen, 
therefore,  that  by  increasing  her  influence  and  trade  in  the 
Levant  France  would  thwart  Great  Britain,  would  follow  the 
policy  which  history  and  tradition  had  marked  for  her,  and 
would  best  realize  the  ideal  of  a  Roman  imperial  republic;  in 
the  words  of  Chenier :  — 

"  En  vain  vous  [England]  pr^tendez  encor 
Appesantir  sur  l'onde  un  sceptre  tyrannique 
Rois,  ministres,  guerriers,  vainqueurs  avec  de  For, 
Triomphant  par  la  foi  punique ! 
L'universe  souleve  :  il  remet  en  nos  mains 
10 


146  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Le  soin  de  recouvrer  le  public  heritage ; 
Et  les  bras  des  nouveaux  Romains 
Renverseront  l'autre  Carthage. 

"  Sur  ton  sein  [the  sea]  geneYeux  porte-nous  des  tre'sors 
De  l'onde  adriatique  et  des  mers  de  Bysance 
Appelle  et  conduis  dans  nos  ports 
Les  doux  attributs  de  l'abondance  !  " > 

1  Arnould  :  Balance  du  commerce,  i.  p.  258 :  "  Ce  commerce  du  Levant,  reunit, 
comme  Ton  voit,  tous  les  avantages.  II  devient  une  ecole  de  matelots  ;  il  soutient 
de  nombreux  atteliers ;  il  encourage  l'agriculture  ou  le  nourissage  des  bestiaux, 
en  favorisant  l'emploi  des  laines  recoltees  dans  nos  provinces  meridionales ;  il 
fait  valoir  le  sol  de  nos  colonies  d'Amerique  ;  il  apporte  l'abondance  des  subsis- 
tances  dans  le  midi  de  la  France ;  il  grossit  par  les  benefices  de  la  reexportation, 
les  capitaux  destinees  a  la  reproduction  du  revenu  annuel ;  enfin,  il  met  perpetuelle- 
ment  de  nouveaux  poids  dans  la  balance  de  1'industrie  francoise,  en  alimentant 
sans  cesse  nos  manufactures  de  matieres  premieres."  Barral-Montferrat :  op.  cit. 
i.  pp.  325  et  sea.,  346.  Beaujour  :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  4  et  sea. ;  ii.  pp.  305  et  sea.,  321,  331. 
•Dubroca :  Politique  du  gouvernement  anglais,  pp.  67,  69.  Delafonte  :  Lettre  & 
M.  Herault,  pp.  3,  4,  12,  18,  19,  21,  24-31.  Bailleu  :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  54,  102,  113, 
123.  Mayer:  Considirations  sur  Pordre  de  Malte,  pp.  6,  7.  "Que  le  clef  du 
Commerce  du  Levant  et  de  la  Mediterranee  est  dans  les  mains  de  l'Ordre, 
Qu'un  nouveau  souverain  place  sur  ce  point  [Malta]  central  des  deux  continens, 
ouvriroit  et  fermeroit  a  son  gre  le  passage  a  nos  vaisseaux:  que  par  la 
preponderance  absolue  que  l'alliance  de  l'Ordre  nous  assure,  le  Commerce  du 
Levant  enrichit  six  de  nos  Provinces,  soutient  nos  Manufactures,  occupe  une  in- 
finite d'ouvriers,  alimente  notre  Commerce  d'Amerique,  entretient  Marseille  dans 
l'etat  le  plus  florissant,  que  par  cette  preponderance,  la  France  'conserve  une  alli- 
ance intime  avec  la  Porte,  et  par  elle  jette  des  contrepoids  toujours  surs  dans  la 
balance  de  l'Europe,"  p.  43.  He  closes  with  an  appeal  for  a  Franco-Turkish 
alliance  directed  against  England  in  the  Levant.  Russia  and  Austria  could  also 
be  checked  in  their  plans  for  the  despoilment  of  Turkey,  and  Russia  could  be 
induced  by  trade  to  cooperate  with  France  against  England.  A  number  of  other 
pamphlets  of  a  similar  character  to  those  above  cited  are  to  be  found  noted  in  the 
bibliography.  Chenier :  (Euvres,  iii.  p.  362,  "  Hymne  —  La  Reprise  de  Toulon." 
(Dec.  30,  1793.) 


CHAPTER  III 

NAPOLEON   BONAPARTE   AND   THE   ORIENT  :   THE   EGYPTIAN 
EXPEDITION 

The  New  Factors  in  Politics  —  Tendencies  of  the  Period :  the  Classic  Revival, 
the  Oriental  Revival,  the  Revolutionary  Spirit,  the  Legend  of  Charlemagne  — 
Their  Influence  on  Napoleon  Bonaparte  —  His  Early  Training  ;  his  Books  and 
Notes  —  Raynal  —  Analysis  of  the  Histoire  philosophique — Colonies,  Com- 
merce, and  Sea  Power ;  the  Trinity  of  the  New  Politics  —  Bonaparte  and 
Charlemagne  —  The  Condition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  1797  —  France  and 
Venice  —  Bonaparte  in  Italy  —  His  Interest  in  the  Orient  —  The  Ionian 
Islands  —  The  Fall  of  Venice  —  Malta  —  Bonaparte  and  the  Directory —  The 
Partition  of  Turkey  —  France  versus  England  —  The  Mission  of  Poussielgue 
— The  Invasion  of  England  —  Bonaparte  in  Paris,  1798  —  The  Discussion  of 
Plans  —  The  Egyptian  Expedition  is  decided,  March  —  The  Authorship  of  the 
Plan  —  Bonaparte's  Information  about  Egypt  —  Motives  for  the  Expedition  — 
Sketch  of  the  Events  —  Bonaparte's  Policy  toward  the  Porte ;  toward  the  Peo- 
ples and  Rulers  of  Egypt,  Syria,  Greece,  and  the  Barbary  States ;  and  toward 
the  Directory  —  Bonaparte  and  Islam  —  The  Mahdi  —  Egypt  and  India  — The 
Situation  in  India,  1793-98 — Tipii-Tib  of  Mysore  —  The  French  in  India  — 
Tipu  and  the  Directory  —  British  Opinion  regarding  the  Egyptian  Expedition  ; 
its  Menace  to  British  Power  in  Asia  —  The  Khalif,  Tipu,  and  the  British  Au- 
thorities —  The  Last  War  with  Mysore,  1798  —Tipu  and  Bonaparte  —  The 
French  at  Suez  and  on  the  Red  Sea  —  The  Death  of  Tipu  —  British  Policy  in 
India,  in  Persia,  and  toward  the  Far  East  —  The  Evolution  of  Asiatic  Politics 

—  The  Situation  in  Europe  —  The  Second  Coalition  —  Success  of  the  Allies 

—  Their  Jealousies  —  Bonaparte's  Return  to  France  —  The  Reasons  for  the 
Failure  of  the  Expedition  —  Its  Influence  on  the  Eastern  Question. 

We  have  followed  the  diplomatic  and  economic  development 
of  the  Eastern  Question  during  the  last  quarter  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century;  we  have  seen  how  great  an  influence  oriental 
affairs  had  on  the  policies  of  Europe;  ^and  we  have  observed 
that  Asiatic  problems  themselves  changed  in  character  under 
pressure  from  the  political  expansion  of  Europe  and  the  econo- 


148  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

mic  demands  of  the  West.  Each  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe 
had  now  become  interested  in  oriental  matters;  colonial  and 
Asiatic  questions  were  now  to  be  linked  in  a  vast  world-prob- 
lem. Statesmen  could  no  longer  depend  merely  on  land 
power ;  they  must  recognize  in  sea  power  a  factor  unknown  to 
the  Eastern  Question  since  the  sixteenth  century;  and  they 
must  perceive  that  dominion  in  Asia  was  both  a  prize  worth 
fighting  for  and  an  important  element  in  the  history  of  Euro- 
pean nations.  It  was  the  fate  of  France  at  this  juncture  to  be 
both  served  and  led  by  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  a.  man  whose 
interest  in  the  Orient  were  deep  and  lasting.  He  touched 
the  Eastern  Question  and  the  colonial  problem,  as  he  did  all 
the  nearer  questions  of  Europe,  with  a  touch  which  is  felt  to 
this  day.  The  ideas  which  he  brought  to  his  task  and  the 
conditions  under  which  he  was  trained  for  his  career  thus  had 
much  to  do,  not  only  with  his  own  personal  treatment  of  these 
matters,  but  also  with  their  historical  development.  For  a 
better  understanding  of  these  things,  therefore,  it  is  necessary 
to  glance  at  certain  tendencies  of  the  period  in  which  he  was 
born.  First  among  these  is  the  classical  revival.  The  eigh- 
teenth century  was  marked  by  the  heralding  of  a  new  propa- 
ganda in  philosophy  and  by  a  return  to  the  ideals  of  the  ancient 
world.  Rome  exerted  an  incomparable  influence  in  the  midst 
of  an  essentially  modern  society.  The  French,  made  familiar 
through  wonderful  translations  with  the  best  of  classic  authors, 
absorbed  the  spirit  of  a  literature  that  was  imperial  —  Augustan 
—  in  its  mission.  The  classicism  reproduced  in  French  writ- 
ings may  have  been  false ;  but  politically  the  revival  was  of  great 
importance.  Every  device  which  strengthened  the  impression 
that  the  new  Republic  was  but  continuing  the  mission  of  the 
old,  received  joyful  and  passionate  acclaim.  The  great  struggle 
of  the  ancient  democracy  had  been  with  Carthage,  the  mistress 
of  the  sea;  the  mighty  empire  of  the  Phoenicians  had  fallen 
before  the  insignificant  naval  power  of  Latium.  That  in  such 
and  such  a  year  of  the  French  Republic,  England,  the  modern 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  149 

Carthage,  the  second  queen  of  commerce  and  trade,  should  fall 
before  the  successors  of  the  Scipios  seemed  not  impossible  to 
French  ambition.1 

The  progress  of  oriental  studies  was  a  cognate  movement. 
The  missionary  work  of  the  Jesuits,  the  commercial  and  colo- 
nial development,  the  expansion  of  the  Russian  Empire,  the 
numerous  explorations  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  Oceanica,  and  the 
growth  of  a  scientific  spirit  of  investigation  had  all  combined 
to  make  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  an  epoch  in 
oriental  philological  and  historical  investigation.  France  had 
played  no  small  part  in  this  movement.  Her  writers  were 
authorities,  and  her  government  and  people  were  in  sympathy 
with  the  advancement  of  knowledge  regarding  the  East.  Both 
the  Peysonnels,  de  Tott,  Volney,  and  many  others  were  busy 
preaching  the  new  evangel  of  the  Orient.  The  star  of  the 
French  Empire  was  to  be  seen  moving  eastward,  and  French 
travellers  and  scholars  were  the  new  astronomers.  The  po- 
litical developments  in  eastern  Europe  and  in  India  at  once 
stimulated  interest  in  the  peoples  and  institutions  of  Asia  and 
led  to  the  rehabilitation  of  ancient  and  oriental  history,  both  as 
a  subject  for  serious  study  and  as  a  text  for  contemporary 
events.  Catherine's  "  Greek  Plan  "  and  Napoleon's  Egyptian 
Expedition  undoubtedly  led  to  a  scientific  revival  of  the  study 
of  Ancient  Greece  and  Egypt ;  but  they  were  also  directed  them- 
selves in  large  measure  by  the  scientific  and  literary  interest 
which  was  part  of  the  spirit  of  the  age.  The  importance  of 
the  Orient  and  the  necessity  for  knowledge  concerning  it  were 
manifested  by  the  establishment  in  Paris  of  a  "  School  for  the 
Study  of  Modern  Oriental  Languages."  Langles  was  largely 
instrumental  in  accomplishing  this ;  and  he  was  placed  at  the 

*  Texte :  Rousseau  et  le  Cosmopolitisme,  pp.  418  et  seq.,  423.  A  short  list  is 
given  of  some  of  the  works  published.  Paulin  Paris :  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau,  in 
Bibliophile  Jrancaise,  i.  pp.  228  et  seq.  Masson :  Dipt,  des  aff.  Strang,  pp.  330, 
410.  Malmesbury :  Diaries,  iii.  p.  544.  Chenier :  OZuvres,  iii.  pp.  186,  187,  362, 
391.  Pingaud:  Choiseul-Gouffier,  pp.  18  et  seq.,  67  et  seq.,  137  et  seq.  Renard: 
L'lnjluence  de  FantiquitS  classique  sur  la  litterature  francaise  {passim). 


150  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

head  of  the  institution  for  which  he  had  appealed,  almost 
entirely  on  political  and  diplomatic  grounds  (1795).  Volney, 
the  scholar  and  traveller,  was  attached  to  the  foreign  office ;  and 
ten  thousand  copies  of  his  "  Simplification  des  langues  orien- 
tales "  were  distributed  by  order  of  the  Committee  of  Public 
Safety.  The  School  was  of  the  greatest  value  to  the  French 
people ;  its  pupils  became  the  emissaries  of  Napoleon,  and  its 
history  is  intimately  connected  with  that  of  a  diplomacy  which 
has  operated  in  India,  Persia,  Egypt,  Algiers,  and  Turkey.  The 
intimate  relations  existing  between  politician  and  philosopher, 
statesman  and  scholar,  make  these  intellectual  movements  of 
still  greater  importance.  The  Frenchman  reading  his  Caesar, 
his  Livy,  his  Plutarch,  or  his  Strabo,  was  a  practical  politician. 
He  was  guided  by  geography  and  history.1 

Geographical  situation  has  given  permanence  to  the  political 
genius  of  France.  Even  before  Charlemagne,  her  kings  were 
summoned  to  redress  the  balance  of  power  in  lands  beyond 
her  eastern  border.  The  subsidies  drawn  from  the  Emperors 
at  Constantinople  for  this -and  like  services  and  the  trade  de- 
veloped with  the  Levant  became  a  source  of  steadily-increasing 
income  to  her  people.  The  great  personality  of  Charlemagne, 
whose  shadow  reaches  across  the  centuries  to  Philip  Augustus 
and  Napoleon,  was  used  as  a  lay  figure,  about  which  were 
twined  the  ideals  and  ambitions  of  a  nation.  It  is  the 
legend  of  his  work  and  policy  which  impressed  the  minds 
of  men.  It  was  he,  according  to  the  story,  who  received 
an  embassy  from  Harun-al-Rashid,  presenting  the  titles  to 
the  shrines  of  Christendom.  He  was  the  first  royal  Crusa- 
der and  pilgrim.  After  leaving  an  army  in  the  north  to  ward 
off  any  attack  of  the  Normans,  he  set  sail  for  the  Orient  with 

1  Benfey:  Gesch.  der  Sprachwissenschaft,  pp.  239,  263,  326.  E.  Charavay : 
L\Orientaliste  Langles,  in  Revolution  frangaise,  xvi.  (1889),  p.  136.  Masson  :  Aff. 
etrang.  pp.  314  (note),  331,  412.  I  have  included  in  the  Bibliography  the  titles 
of  a  few  of  the  works  on  oriental  subjects  which  appeared  at  this  time  in  France, 
which  either  exerted  any  influence  in  directing  public  attention  to  the  East,  or 
which  were  of  political  significance. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  151 

a  fleet  collected  in  the  harbors  of  Venice  and  Ancona.  He 
fought  the  Saracens,  destroying  their  false  gods,  conquered  Eng- 
land for  the  Church,  and  received  "  Costentinnoble  "  at  the  hand 
of  Roland.  He  achieved  in  story  and  song  that  which  every 
ruler  of  France  since  his  day  has  hoped  to  realize  in  fact.1 
These  ancient  traditions,  old  as  France  herself,  were  not  oblit- 
erated by  the  Revolution ;  rather  were  they  enlivened  till  they 
became  political  ideals  for  guidance  in  coming  crises.  Though 
it  is  impossible  to  discuss  here  the  spirit  of  the  Revolution, 
one  fact  must  be  pointed  out,  that  the  Revolution  itself  made 
no  break  in  the  course  of  French  foreign  policy.  It  is  true 
that  the  Revolutionary  spirit  became  for  a  time  a  kind  of  new 
religious  faith,  yet  its  propagation  was  carried  on  by  applying 
old  political  principles,  by  maintaining  the  traditions  and  the 
system  of  the  France  of  history.2 


1  Procopius:  De  bello  gothico,  lib.  i.  c.  5  in  Niebuhr :  Corp.  Scrip.  Byz.  xix. 
p.  27.  Agatthias  :  Historiarum,  lib.  ix.  c.  20,62.  Barbeyrac,  in  Dumont:  Supple. 
i.  part  2,  art.  179.  Mezeray :  Hist,  de  France,  i.  p.  238.  Sorel :  V Europe  et  la 
Revol.  i.  p.  246.  Poeto  Saxo :  Ann.  de  Gestis  B.  Caroli  Magni,  lib.  iv.  ind.  9. 
Pertz:  Mon.  Ger.  iii.  p.  710.  Leibnitz:  Alberici,  Ann.  802,  ii.  p.  133.  Tudebodus; 
Hist,  de  Hierosolymitano  Itinere,  in  Du  Chesne,  iv.  p.  777.  Eginhard  :  Vita  Carol. 
Mag.  ann.  797.  Graetz:  Gesch.  der  Juden,  v.  pp.  184,  185.  Dubois:  De  recupera- 
tione,  pp.  5,  8,  18  (cf.  Lebceuf  in  Hist,  et  mem.  de  FAcad.  des  inscrip.  xxi.  p.  126, 
and  in  Leber :  Collection,  xviii.  pp.  86-106.  Foncemagne  in  Leber :  Ibid,  xviii. 
pp.  107-116).  Auracher:  Pseudo-Turpin,  p.  24.  Paris:  Hist. poetique  de  Charle- 
magne,  p.  295.  Michel:  Chanson  de  Roland,  p.  15  (str.  xxvii.  v.  8),  p.  90  (str. 
clxix.  v.  16).    Roland,  dying,  tells  of  his  conquests  for  Charlemagne. 

"  Jo  Ten  cunquis  Baiver  e  tute  Flandres 
E  Burguigne  e  trestute  Puillanie 
Costentinnoble,  dunt  il  ont  la  fiance, 
E  en  Saisonie  fait-il  90  qu'il  demandet ; 
E  Engleterre  que  il  teneit  sa  cambre." 

CJf.  Forster  :   Christian  von  Troyes  sdmtliche  Werke,  Cligte,  v.  30-44. 

2  Burke :  op.  cit.  iii.  p.  394.  Stern  :  Das  Leben  Mirabeaus,  ii.  p.  246.  De 
Tocqueville  :  VAncien  Regime,  1.  i.  c.  3,  p.  1 5.  Taine  :  VAncien  Regime,  1.  iii.  c.  3, 
p.  267,  and  La  Revolution,  ii.  p.  67.  Mallet  du  Pan :  Corr.  ii.  p.  135.  Montegut : 
La  Democratie  et  la  Revolution,  in  R.  d.  D.  M.  cc.  pp.  425  et  seq.  Aulard :  Dipl. 
de  la  Comiti  de  Salut  Public,  in  Revolution  franc,  xviii.  p.  130.     Lavalle'e  :  op.  cit. 


152  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

What  then  of  the  training  of  the  Corsican  lad  who  was  to 
bridge  the  gulf  between  an  artillery  subaltern  and  a  French 
Emperor  ?  His  boyhood  was  spent  by  the  shores  of  the 
Mediterranean,  where  the  world's  trade  passed  by,  rich  with 
supplies  from  the  mysterious  East;  his  youth  was  occupied 
with  study,  especially  that  of  history,  and  his  mind  was  fasci- 
nated early  by  things  oriental.  Born  again  of  the  spirit  of  the 
Revolution,  its  child  and  heir  by  right  of  that  birth  to  the 
history  and  traditions  of  which  it  was  a  part,  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte was  destined  to  become  a  rival  to  Alexander  and  the 
Caesars.  Nature  had  done  her  share  in  moulding  the  boy;  the 
printed  page  stimulated  and  guided  the  youth.  Thus  the 
man  spoke  from  a  full  mind,  yet  as  no  pedant,  but  as  a  well- 
trained  workman  in  politics.  There  is  indeed  no  study  of  any 
part  of  Bonaparte's  career  which  is  so  self-revealing  as  the 
examination  of  the  books  he  read  and  the  notes  he  wrote  while 
in  school  and  as  a  young  officer.  General  works  on  practical 
politics  and  philosophy  and  the  principles  of  artillery  tactics 
form  a  group  by  themselves ;  they  are  greatly  outweighed  by 
the  vast  amount  of  purely  historical  literature  which  he  made 
his  own.  Plutarch's  Lives,  Strabo,  and  the  Republic  of  Plato, 
were  books  he  loved.  Among  more  modern  volumes,  history  of 
every  description  ranks  first,  and  in  his  own  notes  it  again 
takes  the  major  place.  The  classical  and  oriental  revivals  and 
the  colonial  and  economic  questions  of  the  day  had  their  in- 
fluence with  him  and  guided  him  in  his  choice  of  books.  An 
examination  of  his  notes,  based  on  his  reading,  reveals  much. 
Masson's  edition  of  Bonaparte's  notes  has  fifty-two  printed 
pages  on  the  Republic  and  Rollin's  Ancient  History.  On  the 
latter  there  is  a  detailed  syllabus  treating  of  Persia,  Assyria, 
Scythia,  Thrace,  Greece,  Crete,  Greater  Greece,  and  Egypt. 
Bonaparte  comments :  "  It  is  at  Alexandria,  founded  by 
Alexander  on  the  Nile,  that  the  commerce  of  the  Orient  is 

pp.  i,  2.     Sorel :  L  Europe  et  la  Revol.  i.  pp.  238,  258,  321  et  seq.,  334,  545  ;  ii.  pp. 
532  et  seq.f'm.  p.  144. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  1 53 

carried  on."  1  The  most  careful  analyses  are  those  regarding  the 
Persians,  Greeks,  and  Arabs.  Seventy-four  pages  are  devoted 
to  an  outline  of  English  history  and  a  brief  minute  on  the 
finances  of  the  French  East  India  Company.  At  Brienne  he 
read  and  committed  to  memory  long  passages  of  Vertot's  His- 
tory of  the  Knights  of  Malta.  Baron  de  Tott,  whose  travels  in 
Central  Asia,  Turkey,  Syria,  and  Egypt  were  famous  at  the 
time,  was  a  favorite  author,  and  his  book  was  carefully  digested 
and  annotated.  Such  passages  as  this,  "  Egypt  is  so  situated 
as  to  combine  the  commerce  of  Europe,  Africa  and  the  East 
Indies"  apparently  made  an  impression  on  the  mind  of  the 
reader,  as  did  the  generally  favorable  description  of  that  coun- 
try.2 Volney  is  another  writer  on  the  same  general  subject, 
and  at  a  later  period  he  was  enabled  to  influence  Bonaparte 
more  directly  by  personal  intercourse  along  a  line  distinctly 
sympathetic  with  the  Egyptian  Expedition.  The  history  and 
government  of  Venice  were  also  matters  which  he  thoroughly 
investigated.3  Sixteen  pages  of  Masson  are  occupied  with 
notes  on  Marigny's  History  of  the  Arabs;  and  we  also  find  a 
story  of  oriental  adventure  by  Bonaparte  himself,  entitled  "  Le 
Masque  Prophete."  St.  Helena  is  mentioned  among  various 
notes  on  geography,  and  an  estimate  of  the  earnings  of  the 
British    East  India  Company  gives  the  figure  at  79,874,872 

1  Masson :  Napoleon  Inconnu,  i.  pp.  2S5  et  seq.,  318,  319.  Bonaparte  writes : 
"  Le  commerce  de  la  Perse,  de  lTnde,  de  l'Arabie  s'est  fait  pendant  plusieurs 
siecles  par  la  voie  de  la  mer  Rouge  et  du  Nil.  Le  passage  par  le  Cap  de  Bonne- 
Esperance  que  les  Portugais  ont  decouvert  a  fait  negliger  absolument  l'ancienne 
voie."  Notes  on  Charles  Rollin  :  Histoire  ancieime,  Paris,  1734-40,  13  vols.  Du 
Casse :  Memoires  de  Joseph,  i.  p.  32. 

2  Masson :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  340  et  seq.,  431,  433  et  seq.  John  Barrow :  Histoire 
d'Angleterre  (translation),  Paris,  1771,  10  vols.  Chuquet :  Jeunesse  de  Napoleon, 
i.  pp.  105,  129,  136.  De  Tott:  Memoirs,  ii.  pp.  251,  274  et  seq.  (on  the  Suez 
canal) ;  287  et  seq.  (Egypt  is  described  as  possessing  a  rich  soil,  salubrious 
climate,  a  wretched  people,  and  a  weak  government.) 

3  Masson :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  20  et  seq.  Amelot  de  la  Houssaie :  Histoire  du 
gouvernement  de  Venise  avec  des  notes  historiques  et  politiques,  Lyon,  1740, 
3  vols.     Sainte-Beuve  :  Causeries  de  Lundi.     (Berger :  Volney)  vii.  pp.  408,  427. 


154  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

livres.  Voltaire's  writings  on  China,  India,  Babylon,  and 
Muhammad  received  greater  attention  than  did  his  philos- 
ophy; though  the  preaching  of  the  political  and  social  re- 
formers of  the  time  did  not  fall  on  deaf  ears.  A  mass  of  notes 
on  almost  every  conceivable  subject  is  remarkable  in  that  over 
half  of  them  treat  of  matters  east  of  the  Adriatic.  Cyrus, 
Alexander,  and  Muhammad  were  the  three  men  who  most 
appealed  to  him  from  the  pages  of  oriental  history.1 

There  is  one  work,  however,  which  at  that  time  ranked 
among  the  great  productions  of  a  great  age.  If  Favier's  famous 
book,  "  Les  conjectures  raisonneez  sur  Vetat  de  V Europe"  de- 
serves to  be  called  "  the  Bible  of  the  true  diplomat,"  the  Abbe 
Raynal  was  its  inspired  interpreter.  The  Histoire  philoso- 
phique  et  politique  des  etablissements  et  du  commerce  des 
Europeens  dans  les  deux  Indesf  was  to  the  Conjectures  raison- 
nees  what  the  fiery  eloquence  of  the  Contrat  social  was  to  the 
measured  power  of  the  Esprit  des  Lois,  Sorel  calls  Raynal 
"  the  prophet  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Revolution."  He  applied 
geography  and  political  economy  to  history  and  turned  the 
study  of  statistics  and  descriptions  of  the  tropics  into  a  manual  of 
practical  politics.  He  invoked  Peace,  but  caused  War ;  he  was 
among  the  first  writers  of  economic  history,  world-wide  in  its 
plan,  recognizing  the  new  conditions  which  made  war  a  struggle 
for  bread,  and  commerce  and  colonies  the  pledges  of  power.  Yet 
he  was  not  the  sole  representative  of  this  point  of  view ;  the 
very  fact  that  edition  after  edition  was  exhausted  shows  the 
great  demand  which  the  public  were  making  for  an  interpre- 
tation of  the  new  politics  of  the  world.  His  views  on  India 
were  shared  by  many  other  writers ;  his  clearness  of  thought 
and  power  of  expression  drove  them  home  to  the  hearts  of 

1  Masson :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  I  et seq.,  17  etseq.,49  ("  Ste.  Helene,  petite  ile  "),  5r,  52, 
258  et  seq.,  268  et  seq.  Marigny  :  Histoire  des  Arabes,  Paris,  1750,  4  vols.  Lacroix  : 
La  Geographie  moderne,  Paris,  1747.  Voltaire :  Les  annales  de  V Empire  depuis 
Charlemagne,  and  VEssai  sur  les  mceurs  et  Vesprit  des  nations.  These  were  natu- 
rally the  two  works  which  appealed  to  Bonaparte  peculiarly. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE  ORIENT  155 

men.  It  is,  then,  but  natural  that  the  young  Napoleon  should 
have  received  this  book  with  the  greatest  eagerness,  read  it 
with  the  closest  attention,  annotated  it  and  pondered  over  its 
pages,  dedicated  to  their  author  in  youthful,  yet  sincere  flattery 
his  own  literary  production,  the  History  of  Corsica,  and  finally, 
possessed  by  the  theories  which  Raynal  had  propounded,  en- 
deavored to  realize  in  the  history  of  the  next  quarter-century 
the  ideas  he  had  received  in  the  unforgotten  student  days  at 
Valence.1 

The  general  scheme  and  argument  of  Raynal's  work  are  as 
follows :  The  author  surveys  in  an  introductory  chapter  the 
history  of  colonial  enterprise  in  the  past,  and  then  treats  in 
turn  the  establishments  of  each  European  nation  in  both 
hemispheres,  concluding  with  a  general  discussion  of  the  un- 
derlying causes  for  the  present  situation  and  of  the  methods 
in  vogue.  Here  he  says  with  regard  to  England's  success 
and  its  causes :  "  It  is  not,  as  has  been  hitherto  imagined, 
war  alone  that  settles  the  superiority  of  nations ;  for  the  last 
half-century  commerce  has  had  a  much  greater  influence  in 
it.  While  the  continental  powers  measured  and  partitioned 
Europe  into  unequal  shares,  which  diplomacy  balanced  by 
its  leagues,  treaties,  and  combinations,  a  maritime  nation 
formed,  as  it  were,  a  new  system,  in  which  by  their  industry 
the  land  was  made  subject  to  the  sea,  as  Nature  herself  has 
decreed  by  her  laws.     They  created  or  developed  this  exten- 

1  Masson :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  334  et  seq. ;  Grosjean :  Mission  de  Simonville,  in 
Revolution  francaise,  xiii.  p.  891.  Sorel :  V Europe  et  la  revolution  francaise,  i.  pp. 
308,  309.  Arnould :  Balance  du  commerce,  i.  p.  48.  Gomel :  Causes  financieres,  ii. 
p.  27.  Segur :  Mimoires,  souvenirs  et  anecdotes  i.  p.  150.  Legoux  de  Flaix :  Uln- 
doustan,  i.  pp.  395  et  seq.  Breton :  Notice  sur  Raynal,  in  Mem  de  Vlnstitut,  i.  p.  xv. 
et  seq.  Raynal  was  not  the  real  author  of  the  entire  work.  Diderot  was  respon- 
sible for  much  of  the  philosophy,  and  Raynal's  position  was  in  some  respects  only 
that  of  a  compiler.  Diderot :  OEuvres,  i.  p.  xvii ;  iv.  p.  107  ;  xx.  pp.  103,  104. 
Jung:  Bonaparte  et  son  temps,  i.  p.  162.  Mallet  du  Pan:  Memoires  (ed.  Sayous, 
Eng.  trans.),  i.  pp.  45  et  seq.  G.  T.  Raynal :  Histoire  philosophique  et  politique  des 
itablissements  et  du  commerce  des  Europiens  dans  les  deux  Indes.  Geneva,  1780-81. 
10  vols.  8vo. 


156  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

sive  commerce,  founded  upon  an  excellent  agriculture,  flour- 
ishing manufactures  and  the  richest  possessions  in  the  four 
quarters  of  the  globe.  It  is  this  sort  of  universal  monarchy 
that  Europe  ought  to  wrest  from  England,  thereby  restoring 
to  each  maritime  state  the  liberty  and  power  that  it  ought  to 
have  upon  that  element  which  surrounds  it."1  The  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  book  is  that  commerce  is  power,  and 
that  the  strength  of  a  nation  lies  in  a  colonial  empire  sup- 
ported by  trade.  Trade  routes  and  strategic  positions  are 
discussed.  The  English  had  strengthened  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  route  to  the  East  by  fixing  upon  St.  Helena  as  a  port 
of  call.  The  French,  if  guided  by  La  Bourdonnais,  would 
have  taken  two  of  the  islands  off  the  East  coast  of  Africa, 
and,  on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  with  the  He  de  France 
as  a  naval  base,  could  have  cut  England's  communications 
with  India.2  The  routes  to  India  from  the  eastern  end  of 
the  Mediterranean  are  described  at  length.  Two  in  particu- 
lar are  mentioned:  one,  from  some  Syrian  port  across  the 
desert  to  Persia  via  Aleppo  and  Baghdad,  and  thence  either 
by  land  to  Malabar,  or  down  the  Euphrates  to  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  by  sea  to  India;  and  the  other,  via  Egypt  and  the 
Red  Sea.  Especial  attention  is  paid  to  the  latter;  and  a 
glowing  description  of  Arabia  and  Arabian  trade,  together 
with  a  discussion  of  the  strategic  value  of  the  Red  Sea,  give 
it  peculiar  interest.  It  appears  to  have  attracted  Bonaparte, 
for  he  comments  at  length  on  this  chapter.3     As  regards 

1  Raynal:  op.  cit.  x.  p.  152. 

2  Raynal :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  184,  185. 

8  Raynal :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  48-155 ,  p.  61.  "  The  situation  of  its  [Aden  ]  harbour, 
which  opened  an  easy  communication  with  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  India,  and  Persia, 
had  rendered  it  for  many  ages  one  of  the  most  flourishing  factories  in  Asia." 
Masson  :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  334, 335  (  Bonaparte's  notes  on  Raynal ) :  "  Sous  les  Ptole- 
mies, l'Egypte  fit  le  commerce  par  la  mer  Rouge,  mais  les  uns  passaient  par  le 
Golfe  Persique  et  les  iles  de  Madagascar,  les  autres  s'  arretaient  a  l'ile  de  Ceylon ; 
quelques-uns  allaient  au  Coromandel  pour  remonter  le  Gange.  Leurs  voyages 
duraient  six  ans,  tandis  que  nous  le  faisons  en  six  mois."  Here  follows  a  list  of 
commodities  carried  by  the  Egyptians.     "Toutes  les    nations    commercantes 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  157 

access  to  India  from  the  north,  the  statements  are  also  well 
worth  consideration,  for  the  writer  shows  with  great  clear- 
ness the  invulnerable  position  of  Russia  and  the  natural 
advantages  which  would  accrue  to  her,  at  comparatively 
little  expenditure  of  men  or  money,  as  soon  as  the  plans 
formulated  by  Peter  the  Great  should  be  pushed  to  comple- 
tion. The  history  of  the  rise  of  Russia  is  perhaps  the  most 
suggestive  piece  of  work  in'  the  book,  and  reveals  a  master 
hand.  It  was  claimed  that  Russia  and  China  were  united  in 
a  natural  way,  which  must,  in  the  end,  be  for  the  advantage 
of  the  European  power.  In  this  region,  also,  the  trade-routes 
were  partly  by  water.  The  connection  by  them  between 
east  and  west  is  shown  to  have  been  of  ancient  origin,  and, 
according  to  the  writer,  they  formed  a  series  of  avenues  for 
approach  to  the  southeast  either  for  trade  or  war.1 

allaient  dans  les  ports  d'ligypte  prendre  les  merchandises  des  Indes.  La  naissance 
de  l'Empire  mahometan  affaiblit  le  commerce  d'ligypte,  et  le  commerce  des  Indes 
prit  deux  autres  routes  :  la  premiere  par  Constantinople,  la  mer  Noire  par 
l'Euphrate  jusqu'a  Serapana;  de  la,  par  le  moyen  de  quatre  ou  cinq  jours  de 
voiture,  ils  arrivaient  au  fleuve  Cyrus,  puis  a  la  mer  Caspienne,  oil  Ton  remontait 
l'Oxus ;  ensuite,  par  l'lndus.  L'on  revenait  par  le  meme  chemin.  L'autre  moyen 
etait  moins  complique ;  le  golfe  Persique,  l'Euphrate,  de  la  a  Palmyre  par  terre 
ou  des  caravanes  allaient  jusqu'  aux  bords  de  Syrie.  Lorsque  Palmyre  fut 
detruite,  les  caravanes  prirent  la  route  d'Alep  et  du  port  d'Alexandrette.  Dans 
les  derniers  temps,  les  Venitiens  avaient  persuade  aux  Mamelucs,  souverains 
d'ligypte,  moyennant  une  retribution,  a  leur  laisser  tenter  le  commerce  de  l'Inde. 
Les  Genois,  les  Pisans,  les  Florentins,  les  Catalans  en  profiterent.  Tel  etait 
l'etat  du  commerce  lorsque  les  Portugais  decouvrirent  le  passage  du  Cap  de 
Bonne-Esperance." 

1  Raynal :  op.  cit.  iii.  pp.  129  et  seq.,  147.  It  is  fair  to  suppose  that  passages 
such  as  these  may  have  had  some  influence  upon  Napoleon  in  directing  him  to 
invade  Russia,  with  possibly  India  as  an  ultimate  destination.  At  a  time  but 
little  subsequent  to  the  reading  of  this  book  he  did  endeavor  to  secure  his  trans- 
fer to  the  Russian  service.  Waliszewski :  Autour  d'un  trdne,  p.  62.  Masson : 
op.  cit.  ii.  p.  526.  Mention  must  be  made  here  of  Bonaparte's  attempt  in  1795  to 
enter  the  Turkish  artillery  service.  Napoleon:  Correspondance,  Nos.  56,  61,  64, 
65*  Jur»g '  Bonaparte  et  son  temps,  iii.  pp.  58  et  seq.,  408,  409.  It  was  the  age 
when  the  peculations  of  Anglo-Indian  officials  were  the  theme  of  parliamentary 
discussions.  Napoleon  himself  broached  the  plan  of  entering  the  English  service 
in  order  that  he  might  return  from  the  Indies  "  rich  as  a  nawab."    Jung :  Lucien 


158  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

From  the  conflict  between  France  and  Great  Britain  which 
began  in  1744,  Raynal  drew  several  lessons.  In  India  the 
English  had  previously  defeated  the  Dutch  and  Portuguese, 
and  against  France  their  methods  of  attack  were  the  same. 
Everywhere  they  aimed  at  their  enemy's  commerce,  while 
the  French  exhausted  all  their  strength  in  a  struggle  to  seize 
territory  from  which  they  could  not  hope  to  profit.  At  the 
conclusion  of  peace  in  1763,  the  English  were  practically  in 
control  along  the  coast  of  Arabia,  on  the  Persian  Gulf,  in 
Malabar,  Coromandel,  and  Bengal,  while  the  French  had 
everywhere  sunk  into  inactivity.  The  stakes  for  which 
France  and  England  had  waged  a  war  upon  so  wide  a  field 
were  those  which  in  the  past  had  "tempted  the  first  con- 
querors of  the  world."  The  Empire  of  the  Great  Mughal, 
it  was  alleged,  exceeded  in  wealth  and  luxury  the  wildest 
dreams  of  western  kings.  As  regards  the  future,  Raynal 
was  hopeful.  He  recalled  the  fact  that  France  still  had  a 
number  of  possessions  in  the  East ;  her  defeat  had  been  due 
rather  more  to  chance,  and  to  lack  of  co-operation  at  home, 
than  to  the  prowess  of  English  arms.  In  fact,  since  1763 
the  oppression  of  the  victors  had  already  alienated  the  Indian 
princes.  "  A  fatal  reverse  of  fortune  "  threatened  the  Eng- 
lish. At  the  sight  of  French  standards  the  afflicted  native 
sovereigns  of  India  would  gladly  spring  to  arms,  and  the 
present  tyrannical  foreign  rulers  would  be  assailed  by  land 
and  sea,  did  France  but  accept  the  opportunity  offered  to  her. 
With  victory,  the  French  would  emerge  from  their  present 
humiliating  condition;  "they  would  become  the  idols  of  the 
princes  and  peoples  of  Asia";  and  profiting  by  past  mistakes 
the  great  rival  power  might  at  last  be  overthrown.1 


Bonaparte,  i.  p.  74.  Lucien,  the  same  year  in  which  this  happened,  tried  to 
secure  a  place  with  Semonville,  then  under  appointment  for  his  second  attempt 
to  reach  Constantinople.  Jung :  op.  cit.  i.  p.  100.  The  Orient  apparently  had 
strong  attractions  for  the  entire  family. 

1  Raynal :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  46,  196,  382,  389,  493.    The  He  de  France  was  a  con- 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  1 59 

The  opening  proposition  of  the  work  is  that  commercial 
nations  are  those  which  have  civilized  the  world.  The  con- 
clusion is  an  eloquent  apostrophe  to  sea-power  as  a  force 
which  has  revolutionized  history,  and  made  tributary  to  the 
harbors  of  Europe  the  richest  and  most  distant  lands  of  the 
globe.  The  position  which  Great  Britain  occupies,  the  writer 
continues,  is  due  to  her  navy,  which  she  regards  as  her  ram- 
part, "the  source  of  her  riches,"  and  the  pivot  of  her  hopes. 
The  balance  of  power  has  departed  from  the  continent;  it 
rests  with  the  maritime  nations,  and  upon  their  fleets  de- 
pends the  destiny. of  many  peoples.1  Bonaparte  acquired 
from  this  book  a  share  in  that  community  of  French  thought 
whose  development  we  have  traced.  He  learned  to  consider 
England  as  the  most  dangerous  rival  of  France,  to  regard  her 
as  injured  when  India,  the  alleged  source  of  her  riches,  had 
been  wrested  from  her ;  and  as  conquered  only  when,  shorn 
of  sea-power  and  colonial  possessions,  her  empire  of  trade 
had  passed  across  the  channel  to  the  ports  of  France.  In 
his  own  words  many  years  later,  —  to  win  he  must  have  sea- 
power,  and  that  only  as  the  result  of  an  attack  upon  England 
at  home  and  abroad.     It  was  the  task  of  a  new  Charlemagne.2 

Bonaparte  had  read  also  in  Voltaire  that  "  Charlemagne,  le 
plus  ambitieux,  le  plus  politique,  et  le  plus  grand  guerrier 
de  son  siecle,  fit  la  guerre  aux  Saxons  trente  ann^es  avant  de 
les  assujetir  pleinement.  .  .  .  Enfin,  Charlemagne,  maitre 
dTtalie,  comme  de  l'Allemagne  et  de  France,  juge  du  pape, 
arbitre  de  1' Europe,  vient  a  Rome  a  la  fin  de  l'annee  799. 

stant  menace  to  England's  line  of  communication,  and  at  the  outbreak  of  war 
France  must  expect  an  attack  upon  that  important  position,  p.  483. 

1  Raynal :  op.  cit.  x.  pp.  197  et  seq. 

2  Vandal :  Napolion  et  Alexandre  I.  i.  p.  6 :  "  Napoleon  avait  tout  conquis, 
sauf  la  paix.  Derriere  chaque  ennemi  vaincu,  il  retrouvait  l'Angleterre  en 
armes,  preparant  contre  lui  des  nouvelles  coalitions."  Napoleon :  Commentaires, 
iv.  p.  441 :  "  Qui  [la  Republique]  etait  en  1800  tout  aussi  inferieure  sur  la  mer 
qu'en  1798..  Si  Ton  eut  ete  maitre  de  la  mer,  on  eut  marche  droit  a  la  fois  sur 
Londres,  sur  Dublin,  et  sur  Calcutta,  c'etait  pour  le  deviner  que  la  Republique 
voulait  posseder  rEgypte." 


160  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

.  .  .  Ldon  III.  le  proclame  empereur  d' Occident  pendant  la 
messe,  le  jour  de  Noel."1  Napoleon  I.  wrote  to  Cardinal 
Fesch :  "  Pour  le  Pope,  je  suis  Charlemagne,  parceque, 
comme  Charlemagne,  je  reunis  la  couronne  de  France  a  celle 
des  Lombards,  et  que  mon  empire  confine  avec  1' Orient.  "2 
Repudiating  the  rights  and  position  which  belonged  to  the 
Kings  of  France  of  the  second  and  third  dynasties,  he  dated 
his  heritage  back  to  the  time  when  the  Pope  was  only  the 
Bishop  of  Rome,  and  the  spiritual  power  rested  on  the  tem- 
poral. Bonaparte  crossed  the  Alps  before  his  "thirty  years" 
of  war  against  the  descendants  of  the  Saxons  had  barely 
begun.  He  reversed  the  search  of  Columbus,  who  had 
sailed  into  the  West  to  secure  the  wealth  of  the  East,  and 
marched  to  the  East  to  reach  the  power  of  France's  rival  in 
the  West.  The  propaganda  of  the  Revolution  changed  in 
his  mind  to  the  mission  of  a  Pro-consul  carrying  with  his 
legions  the  rule  of  Rome,  upon  his  eagles  the  law  of  a  con- 
quering republic.3  They  likened  him  to  Epaminondas,  to 
Miltiades;  he  in  turn  proclaimed  to  his  soldiers  that,  in  con- 
quering Italy  they  had  struck  at  England ;  in  defeating  the 
army  of  Austria  they  had  beaten  its  ruler,  the  imperial  em- 
ployee of  London  store-keepers;  and  in  seizing  Ancona,  that 
they  were  within  twenty-four  hours'  sail  of  Macedonia.  The 
image  of  Alexander  of  Macedon,  encamped  on  the  banks  of 
the  Indus,  may  have  risen  before  his  eyes.  He  received  the 
Italian  bishops  with  friendliness,  as  befitted  one  who  was  to 
become  the  "Sword  of  the  Church,"  "Her  eldest  Son,"  "the 
protector  of  Christianity  in  the  Orient,"  the  successor  to 
the  "Most  Christian  Kings."4     By  the  treaty  of  Pressburg 

1  Voltaire  :  Essais  stir  les  mceurs,  ch.  xv.,  xvi. 

2  Napoleon :  Correspondance,  No.  9656,  Jan.  7.  1806;  cf.  No.  9805  (to  the  Pope, 
Feb.  13,  1806). 

8  Napoleon  :  op.  cit.  Nos.  10237,  10399,  9^3!.  997 r- 

*  Napoleon:  op.  cit.  Nos.  1511,  1552,  9762,  9929,  6273  (to  the  Pope,  Aug. 
28,  1802.  The  position  of  France  as  protector  of  Oriental  Christianity  is  to  be 
restored) ;  6274  (to  the  Archbishop  of  Paris) :  "  J'ai  reunis  sous  notre  protection 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  l6l 

the  dream  of  Francis  I.  of  France  was  to  be  realized.  Aus- 
tria had  not  an  acre  of  ground  in  Italy;  but  the  time  had  not 
yet  come  for  that.  The  "war  to  the  death"  was  with  Eng- 
land, whose  fleets  ranged  the  Mediterranean.  The  Spaniards 
had  been  won  over,  as  has  been  told.  They  were  to  receive 
Gibraltar  at  one  end  and  France  was  to  secure  Egypt  at  the 
other;  then  indeed  the  Latin  lake  of  Louis  XIV.  would  be 
a  reality.  In  the  meantime  the  Venice  of  which  Napoleon 
had  read  in  the  pages  of  Amelot  de  la  Houssaie  demanded 
his  attention.  Her  ancient  sea-power  might  be  restored, 
and,  in  his  giant  imagination,  her  insular  possessions  became 
stepping-stones  to  the  Levant.  As  we  shall  see,  he  knew 
nothing  of  Leibnitz  and  his  Consiliacum  cegyptiacum ;  but  he 
had  read  Raynal,  de  Tott,  Marigny,  and  Rollin.  Their  his- 
tories had  been  his  nourishment.  His  military  power  he  had 
gained  independently  from  his  politics;  now  they  were  com- 
bined in  the  mind  of  the  successful  leader.1 

He  was  a  leader,  because  as  a  student  he  had  recognized 
the  new  conditions  of  political  success.  The  policy  of  eco- 
nomic aggrandizement,  which  had  found  its  expression  in  the 
political  writings  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  based  on  the 
maxim  that  the  commercial  progress  of  a  nation  depended  on 
the  extension  of  its  political  system  to  the  territory  from 
which  it  was  to  draw  its  supplies,  and  to  the  markets  in 
which  it  hoped  to  sell.  The  doctrine  of  the  natural  boun- 
daries of  political  sovereignty  expanded  at  the  command  of 
this  economic  system.  It  was  the  age  when  trade  followed 
only  the  flag,  and  when  the  flag  was  welcomed  only  in  the 
harbors  which  recognized  it  as  the  emblem  of  political 
sovereignty.     Trans-marine  possessions  had  entered  into  the 

speciale  le  Saint  Sepulcre  et  tous  les  Chretiens  de  1'Orient";  6495  (Chinese 
missions).  Sorel :  Bonaparte  et  Hoche,  pp.  31  etseq.,  73,  86.  Metternich:  Nach- 
gelassene  Papier e,  i.  p.  280. 

1  Masson  :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  $06  et  seq.  Metternich  :  Nachgelassene  Papiere,  ii.  p.  4. 
Pisani :  La  Dalmatie  {1797-1815),  pp.  145,  146.  Segur:  Hist  et  memoires,  ii.  p. 
478.     Lumbroso  :  Napoleone  I.  e  Inghilterra,  pp.  456  et  seq. 

II 


1 62  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

sphere  of  the  old  system.  The  legend  of  Charlemagne  had 
come  down  across  the  centuries,  but  if  France  were  to  have 
an  emperor  he  must  be  greater  than  Charlemagne;  he  must 
build  an  empire  which  should  take  into  consideration  mod- 
ern conditions  and  ideals.  The  science  of  war  had  changed ; 
printing  had  succeeded  writing;  the  new  astronomy  had  made 
the  radius  of  politics  a  circle  of  latitude;  the  obligation  to 
protect  commerce  and  to  foster  industries  had  supplanted 
that  of  bearing  the  crusader's  emblem.  The  new  empire 
must  claim  oriental  potentates  as  vassals;  it  must  have  a 
navy  to  drive  the  enemy  from  tropical  harbors,  and  ships  to 
bring  home  the  gold  and  spices  of  the  Indies.  History  itself 
had  expanded,  and  Napoleon  recognized  it  when  he  said: 
"Vivre  sans  commerce,  sans  marine,  sans  colonies,  et  sou- 
mis  a  l'injuste  volonte  de  nos  ennemis,  ce  n'est  pas  vivre  en 
Francais."     It  was  the  voice  of  a  new  Charlemagne.1 

Such  was  the  training  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  We  must 
now  turn  to  examine  the  condition  of  the  Orient  whose  em- 
pire he  coveted,  and  to  follow  the  preparations  made  by 
him  for  his  first  attempt  to  realize  his  early  hopes.  The 
Ottoman  Empire  was  in  a  most  critical  condition.  The 
plans  for  its  partition  had  not  been  accomplished;  but  the 
treaty  of  Jassy,  signed  January  9,  1792,  had  ended  a  bloody 
and  exhausting  war  with  Russia  by  a  further  increase  of 
Russian  territory,  which  now  extended  as  far  as  the  river 
Dniestr.  The  accession  of  Selim  III.  in  1789,  and  the  con- 
clusion of  hostilities  with  a  foreign  foe  had  been  the  signal 
for  widespread  internal  dissensions.  The  new  Sultan  was 
bent  on  reforming  the  government,  introducing  European 
methods  and  ideas,  and  practically  abolishing  the  entire 
feudal  system  with  one  decree.  Many  provinces  were  prac- 
tically independent  of  Constantinople;  every  Pasha,  who  felt 
himself  strong  enough,  refused  either  taxes  or  tribute  to  the 
Sultan;  and  the  corruption  and  oppression  of  irresponsible 

1  Napoleon :  Corr.  Nos.  9216,  9929. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  1 63 

local  officials  increased  the  sufferings  of  the  people  tenfold. 
It  was  the  anarchy  of  tottering  feudalism  without  a  strong  cen- 
tral power  to  absorb  and  control.  As  regards  religious  affairs 
the  Druze  and  Matawali  sects  were  in  rebellion  in  Mount  Leb- 
anon; and  all  Arabia,  save  Mecca  and  Medina,  was  practi- 
cally subject  to  the  Puritan  Wahhabis,  who  fought  with  the 
traditional  courage  and  dash  of  early  and  uncorrupted  Islam. 
It  was  the  period  when  the  empire  would  have  been  most 
vulnerable  to  foreign  attacks;  but  Bonaparte's  Italian  cam- 
paigns had  called  all  the  forces  of  Austria  to  the  west,  and 
Russia  was  not  prepared  to  move  alone,  until  her  last  acqui- 
sitions in  Poland  were  more  thoroughly  amalgamated  with 
the  Empire.  The  hope  of  freedom  from  Turkish  rule  which 
the  "Greek  plan"  of  Catherine  II.  had  aroused  in  the  minds 
of  the  subject  population  south  of  the  Balkans  had  been 
almost  extinguished  by  her  abandonment  of  those  who  had 
risen  as  her  allies  in  rebellion  against  the  Porte.  The  poorer 
Greeks,  influenced  by  the  religious  ties  which  united  them  to 
the  great  northern  power,  had  looked  to  her  for  help  in  the 
struggle  toward  a  national  existence.  The  educated  and 
commercial  classes,  however,  under  the  inspiration  of  the 
Revolution,  were  ready  to  turn  to  France,  as  the  founder  of 
republics  in  Italy,  and  as  a  possible  deliverer  from  Ottoman 
rule  in  Greece.  There  were,  therefore,  in  Turkey  three  ele- 
ments, with  which  any  power  having  an  oriental  policy  in 
view,  must  reckon,  and  which  she  might  use  to  her  own 
advantage:  the  weakness  of  the  central  government,  which 
exposed  it  to  foreign  intervention  thrust  upon  it  in  the 
guise  of  friendship  to  terminate  the  internal  disorders;  the 
strength  of  certain  rebellious  Pashas  such  as  Passwan  Oglu 
of  Widdin,  Ali  Pasha  of  Janina,  or  Djezzar  of  Acre,  who 
might  intrigue  with  a  foreign  force  to  secure  their  own  com- 
plete independence  even  at  the  expense  of  the  destruction  of 
the  Empire;  and  the  disaffected  and  revolutionary  spirit  in 
the  entire  Balkan  peninsula,  which  was  ready  to  burst  into 


1 64  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

open  rebellion  with  the  slightest  encouragement.  Bonaparte 
and  his  agents  availed  themselves  of  all  these  methods  in 
turn.  He  invaded  Egypt  with  the  excuse  that  the  Mame- 
lukes were  in  rebellion  against  the  Sultan,  and  that  he  was 
about  to  restore  Egypt  to  her  rightful  ruler;  he  intrigued 
with  Ali,  encouraged  Passwan  Oglu,  and  tried  to  seduce 
Djezzar;  he  sent  revolutionary  agents  into  Greece,  used, 
among  others,  the  poet-patriot  Rhigos,  and  allowed  himself 
to  be  hailed  as  the  future  liberator  of  Greece.  It  was  a  mas- 
terly use  of  every  tool  at  a  period  when  Ottoman  power  was 
at  its  nadir.1 

In  1793  the  French  had  warned  Venice  that  the  realization 
of  Austria's  schemes  for  expansion  on  the  Adriatic  must  be 
the  death  blow  of  that  republic ;  we  have  seen  that  the  secret 

1  Vorontzov:  Arkkiv,  xviii.  pp.  134-140  (Kotchubey's  despatches  in  the 
winter  of  1797-98).  Pisani :  La  Dalmatie,  pp.  41,  49  et  seq.,  114,  115.  Rodoca- 
nachi:  Bonaparte  et  les  iles  ioniennes,  pp.  68,  91.  Stephanopolos :  Voyage  en 
Grece,  i.  pp.  3,  69  et  sea.,  75,  III,  185,  188-194  ;  ii.  pp.  138  et  seq.,  150  et  seq.,  213. 
Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2104,  2105  (to  Pasha  of  Scutari)  ;  2047,  2056  (to  Chief  of 
the  Maniotes),  2061,  2106,  2196,  2684  (to  Ali  Pasha  from  Malta,  June  19,  1798), 
2719.  Swanton-Belloc :  Napoleon  et  les  Grecs,  pp.  54,  56,  64-102,  373.  Eton: 
Survey  of  Turkish  Empire,  p.  495  (a  very  instructive  passage).  Antonopou- 
los:  Bonaparte  et  la  Grece,  in  Nouvelle  revue  (1889),  lx.  pp.  254-261.  Wilkinson  : 
Dalmatia  and  Montenegro,  ii.  pp.  361  et  seq.  Buckhardt :  Notes  on  the  Wahabeys, 
pp.  273  et  seq.,  277,  425.  Arnold:  The  Preaching  of  Islam,  pp.  153,  158  et  seq., 
230,  265,  299,  345  et  seq.  Hughes  r  Albania,  ii.  pp.  149  et  seq.  Holland:  Travels, 
pp.  66,  103-133,  274.  Hobhouse:  Travels,  i.  pp.  101-112;  ii.  pp.  46  et  seq.  388. 
Coquelle  :  Hist,  de  Montenegro,  pp.  249,  255.  Mendelssohn  :  Griechenland,  i.  pp. 
70  et  seq.,  92  et  seq.  Zinkeisen,  Gesch.  des  osman.  Reiches,  vii.  pp.  3-17,  34-45, 
84-94,  T94  et  seq.,  318-328.  Juchereau  de  St.  Denys  :  Histoire  de  V Empire  otto- 
man, ii.  pp.  59  et  seq.,  387  et  seq.  Finlay  :  Hist,  of  Greece,  vi.  pp.  33  et  seq.,  39,  97. 
Hertzberg:  Griechenland,  hi.  pp.  255  et  seq.,  287,  299  etseq.  Rhizos:  Hist,  de  la 
Grhe  moderne,  pp.  137  et  seq.,  241,  and  Cours  de  la  littirature  grecque,  pp.  45,  157, 
179.  Rangabe  :  Hist,  littiraire  de  la  Grece,  i.  pp.  104, 1 14,  187.  Legrand :  Chansons 
grecques,  pp.  105-116.  Byron:  Childe  Harold's  Pilgrimage,  pp.  223  etseq.,  273. 
Fauriel :  Chants  de  la  Grece,  ii.  pp.  15  etseq.  Liibke  :  Neugriechische  Lieder,  pp. 
317  et  seq.  Leake  :  Travels  in  Northern  Greece,  i.  pp.  54,  463,  507,  and  Travels  in 
Morea,  i.  p.  314,  and  Researches  in  G?'eece,  pp.  83  etseq.,  92,  140,  153.  Raybaud  : 
Memoir e  sur  la  Grhe,  pp.  488  ei  seq.  Pouqueville :  Voyage  e?i  Morie,  ii.  pp.  176 
et  seq.,  and  Regeniration  de  la  Grece,  i.  p.  124;  ii.  pp.  388  et  seq. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE  ORIENT  l6$ 

treaty  of  January,  1795,  between  Austria  and  Russia  included 
such  plans.  In  time  the  intention  of  the  Directory  became 
more  earnest;  they  wished  to  draw  Venice  from  her  neutral 
position.  Sandoz-Rollin,  the  Prussian  ambassador  at  Paris, 
spoke  of  an  alliance  with  Venice  in  order  to  check  Austria; 
and  with  similar  views  the  French  representative  at  the 
Porte,  Verninac,  suggested  a  defensive  alliance  of  France, 
Spain,  Venice,  and  the  Ottoman  Empire.  This  matter  was 
urged  on  the  Venetian  diplomats  at  Madrid,  Constantinople, 
and  Paris;  but  Venice  still  declared  her  desire  to  maintain 
her  neutrality.  The  offer  of  a  defensive  alliance  with  France 
was  also  refused,  in  the  summer  of  1796;  and  though,  on  May 
29,  Bonaparte  had  assured  Venice  that  her  neutrality  would 
be  respected,  he  soon  made  demands  for  supplies  to  be  fur- 
nished the  French  armies.  A  little  later  the  general  wrote 
to  the  Directory  of  the  weakness  of  the  ancient  city,  of  her 
potential  naval  strength,  and  of  the  importance  of  her  port 
to  English  trade.  Other  events  also  had  effect  in  the  mat- 
ter. The  evacuation  of  Corsica  by  the  English  a  few  weeks 
later  aided  the  plan  for  French  domination  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean ;  and  the  French  in  Italy  hastened  their  efforts  to  gain 
control  of  the  Adriatic.  The  Directory  in  the  meantime, 
while  considering  terms  of  peace  with  Austria,  had  sug- 
gested the  abandonment  of  Italy  and  indemnification  for 
France  on  the  Rhine  and  in  America.  This,  however,  was 
by  no  means  Bonaparte's  plan.  He  talked  of  marching  on 
Vienna  and  inciting  rebellion  in  Hungary.  In  any  event 
the  economic,  political  and  naval  decadence  of  Venice,  her 
importance  strategically,  and  the  value  of  her  transmarine 
and  insular  possessions,  had  marked  her  for  a  sacrifice  to 
either  French  or  Austrian  greed!  It  had  become  a  matter 
of  purely  political  expediency.  The  Venetian  territories 
and  Dalmatia  and  Albania  were  open  roads  to  the  heart  of 
the  Ottoman  dominions;  they  outflanked  Austria,  strength- 
ened the    control   of    Italy,  and,  with   the   Ionian  Islands, 


1 66  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

formed  an  unrivalled  approach  to  the  Levant.1  The  capture 
of  Ancona  by  the  French  revealed  the  train  of  thought  in 
Bonaparte's  mind.  He  wrote  that,  after  Venice,  it  was  the 
only  harbor  of  importance  on  that  coast ;  that  a  sail  of  twenty- 
four  hours  ended  in  Macedonia;  that  Constantinople  was  but 
ten  days  distant;  and  that  the  possession  of  Ancona  was 
essential  to  France,  giving  her  power  on  the  Adriatic,  in- 
creased influence  with  the  Porte,  and  a  strong  military  posi- 
tion. The  people  of  France,  however,  cared  more  for  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  than  they  did  for  the  coast  of  the 
Adriatic;  and,  realizing  this,  the  victorious  and  politic  gen- 
eral insisted  as  a  sine  qua  non  in  the  peace  negotiations  with 
Austria  that  the  theory  of  the  natural  boundaries  should 
receive  its  practical  accomplishment.  Nevertheless,  though 
at  first  glance  sacrificing  much  in  Italy,  he  kept  a 
line  open  to  the  Adriatic  along  the  River  Po,  secured  the 
Ionian  Islands,  and  pillaged  Venice  before  abandoning  her 
to  Austria.2 

At  the  same  time  that  the  fall  of  Venice  was  preparing,  a 
similar  scheme  for  seizing  Malta  was  maturing  in  Bonaparte's 
mind.  Indeed,  the  young  general,  victorious  in  battle  and 
council,  was  seeing  oriental  vistas  open  before  him;  there 
were  those  about  him  who  even  suggested  for  him  an  in- 
dependent rule  in  Italy,  including  the  domination  of  the 
Adriatic    and   the    Mediterranean    and    the    restoration    of 

1  Pesenti :  Diplomazia  franco-turca,  pp.  45  et  seq.,  65,  66,  78  et  seg.,  100,  102. 
Bonnal :  Chute  d'une  republique,  pp.  89,  et  seq.,  359,  363.  Gaffarel :  Bonaparte  et 
les  ripubliques  italiennes,  pp.  115-117.  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  514,  582,  889,926, 
1060,  1061,  1096,  1099,  1235.  Daru  :  Hist,  de  Venise,  v.  pp.  227,  245,  250,  264,  433 
et  seq. ;  vii.,  pp.  269  et  seq.  Pisani:  La  Dalmatie,  pp.  xiii.,  18,  22, 127  et  seq.,  136, 
145  et  seq. 

2  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  1475,  J494,  1497,  '544,  1686,  1691,  1703,1712,  1714, 
1715.  l735>  J743>  J744,  1745.  ^65,  1766,  1791,  1793,  J797>  I799>  l8o3>  l8o4>  l8|4- 
Du  Casse  :  Mimoires  du  Prince  Eugene,  i.  pp.  34,  460.  Daru  :  Hist,  de  Venise, 
vii.  pp.  349,  355,  356  (Direct,  to  B.  May  19,  1797,  ordering  him  to  secure  naval 
supplies  from  Venice,  repeating  Bonaparte's  language  to  them  of  some  months 
earlier).     Cf.  also  Bonnal :  op.  cit.,  and  Gaffarel :  op.  cit. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE  ORIENT  1 67 

the  ancient  commercial  power  of  central  southern  Europe. 
Thus  would  he  hold  Austria  and  France  in  balance.  But 
Bonaparte  had  become  a  Frenchman ;  the  iron  crown  was  not 
for  him,  save  as  an  appanage  of  the  Imperial.  In  Italy  his 
mind  was  big  with  plans;  the  genesis  of  that  against  Malta 
may  be  assigned  to  the  early  spring  of  1797.  The  Order  of 
Malta  had  fallen  into  decadence  during  the  latter  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  but  the  strategic  value  of  the  island  gave 
to  the  policy  of  the  Order  an  importance  greater  than  its  real 
power  and  condition  would  have  warranted.  The  diplomatic 
intercourse  between  Valetta  and  Paris  had  been  impaired  by 
death  and  by  the  Revolution.  When  finally  a  representative 
of  the  Directory  was  established  in  Malta  during  the  winter 
of  1796,  it  was  with  the  intention  of  preserving  French  influ- 
ence and  of  preventing  the  island  from  becoming  a  point  of 
vantage  for  the  allies.  The  suppression  of  the  French  com- 
manderies  of  the  Order  by  decrees  of  the  Assemblee  constitu- 
ante  (June  30,  1791,  Sept.  19,  1792)  had  involved  the  fortunes 
of  the  Order  and  injured  the  prestige  of  France.  Through 
this  situation  the  various  continental  powers  endeavored  to 
profit,  and  on  January  4  (15),  1797,  a  convention  was  signed 
with  Russia  for  the  transformation  of  the  old  priory  in 
Poland  to  one  for  all  Russia.  This  close  relationship  de- 
veloping between  the  Knights  of  St.  John  and  the  Tzar  was 
revealed  to  Bonaparte  by  the  capture  of  some  despatches  in 
February;  he  then  proposed  to  excite  the  fear  of  the  Porte 
at  Russian  intrigue  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  to  draw  the 
Turks  toward  France.  Within  two  months  the  signature  of 
preliminaries  of  peace  at  Leoben  between  France  and  Aus- 
tria (April  18),  was  to  give  an  unexpected  importance  to 
these  negotiations  of  the  various  powers  at  Malta.  The 
proposed  sudden  increase  of  Austrian  power  by  the  fall  of 
Venice  necessitated  for  France  the  possession  of  islands  such 
as  the  Ionian  in  the  Adriatic  or  Malta  in  the  Mediterranean, 
in  order  to  protect  her  commerce  and  to  support  her  policy. 


1 68  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

In  a  letter  of  May  26  Bonaparte  expressed  these  ideas,  and 
suggested  the  capture  of  Malta.  His  letters  clearly  showed 
his  appreciation  of  the  value  of  both  Malta  and  Corfu  to 
France.  With  regard  to  the  latter  island  a  decision  had 
already  been  reached.  Ancona  and  Corfu  were  to  be  kept 
by  If  ranee,  and  Admiral  Brueys  with  his  fleet  was  hurried 
from  Toulon  to  complete  the  control  of  the  sea.  Bonaparte's 
letters  of  this  period  are  a  curious  compound  of  classical  and 
oriental  phrases,  revolutionary  catch-words  and  political  and 
economic  maxims,  all  showing  the  strong  influence  exerted 
on  him  by  the  tendencies  of  the  period.  In  August  was  des- 
patched that  well-known  series  of  wonderful  letters,  which 
in  graphic  language  repeated  the  personal  and  national  long- 
ings of  all  Frenchmen,  — ■  the  policy  was  outlined  which  Bona- 
parte was  to  follow  for  the  next  two  years.  The  Ionian 
Islands  were  worth  all  Italy  to  France,  so  Bonaparte  wrote, 
and  as  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  soon  to  fall,  France  should 
be  ready  to  seize  her  share  of  the  spoils.  England  could  be 
destroyed  only  if  Egypt  were  in  French  hands,  and  the  trade 
of  the  Levant  preserved  to  the  Republic.  The  power  of  the 
Pashas  of  Albania  and  Bosnia,  the  weakness  of  the  Sultan, 
and  the  value  of  the  Ottoman  domain  had  been  impressed 
anew  upon  Bonaparte's  mind.  He  believed  that  the  day 
destined  for  the  downfall  of  that  Empire  was  at  hand,  and 
the  struggle  of  a  few  Greeks  for  independence  revealed  to 
him  the  agent  he  had  to  his  hand  should  the  time  come  when 
France,  abandoning  her  traditional  attitude  of  friendly  alli- 
ance with  the  Porte,  would  claim  the  richest  portion  of  the 
Levant.  The  Directory,  reversing  its  previous  propositions, 
now  talked  of  the  total  expulsion  of  Austria  from  Italy,  the 
union  of  Venice  to  the  "  Republique  italique"  under  French 
protection,  and  in  every  event  the  absolute  possession  of  the 
Ionian  Islands  by  France.  Talleyrand  in  much  the  same 
language  that  Bonaparte  himself  had  used,  wrote,  on  August 
23,   "Nothing  is  more  important  than  that  we  should  gain 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  1 69 

a  good  footing  in  Albania,  Greece,  Macedonia,  and  other 
provinces  of  the  Turkish  Empire  in  Europe,  and  even  all 
which  border  on  the  Mediterranean,  such  as  Egypt  in  par- 
ticular, which  may  some  day  be  of  the  greatest  value  to  us."  a 
On  September  13,  Bonaparte  made  his  second  proposition 
to  seize  Malta.  Once  in  possession  of  that  island,  of  St. 
Pierre,  already  ceded  by  the  King  of  Sardinia,  and  of  Corfu, 
France  would  be  mistress  of  the  Mediterranean.  In  case  at 
the  next  peace  with  England,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  should 
pass  from  French  control,  it  would  be  necessary  to  secure 
Egypt,  which  could  be  held  by  twenty-five  thousand  men  sail- 
ing from  Italy.  He  asked  Talleyrand  to  inform  him  what 
effect  the  invasion  of  that  country  by  the  French  would  be 
likely  to  have  on  the  Porte;  and  curiously  enough  he  stated 
that  Egypt  did  "not  belong  to  the  Grand  Seignior."  At 
about  this  time  Desaix  visited  Bonaparte  at  Passeriano,  and 
his  notes  of  the  conversations  are  suggestive  of  what  was 
absorbing  the  mind  of  the  great  leader.  The  resources 
of  Egypt  were  discussed ;  the  results  of  the  travels  of  Savary 
and  Volney  were  talked  over;  a  plan  was  outlined  for  an 
expedition  to  Egypt  of  eighteen  thousand  men,  sailing  from 
Venice;  and  the  advantages  of  Egypt  as  a  permanent  French 

1  De  la  Jonquiere  :  Expidition  d'  Egypte,  i.  pp.  19-21,22  (France  and  Malta  in 
1794,  Arch.  etr.  France,  vol.  652) :  "  Lorsque  Toulon  fut  pris,  l'Ordre  de  Malte  pa- 
rut  vouloir  se  declarer.  II  est  ni  ami  ni  ennemi.  Si  Ton  eut  recherche  la  conduit 
de  l'Ordre  de  Malte,  peut-etre  eut-on  trouve  qu'il  inclinnait  d'avantage  du  cote  de 
nos  ennemis  que  de  notre ;  mais  il  importe  de  ne  pas  multiplier  les  ressources 
des  Anglais  et  de  conserver  en  etat  de  neutralite  une  ile  que  Ton  doit  considerer 
comme  le  clef  du  Levant."  pp.  23-31,  651,  653-56  (Doublet  to  Lafont,  Malta, 
May  12,  1796).  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  1475,  J8i6,  1828-32,  1835-36,  1852, 
1854-55,  1867,1871,  1912-16,  1949-50,  1980,  1990-92,  1998-2000,  2020,  2047,  2050, 
2053,  2056,  2061,  2072-75,  2103,  2106,  2135-36,  2186,  2235,  2247,  2339.  Daru  : 
op.  cit.  vii.  pp.  369  et  seq.,  392  et  seq.,  398  (Carnot  to  Bonaparte,  Aug.  17,  1797), 
399  (Talleyrand  to  Clarke,  Aug.  19),  408.  Rodocanachi :  op.  cit.  pp.  60  et  seq. 
Marmont:  Memoires,  i.  p.  182.  Miot  de  Melito :  Memoires,  p.  133  (at  fault  as 
to  Bonaparte's  intentions  in  1797).  Pallain  :  Talleyrand et  le  Directoire,  pp.  117, 
124,  145  et  seq.,  159,  207.  Doublet:  Mimoires,  pp.  12  et  seq.  Cantu  :  Hist,  de 
cent  ans,  ii.  p.  105.     Mayer:  Considerations politiques  (pamphlet), passim. 


\/ 


170  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

possession  were  detailed.  Desaix  was  informed  of  the  in- 
trigues which  Bonaparte  was  carrying  on  with  Turkish 
Pashas  in  the  Balkan  peninsula  and  with  the  Albanians. 
With  regard  to  Malta  Bonaparte  wrote:  "An  island  which 
sooner  or  later  will  belong  to  the  English,  if  we  are  stupid 
enough  to  let  them  forestall  us."  From  these  statements 
and  from  the  letters  of  this  period,  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
Bonaparte's  plan  in  1797  was  quite  different  from  his  final 
project  in  1798.  He  had  been  impressed  with  the  weakness 
of  the  Porte ;  he  had  learned  that  Russia  wished  to  win  the 
holders  of  Malta  to  her  side;  he  saw  the  eagerness  with 
which  Austria  grasped  the  opportunity  of  strengthening  her 
position  on  the  Adriatic;  and  he  made  up  his  mind  that 
under  his  guidance  France  must  outwit  the  other  Powers  by 
anticipating  them  in  a  partition  of  Turkish  territory.  Above 
all  and  behind  all  stood  Great  Britain,  who  must  be  vitally 
injured,  preferably  in  the  Orient.  Yet  these  Egyptian 
schemes  were,  in  1797,  nothing  more  than  further  applica- 
tions of  the  same  sort  of  intrigue  which  he  was  then  carry- 
ing on  in  Greece  and  Albania.  The  grand  plan  had  not 
been  developed,  although  he  had  written  to  Paris  for  in- 
formation regarding  the  East,  and  had  questioned  the  men 
about  him.  The  mfonoires  of  Monge,  who  had  been  in  the 
Orient  in  1787,  of  Truguet  (1784),  of  de  Castries  on  com- 
merce with  India  via  Egypt  (1785),  of  Consul-General  Mure, 
of  de  Tott  on  the  Isthmus  of  Suez,  and  of  many  others,  to- 
gether with  various  maps,  were  furnished  him  by  Admiral 
Rosily.  In  the  meantime  the  Directory  had  responded 
promptly  that  it  approved  the  plan  of  seizing  Malta,  at- 
tributing to  Austria  rather  than  to  England  or  Russia  the 
most  ambitious  schemes  for  control  of  the  Mediterranean, 
though  it  was  believed  France  would  also  earn  the  gratitude 
of  the  Porte  by  checking  the  Anglo-Russian  plans  for  ex- 
ploiting the  weakness  of  the  Turks.  The  Directory  also 
wrote  protesting  against  the  cession  of  even  Venice  to  Aus- 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  171 

tria,  declaring  the  intentions  of  that  power,  as  shown  in  Italy, 
pointed  toward  a  too  dangerous  expansion  in  the  Levant.  It 
seems  probable,  however,  that  they  knew  the  fate  of  Venice 
was  already  decided,  and  wished  to  throw  the  onus  of  this 
deed  on  Bonaparte.  At  all  events,  the  treaty  of  Campo 
Formio  was  signed  before  the  letter  reached  him;  and  its 
terms  were  his  own.  Shortly  before,  Talleyrand  had  written 
him  that  his  plans  against  Malta  were  authorized  by  the 
Directory,  adding  later,  "Quant  a  l'Egypte,  vos  idees,  a  cet 
dgard,  sont  grandes."  He  said  that  "Egypt  as  a  colony 
should  in  time  replace  the  productions  of  the  Antilles,  and 
as  a  trade  route  should  give  us  the  commerce  of  India;"  he 
also  inserted  a  statement  of  his  views  regarding  Malta,  which 
he  feared  would  soon  fall  into  English  or  Russian  hands. 
Bonaparte,  in  reply  to  these  letters,  and  in  order  to  defend 
his  policy  in  regard  to  the  treaty  with  Austria,  declared  that 
that  power  could  not  harm  the  French  Republic,  —  England 
alone  was  the  foe.  "  Our  government  must  destroy  the  Eng- 
lish monarchy,  or  else  expect  to  be  destroyed  itself  by  the 
corruption  and  intrigues  of  these  active  islanders.  The 
present  time  gives  us  a  good  chance.  Concentrate  all  our 
activities  on  the  navy,  and  we  will  destroy  England.  That 
done,  and  Europe  is  at  our  feet."  To  Talleyrand  he  wrote 
that  he  saw  no  limit  to  the  possibilities  of  the  future;  as 
France  had  the  Rhine  border,  the  city  of  Mayence  in  the 
northeast,  and  Corfu  in  the  Levant,  what  more  was  to  be 
expected  for  the  present  ?  The  reply  of  the  Directory  to  the 
news  of  peace  was  the  appointment  of  Bonaparte  as  general 
commanding  the  army  destined  to  invade  England.  Of  these 
plans  it  will  be  possible  to  speak  later;  at  present  we  must 
examine  the  proposals  to  secure  Malta  for  France.1 

1  De  la  Jonquiere :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  31-41.  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2195,  2212, 
2240,  2244,  2292,  2296,  2303-09,  2312,  2318,  2338,  2386,  2395.  Rodocanachi :  op. 
cit.  p.  61.  Pallain  :  op.  cit.  pp.  154  et  seq.  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe:  Le  Directoire 
et  T Expedition  d'Egypte,  pp.  275  et  seq.  (Talleyrand  to  Bonaparte,  Sept.  27,  1797). 


172  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Bonaparte's  plan  for  the  surprise  of  Malta  in  the  autumn  of 
1797  had  been  criticised  by  Pleville  de  Pelley,  the  minister  of 
marine,  who  doubted  the  success  of  bribery  and  declared  that 
the  neutrality  of  the  island  was  all  for  which  France  could 
hope.  Nevertheless,  Bonaparte  felt  certain  that  Malta  was  for 
sale  to  the  highest  bidder  ;  and  in  October  he  had  been  author- 
ized by  the  Directory  to  take  steps  to  secure  the  island  for 
France.  The  Directory  was  fully  cognizant  of  these  plans  and 
the  statements  of  La  Revelliere-Lepeau  to  the  contrary  are  at 
fault.  The  sum  of  600,000  francs  was  then  named  as  the 
price.  He  despatched  Poussielgue,  secretary  of  the  French 
legation  at  Genoa,  to  complete  the  bargain  for  the  betrayal  of 
the  island  to  a  French  force,  and,  though,  in  December,  he 
countermanded  these  orders,  Poussielgue  had  already  left  for 
Malta;  and  Bonaparte's  hesitation  on  this  occasion,  owing  to 
the  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  England,  was  unavailing 
to  prevent  the  completion  of  his  intrigues  with  various  mem- 
bers of  the  Order.  Poussielgue  arrived  at  Malta  on  Decem- 
ber 24.  It  is  hard  to  say  just  why  this  coup  de  main  was  not 
then  attempted;  it  is  possible,  as  Jonquiere  thinks,  that  the 
Directory  feared  its  effect  on  the  negotiations  at  Radstadt.  It 
now  seems  certain  that  Austria  did  not  have  serious  intentions 
of  profiting  both  by  the  German  nationality  and  the  venality 
of  Hompesch,  the  new  Grand  Master  of  the  Order,  and  that 
the  plans  of  Russia  to  this  end  have  also  been  exaggerated; 
but  Great  Britain  was  not  so  doubtful  a  factor  in  the  case. 
English  diplomats  appear  to  have  dreaded  a  French  attack  and 
to  have  asked  both  de  Rohan  and  his  successor,  Hompesch, 
to  commit  the  defence  of  the  island  to  British  forces,  a  step 
which  would  undoubtedly  have  anticipated  by  several  years 
the  permanent  British  occupation  of  Malta.  Returning  to  the 
examination  of  Poussielgue's  mission  we  find  that  the  wretched 
condition  of  Bruey's  fleet  at  Corfu  would  have  made  impossible 

Daru  :  Hist,  de  Vetiise,  vii.  pp.  412,  413,  418  et  seq.,  432,  436  et  seq.     De  Clercq: 
Recueit,  L  pp.  335,  336. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  lj$ 

the  endeavor  to  seize  Malta  in  January,  1798,  even  if  Bonaparte 
himself  had  not  been  backward  in  pressing  the  matter  to  the 
end.  It  is  now  possible,  however,  to  read  the  published  report 
of  Poussielgue's  mission,  dated  from  Milan,  February  8,  1798. 
In  this  long  document  he  discusses  the  personal  characteristics 
of  the  leading  Knights,  the  strength  of  the  various  parties  on 
the  island,  and  the  international  intrigues  which  were  being 
carried  on.  He  also  describes  at  length  the  resources  of  the 
Order,  the  fortifications,  and  the  chances  of  success  in  an  at- 
tempt to  capture  the  island.  The  importance  of  the  position 
to  France  he  states  in  the  strongest  terms ;  and  he  concludes  by 
saying  that  the  financial  embarrassments  of  the  Order  and  of 
Hompesch  were  such  that  the  Government  could  not  long  con- 
tinue without  assistance  from  the  outside.  These  facts,  he 
pointed  out,  could  be  utilized  by  the  French,  as  the  other 
Powers  were  already  endeavoring  to  profit  by  them,  each  in  its 
own  interest.  This  report  was  made  to  Bonaparte  and  not  to 
the  Directory.  It  served  as  the  basis  for  action  in  May  of 
this  year,  when  the  final  move  was  made.1 

The  plan  for  an  invasion  of  England  was  in  the  meantime 
engaging  the  attention  of  all  classes  of  society.  Bonaparte 
himself  had  first  mentioned  the  possibility  of  such  a  scheme  to 
Bernadotte  in  May,  1797,  and  again,  a  few  days  later,  to  Ber- 
thier ;  throughout  the  summer  his  thoughts  had  centred  on 
the  south  and  east ;  and  it  was  only  when,  as  victorious  dic- 
tator of  peace  at  Campo  Formio,  he  received  his  new  commis- 
sion from  the  Directory  that  he  again  turned  his  attention  to 
the  matter.  A  few  days  later  Sandoz-Rollin,  the  Prussian 
minister  in  Paris,  reported  that  the  appointment  of  Bonaparte 
to  the  command  of  the  "  Armee  cT Angleterre"  was  regarded 
either  as  a  means  to  destroy  that  general's  power  and  prestige, 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2354,  2355.  De  la  Jonquiere:  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  35,  note 
1,  39,  note  3,  50,  51,  73,  74,  125  et  seq.  (Poussielgue's  report),  136-38,  656-58. 
Ckronique  in  La  Rivol.  fratif.  iii.  p.  89.  La  Revelliere-Lepeaux :  Mimoires,  ii. 
p.  367.    Barras :  M6moiresy  iii.  p.  63. 


174  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

or  to  cause  alarm  in  England.  Bonaparte  himself,  while  ac- 
cepting the  commission,  wrote  that,  to  invade  England  with  any 
probability  of  success,  a  strong  naval  force,  a  large  army  well- 
led,  perhaps  by  Desaix,  and  thirty  millions  of  livres  were  in- 
dispensable. He  would  not  refuse  to  fulfil  his  duty  to  his 
country,  though  sorely  in  need  of  rest.  The  distribution  of 
troops  in  Italy  and  the  Ionian  Islands  required  twenty-five 
thousand  men ;  thirty-six  thousand  would  be  needed  for  Eng- 
land ;  and  the  remainder  could  stay  in  the  south  of  France  and 
in  Corsica.  The  plan  for  the  invasion  necessitated  the  move- 
ment of  troops  to  the  Channel  coast,  and  this  was  rapidly  car- 
ried on,  while  elaborate  preparations  were  being  made  at  various 
points  to  equip  the  expedition.  Bonaparte,  however,  did  not 
abandon  the  fortification  of  Corfu,  nor  did  he  fail  to  report  in 
full  to  Talleyrand  the  intrigues  and  negotiations  with  various 
Turkish  officials  which  he  had  carried  on  while  in  Italy,  and 
which  are  recorded  but  here  and  there  in  his  letters.  Talley- 
rand himself  early  showed  Sandoz-Rollin  that  he  did  not  expect 
Bonaparte  to  attempt  the  invasion  of  England,  —  all  the  prep- 
arations being  designed  to  frighten  that  Power  into  a  peace. 
Metternich,  at  Radstadt,  prophesied  failure  if  the  scheme  were 
attempted,  and  sneered  at  the  wild  schemes  which  filled  the 
mind  of  the  populace  at  Paris.  This  populace,  always  ready 
for  a  new  hero,  was  already  beginning  to  question  Bonaparte's 
long  stay  at  Paris.  That  general  was  no  longer  a  sensation, 
and  his  popularity  was  on  the  wane.  A  failure  in  any  great 
venture,  if  accomplished  before  the  eyes  of  all  Paris,  meant 
annihilation  to  his  hopes  ;  his  politics,  or  "  calculation  of  com- 
binations "  as  he  termed  them,  showed  him  this,  and,  further, 
all  the  chances  he  would  run  in  following  the  orders  of  the 
Directory.  His  quarrels  with  that  body  were  already  known 
to  many;  and  an  open  break  between  the  Government  and  the 
general  seemed  imminent.  Such  was  the  situation  when,  in 
February,  Bonaparte  decided  to  investigate  the  preparations 
which  were  being  made  on  the  coast  and  at  the  naval  arsenals. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE   AND    THE   ORIENT  1 75 

A  week's  trip  showed  conclusively  that  the  demand  he  had 
made  in  the  preceding  November  for  good  officers,  plenty  of 
men,  and  many  ships,  could  not  be  met ;  the  French  navy  had 
not  recovered  from  the  disorder  and  weakness  for  which  the 
Revolution  was  largely  responsible.  The  inefficiency  of  the 
Directory  had  become  more  apparent.  Bonaparte,  therefore, 
ordered  Najac  to  recall  all  the  ships  of  the  Mediterranean 
squadron  to  Toulon,  and  sent  a  report  of  his  trip  to  the  Direc- 
tory, in  which  he  made  an  elaborate  exposition  of  the  difficul- 
ties and  dangers  which  blocked  the  way  to  an  invasion  of 
England.  The  time  was  passed,  he  declared;  nevertheless, 
with  that  affectation  of  modesty  which  was  his  wont  at  this 
period,  he  stated  the  amount  of  money  needed,  the  naval 
stores,  the  sailors,  and  the  ships,  knowing  full  well  that  to  sup- 
ply them  was  beyond  the  power  of  the  weakening  Government. 
There  were,  however,  two  other  means,  he  said,  of  harming 
England,  —  an  invasion  of  Hanover  and  the  seizure  of  Egypt; 
or  else,  if  all  three  plans  proved  impossible,  peace  must  be 
concluded.  This,  again,  he  knew  was  past  accomplishment ; 
the  Directory  must  stultify  itself  by  renewing  the  negotiations 
at  Lille,  which  it  had  so  recently  terminated  with  the  declaration 
of  war  to  the  bitter  end.  Bonaparte  presented  this  dilemma 
on  February  23 ;  but  Pleville  de  Pelley,  minister  of  marine, 
had  for  days  previous,  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  the  navy 
was  inadequate  to  any  such  operation  as  the  invasion ;  and 
Talleyrand,  directly  on  Bonaparte's  return  to  Paris,  had  told 
Sandoz-Rollin  that  an  expedition  was  to  be  made  against 
Egypt.  The  latter  welcomed  the  idea  and  drew  the  analogy 
of  Leibnitz's  advice  to  Louis  XIV.  to  quit  his  Dutch  war  and 
strike  in  the  Levant.  In  reality,  Bonaparte  was  not  finally  de- 
termined on  the  Egyptian  expedition.  The  principle  of  alterna- 
tives in  action  was  one  that  he  had  adopted  early  in  his  career ; 
and  this  was  the  period  when  he  was  balancing  carefully  the 
chances  of  success  in  each  of  the  various  plans.  By  March  5, 
however,  he  appears  to  have  told  the  Directory  that  he  had 


176  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

decided  for  Egypt.  People  gossiped  of  Portugal,  Ireland, 
Greece,  Constantinople,  and  every  point  that  French  imagi- 
nation might  fancy  a  weak  spot  in  England's  armor ;  constant 
in  one  thing  they  remained.  The  cry  still  was,  Delenda  est 
Carthago.  Bonaparte  had  estimated  thirty  thousand  troops  as 
needful  for  Malta  and  Egypt ;  and  the  plans  for  mobilization 
show  the  usefulness  of  the  stepping-stones  to  the  Levant  which 
he  had  garrisoned  and  fortified  along  the  northern  Mediter- 
ranean and  in  the  Adriatic  during  his  Italian  campaigns.  Rollin 
had  guessed,  as  early  as  March  24,  that  Malta  was  included  in 
the  plan;  and  the  secret  negotiations  begun  by  Poussielgue 
were  now  to  be  utilized.1 

Before  continuing,  however,  with  the  history  of  the  Expedi- 
tion we  must  consider  two  matters  of  importance :  first,  the 
author  of  the  plan ;  and,  secondly,  Bonaparte's  sources  of  infor- 
mation regarding  Egypt.  We  have  seen  that  Bonaparte  during 
his  youth  had  been  greatly  interested  in  the  Orient,  that  he 
had  been  subject  to  those  influences  which  not  only  made  him 
a  Frenchman,  but  a  Frenchman  alive  to  all  the  possibilities  of 

1  Napoleon :  Corr  Nos.  1808  (first  mention  of  the  invasion  of  England)  1881, 
2320,  2321,  2325,  2326,  2343,  2362,  2364,  2371,  2377,  2388,  2391,  2396,  2397,  2400, 
2409,  2418,  2419,  2426.  Pallain:  op.  cit.  pp.  41  et  seq.  Rodocanachi:  op.  cit. 
p.  77.  Marmont :  Mimoires,  i.  pp.  213,  215  et  seq.  Bailleu :  Preussen  und Frankreich, 
i.  pp.  156  (report  of  Sandoz-Rollin,  Paris,  Nov.  2,  1797),  162  (ditto,  Dec.  8),  172, 
173  (ditto,  Feb.  18,  1798),  174  (Feb.  28),  176  (March  10),  179  (March  18),  180 
(March  24).  Hiiffer :  Dipt.  Verhandlungen,  \\.  pp.  372  et  seq.,  27 6-  Metternich  : 
Nachgelassene  Papiere,  i.  pp.  357  (Radstadt,  Dec.  22),  364  (March  27,  1798). 
Segur  :  Hist,  et  mimoires,  i.  pp.  392  et  seq.  De  Testa  :  Recueil,  i.  p.  519.  Mahan  : 
Sea  Power  and  the  French  Revolution,  i.  pp.  35  et  seq.  Jurien  de  la  Graviere : 
Guerres  maritimes,  i.  pp.  329  et  seq.  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe  :  Le  Directoire  et  V Ex- 
pedition d'Egypte,  pp.  4,  9,  13,  23.  Troude :  Batailles  navales,  ii.  pp.  252,  264. 
Michel :  Corr.  de  Mallet  du  Pan,  ii.  p.  416  (Feb.  26,  1798).  "  Ce  general  [Bona- 
parte] decline  rapidement;  Merlin  et  Rewbell  vont  achever  de  l'enterrer  dans 
1 'expedition  d' An gleterre."  Millon:  Histoire  des  descentes  qui  ont  lieu  en  Angle- 
terre,  Ecosse,  Irlande  et  isles  adjacentes,  depuis  Jules  Char  Jusqu'd  nos  jours  ;  and 
Tardieu :  Notice  historique  des  descents  qui  ont  itefaites  dans  les  Isles  Brittanniques, 
depuis  Guillaume  le  Conquerant  jusqu'd  Pan  VI.  de  la  Ripublique  francaise.  Both 
are  Paris,  Tan  VI.  1797-98.  De  la  Jonquiere :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  17,  43  et  seq.,  69  et  seq., 
87  et  seq.  to  123,  172  et  seq. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  1 77 

French  control  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  French  prestige  and 
dominion  beyond  the  Alps  and  the  Adriatic.  We  have  studied 
his  career  in  Italy,  and  have  seen  how,  early  in  his  conquering 
progress,  he  himself  suggested  a  French  occupation  of  the  Ionian 
Islands  and  a  French  expedition  to  Egypt.  In  view  of  these 
facts,  and  of  the  failure  which  he  predicted  for  an  invasion  of 
England,  it  has  been  the  habit  of  some  writers  to  assign  to 
Bonaparte  alone  the  first  conception  of  a  conquest  of  Egypt, 
and  the  final  decision  to  carry  out  the  scheme.  Such  a  theory 
is  not  only  oblivious  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  it  is  also  bur- 
dened by  a  view  of  history  which  makes  the  genius  of  one 
man,  however  remarkable,  responsible  for  a  marvellous  attempt 
to  anticipate  history  by  nearly  a  century,  and  to  demonstrate 
political  and  economic  problems  which  were  as  yet  unknown 
to  the  vast  majority  of  people.  In  the  first  place,  we  have 
seen  in  a  previous  chapter  that  the  diplomats  of  the  Ancien 
Regime  were  in  the  habit  of  tentatively  assigning  Egypt  to 
France  in  the  event  of  a  partition  of  Turkish  territories 
between  the  European  Powers.  Expansion  in  the  Mediterra-  l 
nean  basin  was  recognized  as  a  wise  and  natural  policy  for 
French  statesmen  to  follow.  Even  if  we  go  no  further  back 
than  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  we  find  Choiseul 
suggesting  the  occupation  of  Egypt  to  Louis  XV.  as  a  com- 
pensation to  France  for  the  losses  of  the  Seven  Years'  war; 
similar  ideas  inspired  the  acquisition  of  Corsica  (1768),  a 
step  which  was  to  make  Bonaparte  a  French  citizen.  Saint- 
Priest,  the  French  ambassador  at  the  Porte  from  1768  to  1784, 
wrote  two  memoires  in  which  a  French  occupation  of  Egypt 
was  discussed ;  in  one  as  late  as  1789  he  said  that  France  had 
a  choice  between  either  supporting  the  integrity  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire  or  letting  it  go  to  pieces,  —  "  En  s'appropriant  le 
ddbris  le  plus  a  la  convenance  de  la  France,  donnant  en  ce  cas 
la  preferance  a  l'Egypte,  a  raison  de  sa  fertility,  de  la  facility 
de  la  conquerir  et  ensuite  de  la  defendre,  finalement  a.  cause 
de  la  courte  communication  aux  Indes  par  la  mer  Rouge,  dont 

12 


f 


178  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

elle  a  le  clef."  French  travellers  and  officers  who  journeyed 
in  the  Levant  on  various  errands  all  spoke  to  the  same  pur- 
pose. Any  man  who  had  ever  been  connected  with  the  French 
foreign  office  was,  therefore,  familiar  with  at  least  the  idea  of 
such  an  expedition,  and  some  had  studied  the  practical  details 
involved.  Talleyrand,  among  others,  had  followed  the  plan 
with  interest,  and  had  written  of  it  in  1796.  He  also  went 
further,  and  in  July,  1797,  presented  three  memoires,  based  on 
information  at  the  foreign  office  regarding  the  condition  of 
India,  the  power  of  the  British  there,  and  the  means  of  expel- 
ling them  from  that  region.  A  little  later  it  was  suggested 
that,  while  continuing  the  preparations  for  an  invasion  of  Eng- 
land, the  troops  should  in  reality  be  equipped  for  an  Asiatic 
campaign.  The  difficulties  of  the  passage  from  Suez  to  India 
by  sea  were  either  ridiculed  or  greatly  exaggerated  in  the 
various  mhnoires.  One  proposed  the  seizure  of  Egypt,  an 
alliance  with  the  Porte,  and  a  land  invasion  of  India  via  Persia 
by  a  force  of  twenty  thousand  French  troops  assisted  by  native 
allies.  Jourdan  was  familiar  with,  and  advocated,  the  idea  of 
/  an  expedition  to  India  which  would  arouse  the  Indian  princes 
against  the  English.  All  of  these  ideas  were  embodied  in  a 
report,  "  Stir  le  conqnUe  de  VEgypte"  made  by  Talleyrand  to 
the  Directory  on  February  14,  1797,  while  Bonaparte  was 
absent  from  Paris.  This  document,  which  De  la  Jonquiere 
publishes  for  the  first  time,  does  not  seem  to  have  received  the 
attention  which  it  deserves  from  students  of  the  period.  After 
summarizing  the  history  of  Egypt  in  the  past,  the  government 
of  the  Mamelukes  is  described,  and  the  injuries  done  to  French 
citizens  by  the  Beys  are  enumerated.  Next  the  commerce  and 
produce  of  Egypt  receive  attention,  and  the  immense  import- 
ance of  its  geographical  situation  is  emphasized.  "  N'oublions 
jamais  que  les  nations  anciennes  et  modernes  qui  on  eu  le 
commerce  de  lTnde  sont  toujours  parvenues  au  plus  haut  degre 
de  richesse."  The  opposition  of  the  Porte  and  of  the  Powers 
of  Europe  is  lightly  treated;  and  it  is  declared  that  French 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  1 79 

diplomacy  will  do  much  at  Constantinople.  The  actual  con- 
quest of  Egypt,  it  was  estimated,  could  be  safely  accomplished 
by  twenty  thousand  to  twenty-five  thousand  men,  and  with 
but  the  slightest  loss  of  life.  The  despatch  of  fifteen  thousand 
additional  troops  from  Egypt  to  India  is  then  discussed.  They 
were  to  operate  with  Tipu  Tib  of  Mysore  against  the  British, 
but  were  not  to  attempt  a  regular  conquest  of  India.  General 
observations  end  the  paper.  They  are  to  the  effect  that  two  or 
three  persons  serving  on  a  commission  should  be  in  charge  of 
the  expedition ;  generals  need  expect  no  glory  as  the  campaign 
would  be  an  easy  one,  and  military  talents  would  be  wasted ; 
the  native  population  would  welcome  the  invaders  with  delight. 
In  fine,  the  conquest  would  be  a  just  punishment  for  wrongs 
inflicted  on  Frenchmen ;  it  would  be  easy,  failure  was  impos- 
sible ;  it  would  be  inexpensive,  of  immense  value  to  the  Re- 
public, and  presented  many  other  favorable  aspects.  Reference 
is  made  to  Magallon,  for  many  years  French  Consul  at  Cairo. 
It  is  clear  from  a  comparison  of  this  report,  signed  by  Talley- 
rand, and  the  writings  of  Magallon  that  many  of  the  latter' s 
ideas  were  utilized  by  the  French  statesman.  This  document 
was  annotated  by  Bonaparte  after  his  return  from  Egypt  with 
the  most  bitter  and  sarcastic  expressions,  which,  while  not  proof 
positive*,  points  to  the  fact  that  he  was  not  in  Talleyrand's  con- 
fidence when  the  memoire  was  being  prepared.  The  contradic- 
tions of  each  of  the  characters  on  the  stage  at  Paris  regarding 
the  authorship  of  the  plan  render  this  matter  still  more  puz- 
zling. The  question  as  to  whether  Bonaparte  seriously  intended 
at  any  time  to  attempt  the  invasion  of  England  is  another 
complication.  The  truth  seems  to  lie  between  the  extremes  of 
the  various  conflicting  statements.  The  idea  of  a  French  ex- 
pedition to  Egypt  occurred  to  Bonaparte  while  in  Italy;  he  wrote 
of  it  to  Talleyrand,  who  sympathized  with  any  movement  which 
would  tend  to  realize  for  France  the  ideal  of  empire  based  on 
sea  power  and  oriental  dominion.  Talleyrand  thus  continued 
in  the  policy  which  the  tradition  of  his  office  had  outlined  for 


j 


180  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

French  statesmen.  Bonaparte,  returning  from  Italy,  pressed 
matters  on  for  the  invasion  of  England,  being  unable  to  usurp 
the  supreme  authority  and  fearful  to  cross  the  determination  of 
the  Directory  and  the  passionate  desire  of  the  French  people. 
The  insufficiency  of  the  means  supplied  him  for  the  attempt 
gave  reasonable  excuse  for  him  to  oppose  its  execution  ;  in  the 
meantime  the  Directory,  already  informed  of  the  backwardness 
of  the  preparations,  aware  of  their  own  growing  weakness,  and 
urged  on  by  Talleyrand,  who  advocated  the  conquest  of  Egypt, 
agreed  to  give  up  the  plan  against  England  and  to  unite  with 
Talleyrand  in  stimulating  the  ready  imagination  of  Bonaparte 
for  oriental  ventures.  Bonaparte  was  thus  enabled  to  return 
to  his  true  ambition,  and  to  realize  more  fully  than  ever  before 
the  wishes  and  ideals  of  French  foreign  policy  by  deciding  on 
a  conquest  of  Egypt.1 

The  next  matter  to  consider  is  the  information  which 
Bonaparte  secured  regarding  Egypt.  We  have  already  noted 
his  own  wide  reading,  the  documents  sent  to  him  in  Italy  by 
Rosily,  and  the  m'emoires  presented  to  the  Directory  during 
the  years  1797-98.  All  of  these,  except  perhaps  Talley- 
rand's mjmoire  of  February  14,  he  had  in  his  possession  by 
March  10.  He  then  made  requisitions  upon  the  "  Ecole  des 
langues  orientales"  for  interpreters  of  Arabic,  Persian,  and 
Greek,  and  for  type  to  issue  proclamations  in  these  lan- 
guages:  the  war  office  furnished  him  maps;  Monge  was  his 
right-hand  man  at  this  time,  and  at  Rome  secured  the  Arabic 
printing  outfit  of  the  Propaganda.     Say  collected  a  library  of 

1  De  la  Jonquiere :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  147  et.  seq.  Numerous  documents  are  here 
printed  in  extenso.  Saint-Priest :  Memoire  militaire  et  politique  sur  VEgypte,  in 
Revue  (TEgypte,  April  and  May,  1896.  The  statements  in  Botta:  Hist.  cTItalie 
(Fr.  trans.),  iii.  pp.  160-162,  are  refuted  by  De  la  Jonquiere,  pp.  152,153.  Talley- 
rand's Memoire  is  to  be  found  pp.  154-68.  Without  accepting  De  la  Jonquiere's 
conclusions  as  to  Bonaparte's  intentions  with  regard  to  the  English  invasion,  his 
work  presents  in  many  aspects  the  most  satisfactory,  and  certainly  the  most  com- 
plete, book  on  the  Egyptian  Expedition.  It  is  a  matter  of  regret  to  the  writer 
that  at  the  date  of  writing  the  succeeding  volumes  had  not  appeared. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE  ORIENT  l8l 

Bonaparte's  selection,  which  was  taken  to  Egypt,  and  which  in- 
cluded the  Vedas,  the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  and  the  Kuran. 
Talleyrand  examined  the  archives  of  the  foreign  office,  and 
gave  Bonaparte  the  reports  of  Choiseul,  of  Lazousky,  French 
political  agent  in  the  Levant,  of  Prix-R6al,  a  French  merchant 
resident  at  Cairo  in  1796,  and  of  many  others.  Magallon, 
Consul-General  at  Cairo  for  many  years,  had  been  summoned 
home  by  Delacroix  a  short  time  previous,  and  had  submitted 
a  long  report  on  Egypt.  These  documents  Bonaparte  read, 
supplementing  them  by  books  of  travel  and  history,  with 
many  of  which  he  was  already  familiar.  Thus  he  formulated 
his  ideas  and  developed  his  plans.  Magallon  told  him  that 
the  Porte  had  not  the  shadow  of  authority  in  Egypt,  and 
drew  no  revenues  from  that  province.  The  rule  of  the 
Mamelukes  was  hated  by  the  population;  the  French  had 
suffered  greatly  in  the  matter  of  trade  and  of  personal  safety; 
and  a  French  invasion  would  find  ready  support  from  all 
classes  save  the  Beys.  The  consul  drew  a  flattering  picture 
of  the  richness  of  the  country,  its  unique  and  valuable  situa- 
tion, and  the  probability  that  under  French  control  it  would 
resume  its  ancient  office  of  gateway  to  Indian  commerce,  by 
drawing  to  the  Red  Sea  the  trade  that  then  followed  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  route  to  Europe;  he  unconsciously 
quoted  the  words  of  old  William  of  Tyre  regarding  Eygpt: 
" forum  publicum  utrique  orbi."  The  threatened  rebellion  in 
the  Balkans  and  Greece,  properly  stimulated  by  French 
agents,  would,  in  his  opinion,  effectually  prevent  any  seri- 
ous opposition  by  the  Porte.  Magallon  thought  success 
almost  certain.  A  book  suggestively  entitled  "Route  de 
VInde"  published  shortly  after  Bonaparte  had  sailed,  en- 
forces the  favorable  descriptions.1      Sir  John  Seeley  is  the 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2452,  2454,  2458,  2471,  2473,  2479,  2500,  2731,  2784. 
Reybaud:  Histoire  scientifique,  iii.  pp.  21  et  seq.  Mason:  Aff.  Strangles,  p. 
428.  Jomard:  Souvenirs  sur  Gaspard  Monge.  De  Testa:  Recueil,  i.  pp.  521- 
535.  Merruau:  EgypU  contemporaine,  pp.  197  et  seq.  (Magallon's  report  is 
given  here).    Magallon  accompanied   Bonaparte  to  Egypt.    Intercepted  Corr. 


1 82  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

most  recent  writer  who  is  in  error  regarding  the  influence 
upon  Napoleon  Bonaparte  of  Leibnitz'  book,  the  "  Consilium 
ALgyptiacum"  The  philosopher  had  endeavored  to  divert 
Louis  XIV.  from  renewing  a  devastating  war  in  Europe  by 
urging  the  conquest  of  Egypt.  Bonaparte  never  saw  the 
complete  original  work  of  Leibnitz,  nor  was  it  published 
until  1864.  The  Summa,  or  abridgment,  of  this  book  has 
been  repeatedly  referred  to  as  the  real  memoir  presented  to 
Louis ;  but  neither  did  Bonaparte  see  even  this  abridgment, 
which  is  only  some  twenty-five  printed  pages  in  length,  until 
August,  1803,  when  it  was  forwarded  to  him  by  General  Mor- 
tier,  then  in  Hanover,  who  had  secured  a  copy  from  Feder, 
the  librarian  of  the  State  Library  in  that  city.  This  was 
then  read  by  Bonaparte  and  sent  to  Paris  with  the  comment 
"tres  curieux."  Fourier,  in  the  "Description  de  V Egypte" 
referred  to  the  work,  but  understood  that  only  the  shorter 
manuscript  was  in  existence.1 

i.  p.  104.  Henry :  Route  de  I  yInde,  ou  description  giographique  de  I  'Jigypte,  la  Syrie, 
I' Arabic,  la  Perse,  et  VInde.  Paris,  an  VII,  8vo,  pp.  v-viii,  6  ("  L'ligypte  etoit  le 
grenier  de  l'Empire  romain  "),  31  et  sea.,  42  ("Les  Mamlouks  ne  connoissent  rien 
de  notre  art  militaire  .  .  .  Le  luxe  des  M.  est  extreme.  II  n'y  en  a  point  dont 
l'entretien  ne  coute  2500  liv.  par  an  "),  139  (Suez),  141  et  seq.  (The  commerce  of 
Egypt  is  rich.  The  income  from  its  exports  has  made  it  a  gold  mine.  The  author 
draws  a  marvellous  picture  of  its  future  prosperity),  153  et  seq.  (The  routes  to 
India.  That  via  Suez  and  the  Red  Sea  is  very  easy).  Cf.  Aegyplen-was  es  war- 
ist-und  sein  kb'nnte,  Berlin,  1799,  i2mo.  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe  :  op.  cit.  pp.  169,  230, 
note  2  (Distinguish  between  several  Magallons).  Cf.  Pongerville :  Gaspard 
Monge  et  I ''expedition  d'Egypte.  Heyd :  Gesch.  des  Levanthandels,  i.  p.  417.  Guil. 
Tyrensis.  lib.  19,  c.  27.  De  la  Jonquiere :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  148  et  seq.  It  is  interest- 
ing to  note  that  Dubois  de  Thainville,  French  agent  in  the  Levant,  reported  to 
Verninac  at  Constantinople  in  September,  1796,  that  "l'Egypte  est  devoree  par 
l'anarchie.  Le  moment  du  revolution  ne  semble  pas  e'loigne.  ...  Si  jamais  le 
commerce  de  lTnde  s'ouvre  par  la  voie  de  Suez,  le  Caire  deviendra  la  plus  impor- 
tante  place  du  monde.     Les  Anglais  profitent  deja  de  cette  voie." 

1  Seeley:  British  Policy,  ii.  p.  168.  Foucher  de  Careil :  GEuvres  de  Leibnitz, 
v.  pp.  xiv-xix,  65.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  mention  of  Malta  made  by  Leibnitz 
as  an  "island  of  great  value,  connected  with  France  by  many  ties,"  pp.  345,  346. 
A  letter  of  Leibnitz  to  Louis  XIV.  in  1671  contains  the  following:  "  ^Egyptus 
omnium  regionum  ad  dominum  non  maris  tantum  sed  et  orbis  opportunissima,  et 
ipso  situ  incredibilique  fertilitate  et  populositate  gentis  mater  scientiarum,  mirac- 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  183 

It  will  be  wise,  now  at  the  actual  start  of  the  expedition, 
to  summarize,  even  at  the  risk  of  being  repetitious,  the  per- 
sonal_motives  which  actuated  Bonaparte  in  undertaking  the 
expedition.  In  the  first  place  it  was  necessary  for  him  to 
leave  Paris  and  to  accomplish  some  successful  feat  of  arms. 
Secondly,  he  wished  to  realize  his  own  oriental  ambitions 
by  following  in  the  footsteps  of  the  great  world-conquerors. 
The  imperial  vistas  had  been  opened  to  him  in  his  youth; 
Bossuet's  description  of  the  passing  of  the  empires  had  torn 
the  veil  before  him  ;  he  had  seen  the  mysteries ;  now  he  was 
to  become  an  Alexander.  Thirdly,  as  a  French  statesman 
he  felt  that  the  peace  with  Austria  left  no  adequate  means  of 
harming  England  save  by  a  direct  blow  at  London,  the  heart, 
or  at  India  and  Ireland,  the  limbs,  of  the  mighty  sea- 
monster.  He  believed  with  all  Frenchmen  that  England's 
stability  lay  in  her  trade,  which  fattened  on  her  foreign 
possessions.  A  move  toward  the  Orient  would  call  the 
British  naval  forces  from  the  Atlantic  and  scatter  them  to 
various  points,  so  that,  in  case  a  more  direct  attempt  to 
attack  her  should  appear  wise,  the  Channel  might  be  par- 

ulorum  naturae  materia,  asylum  perfidiae  Mahometicae,  cujus  solius  neglectio 
effecit,  ut  Christiani  terram  sanctam  amiserint;  Asiae  et  Africae  vinculum. 
Oceani  et  Mediterranei  maris  agger  interjectus,  horreum  Orientis  emporium 
commune  Indiae  et  Europae."  (The  original  larger  work  covers  300  printed 
pages.)  It  was  a  repetition  in  more  modern  language  of  the  appeal  of  Pierre 
Dubois.  Fourier :  Description  de  I  'Mgypte,  p.  ii.  Napoleon  :  Corr.  No.  6976  (Aug. 
4,  1803).  Cf.  Guhrauer:  Leibnitz,  Erne  Biographie,  i.  pp.  93  et  seq.f  and  MSmoire 
sur  le  projet  d?  expedition  en  JSgypte  presente  en  1672  &  Louis  XIV.  par  Leibnitz,  in 
Mini,  de  T Acad,  des  Sci.  morales  et politiques.  Savants  Etrangeres,  i.  pp.  679-767. 
The  following  passage  is  so  remarkably  prophetic  that  it  deserves  quotation. 
Leibnitz  :  OZuvres,  v.  p.  47  :  "  II  y  a  d'abord  Tisthme  principal  du  monde  qui 
separe  les  plus  grandes  mers,  l'Ocean  et  le  Mediterranee,  qu'on  ne  saurait  eviter 
sans  faire  le  tour  des  sinuosites  de  toute  l'Airique.  C'est  le  lien,  la  barriere,  la 
clef,  la  seule  entree  possible  de  deux  parties  du  monde,  l'Asie  et  l'Afrique.  C'est 
le  point  de  contact,  le  marche  commun  de  lTnde  d'une  part,  de  l'Europe  de  l'autre. 
Je  conviens  que  l'isthme  de  Panama,  en  Amerique  pourrait  rivaliser  avec  lui,  si 
cette  partie  du  monde  etait  aussi  fertile  et  si  les  autres  richesses  lui  etaient  pro- 
diguees  avec  la  meme  abondance." 


1 84  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

tially  unprotected.  He  believed  that  the  capture  of  Malta 
and  Egypt  would  make  possible  a  French  Mediterranean, 
and  that  the  possession  of  Egypt  would  be  of  great  value  to 
France  intrinsically  and  potentially.  It  would  recompense 
her  for  the  loss  of  her  American  possessions;  it  would 
restore  to  Levantine  trade  its  former  position,  and  add  to  it 
the  commerce  of  Asia;  it  would  widen  the  political  view  at 
home,  by  checking  that  passionate  promulgation  of  revolu- 
tionary principles  on  the  continent  of  Europe  which  made 
every  monarchical  government  the  secret  if  not  the  open  foe 
of  the  Republic,  and  inevitably  postponed  the  day  of  final 
peace.  Fourthly,  it  would  appeal  to  every  Frenchman  who 
had  read  history,  who  had  been  influenced  by  the  renascence 
in  classic  and  oriental  studies,  or  who  believed  in  the  eco- 
nomic and  political  principles  which  required  the  resurrec- 
tion of  a  French  Empire  on  land  and  sea  as  the  incarnation 
of  the  spirit  of  French  traditions  and  ambitions.1 

The  Directory  forwarded  his  plans,  and  gave  the  final  orders 
in  a  series  of  secret  despatches  during  the  second  week  of 
April,  1798.  The  "  Armee  d } Orient"  was  to  be,  as  in  Bona- 
parte's words,  a  wing  of  the  "  Armee  d' Angleterre;  "  to  seize 
Malta  and  Egypt  was  to  injure  England  in  a  vital  spot,  to 
make  France  supreme  on  the  Mediterranean,  to  add  to  her 
colonial  empire,  to  increase  her  trade,  and  to  open  the  door 
to  India.  Kl^ber  was  to  be  second  in  command;  the  delay 
which  the  events  at  Radstadt  and  Vienna  necessitated  was 

1  Bailleu:  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  183  et  seq.  (Despatches  of  Mar.  28,  Apr.  7  and  19). 
Marmont:  Memoires,  pp.  216  et  seq.  Mathieu  Dumas:  Notes  sur  le  precis  des 
evirtements  militaires,  ii.  p.  171.  Though  not  of  direct  value  as  evidence,  the  pas- 
sages in  the  Commentaries  form  interesting  parallels.  Napoleon :  Comm.  ii.  pp. 
184,  285,  330,  360,  362;  iii.  pp.  20  etseq.,  144.  Of  the  same  nature  is  the  work  of 
Fourier  in  1809,  eleven  years  later.  Champollion  gives  the  corrections  which 
Bonaparte  himself  suggested  at  that  time.  Fourier :  op.  cit.  pp.  i,  xxiii.  Champol- 
lion: Fourier,  pp.  83,  88-172.  Napoleon:  Corr.  No.  2502.  Intercepted  Corr.  L 
p.  137  (Letter  of  Boyer,  July  28, 1798).  Cf.  ii.  p.  ix,  note.  Dubroca  :  Politique,  etc. 
pp.  90-92.  Fonvielle  :  France  et  Angleterre,  pp.  183-186.  The  question  of  India 
as  a  possible  ultimate  destination  will  be  considered  later. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE  ORIENT  1 85 

not  long;  and  the  circumstances  only  showed  more  clearly 
the  strained  relations  between  the  Directory  and  the  Gen- 
eral. The  former  desired  to  be  rid  of  a  too  successful  sol- 
dier; the  latter  foresaw  the  ruin  of  the  present  government, 
and  wished  to  be  neither  a  direct  accomplice  to  it  nor  a  vic- 
tim of  its  fall.1 

As  this  is  an  historical  study  of  motives,  methods,  and 
effects,  it  is  without  its  scope  to  trace  the  course  of  events 
in  any  detail.  In  particular  it  is  unnecessary  to  record  the 
history  of  a  period  so  well  known  as  is  the  one  under  discus- 
sion. It  will  be  the  object  of  the  latter  half  of  this  chapter 
to  treat  the  schemes  of  Bonaparte  in  the  East,  the  means  he 
used  to  forward  them,  especially  the  political  and  religious 
agencies  employed,  the  ultimate  effect  that  these  had  upon 
the  course  of  events,  the  evolution  which  the  Egyptian  Ex- 
pedition engendered  in  the  political  character  of  the  Eastern 
Question,  the  results  in  India  and  their  significance  for  the 
future,  and  the  reasons  for  the  failure  of  the  expedition  to 
accomplish  the  objects  assigned  to  it.  The  fleet  with  the 
army  on  board  set  sail  from  Toulon  May  19.  The  great 
secrecy  as  regards  its  preparation  and  destination  aided  the 
success  which  attended  its  first  moves.  Malta  yielded  to  the 
combined  forces  after  a  perfunctory  struggle,  and  the  design 
which  Brueys  had  not  been  able  to  realize  in  the  previous 
February  was  easily  accomplished.  Malta,  the  strongest 
fortified  position  in  the  Mediterranean,  with  perhaps  the 
exception  of  Gibraltar,  was  in  French  hands.  It  seems 
scarcely  possible  to  doubt  that  intrigue  and  bribery  had 
prepared  the  way  for  the  capture,  and  that  it  was  no  reckless 
chance  of  war  which  made  Bonaparte  risk  so  much  on   its 

1  Napoleon :  Corr.  Nos.  2491-2496,  2502,  2533,  2547,  2548,  2562,  2570,  2608. 
2710.  Intercepted  Corr.  i.  p.  99.  De  Testa:  Recueil,  i.  p.  535  (Directory  to  Bona- 
parte, March  5,  1798,  giving  him  the  orders  "pour  remplir  le  grand  objet  de 
l'armement  de  la  Mediterranee  "  ).  Pajol  :  Kleber,  p.  269.  Hurler :  Dipt.  Verh. 
"•  P-  377*  Masson:  Dipl.  de  la  Rivol.  pp.  211  et  seq.  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe: 
op.  cit.  p.  23. 


1 86  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

fall.1  Proceeding  to  Egypt,  Alexandria  was  captured  with 
ease,  and  some  days  later  Cairo  fell  before  Bonaparte's  army. 
The  succeeding  months  were  occupied  in  extending  French 
control  toward  Upper  Egypt,  in  the  Delta  and  toward  Syria. 
Nelson  destroyed  the  French  fleet  in  Abukir  Bay  on  August 
i ;  and  in  September  the  Porte  joined  the  coalition  of  Euro- 
pean powers  against  France.  In  February  Bonaparte  set  out 
to  invade  Syria,  marching  rapidly  toward  Acre,  where  the 
defence  of  that  city  by  Djezzar  Pasha,  assisted  by  the  English, 
who  had  captured  part  of  Bonaparte's  siege  artillery,  forced 
him  to  return  to  Egypt.  A  Turkish  army  was  routed  in  the 
early  summer  of  1799  at  Abukir,  but  the  blockade  of  Alex- 
andria, defeats,  unproductive  victories,  plague,  and  lack  of 
reinforcements  completed  the  tale.  On  receiving  confirma- 
tion of  the  success  of  the  allies  in  Europe,  and  of  the 
weakness  of  the  Directory,  Bonaparte  stole  away  from  Egypt 
and,  barely  escaping  capture  by  the  English,  landed  at  Frejus 
on  the  Mediterranean  coast  in  November,  accompanied  by 
only  a  few  officers.  The  army  had  been  left  under  the  com- 
mand of  Kleber  in  Egypt.     Such  is  the  bare  outline. 

Returning  now,  we  must  consider,  first,  Bonaparte's  policy 
toward  the  Porte ;  second,  with  regard  to  the  native  popula- 
tions and  rulers  of  Egypt,  Syria,  and  Greece;  third,  with 
regard  to  the  Barbary  States,  and  lastly,  toward  the  Direc- 
tory. On  landing  in  Egypt  Bonaparte  announced  that  he 
had  come  to  restore  the  enfeebled  authority  of  the  Sultan, 
and  the  insignia  of  that  ruler  were  preserved  on  every  hand. 
The  Mameluke  Beys,  he  declared,  were  his  only  enemies, 

1  Vivenot:  Brief e  von  Thugut,  ii.  pp.  ,46, 106,  109.  Hiiffer:  Dipl.  Verh.  ii.  pp. 
384  et  seq.  Reumont:  Letzten  Zeiten  desjoh.  Ordens,  pp.  24  et  seq.,  28,  32,  36,  175 
et  seq.  Doublet :  MStnoires  historiques,  pp.  370,  372.  Ballou :  Story  of  Malta, 
p.  307.  Villeneuve-Bargemont :  Monuments  des  Grand-Maitres,  ii.  pp.  277,  280, 
283  et  seq.,  321,  391,  400  et  seq.  Marmont :  Memoires,  i.  pp.  220,  221.  De  Clercq : 
Recueil,  i.  p.  361.  Convention  for  the  surrender  signed,  June  12,  1798.  Napo- 
leon: Corr.  Nos.  2629,  2634,  2636-2638,  2641,  2642,  2645-2647,  2667.  Jurien  de 
la  Graviere  :  Guerres  maritimes,  i.  p.  359. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  1 87 

the  oppressors  of  a  people  whom  he  professed  to  protect  and 
guard.  The  French,  who  had  destroyed  the  Pope,  the  enemy 
of  Islam,  and  captured  Malta,  the  stronghold  of  those  who 
were  sworn  to  war  against  all  Muhammadans,  believed  in 
complete  religious  tolerance,  and  came  to  Egypt  as  allies  of 
its  rightful  lord,  the  Khalif  of  all  true  believers.  "I  love 
the  Kuran,"  he  told  the  people,  "and  my  armies  are  at  the 
service  of  the  Sultan. "  Before  leaving  Paris  Bonaparte  had 
understood  that  Talleyrand  would  proceed  to  Constantinople 
as  French  ambassador.  He  sent  a  ship  from  Malta  to  con- 
vey him  to  this  important  point,  where  his  talents  would  be 
strained  in  the  endeavor  to  appease  the  alarm  and  anger  of 
the  Porte  at  the  invasion  of  Egypt.  Talleyrand,  however, 
recollecting  that  the  Sultan  did  not  recognize  the  immuni- 
ties of  diplomats,  concluded  not  to  go.  Descorches  was 
under  appointment  when  the  Sultan  declared  war.  Ruffin, 
secretary  and  charge"  at  the  embassy,  was  imprisoned  by  the 
Turks,  and  all  French  consuls  throughout  the  Empire  were 
arrested.  Ignorant  of  this,  Bonaparte  wrote  to  both  Talley- 
rand and  Descorches  at  Constantinople.  His  letters  to  the 
Grand  Vizir  proclaimed  his  cordial  relationship  to  the  Sul- 
tan and  the  traditional  friendship  of  France;  the  common 
enemies  of  both,  he  said,  were  Austria  and  Russia;  there 
was  a  basis  for  an  amicable  arrangement  in  this  situation. 
When  he  learned  of  the  co-operation  of  the  Russian  and 
Turkish  squadrons  at  the  siege  of  Corfu,  he  warned  the  Porte 
that  the  advent  of  the  former  in  the  Mediterranean  could 
only  mean  danger  to  the  integrity  of  the  Empire.  The 
Sultan,  after  hearing  of  Nelson's  victory,  had  yielded  to 
the  pressure  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  and  had  issued  a 
proclamation  in  September,  1798,  declaring  a  Jihad,  or  Holy 
War,  against  the  French  incumbent  upon  Muslims  the  world 
over.  Upon  the  invasion  of  Syria  a  second  was  promulgated, 
and  a  Hatti-Sharif  regarding  the  French  operations  at  Suez 
and  on  the  Red  Sea,  renewed  the  statement  that  that  sea  was 


1 88  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

a  sacred  highway  of  Islam.  The  burst  of  Muslim  fanaticism 
throughout  the  Levant  brought  serious  loss  to  many  French- 
men; their  persons  and  property  were  seized,  and  French 
trade  was  almost  annihilated.  In  vain  Bonaparte  wrote  re- 
peatedly to  Constantinople,  even  to  within  a  few  days  before 
he  left  Egypt ;  the  Porte,  provoked  by  the  invasion,  at  the 
mercy  of  its  enemies,  with  French  diplomatic  prestige  at  an 
end,  and  fearing  its  allies  as  much  as  it  did  the  French,  had 
become  an  unwilling  combatant  in  the  gigantic  conflict  which 
stirred  all  Europe.1 

With  regard  to  the  people  and  local  rulers  of  the  Levant, 
Bonaparte's  policy  is  very  interesting.  It  reveals  the  great 
value  of  scholarship  to  public  policy,  the  intimate  relations 
existing  between  religion  and  politics  in  the  East,  and  the 
use  of  methods  of  oriental  diplomacy  which  were  mentioned 
in  the  opening  pages  of  this  chapter.  The  proclamations 
issued  on  landing  in  Egypt  were  translated  into  Arabic  by 
the  oriental  scholars  who  accompanied  the  expedition.  The 
religious  observances  of  Islam  were  protected  and  maintained 
in  the  hope  that  a  political  ascendency  might  be  gained; 
Menou  and  some  of  the  French  officers  accepted  Islam ;  and  a 
French  tricolor  inscribed  with  a  sentence  of  the  Kuran  was 
given  to  a  native  officer  who  took  service  with  the  French. 
Small  bodies  of  Egyptian  troops  were  organized,  and  mild 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2608,  2674,  2703,  2719,  2721,  2723,  2734,  2761,  2767, 
2777,  2778,  2785,  2819,  2824,  2878,  2880,  2934,  3075,  3076,  3127,  3183,  3206,  3280, 
328i,  3373.  3436>  35^1,  35^2,  3573.  3594~3596,  3744"3748,  3928.  Cf.  Napoleon: 
Comm.  ii.  p.  330.  Intercepted  Corr.  i.  pp.  235,  244.  Broglie:  Memoir es  de  Talley- 
rand, i.  p.  268.  Pouqueville:  Voyage  en  Morie,  ii.  p.  219.  De  Testa  :  Recueil,  i. 
pp.  548  et  sea.,  572  et  sea.,  583.  The  proclamation  of  the  Porte  to  all  Muslims 
(Feb.  15,  1799)  contained  passages  such  as  the  following:  "  Purify  your  hearts, 
that  your  thoughts  may  be  worthy  of  praise ;  unite  yourselves  to  our  brother- 
believers  against  the  evil  infidels  ;  work  for  the  triumph  of  Islam,  for  by  the  help 
of  the  Almighty  you  will  be  the  conquerors  of  your  enemies,  who  are  also  the 
enemies  of  God,"  ii.  p.  73,  Hatti-Shereef  of  1799;  cf.  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe, 
Le  Directoire  et  V Expedition  d'£gypte,  pp.  36  et  sea.,  64,  65.  Masson :  Aff.  etrang. 
p.  428. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  1 89 

terms  were  offered  to  those  who  would  submit.  The  Arabic 
printing-press  which  Bonaparte  had  imported  issued  accounts 
of  the  pomp  with  which  Muhammadan  feast  days  were  cele- 
brated by  the  French;  and  in  the  Courier  (T Egypte,  a  French 
newspaper  published  at  Cairo,  there  appeared  the  story  of  an 
alleged  revelation  received  by  a  Muslim  Holy-man  of  Egypt. 
Muhammad  and  Fate  are  supposed  to  be  conversing  together ; 
while  standing  on  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  they  des- 
cry the  French  fleet  approaching.  The  prophet  is  filled  with 
dismay  at  the  sight.  Fate  reassures  him  by  foretelling  the 
conquest  of  Egypt  by  this  force,  the  establishment  of  a 
strong  government,  and  the  acceptance  of  Islam  by  every 
Frenchman.  Muhammad  then  expresses  himself  as  com- 
pletely satisfied.1 


1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2710,  2723,  2765,  2817,  2818,  2834,  2837,  2840, 
2880,  2902,  2907,  2921,  3045,  3127,  3151,  3157,  3176,  3221,  3243,  3244,  3284,  3478, 
3484,  3669,  3672,  3850,  3951.  Cf.  Lumbrose:  Miscellanea  Napoleonica,  ii.  p.  333. 
The  long  rule  and  remarkable  position  which  the  Mamelukes  maintained  in  Egypt 
are  in  themselves  striking  phenomena.  This  community  of  slaves,  ruling  a  rich 
land  distant  from  their  own  original  home,  reinforced  from  time  to  time  by  addi- 
tions to  their  numbers,  slaves  who  were  destined  to  become  sovereigns,  preserved 
their  identity  and  power  for  several  centuries  in  a  country  in  which  all  races  and 
interests  mingled.  The  rise  of  the  race  was  due  to  the  weakening  Khaliphate  of 
Egypt,  which  followed  the  example  of  the  Abbassids  at  Bagdad  in  calling  Barba- 
rian peoples  from  the  north  to  support  their  tottering  rule.  This  system  was 
adopted  by  Saladin  and  the  Ayoubite  dynasty  in  order  to  protect  themselves 
from  the  servile  community  which  had  already  been  created  in  Egypt.  These  late 
comers  overthrew  the  Ayoubites,  and  formed  an  oligarchy  which  remained  in  its 
singular  isolation  and  dominant  position  even  after  an  Ottoman  Sultan,  in  151 7, 
had  usurped  the  title  of  Khalif  from  its  unworthy  titular  holder.  Crushed  but 
not  extinguished  by  the  establishment  of  Turkish  rule,  the  wane  of  that  power 
was  marked  by  the  lessening  influence  of  its  representative,  the  Pasha  of  Cairo, 
and  the  corresponding  ascendency  of  the  Mameluke  Beys.  They  imported  their 
slaves  from  Central  Asia,  and  made  those  slaves  the  rulers  over  the  oppressed 
indigenous  population.  A  few  years  before  Napoleon  invaded  Egypt,  their  chief, 
Sheik  Ali  Bey,  had  taken  advantage  of  the  war  between  the  Porte  and  Russia  to 
dismiss  the  Ottoman  Governor,  after  increasing  his  own  force  of  Mamelukes, 
then  defeating  the  Arabs  and  conquering  Syria,  he  received  the  title  of  Sultan 
and  Protector  of  the  Holy  Places  from  the  Sharif  of  Mecca.  He  had  died,  and 
Ibrahim,  the  ruling  Bey  in  1798,  was  by  no  means  as  powerful.    The  "  Demo- 


190  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

An  Arabic  poem  in  honor  of  Bonaparte  was  also  written 
about  this  time,  praising  the  destruction  of  the  Mamelukes, 
and  hailing  him  as  the  "favorite  of  victory"  and  "the  right 
eye  of  God  the  Exalted."  In  some  of  the  letters  to  the 
Sheiks  of  Palestine  certain  vague  powers  of  Kismet  were 
attributed  to  Bonaparte ;  fate  directed  his  armies,  and  oppo- 
sition was  useless.  It  was  an  idea  common  throughout  the 
East.  In  the  proclamation  of  December  21,  1798,  to  the 
people  of  Cairo  after  their  brief  revolt  there  is  a  strong 
suspicion  of  Messianic  language.  Bonaparte  claimed  in  it 
divine  inspiration  and  prescience.  Whoever  wrote  the 
document  perhaps  recalled  that  the  Fatimide  dynasty  of 
Egypt  had  been  Alyite,  and  of  the  transcendental  Shiah 
sect,  and  it  is  possible  that  he  desired  to  insinuate  the  idea 
that  the  French  general  might  be  called  to  fill  the  position 
of  Vicar  to  the  Mahdi,  which,  it  was  believed  by  the  Mus- 
lim, Jesus  was  to  occupy  at  the  coming  of  the  former;  or  it 
is  even  possible  that  he  wished  to  pose  Bonaparte  as  a  Mahdi 
himself.  He  certainly  claimed  that  his  arrival  and  conquests 
had  been  prophesied  in  writing,  which  in  the  Muhammadan 
East  can  only  mean  that  they  were  mentioned  in  the  Kuran 
or  the  Hadith.  Though  the  Kuran  does  not  speak  of  the 
Mahdi,  tradition  has  ascribed  to  Muhammad  the  promise  of 
a  leader  who  should  establish  a  just  rule  and  banish  oppres- 
sion; and  the  mission  of  Jesus  as  a  prophet  and  co-worker 
with  the  Mahdi  is  recognized.  It  is  very  interesting  to  com- 
pare the  language  of  this  proclamation  with  that  of  any  of 
the  famous  Mahdis  of  Islam.1 

cratic  slave-soldiery  "  still  existed.  Though  redoubtable  enough  to  an  Asiatic 
enemy,  it  was  totally  unable  to  meet  the  French  upon  an  equal  footing.  Muir  : 
The  Mameluke  or  Slave  Dynasty,  pp.  215,  223,  225  (App.  II.,  a  valuable  memo- 
randum by  Yacoub  Artin  Pasha).  Miiller  :  Die  Beherrscher  der  Glailbigen,  p.  45. 
1  Kermoysan  :  Recueil,  i.  p.  241.  Mimoires  sur  VE~gypte  (edition  of  1800),  i.  p. 
118.  La  Dicade  £gyptienne  (Proceedings  of  the  Institute  of  Cairo),  i.  pp.  83  et 
sea.  Courier  d'JSgypte,  No.  21.  Napoleon :  Corr.  Nos.  3785,  4020,  4022,  4096, 
4188  (Mention  of  the  alleged  Mahdi  who  appeared  at  this  time,  June,  1799). 
Darmstetter :  Mahdi,  pp.  13  et  seq.    In  Islam  Adam,  Noah,  Abraham,  Moses,  and 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  191 

Bonaparte  also  wrote  several  times  to  the  Sharif  of  Mecca, 
the  Imam  of  Muscat,  and  the  Sultan  of  Darfur.  The  great 
annual  pilgrimage  to  Mecca  is  a  religious,  political,  and  com- 
mercial event  of  the  first  rank  in  the  Muhammadan  world. 
From  every  quarter  the  little  knots  of  pilgrims  gather  until 
they  unite  in  several  immense  caravans ;  those  from  Northern 
Africa  and  Damascus  are  among  the  most  important.  The  start 
of  the  pilgrims  from  Cairo  is  a  great  occasion ;  and  the  nomina- 
tion of  the  Emir-al-Hajj,  or  leader  of  the  Pilgrimage,  for  that 
year  is  an  important  function.  Bonaparte  appointed  a  man 
to  this  office  the  year  after  he  reached  Egypt;  and  a  letter 
was  sent  to  the  Sharif  of  Mecca  by  the  Divan  of  Cairo  ask- 
ing that  the  nominee  be  accepted.  He  was  accepted,  and 
the  reply  of  the  Sharif  addressing  Bonaparte  as  the  "Pro- 
tector of  the  '  Ulema '  and  the  Friend  of  the  Holy  Ka'aba  " 
was  published.  In  addition  to  the  religious  influence  of 
such  conduct  the  trade  of  the  Red  Sea  was  important  to  the 
French;  it  was  their  only  channel  of  communication  with 
India.  Bonaparte  promised  the  caravan  from  the  Barbary 
States  that  there  should  be  no  interruption  to  its  passage 
through  Egypt;  but  after  proceeding  some  distance  on  its 
way,  it  dispersed,  not  trusting  his  assurances.  He  also 
wrote  to  the  Mullah  at  Damascus  to  the  same  effect;  but 
fanaticism  was  rife,  a  Jihad  had  been  declared,  and  it  was 
no  longer  possible  for  the  French  to  win  over  to  their  side 

Jesus  are  prophets,  each  greater  than  his  predecessor,  and  having  a  fuller  revela- 
tion from  God  to  man.  Muhammad  supersedes  all.  In  the  great  day  of  final 
conflict  Jesus  will  be  the  helper  of  the  Mahdi,  or  "  well-guided  one,"  who  is  to  end 
the  fight  by  leading  the  hosts  of  Islam  to  victory.  He  must  be  of  Muhammad's 
family,  and  possess  certain  special  characteristics.  There  have  been  many  who 
claimed  to  be  such.  Among  the  Shiahs  or  followers  of  AH,  the  idea  is  still  more 
complicated  (p.  57).  In  May,  1799,  a  Mahdi  did  arise  who  came  from  Tripoli.  He 
was  probably  in  Turkish  employ,  and  his  campaign  against  the  French  was  of 
short  duration  (p.  78).  It  appears  to  me  somewhat  forced  to  say  with  Darmstetter 
that  "  the  revolutionary  idea  among  the  French,  and  the  idea  of  the  Messiah 
among  the  Mussulmans  spring  from  the  same  instinct,  the  same  aspiration.'* 
Cf.  Hughes  :  Dictionary  of  Islam.     Article  :  Mahdi. 


f  or  THE    ' 

V       t-A  OF  J 

192  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

wholly  on  religious  grounds  any  large  body  of  Muslims.  A 
marked  change,  therefore,  is  to  be  noticed  in  Bonaparte's 
policy  as  the  year  1799  wore  on.  He  continued  writing  to 
Constantinople  of  his  friendship  to  the  Porte,  but  it  was  an 
unprofitable  business ;  and  he  resumed  the  endeavors,  which 
he  began  soon  after  his  capture  of  Cairo,  to  win  over  Ahmad 
Pasha  of  Acre  from  his  titular  allegiance  to  the  Sultan. 
That  governor  had  deluged  Syria  with  blood  and  earned  the 
surname  of  Djezzar,  or  Butcher.  Bonaparte  wrote  him  that 
Islam  was  to  be  protected ;  that  the  Mamelukes,  his  enemies, 
were  destroyed,  and  that  if  he  would  support  the  French  his 
own  personal  authority  would  be  increased.  To  the  Pasha  of 
Damascus  a  letter  of  the  same  tenor  was  sent.  These  incite- 
ments to  treason  were  neglected,  and  Ahmad  with  the  sup- 
port of  the  English  met  the  French  in  most  determined 
manner  at  Acre,  and  effectually  stopped  the  progress  of 
Bonaparte's  army.  Failing  this,  overtures  were  made  to  all 
who  had  suffered  despoilment  at  the  hands  of  Ahmad,  prom- 
ising revenge.  To  the  Druze  and  Matawali  sects  in  Mount 
Lebanon,  at  enmity  alike  with  Sultan  and  Pasha,  Bonaparte 
extended  his  protection,  and  guaranteed  complete  indepen- 
dence from  the  Porte,  with  an  increase  of  territory,  giving 
the  former  the  seaport  of  Beirut  and  nearly  all  Lebanon. 
The  Christian  population  probably  supported  a  nation  which 
had  been  their  protector  for  centuries,  but  the  Greeks  may 
have  been  directed  by  their  clergy  to  oppose  the  French;  the 
Greek  Patriarch  at  Constantinople,  under  Russian  guidance, 
had  issued  a  virulent  document  against  the  French  Republic 
in  the  autumn  of  1798.1 

With  the  capture  of  Malta  the  perusal  of  an  agreement 
between  the  Tzar  and  the  Knights  which  pointed  to  a  re- 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  3050,  3077,  3078,  3110,  3136,3138,  3148,  3205,  3215, 
3644,  3899,  4020,  4022,  4026,  4041,  4044-4047,  4049,  4063,  4077-4080,  4096,  4235, 
4268.  Courier  d'£gypte,  Nos.  6,  24,  35.  Marmont:  Mhnoires,  i.  p.  155.  De 
Testa :  Recueil,  i.  pp.  572  et  seq. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  1 93 

newal  of  Catherine's  Mediterranean  plans  had  assured  Bona- 
parte that  he  would  have  Russia  to  reckon  with  in  the  future. 
When  therefore   the  alliance   between  the  Sultan   and   the 
Tzar  was   consummated,   he   turned  his   fulminations   upon 
the  Russians,  as  polytheists,  the  traditional  and  implacable 
enemy  of  every  Muslim ;  then,  continuing  the  campaign  of 
letters  and  documents  sent  throughout  the  Levant  and  into 
Arabia,  he  reversed  his  attitude  toward  the  Porte,  and  im- 
peached the  orthodoxy  of  a  ruler  who  was  in  alliance  with 
other  Christian  nations  against  a  general  who  had  always 
protected  Islam.     He  declared  that  Selim  III.  had  betrayed 
the  faith,  that  Osmanly  rule  in  Egypt  was  at  an  end  forever; 
he  questioned  his  title  as  Khalif,  stirred  up  the  ever  latent 
jealousy  of  the  theological  doctors  of  Cairo  against  Constan- 
tinople, and  appealed  to  the  Sharif  of  Mecca,  as  the  "Head 
of  Islam,"  the  Descendant  of  the  Khalifs,"  the  "greatest  and 
best  of  Princes."     Egyptian  nation  there  was  none;  but  such 
an  appeal  which  asserted  the  religious  and  political  suprem- 
acy of  Mecca  over  the  Porte  could  find  a  large  audience. 
The  Muslim  of  Muhammad  was  an  Arab;  the  Muhammadan 
of  Amurath  was  an  Ottoman  Turk.     Jealous  of  the  prestige 
of  Constantinople,  recalling  the  glories  of  the  Arab  Khali- 
fate  of  Baghdad,  united  in  an  Islam  which  was  far  purer  than 
that  of  the  Ottoman,  the  Arab  tribes  of  the  South,  under  the 
leadership  of  the  Sharif  of  Mecca,  would  have  been  fit  tools 
for  Bonaparte's  use.     Race,  religion,  and  politics  were  on 
his  side.     The  success  of  the  Wahhabi  rebellion  showed  the 
possibility  of  a  purely  Arab  Islam,  fighting  with  puritanic 
zeal  and  godly  courage;  it  was  a  movement  that  could  well 
be  likened  to  the  Protestant  Reformation  in  the  West.     But 
Semitic  fanaticism  would  have  prevented  their  alliance  with 
the  French ;  and  an  agreement  between  Bonaparte  and  the 
Sharif  to  raise  the  Arab  tribes  in  opposition  to  the  Turks 
was  probably  also  impracticable;  yet  the  idea  was  undoubt- 
edly in  the  mind  of  Bonaparte;  and  such  a  scheme  under 

13 


194  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

different  circumstances  is  not  solely  of  speculative  value, 
as  students  of  the  Eastern  Question  and  of  Islam  will 
recognize.1 

The  potential  value  of  the  ports  in  Italy  and  the  Ionian 
Islands,  which  attracted  Bonaparte's  attention  during  the 
campaigns  in  1796  and  1797,  becomes  evident  when  we  con- 
sider his  policy  with  reference  to  Greece  and  the  Balkan  pen- 
insula. The  propaganda  of  revolution  which  he  began  while 
still  in  Italy  was  carried  on  by  the  Directory  after  he  sailed 
for  Egypt.  One  of  the  cleverest  political  and  religious  doc- 
uments which  has  appeared  in  connection  with  the  history  of 
the  Eastern  Question  was  published  in  October,  1798.  It 
was  an  appeal  to  the  Greeks  to  support  the  French;  it  re- 
called the  abandonment  of  the  Greeks  by  Catherine  in  1791, 
and  cited  the  alliance  between  Paul  and  the  Sultan  as  proof 
that  the  only  hope  of  Hellenic  freedom  lay  in  France.  The 
intrigues  with  Ali  Pasha  were  also  continued  by  Bonaparte 
while  at  Malta;  and  French  agents  encouraged  Passwan  Oglu 
to  rebel  against  the  Porte.  The  betrayal  of  the  French  by 
Ali,  and  the  failure  of  demonstrations  in  that  region  to  de- 
tract from  the  strength  of  the  coalition  was  a  bitter  disap- 
pointment, as  was  the  siege  and  capture  of  Corfu  by  the 
combined  Russo-Turkish  forces.  In  the  early  stages  of  the 
expedition  Bonaparte  had  depended  for  supplies  and  informa- 
tion on  that  island ;  he  urged  later  that  a  second  French 
squadron  be  formed  with  Malta  and  Corfu  as  bases,  that  the 
Spanish  and  Dutch  fleets  be  used  to  decoy  the  English  ships 
to  the  Atlantic,  and  that  in  case  the  Irish  expedition  had 
failed,  an  invasion  of  the  Morea  should  be  attempted.  The 
haste  with  which  the  allies  moved  to  the  attack  of  both  these 


1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2676,  2687,  4224,  4238,  4265,  4296,  4297,  4350,  4362. 
Courier  d'Egypte,  No.  16.  Villeneuve-Bargement :  op.  cit.  ii.  pp.  267,  277.  Mon- 
iteur,  Jan.  30,  1803.  Annual  Register,  1803,  p.  746.  Torrens  :  Wellesley,  i.  p.  172. 
Selim  III.  to  Tipu  Tib,  Sept.  20,  1798  :  "from  intercepted  letters  it  appears  that 
the  design  of  the  French  was  to  break  up  Arabia  into  separate  republics.  .  .  ." 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  1 95 

islands  shows  how  invaluable  their  possession  and  free  inter- 
course would  have  been  to  the  French.1 

Upon  the  capture  of  Malta  letters  were  sent  to  the  French 
consuls  at  Algiers,  Tripoli,  and  Tunis  with  news  of  the  re- 
lease of  the  Barbary  slaves  owned  by  the  Order.  In  Algiers 
the  destruction  of  the  Knights  was  hailed  with  joy,  until  it 
was  learned  that  Bonaparte  was  bound  for  Egypt.  The  news 
of  Nelson's  victory  on  August  1,  the  outbreak  of  open  war 
between  the  Porte  and  France  and  the  direct  command  of  the 
Sultan  to  his  vassal  provinces  that  all  Frenchmen  were  to  be 
treated  as  enemies,  worked  wide-spread  disaster  to  French 
interests  in  that  state.  All  the  Frenchmen  in  Algiers  were 
arrested  in  December,  1798,  and  their  property  seized.  This 
possible  ally  or  agent  of  communication  with  France  was 
thus  rendered  totally  useless  to  Bonaparte.  Yussuf  Pasha, 
of  Tripoli,  on  the  contrary  remained  friendly;  and  Beaussier, 
the  French  consul,  was  enabled  to  send  provisions  to  Malta, 
and  to  communicate  with  Egypt  and  with  Italy.  The  Eng- 
lish soon  interfered,  however,  seized  the  consul,  and  forbade 
the  Pasha  to  assist  Bonaparte,  who  had  been  sending  many 
letters  via  Derne  to  Tripoli.  In  Tunis  there  had  been  no 
such  outbreak  as  at  Algiers,  but  the  English  acted  there  as 
they  had  at  Tripoli.  Morocco  had  also  refused  to  obey  the 
instructions  of  the  Porte;  but  distance  prevented  it  from 
being  of  service  to  France.2 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2615,  2662-2663,  2683,  2687,  2960-2964,  3034,  3036, 
3056,  3063-3065,  3146,  3245,  3749-3750,  3764,  3774-3775'  3777-  Intercepted  Corr. 
i.  p.  242  ;  ii.  p.  232.  Rodoconachi :  op.  cit.  pp.  86,  92,  98,  102.  De  Testa  :  op.  cit. 
i.  pp.  557  et  seq.     Zinkeisen  :  Gesch.  Osman.  Retches,  vii.  pp.  42,  84  et  seq. 

2  Mercier :  Hist.  d'Afrique,  iii.  pp.  448  et  seq.,  452  et  seq.,  468,  489.  Ber- 
brugger :  Alger  sous  le  Consulat,  in  Revue  Africaine,  xv.  pp.  258,  324,  329  et  seq., 
401,  411  et  seq.  Devoulx :  Rats  Hamidou,  pp.  35  et  seq.  (The  denunciations  of 
the  Porte  against  the  French  were  bitter).  Cf.  R.  Afric.  xix.  p.  24.  Ferand : 
Ephimerides  cfun  secretaire,  in  R.  A.  xviii.  pp.  305  et  seq.  Extract  from  the 
Arabic  diary  of  a  secretary  to  the  Dey  of  Algiers  (1775-1805):  "The  French, 
enemies  of  God,  captured  by  treason  the  city  of  Alexandria  during  the  month  of 
Muharrem  1213.  .  .  .  Islam  has  suffered  a  blow,  and  the  enemy  of  God  has  won 


V 


196  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

So  much  attention  has  been  centred  on  the  history  of  the 
relations  between  Bonaparte  and  the  Directory  that  it  is 
unnecessary  to  dilate  upon  them ;  the  situation  of  the  army 
in  Egypt  and  the  work  accomplished  by  it  have  also  been 
thoroughly  discussed  by  many  writers.  When  approaching 
Egypt,  Bonaparte  had  addressed  his  soldiers  as  Frenchmen, 
representatives  of  a  country  whose  interest  in  the  East  was 
a  corollary  to  its  national  existence.  The  reports  he  sent 
home  were  for  the  most  part  exaggerated  and  fancifully  col- 
ored accounts  which  magnified  a  skirmish  into  a  battle  and 
changed  a  retreat  into  strategy.  Distance  lent  enchantment, 
and  the  "great  desertion"  ended  with  a  triumphal  progress 
across  France.  The  disaster  which  cut  the  communications 
with  France  was  the  annihilation  of  the  French  navy  in  the 
Mediterranean.  Prior  to  this  battle  Napoleon  had  written 
despondently  to  his  brother  Joseph,  speaking  of  a  possible 
sudden  return  to  France.  Before  sailing,  October  had  been 
mentioned  in  Paris  as  the  date  when  he  expected  to  come 
back;  but  the  defeat  of  August  1  instead  of  hastening  his 
departure  confirmed  him  in  the  intention  to  remain  longer 
in  Egypt.  It  is  unfair  to  say,  therefore,  that  Bonaparte  fore- 
saw disaster  soon  after  his  arrival,  and  desired  to  desert  his 
army  for  months  prior  to  his  stealthy  departure.  He  was 
supreme  on  land,  and  for  some  months  his  losses  continued 
to  be  insignificant.  There  was  in  war  and  politics  an  uncer- 
tainty; and  either  in  East  or  West  there  might  have  arisen 
at  almost  any  time  contingencies  which  would  have  deprived 
the  coalition  of  its  strength.  These  chances  Bonaparte  took. 
In  Egypt  he  declared  that  "  if  the  English  continue  to  hold 

a  victory.  May  God  in  his  omnipotence  free  his  children  from  this  calamity." 
This  is  an  interesting  illustration  of  the  solidarity  of  Islam.  Ferand :  Annates 
Tripoli  tat  nes,  in  R.  A.  xxvii.  p.  219.  Napoleon  :  Corr.  Nos.  2665,  2966,  3043,  3050, 
31%3>  35°4>  373°-3732>  4349»  435$,  4359-  Pajol :  Kleber,  p.  303.  Nelson: 
Despatches,  iii.  pp.  293,  301,  338  ;  iv.  p.  125.  The'English  also  posed  as  the  friends 
of  Islam  and  the  Porte,  and  declared  they  fought  against  the  French  as  atheists 
and  robbers. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE  ORIENT  197 

{inonder)  the  Mediterranean  they  will  perhaps  compel  us  to  \  / 
do  greater  things  than  we  intended."  Early  in  the  campaign 
he  recurred  to  the  position  which  had  been  taken  by  some 
with  regard  to  the  projected  invasion  of  England  in  1798, 
and  suggested  that  if  the  war  showed  no  sign  of  coming  to 
an  end  the  evacuation  of  Egypt  might  be  the  price  of  peace. 
He  asserted  from  first  to  last  the  great  value  of  that  province 
to  France  as  a  menace  to  Great  Britain.  From  another  point 
of  view  it  is  no  exagggeration  to  say  that  the  invasion  of 
Syria  was  a  radical  move  toward  a  settlement  of  the  Eastern 
Question.  It  is  useless  to  discuss  the  possible  results  if 
Acre  had  fallen;  yet  it  seems  probable  that  the  immediate 
effects  of  a  successful  campaign  in  Syria  with  all  that  was 
bound  to  follow  would  have  done  much  to  alter  the  history 
of  Europe  and  Asia  at  least  for  the  succeeding  quarter- 
century.1 

Turning  now  from  West  and  North,  we  must  examine  con- 
ditions and  plans  in  the  further  East ;  the  Egyptian  Expedi- 
tion loses  its  true  significance  if  it  be  treated  wholly  as 
European  history;  indeed  the  study  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury is  not  complete  if  the  contemporary  history  of  Asia  be 
neglected.  The  present  Viceroy  of  India,  Lord  Curzon,  has 
well  expressed  the  inherent  fact  in  the  history  of  Asiatic 
dominion:  "The  possession  of  India  is  the  inalienable  badge 
of  sovereignty  in  the  Eastern  hemisphere.     Since  India  was 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  2710,  2765,  2874,  3045,  3051,  3059,  3065,  3083,  3084, 
3°9r>  336S  3528>  3538>  3886,  3897>  3938»  4012,  4021,  4035  (the  grandiloquent 
announcement  —  On  Feb.  23,  "  nous  couchames  en  Asie  "),  4086,  4087,  4091, 4092, 
4101,  4102,  4124,  4136,  4138,  4156,  4323,  4329.  Marmont:  Memoires,  i.  pp.  261, 
278.  Segur  :  Hist,  et  Mimoires,  i.  pp.  439,  440  (the  famous  passage  in  which  Bona- 
paite  speaks  of  marching  on  Constantinople,  establishing  a  new  Eastern  Empire,  y/ 
overthrowing  Austria  and  returning  to  Paris  across  Europe).  Intercepted  Corre- 
spondence, i.  p.  137  ;  ii.  p.  ix.,  note.  Du  Casse  :  Mem.  et  Corr.  du  Roi  Joseph,  i.  p. 
189.  Napoleon  to  Joseph,  Cairo,  July  25,  1798:  "Egypt  is  a  rich  country,  but 
there  is  no  money  to  pay  the  troops.  I  can  be  with  you  in  two  months.  I  desire 
to  retire  from  public  life  and  live  in  the  country.  For  me  at  29  glory  has  faded." 
There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  authenticity  of  this  letter. 


198  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

known,  its  masters  have  been  lords  of  half  the  world.  The 
impulse  that  drew  an  Alexander,  a  Timur,  and  a  Baber  east- 
wards to  the  Indus  was  the  same  that  ...  all  but  gave  to 
France  the  Empire  which  England  "  won.  Annihilation  or 
Empire  was  the  principle  that  governed  the  struggle  which 
decided  that  there  should  be  English  and  not  French  domin- 
ion in  India.  Whichever  won,  the  victorious  side  could  not 
remain  either  a  trading  company  or  a  band  of  military  adven- 
turers; it  must  become  a  political  sovereign.  The  Egyp- 
tian Expedition  was  an  important  factor  in  the  conclusion  of 
that  struggle;  and  its  results  were  in  fact  more  important 
than  the  events  themselves.1 

The  works  of  Colonel  Malleson  have  rehabilitated  the  his- 
tory of  the  period;  but  it  is  still  common  enough  among  some 
students  to  regard  the  struggle  between  France  and  Great 
Britain  in  India  as  ended  by  the  time  of  the  Revolution.  It 
appears,  however,  that  if  France  had  almost  abandoned  the 
contest,  Frenchmen  were  by  no  means  so  ready  to  withdraw 
from  the  field.  The  military  adventurers  who  served  in 
India  at  this  time  were  a  continual  source  of  anxiety  to  the 
British ;  and  their  presence,  in  command  of  strong  native  and 
European  forces,  together  with  the  connection  which  some  of 
them  maintained  with  the  states  most  antagonistic  to  Great 
Britain ;  whether  in  Europe  or  Asia,  sufficed  to  call  forth  the 
energies  of  the  men  who  directed  the  affairs  of  that  country 
in  the  East,  in  a  determined  effort  to  exclude  all  persons  of 
French  blood  from  the  service  of  native  princes,  to  cripple 
the  power  of  the  greater  Indian  states,  and  to  extend  the 
political  ascendency  of  Great  Britain  over*  an  ever  increasing 
area.2 

1  Curzon  :  Persia,  i.  p.  4.  Rapson :  Struggle  between  France  and  England, 
pp.  3  et  sea.,  II,  106.     Seeley:  Expansion  of  England,  pp.  40  et  sea. 

2  Malleson  :  French  in  India,  and  Final  French  Struggles  in  India,  pp.  158, 175 
etseq.,  195  et  sea.,  241,  244  et  sea.  Compton  :  European  Military  Adventurers  of 
Hindustan,  pp.  7  et  sea.,  I$et  sea.,  221  et  sea.  Malcolm  :  History  of  India,  i.  p.  195. 
Bar  be  :  Le  Nahab  Reni  Madec,  passim.    Kirkpatrick  :  Select  letters  of  Tippoo  Sultan, 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE  ORIENT  199 

The  weakness  of  the  French  navy  has  also  led  many  to 
suppose  that  the  English  flag  was  supreme  on  the  Indian 
Ocean;  yet  prior  to  the  Revolution  the  contest  on  sea  be- 
tween the  rival  powers  had  been  by  no  means  unequal. 
Some  of  the  English  naval  historians  have  suppressed  and 
distorted  the  history  of  this  period ;  and  it  has  only  been  of 
recent  years  that  research  and  fairness  have  secured  to 
French  sailors  their  meed  of  praise.  At  the  outbreak  of 
war  in  1793  the  regular  naval  forces  of  France  were  un- 
doubtedly inferior  to  those  of  her  enemy;  but  the  privateers 
which  were  despatched  from  the  lies  de  France  and  de  Bour- 
bon made  this  preponderance  avail  English  Asiatic  commerce 
but  little;  between  1793  and  1797  they  captured  2266  Eng- 
lish merchant  ships  as  against  375  French,  taken  by  the 
English.  The  profits  were  enormous,  and  while  the  French 
home  ports  suffered  greatly  during  the  war,  these  colonies 
grew  rich.  Thus  it  will  be  seen,  that  if  the  Republic  were 
herself  weak  in  India,  the  possible  united  strength  of  the 

Appendix  L.  An  outline  of  Tippoo  Sultan's  military  establishment.  During  the  last 
years  of  the  century  Tipii  Tib,  an  inveterate  Anglophobe,  seemed  about  again  to  at- 
tack the  English  establishments  ;  French  soldiers  were  in  power  with  the  Nizam  and 
Sindhia.  The  court  of  Puna  was  under  the  control  of  the  latter  chief,  and  the  Raja 
of  Berar  was  certainly  not  friendly  to  the  English.  Tipii  could  bring  into  the  field  in 
Mysore  between  50,000  and  75,000  men,  including  the  "  European  or  French  force  " 
of  nearly  600  officers  and  men.  The  Nizam  of  Haidarabad,  Ali  Khan,  had  some 
70,000  irregular  infantry  and  a  trained  body  of  14,000  men  and  guns  under  Piron, 
who  had  succeeded  the  famous  Raymond  in  the  Nizam's  service ;  and  Daolat 
Rao  Sindhia  had  40,000  disciplined  infantry,  380  guns,  and  300  European  officers 
under  Perron,  who  had  taken  command  of  this  splendid  fighting  machine,  which 
the  talents  of  De  Boigne  had  created  for  his  predecessor  Madhaji  Sindhia.  The 
dream  of  the  last  named  ruler  had  been  to  unite  all  the  native  princes  of  India 
under  Maratha  leadership  against  the  English.  He  had  disapproved  of  Tipii's 
first  war  against  them,  for  he  realized  that  no  native  sovereign  could  successfully 
fight  them  alone.  The  total  strength  of  the  Maratha  powers  under  the  Peshwa 
had  amounted  to  140,000  men  at  the  battle  of  Kardla  in  1795,  of  which  23,000 
horse,  foot,  and  artillery  were  officered  and  trained  by  Europeans,  for  the  most 
part  Frenchmen.  Teignmouth  :  Life,  i.  pp.  261,  267,  285,  319,  327-329,  333,  334.' 
Cornwaliis  :  Corr.  ii.  pp.  53  et  sea.  Castonnet  des  Fosses,  in  Rev.  de  la  Revol.  i. 
P-  337- 


200  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

enemies  of  England  offered  to  the  French  a  strong  weapon 
for  attack,  while  at  sea  the  trade  of  their  rivals  suffered 
serious  injury.1 

In  1798,  of  the  three  strong  native  powers  of  India,  each 
possessed  bodies  of  well  disciplined  troops  under  the  com- 
mand of  French  officers;  the  Sultan  of  Mysore,  Tipu  Tib, 
was  the  one  most  relied  on  by  the  French  to  create  a  diver- 
sion in  the  far  East,  thus  assisting  the  French  cause  in  the 
Levant,  and  threatening  English  dominion  in  Asia.  Indeed, 
Bonaparte's  imagination  may  have  carried  the  plan  still  fur- 
ther; before  leaving  Paris  he  had  asked  for  a  copy  of  Ren- 
nell's  work  and  for  maps  of  the  River  Ganges;  he  had 
ordered  Piveron,  formerly  in  the  employ  of  Tipu  to  accom- 
pany the  expedition;  and  the  naval  forces  of  the  lie  de 
France  had  been  directed  to  report  at  Suez  and  await  his 
orders,  with  as  large  a  number  of  transports  as  could  be 
gathered  in  those  waters.  Previous  to  this,  Tipu,  who  had 
been  on  intimate  terms  with  the  French  in  the  past,  as  has 
been  noted  in  a  preceding  chapter,  had  written  to  the  Direc- 
tory and  expressed  a  desire  for  the  cementing  of  their  "an- 
cient alliance."  Tipu  was  a  fanatical  Muslim,  and  his  call 
to  the  other  princes  for  &  Jihad  against  all  infidels,  together 
with  the  arrogant  tone  he  often  assumed  even  toward  his 
allies,  the  French,  show  that  his  union  with  France  against 
England  was  only  a  stronger  sign  of  his  intense  hatred  of  the 
latter  power.  The  tentative  draft  of  a  treaty  of  offensive 
alliance  between  Mysore  and  France  was  sent  with  the  above 
letter  to  the  Directory.  At  this  time,  April,  1797,  there 
existed  in  his  capital,  Seringapatam,  a  French  Jacobin  Club, 
which  held  ecstatic  meetings,  discharged  cannon,  and  swore 

1  Villele :  Memoires,  i.  pp.  86  et  seq.,  92,  101,  107.  Malleson  :  Final  French 
Struggles,  p.  8 1 .  D'Epinay  :  Renseignements pour  sei-vir  a  Phistoire  de  Vile  de  France, 
pp.  369  et  seq.  The  daily  entries  from  June  3,  1793,  on  m  tn^s  curious  and  other- 
wise very  faulty  book,  show  beyond  a  doubt  that  the  damage  inflicted  on  English 
commerce  was  enormous.  The  figures  given  in  the  text,  however,  are  from  Eng- 
lish sources. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  201 

allegiance  to  Tipu  and  the  French  Republic,  but  eternal 
hatred  toward  the  British.  Some  months  later  Ripaud,  one 
of  the  leaders  in  the  club,  was  sent  to  the  He  de  France  with 
ambassadors  bearing  letters  from  Tipu.  Three  days  after 
their  arrival,  January  18,  1798,  Malartic,  the  Governor,  for- 
warded the  despatches  to  France.  They  were  in  the  main 
identical  with  the  letter  of  (  the  previous  April,  and  reached 
Rochefort  on  September  5,  1798.  On  January  30,  Malartic 
issued  a  proclamation  setting  forth  the  intentions  and  desires 
of  Tipu  Tib,  calling  on  all  Frenchmen  for  aid;  enlistment 
in  the  Sultan's  service  was  urged,  and  liberal  pay  promised; 
war  against  the  English  was  to  be  carried  on  until  the 
latter  were  expelled  from  India.  On  the  receipt  at  Paris  of 
Malartic's  enclosures  the  Minister  of  Marine  presented  a 
report  on  the  situation  (September  18,  1798).  It  recounted 
the  celebrations  under  the  auspices  of  the  Jacobin  Club  at 
Seringapatam  and  stated  the  proposals  of  Tipu  Tib  "  to  make 
joint  war  with  France  until  no  English  remain  in  India." 
The  report  then  went  on  to  review  the  offers  previously 
made  by  the  Sultan.  In  October,  1794,  and  in  April,  1796, 
identical  proposals  had  been  presented  by  that  Prince.  The 
minister  advised  acceptance  of  the  plans  as  given,  and  sug- 
gested a  demonstration  by  the  forces  of  Spain  and  the  Bata- 
vian  Republic  in  the  Indies  to  assist  him,  "whose  only 
object  is  to  destroy  the  power  of  England  in  India.  It  is 
to  the  interests  of  the  French  Republic  to  second  him  in 
his  designs."  On  October  26,  the  Directory  approved  in- 
structions given  to  Louis  Monneron  to  send  a  ship  from  the 
He  de  France  to  the  Red  Sea  in  order  to  open  communica- 
tions with  Bonaparte,  and  to  secure  information  regarding 
the  course  of  events  in  India,  particularly  of  the  position  of 
Tipu  Sultan,  and  also  to  take  steps  to  maintain  the  present 
friendly  relations  with  that  Prince.  He  was  to  assure  Tipu 
that  the  Directory  would  count  upon  him  when  the  time 
came  to  act  effectively  against  the  common  enemy,  and  that 


202  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

he  would  be  informed  when  to  prepare  for  this.  On  Novem- 
ber 4,  the  Directory  attempted  to  communicate  to  Napoleon 
what  had  occurred,  and  to  lay  before  him  several  plans  of 
action.  They  pointed  out  that  since  the  control  of  the 
Mediterranean  was  in  the  hands  of  the  English,  a  return  to 
France  would  be  difficult.  The  critical  situation  of  Turkey 
seemed  to  indicate  the  speedy  dissolution  of  that  Empire  and 
the  consequent  partition  of  its  territories;  Russia,  Austria, 
and  Prussia  were  intriguing  at  present  to  profit  by  such  an 
event,  and  if  France  were  to  secure  her  portion,  a  march  on 
Constantinople  would  be  necessary.  A  treaty  with  Tipii 
Sultan  had  been  negotiated  but  not  yet  signed,  and  if  Napo- 
leon's eye  had  turned  toward  India,  Citizen  Louis  Monneron 
would  be  able  to  assist  him.  With  the  General  alone,  how- 
ever, rested  the  decision.  Three  plans  suggested  themselves : 
To  remain  in  Egypt,  establishing  there  a  position  secure 
against  the  attacks  of  the  Turks,  though  remembering  that 
certain  seasons  of  the  year  were  very  injurious  to  Europeans ; 
to  penetrate  into  India,  where  he  would  doubtless  find  men 
ready  to  join  him  in  overthrowing  the  rule  of  the  British;  or 
finally  to  march  toward  Constantinople  to  meet  the  enemy 
who  menaced  him.  This  letter  reached  Bonaparte  in  March. 
In  India  Tipu  had  received  letters  from  many  French  officials 
at  the  lie  de  France  promising  aid  and  urging  an  attack  on 
the  East  India  Company;  on  July  20  he  had  written  again 
to  the  Directory,  outlining  a  treaty  of  eleven  articles,  and 
appointing  Dubuc,  a  Frenchman,  his  ambassador  at  Paris. 
That  officer  proposed  a  union  of  native  forces  in  India  to 
oust  the  English;  it  was  a  plan  such  as  Mahadji  Sindhia  had 
dreamed  of;  the  possibility  of  its  realization  was  a  nightmare 
to  British  officials.1 

1  Napoleon :  Corr.  Nos.  2473,  2498,  2509.  (Piveron  did  not  reach  Egypt. 
Boulay :  op.  cit.  p.  227.)  Henry:  Route  de  I'lnde,  pp.  386,  404  et  seg.,  431  (the 
French  had  exaggerated  ideas  regarding  the  strength  of  Tipu).  Wellesley : 
Despatches,  i.  p.  viii.  (proclamation  of  Malartic,  Jan.  30,  1798),  p.  710;  ii.  pp.  57, 
note  (Dubuc  to  Tipii,  Dec.  16,  1798),  740  et  seq.\  v.  pp.  1  (Tipu  to  the  Direc- 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE  ORIENT  20$ 

Returning  now  for  a  short  time  to  trace  the  course  of  pub- 
lic opinion  in  Great  Britain,  we  find  that  a  French  expedi- 
tion to  India  did  not  appear  impossible  to  the  English 
ministry  in  1798,  nor  to  the  East  India  Company.  The 
effect  of  this  feeling  has  a  value  in  history  independent  of 
the  fact  whether  it  appears  to-day  that  Bonaparte  did  or  did 
not  plan  to  attack  India.  The  military  and  naval  experts 
may  or  may  not  consider  it  possible  for  him  to  have  suc- 

tory.  April  2,  1797),  6  (Tipu  to  French  officials  at  lie  de  France,  April  21, 1797),  8 
et  seq.  (replies  to  the  above,  March  1798),  14  (Tipu  to  the  Directory,  July  20, 1798, 
enclosing  a  treaty  of  eleven  articles.  This  did  not  leave  Tanquebar  till  Feb.  1799). 
Salmond  :  War  in  Mysore,  pp.  52  et  seq.,  56;  Appendix  A,  Document  No.  1  (Tipu 
to  Directory,  Oct.  9,  1797)  ;  Appendix  A,  No.  15;  Appendix  B,  No.  1  (treaty  of 
20  articles  proposed  by  Tipu,  April  2,  1797).  He  engaged  on  his  part  to  provide 
with  food  all  French  troops  immediately  upon  their  arrival  on  his  coast,  to  ad- 
vance money  for  equipments  on  land  and  sea,  to  secure  bullocks  and  camels  for 
the  artillery  train  and  baggage,  to  supply  lack  of  gunpowder  and  ammunition, 
and  to  co-operate  in  all  campaigns  with  the  French  with  30,000  cavalry  and  3,000 
infantry,  fully  equipped.  They,  on  the  other  hand,  were  not  to  make  peace  to 
his  exclusion  or  without  his  consent,  he  was  to  be  a  party  to  every  treaty  made 
by  them,  and  the  French  generals  were  not  to  take  the  initiative  in  any  action  with- 
out his  approval.  France  was  to  reimburse  him  at  the  termination  of  the  war 
for  expenses  into  which  he  had  entered,  and  an  equal  division  of  territory  and 
spoil  should  be  faithfully  carried  out,  except  in  the  case  of  such  lands  as  were 
formerly  his.  Goa  should  be  his,  but  the  Directorate  was  to  have  Bombay.  The 
French  were  to  supply  between  five  and  ten  thousand  regular  troops,  and  twenty- 
five  to  thirty  thousand  "  new  citizens,"  or  free  native  colonial  militia  for  the  war, 
which  was  to  be  directed  against  the  English  and  Portuguese,  and  if  necessary 
against  the  Marathas  and  the  Nizam.  Pledges  were  to  be  immediately  exchanged 
to  carry  out  this  treaty.  As  Ripaud  did  not  leave  India  till  the  autumn,  these 
articles  were  probably  not  forwarded  in  April.  Salmond,  Appendix  B,  No.  12 
(Gen.  Cossigny  to  Tipu's  ambassadors,  Pondicherry,  March  5, 1798) ;  Appendix  B, 
Nos.  22,  23.  Asiatic  Annual  Register,  1798-99.  Supple,  to  the  Chronicle,  pp.  246 
et  seq.  Mill :  Hist,  of  India,  vi.  pp.  70  et  seq.  (an  unsatisfactory  account).  Miles  : 
History  of  Tipii  Sultan,  pp.  252  et  seq.  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe :  op.  cit.  pp.  59  et 
seq.  (Bonaparte  had  received  letters  of  credence  addressed  in  blank  for  the  Indian 
princes,  April  22,  1798),  227  et  seq.,  281,  283  et  seq.  (Some  of  the  letters  are  given 
from  the  French  sources.)  To  secure  a  good  understanding  of  Tipu's  feeling 
toward  the  French  and  English  it  is  well  to  read  some  of  his  other  letters.  Cf. 
Kirkpatrick  :  Select  Letters,  pp.  13,  139,  178,  291,  369,376,  395,  435,  456,  462.  See 
also,  Asiatic  Annual  Register.  Col.  Kirkpatrick  has  given  44  more  letters.  Ren- 
nell :   Carte  generale  de  FInde,  etc.,  trans,  from  Eng.  by  J.  Bernoulli. 


y 


204  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

ceeded  if  he  had  tried  it;  but  in  this  matter  as  in  many 
others,  it  is  as  important  to  note  what  one  power  thought 
its  opponent  might  do  as  to  record  the  actual  events  which 
took  place.  Mr.  Udney  had  written  to  Lord  Grenville  from 
Leghorn  on  April  16,  1798,  saying  that  he  had  certain  in- 
formation that  Alexandria  or  some  port  in  the  Black  Sea 
was  the  destination  of  Bonaparte's  expedition,  which  was  to 
number  fifty  thousand  men.  The  Ottoman  Empire  would 
not  oppose  it,  for  the  blow  was  eventually  to  strike  at  the 
power  of  the  East  India  Company  in  India.  Whether  access 
to  that  country  should  be  obtained  by  the  Gulf  of  Persia,  by 
land  from  Egypt,  or  by  the  Red  Sea,  troops  could  be  for- 
warded now  or  later;  for  with  Alexandria,  Cairo,  and  Suez 
in  French  hands,  even  in  time  of  peace,  opportunity  for 
hostile  alliances  and  rebellions  in  India  could  be  greatly 
increased  and  English  control  weakened.  In  May  Henry 
Dundas,  President  of  the  Board  of  Commissioners  for  Affairs 
in  India,  had  received  like  information  with  the  more  definite 
statements  that  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  reported  to  have 
consented  to  a  plan  which  included  the  seizure  of  Egypt;  the 
French  army  was  to  march  north  to  Persia,  and  on  to  the 
Indus,  "  crossing  near  where  Alexander  did,  and  from  thence 
advance  into  British  territories."  His  correspondent  con- 
tinued that  French  agents  had  been  at  work  throughout  the 
East  for  some  time  past,  securing  concessions  from  several 
princes,  and  had  concerted  with  Tipu  Tib  for  a  joint  cam- 
paign. Bonaparte's  personal  ambition,  and  the  prospect  of 
establishing  himself  in  a  more  independent  position  than 
was  possible  in  Italy,  were  thought  to  be  prime  factors  in 
this  attack  on  England.  Mr.  Dundas  wrote  to  Lord  Gren- 
ville forwarding  a  brief  memoir  in  which  he  portrayed  the 
advantages  which  the  possession  of  Egypt  held  forth  to  the 
French ;  and  he  analyzed  in  his  own  letter  the  various  reports 
current  concerning  Bonaparte's  plans,  rejecting  the  Black 
Sea  route  to  India  as  impracticable  unless  with  the  co-op- 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE  ORIENT  20$ 

eration  of  Russia  and  pointing  out  that  the  strength  of  the 
English  squadron  in  Indian  waters  rendered  the  sea  passage 
from  Suez  too  hazardous  for  the  French  to  attempt;  but  he 
acknowledged  that  the  land  route  was  traversable,  and  that  it 
presented  no  insuperable  obstacles.  To  meet  an  attack  from 
this  quarter  a  rapid  increase  of  the  English  forces  in  India 
was  urged.  He  recalled  the  fact  that  the  possession  of 
Egypt  had  been  for  a  long  time  an  object  in  French  politics, 
and  that  Baron  de  Tott  had  been  sent  several  years  before  to 
survey  the  levels  and  report  on  the  roads  practicable  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Suez.  To  his  mind  the  belief  on  the  part  of 
the  French  Government  that  a  seizure  of  Egypt  would  be 
the  most  effectual  means  of  undermining  the  British  power 
in  India,  was  at  the  root  of  the  matter.  Mr.  Dundas  wrote 
on  June  16  to  the  Earl  of  Mornington  (Richard  Wellesley), 
the  new  Governor-General  of  India,  that  if  Bonaparte's  ex- 
pedition were  actually  destined  for  Egypt,  he  considered  it 
"  to  be  a  great  and  a  masterly  stroke,  and  if  successful  [one 
that]  would  be  attended  with  very  pernicious  consequences 
to  the  interests  of  this  country."  Jacob  Bousanquet,  Chair- 
man of  the  Court  of  Directors  of  the  Company,  wrote  to  the 
Governor  of  Bombay  that  while  he  doubted  the  success  of 
Bonaparte,  he  was  greatly  alarmed  for  Egypt  and  India,  for 
the  projects  did  not  seem  wholly  impossible  to  him.  Nelson, 
while  searching  for  the  French  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean, 
had  also  expressed  his  anxiety  by  writing  Earl  Spencer  on 
June  15,  1798,  that  if  the  French  fleet  had  gone  east  of  Sicily 
he  should  believe  that  they  were  bound  for  Alexandria,  and 
were  set  on  "getting  troops  to  India  —  a  plan  concerted  with 
Tippoo  Saib,  by  no  means  so  difficult  as  might  at  first  view 
be  imagined."  The  last  week  of  June  he  was  firmly  con- 
vinced that  such  was  the  plan,  and  wrote  inquiring  if  any 
transports  had  been  collected  in  the  Red  Sea  to  carry  the 
French  troops.  His  thought,  after  the  destruction  of  the 
French  fleet  on  August  1,  was  to  despatch  news  of  the  victory 


206  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

to  India,  for  he  reasoned  that  Bonaparte's  Indian  schemes 
would  be  spoiled  by  the  loss  of  his  Mediterranean  squadron.1 
In  India  directly  upon  the  receipt  of  this  news  the  Earl  of 
Mornington  wrote  to  Tipii  reporting  the  complete  defeat  of 
the  French.  The  news  of  Malartic's  proclamation  of  Janu- 
ary 30,  had  reached  India  some  months  previous,  and  a  pro- 
test had  been  sent  to  the  Sultan  of  Mysore;  but  that  ruler 
had  declared  his  friendship  for  the  English  while  at  the  same 
time  he  continued  his  correspondence  with  the  French.  The 
British  representative  at  Constantinople  had  influenced  the 
Sultan,  Selim  III.,  as  Khalif  of  the  Muslim  world,  to  write 
to  Tipii  warning  him  that  the  French  were  bent  on  "effacing 
the  religion  of  the  Prophet  from  the  face  of  the  earth." 
This  letter  was  forwarded  by  the  Governor-general  of  India 
to  Tipii  on  January  16,  1799.  The  Sultan  of  Mysore  replied 
in  a  letter  to  Selim  on  February  10  that  "in  forty  years  the 
English  had  successfully  subverted  the  Mohammedan  powers 
in  the  Carnatic,  Bengal  and  Oude  .  .  .  ,"  and  concluded  by 
asking,  "What  respect  could  a  nation  [England]  have 'for  the 
religion  of  the  Koran  who  everywhere  had  butcher-shops 
open  for  the  sale  of  pork?"  Before  arriving  in  India  Morn- 
ington had  been  warned  that  the  bodies  of  French  troops  in 

1  Wellesley :  Despatches,  i.  pp.  350,  651,  688,  692.  Cf.  Intercepted  Corr.  i.  p.  1 1 1. 
Auckland:  Corr.  iii.  p.  425.  Vorontzov:  Arkhiv,  x.  pp.  23,  28-30.  Nelson: 
Despatches,  iii.  pp.  31  (Nelson  to  Earl  Spencer,  June  15,  1798),  -^etseq.  (Nelson  to 
Baldwin,  Eng.  consul  at  Alexandria,  June  26 :  "I  am  so  persuaded  of  the  inten- 
tion of  the  French  to  attempt  driving  us  from  India  in  concert  with  Tippoo  Saib, 
that  I  shall  never  feel  secure  till  Mangalore  and  all  of  Tippoo's  coast  is  in  our 
possession  "),  40, 96,  97,  112  (Nelson  to  Lord  Minto,  off  Rhodes,  Aug.  29 :  "  I  lost 
not  a  moment  in  sending  an  officer  overland  to  India,"  after  the  battle  of  the  Nile)  ; 
vii.  p.  cxlii  (Nelson  to  Admiral  Sir  John  Jervis,  H.  M.  S.  Theseus,  June  18,  1797 : 
*'  .  .  .  Tippoo  is  as  much  our  natural  enemy  as  the  French.  .  .  .")  James :  Naval 
History,  ii.  pp.  183,  388.  An  account  of  Lieut.  Duval's  trip  to  India  after  the 
battle  of  Aug.  1.  Buckingham:  Courts  and  Cabinets,  ii.  p.  401.  (Grenville  to 
Buckingham,  June  13,  1798) :  "  It  really  looks  as  if  Bonaparte  was  after  all  in 
sober  truth  going  to  Egypt:  and  Dundas  seems  to  think  the  scheme  of  attacking 
India  from  thence  not  so  impracticable  as  it  may  appear.  I  am  still  incredulous 
as  to  the  latter  point,  though  as  to  the  former  I  am  shaken." 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE  ORIENT  207 

the  employ  of  native  rulers  must  receive  the  most  careful 
attention  by  the  British.  The  status  of  the  Nizam  of  Haida- 
rabad  in  particular  was  a  source  of  anxiety  to  him ;  the  chief 
officers  in  the  Nizam's  service,  he  wrote,  "are  Frenchmen  of 
the  most  virulent  and  notorious  principles  of  Jacobinism; 
and  the  whole  corps  constitutes  an  armed  French  party  of 
great  zeal,  diligence  and  activity."  When  he  reached  India, 
the  situation  seemed  to  him  much  more  serious;  if  the 
French  should  succeed  in  landing  any  body  of  troops  in 
India,  the  general  co-operation  of  all  the  foreign  adventurers 
with  their  native  masters  might  be  dreaded  by  the  English, 
and  the  only  way  to  prevent  a  landing  of  French  within  the 
disaffected  region  would  be  the  possession  by  the  English  of 
the  coast  of  Mysore.  In  addition  to  the  danger  of  a  union  of 
the  Niz&m,  Sindhia  and  Tipu,  there  was  the  possibility  of  an 
invasion  of  India  by  Zeman  Shah  from  the  northwest,  which 
would  receive  the  support  of  Tipu.  This  was  an  alliance  of 
two  Muslim  rulers  against  the  English,  and  also  against  the 
non-Muslim  native  states  of  India.  There  had  been  consid- 
erable correspondence  between  the  two  rulers,  and  though 
this  was  suspected  by  the  English  they  did  not  receive  the 
full  confirmation  of  it  till  the  capture  of  Tipu's  private  docu- 
ments in  May,  1799,  put  them  in  possession  of  all  the  facts. 
Col.  Arthur  Wellesley,  the  future  Duke  of  Wellington,  who 
was  at  that  time  in  India,  however,  urged  that  no  war  with 
Tipu  was  necessary  till  it  should  appear  that  the  French 
could  be  of  aid  to  him,  or  till  he  definitely  refused  the  Eng- 
lish offers  of  amicable  agreement.  He  wrote  later  to  his 
brother  the  Governor-general,  not  to  press  Tipu  into  a  war 
till  an  alliance  had  been  concluded  by  the  English  with  the 
NizSm  and  the  Maratha  powers.  In  that  way  the  Nizam's 
force  of  French-led  troops  might  give  way  to  a  correspond- 
ing force  under  English  control.  This  was  done  as  regards 
the  NizSm,  and  as  Tipu's  attitude  remained  secretly  hostile 
to  the  English,  demands  were  made  of  him  which,  if  granted 


208  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

by  him,  would  have  effectually  placed  his  state  in  a  position 
subservient  to  the  English.     He  refused  and  war  ensued.1 

The  operations  of  Bonaparte  at  Suez  and  along  the  Red  Sea 
now  receive  a  wider  meaning.  That  General  had  concerned 
himself  with  the  survey  and  occupation  of  the  Nile  Delta  and 
of  the  Isthmus  of  Suez  within  a  few  months  after  the  capture 
of  Alexandria ;  and  he  had  written  to  the  Directory  that  "mis- 
tress of  Egypt,  France  would  in  the  end  be  mistress  of  the 
Indies."  In  December  he  ordered  the  fortification  of  Suez, 
and  accompanied  by  the  French  scholars  of  the  expedition,  he 
explored  the  ancient  water-courses  of  the  Isthmus,  and  ex- 
amined the  ground  which  separated  the  Red  Sea  from  the 
Mediterranean.  Several  small  ships  were  secured  and  equipped 
for  service  on  the  Red  Sea,  a  move  which  was  hastened  by  the 
report  of  a  courier  from  India  announcing  that  Tipu  Tib  was 
about  to  take  the  field  against  the  English.  Preparations  were 
made  to  secure  good  anchorage  for  vessels  arriving  from  the 
lie  de  France,  and  an.  expedition  was  sent  to  seize  Kosseir,  on 
the  Egyptian  coast  about  a  third  of  the  distance  from  Suez  to 

1  Torrens  :  Wellesley,  i.  p.  172.  Wellesley  :  Despatches,  i.  pp.  1,  3  (Mornington 
to  Dundas,  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  Feb.  23,  1798),  61,  92  (M.  to  Dundas  July 
6),  98  (M.  to  Kirkpatrick,  July  8,  "  The  junction  which  might  thus  be  effected 
between  the  French  officers  with  their  several  corps  in  the  respective  service  of 
the  Nizam,  of  Scindiah,  and  of  Tippoo,  might  establish  the  power  of  France  and 
India  upon  the  ruin  of  the  states  of  Poonah  and  of  the  Deccan  "),  109,  125  (M. 
to  Palmer,  July  8),  138  (M.  to  Gen.  Harris,  July  18),  170,  171,  185  (the  French 
force  at  Haiderabad,  Aug.  12),  204,  321,  413  et  seg.  (M.  to  Tipu,  Jan.  16,  1799),  506 
(Chief  Justice  of  Bengal  to  Mornington,  March,  1799),  7I0J  v-  PP-  *4>  J6  et  seq. 
(Tipu  to  Zeman  Shah,  Feb.  5,  1797.  Plan  of  co-operation  of  these  rulers),  21 
(reply  to  the  above),  22  (Tipu  to  Zeman,  Jan.  30,  1799),  24  (Tipu  to  Sultan  Selim 
iii.  Feb.  10, 1799),  36  (M.  to  Gen.  Anker,  Jan.  18,  1799).  Wellington :  Supplemen- 
tary Despatches,  i.  pp.  52  et  seq.,  71  et  seq.  (Memorandum  on  the  French  force  at 
Haiderabad),  96,  97  (French  at  Calicut),  no  (considerations  on  the  war  with 
Tipu),  127,  128  (the  invasion  of  Zeman  Shah  and  the  northwest  frontier),  152 
et  seq.,  222,  230.  Mills  :  Hist,  of  India,  vi.  p.  73.  An  instance  of  the  unfairness  of 
this  writer  with  regard  to  the  Earl  of  Mornington,  which  Prof.  Wilson  corrects  in 
a  footnote.  Salmond  :  op  cit.  p.  75.  Cf.  Beatson:  The  War  with  Tippoo  Sultan, 
passim.  Bignon  :  Hist,  de  France,  i.  p.  241  (comment  on  Pitt's  Speech  of  Nov. 
27,  1800). 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  209 

Suakim.  Every  effort  was  made  to  develop  the  commerce  of 
that  region,  and  letters  were  sent  to  Muscat  and  Mecca  to  be 
forwarded  to  Tipu  in  India  and  to  the  lie  de  France.  The  one 
for  Tipu  was  secretly  communicated  to  the  English  by  a  native 
secretary  at  about  the  time  when  Mysore  was  attacked.  Bona- 
parte attached  great  strategic  importance  to  Kosseir,  and 
choice  of  it  by  the  Anglo-Indian  Expedition  in  1801  as  a  base  of 
operations  against  the  French  confirms  his  judgment.  After 
the  return  from  Syria  Bonaparte  made  still  further  efforts  to 
communicate  with  the  East,  but  by  this  time  Tipu  was  dead 
and  the  English  cruisers  were  patrolling  the  mouth  of  the  Red 
Sea.  It  does  not  appear  then  that  there  was  any  definite  plan 
to  press  on  to  India;  in  fact  even  if  there  had  been,  the  victory 
of  Nelson,  the  formation  of  the  new  coalition  in  Europe,  and 
the  difficulties  of  the  situation  in  Egypt  would  have  effectually 
prevented  any  decided  move  in  that  direction.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  view  of  the  cast  of  Bonaparte's  mind,  the  political 
dreams  of  France,  and  the  romantic  and  marvellous  success  of 
many  soldiers  of  fortune  in  India  at  that  very  period,  it  is  fair 
to  believe  that  a  continuation  of  the  Expedition  to  India  with 
the  slightest  possible  prospect  of  success  would  have  been 
welcomed  by  Bonaparte  either  for  himself  or  for  a  subordinate, 
whose  glory  in  victory  would  have  been  credited  to  his  superior, 
and  whose  failure  would  not  have  dimmed  his  superior's  fame. 
Often  worthless  as  direct  historical  evidence,  yet  of  weight  in 
a  study  of  the  ambitions  and  imaginative  characteristics  of 
Bonaparte,  his  Commentaries,  written  at  St.  Helena,  furnish 
interesting  testimony  on  this  point.  The  invasion  of  India 
from  Egypt  is  worked  out  with  detail,  and  the  attempt  is  made 
to  treat  the  entire  Expedition  to  Egypt  as  in  the  nature  of  a 
preparatory  move  toward  an  ultimate  destination  beyond  the 
Indus.1 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  291 1,  3252,  3259,  3264,  3270,  33°4,  3336,  3375,  3439, 
3490, 3519, 3602, 3624, 3649, 3697-3699, 374o,  3741, 3452, 3767, 3781, 3782, 3799-3810, 
3820,  3821,  3824,  3830,  3835,  3842,  3855,  3900,  3901,  3910,  3913,  3934,  3944,  3949, 

14 


210  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Whether  Bonaparte  planned  an  invasion  of  India  or  not,  the 
effects  of  his  invasion  of  Egypt  were  very  marked  in  India. 
Indeed  one  of  the  clearest  signs  of  the  intimate  relation  be- 
tween the  Levant  and  India  is  the  correspondence  which  was 
maintained  so  assiduously  between  the  Earl  of  Elgin,  the 
English  diplomatic  representative  at  the  Porte,  and  the  Earl 
of  Mornington,  and  between  the  latter  and  Sir  Sydney  Smith 
of  the  English  naval  force  operating  in  Syrian  and  Egyptian 
waters.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  English  ministry 
could  best  gain  the  support  of  the  country  by  catering  to  the 
popular  fear  and  hatred  of  the  French,  that  Bonaparte  was  the 

3952»  3953,  4*79>  4187,  4188,  4205,  4225,  4234,  4236,  4237.  Courier  d'Egypte, 
No.  22.  Tipu  was  reported  to  have  260,000  infantry  and  130,000  cavalry. 
Reybaud :  Mimoires,  etc.  iv.  pp.  216  et  seq.  Asiatic  Annual  Register,  1798. 
Suppl.  to  State  Papers,  p.  259.  Bonaparte  to  Tipu,  Jan.  26,  1799  (No.  3901). 
Salmond  :  op.  cit.,  page  14,  and  App.  B,  No.  25.  A  letter  from  Bonaparte  to  the 
Sharif  of  Mecca,  which  is  not  found  in  the  Correspondance,  asking  that  a  letter 
be  forwarded  to  Tipu.  It  is  shown  here  how  the  English  secured  these  letters 
from  the  Secretary  to  the  Sharif.  The  letter,  as  it  was  read  by  the  English,  is  as 
follows :  — 

French  Republic. 
Liberty.  Equality. 

Bonaparte,  member  of  the  National  Convention,  General-in-Chief,  to  the  most  mag- 
nificent Sultan,  our  greatest  friend,  Tippoo  Said. 
Headquarters   at  Cairo,  7th   Pluvoise,  7th  year  of  the  Republic,  one  and 
indivisible. 

You  have  already  been  informed  of  my  arrival  on  the  borders  of  the  Red  Sea 
with  an  innumerable  and  invincible  army,  full  of  the  desire  of  delivering  you 
from  the  iron  yoke  of  England.  I  eagerly  embrace  this  opportunity  of  testifying 
to  you  the  desire  I  have  of  being  informed  by  you,  by  the  way  of  Muscat  and 
Mocha,  as  to  your  present  political  situation.  I  would  wish  even  that  you  could 
send  some  clever  man  to  Suez  or  Cairo,  possessing  your  confidence,  with  whom 
I  might  confer. 

May  the  Almighty  increase  your  power  and  destroy  your  enemies. 

(Signed)  Bonaparte. 
A  true  translation.  (Signed)  F.  Wappers. 

Napoleon:  Comm.  ii.  pp.  184,  285,  330;  iii.  pp.  20  et  seq.,  144.  If  these  pas- 
sages could  be  admitted  as  evidence,  the  case  for  India  would  be  very  strong. 
Cf.  also,  Roseberry :  Napoleon,  the  last  Phase,  pp.  180  et  seq.,  217  et  seq. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  211 

bogey  of  English  and  Anglo-Indian  politics,  and  that  any 
measure  might  be  made  to  appear  wise  or  defensible  provided 
it  could  be  shown  that  it  was  destined  to  thwart  the  schemes 
of  that  leader.  Mornington's  ejaculation  to  Dundas  after  Tipu's 
death,  and  after  the  alliance  with  the  Nizam  had  broken  French 
paramountcy  in  that  court,  is  full  of  this  feeling.  He  wrote, 
"  The  French  influence  in  India,  thanks  be  to  God !  is  now 
nearly  extirpated."  He  pleaded  that  at  the  conclusion  of  peace 
neither  France  nor  Holland  might  receive  any  restoration  of 
territory  in  India.  He  believed  that  Nelson's  victory  on 
August  i  was  what  saved  India  from  an  invasion  by  the 
French;  and  he  set  about  the  definite  policy  of  undermining 
French  influence  with  Sindhia,  thereby  reducing  the  military 
strength  of  the  Maratha  leader,  freeing  the  Peshwa  at  Puna 
from  his  control,  and  ejecting  from  one  native  court  after  an- 
other the  various  French  adventurers,  who  to  his  mind  repre- 
sented the  slightest  menace  to  absolute  English  hegemony  in 
that  portion  of  Asia.  The  treaty  which  was  negotiated  on 
February  21,  1798,  with  Oudh  is  an  earnest  of  this  policy,  and 
Article  XV.  is  the  forerunner  of  similar  provisions  to  ex- 
clude Europeans  from  Indian  service  unless  by  consent  of  the 
East  India  company,  which  are  to  be  found  in  every  treaty  or 
convention  negotiated  with  any  Asiatic  power  during  the  next 
fifteen  years.  This  political  scheme  could  be  best  followed  to 
its  completion  by  treating  it  as  a  complement  to  the  struggle 
over  the  treaty  of  Amiens  (1802-03).  For  the  present  we 
must  notice  the  other  directions  in  which  this  English  expan- 
sion moved  as  a  result  of  the  war  with  France.  Arthur  Wel- 
lesley  was  one  of  the  first  of  the  English  officers  to  advocate 
measures  which  looked  beyond  the  mainland  of  India;  as 
early  as  July,  1797,  he  wrote  to  his  brother:  "Mauritius  [lie  de 
France]  ought  to  be  taken.  As  long  as  the  French  have  an 
establishment  there  Great  Britain  cannot  call  herself  safe  in 
India."  He  likewise  advocated  the  possession  of  Pulo  Penang 
Straits  on  the  west  coast  of  the  Malay  Peninsula,  as  the  future 


2 1 2  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

mart  of  India  and  China,  the  repair  shop  of  the  East.  That 
office  is  now  filled  by  Singapore  in  the  Straits  Settlement ;  but 
the  far  look  ahead  toward  China  and  the  Philippines  was 
characteristic  of  the  determination  of  the  British  to  allow  no 
strategic  point,  no  important  market  to  escape  their  control. 
Mornington  was  bent  on  securing  all  Ceylon  for  England  for  the 
same  reasons.  Persia's  relation  to  India  was  also  within  his 
range  of  view;  here  the  fear  of  Bonaparte  may  be  admitted 
as  the  direct  principle  of  action.  It  had  been  advocated  by 
some  that  Persia's  weakness  was  Great  Britain's  strength ;  but 
Mornington  felt  that  the  exclusion  of  French  influence  was  the 
great  political  object  to  be  gained  by  a  treaty  with  the  Shah  of 
Persia,  especially  in  view  of  the  possibility,  as  he  viewed  it  in 
February,  1799,  that  the  French  might  endeavor  to  penetrate 
through  Persia  to  the  Indus  ;  another  object  was  the  creation 
of  a  hostile  power  to  attack  Zeman  Shah  in  the  rear,  should  he 
move  to  an  invasion  of  India.  The  Red  Sea,  in  General  Stuart's 
words,  had  become  an  "  avenue  to  India  "  and  the  Persian  Gulf 
had  received  a  new  political  importance.  To  these  problems 
the  Indian  Government  addressed  itself.  Capt.  Malcolm  was 
despatched  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with  the  Shah  and  also  with 
the  Imam  of  Muscat.  This  he  did  in  1800-01  ;  it  was  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Persian  Question  with  all  its  fluctuations.  The 
decision  to  despatch  an  army  from  India  to  secure  the  evacua- 
tion of  Egypt  by  the  French  is  also  a  forerunner  of  future 
events.  The  success  attending  its  operations  undoubtedly 
contributed  to  develop  a  policy  which  has  now  become  the 
formula  of  English  politics  and  the  key  to  the  problem  of 
Asiatic  Empire.1 

1  Wellesley :  Despatches,  i.  pp.  31  (Mornington  to  Dundas,  Feb.  28,  1798,  about 
Ceylon),  188  (Zeman  Shah),  295,  296  (M.  to  Dundas,  Oct.  II,  1798.  Bonaparte  in 
Egypt),  322  (M.  to  Lord  Clive,  November  5,  1798.  Expresses  the  con- 
viction that  Nelson's  victory  saved  India),  433  (M.  to  Duncan,  Feb.  19,  1799, 
Persia  and  Zeman  Shah),  581  (M.  to  Gen.  Harris,  April  23,  1799.  The  reasons 
for  attacking  Tipu:  1.  His  adherence  to  the  French.  2.  Bonaparte's  possible 
situation  in  Egypt.    3.  Lack  of  English  naval  strength  in  the  Red  Sea.     4.  Atti- 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE  ORIENT  213 

Such  was  the  development  of  Eastern  history  under  the 
stimulus  and  at  the  time  of  Bonaparte's  Expedition  to  Egypt. 
The  influence  of  the  Expedition  upon  the  evolution  of  the 
Eastern  question  per  se  is  naturally  even  more  direct ;  and  the 
events  on  the  continent,  and  in  the  Mediterranean  and  Adriatic, 
which  may  be  considered  as  a  part  of  its  history,  were  fully  as 
important.  They  are  better  known  than  those  in  India ;  it 
remains,  therefore,  only  to  point  out  the  relationship  between 
them  and  their  effects  rather  than  to  summarize  the  actual 
happenings.  The  treaty  of  Campo  Formio  was  in  reality 
only  a  truce  ;  the  second  coalition  was  in  the  germ  before 
Bonaparte   sailed  for  Malta.     Russia  had  been  the  first  con- 

tude  of  Zeman  Shah.  5.  Ditto  of  Sindhia.  6.  The  Peshwa  becomes  subservient 
to  the  latter),  671 ;  vol.  ii.  pp.  36  (M.  to  Dundas,  June  7,  1799.  Victory  over 
Tipu),  39  (ditto.  The  extirpation  of  the  French),  40,  69  (M.  to  Col.  Palmer,  Eng. 
Resident  at  Puna,  July  4,  1799.  The  English  system),  70,  89  (M.  to  the  Court  of 
Directors,  Aug.  3,  1799),  98,  139,  142,  205,  207,  224,  252,  299,  304,  309,  415,  438 
et  seq.,  469,  492>  5°5>  539.  565>  587,  633,  715;  vol.  v.  pp.  82,  85  (Kirkpatrick  to 
Malcolm,  Dec.  10,  1779),  179  (Gen.  Stuart  to  Dundas,  Jan.  1800.  He  believed  an 
invasion  of  India  by  the  French  from  Egypt  would  have  been  practicable  and 
successful  "  had  the  Turks  been  in  alliance  with  the  French,  or  had  the  enemy 
pushed  on  immediately  after  he  reached  Cairo")-  Aitchison :  Treaties  and  Con- 
ventions, ii.  p.  102.  "  Treaty  with  Nabob  Vizier  Saadet  Ali  Khan  Behauder," 
Feb.  21,  1798,  Art.  XV.  The  Nabob  of  Oudh  "  engages  and  promises  that  he  will 
not  entertain  any  European  of  any  description  in  his  service,  nor  allow  any  to 
settle  in  his  country  without  the  consent  of  the  Company."  Wellington  :  Supple- 
mentary Despatches,  i.  pp.  13  et  seq.  ("  I  have  observed  since  my  arrival  here  that 
he  [Tipu]  is  a  constant  object  of  fear  to  the  English,  and  whenever  they  want  to 
add  a  little  colouring  to  a  statement,  they  find  out  that  he  has  an  army  in  motion. 
. . .  They  likewise  say  that  Zemaun  Shah  will  attack  Hindoustan  in  the  next  season ; 
but  that  I  equally  disbelieve,  from  a  conviction  of  its  difficulties,  and  of  its  inutil- 
ity even  if  he  should  succeed."  A.  Wellesley  to  Mornington,  July  12,  1797),  24 
et  seq.;  vol.  ii.  pp.  334  et  seq.,  346,  356  et  seq.,  408.  Mill  and  Wilson:  Hist,  oj 
India,  vii.  p.  220.  Kaye :  Life  of  Malcolm,  i.  pp.  105^  seq.,  516  et  seq.  Hertslet : 
Treaties  with  Persia,  pp.  I,  8.  Eton:  Survey  of  Turkey,  pp.  497,498.  Curzon: 
Persia,  ii.  p.  435.  Low :  Indian  Navy,  i.  p.  325.  A  treaty  had  been  negotiated  in 
August,  1798,  with  the  Imam  of  Muscat  directed  against  the  French  and  Dutch. 
Brydges:  Mission  to  Persia,  ii.  pp.  16,  177.  English  agents  in  the  interior  of 
Turkey  and  at  Bassora  were  instructed  to  operate  against  French  influence. 
Malleson :  Final  French  Struggles,  pp.  253  et  seq.  The  Anglo-Indian  Expedition 
to  Egypt  in  1801. 


214  .  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

tinental  power  to  feel  that  the  Expedition  was  a  menace  to 
her  ;  in  April,  1798,  reports  had  been  received  at  St.  Peters- 
burg which  aroused  the  Tzar  to  decided  action.  Fearful  lest 
an  attack  upon  the  Balkan  peninsula  might  again  raise  the 
Polish  question,  he  strengthened  the  Black  Sea  fleet,  and 
made  preparations  to  resist  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the 
French  to  injure  Russian  prestige  in  the  southeast.  An 
alliance  was  offered  to  the  Porte  in  May,  and  in  August 
military  and  naval  support,  to  fight  the  French  or  to  suppress 
Passwan  Oglu  of  Widdin  was  proposed.  It  afforded  a  wel- 
come opportunity  to  intervene  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  to 
resuscitate  an  oriental  policy  which  consisted  in  alternating 
between  friendship  and  war  with  the  Porte.  Great  Britain 
co-operated  with  Russia  to  urge  the  Porte  to  join  the  coalition 
against  France,  to  accept  Russian  assistance,  and  to  permit  the 
Russian  Black  Sea  fleet  to  pass  through  the  Bosphorus  to  the 
Mediterranean.  Thus  there  arose  the  anomalous  situation  of 
a  Russo-Turkish  armament  attacking  and  capturing  Corfu, 
while  England,  at  first  alone,  afterwards  temporarily  assisted 
by  the  Russians,  blockaded  Malta.  There  was  in  that  very 
situation  the  seed  of  disruption.  Russia  had  her  own  ends 
to  serve  and,  feared  by  the  Turks,  offensively  slighted  by  the 
Austrians,  and  distrusted  by  the  English,  it  was  in  the  nature 
of  events  that  Russia  should  drift  away  from  the  allies  and 
turn  toward  France,  who  had  already,  in  1797,  made  the 
endeavor  to  win  her  over.  The  outbreak  of  this  war  of  the 
second  coalition  against  France,  while  Bonaparte  was  in 
Egypt,  did  the  work  by  which  that  General  was  ready  to 
profit,  since  the  defeat  of  the  French  armies,  and  the  weak- 
ness of  the  Directory,  made  for  him  an  opportunity  to  secure 
the  supreme  position  at  home,  which  had  been  denied  him 
in  the  winter  of  1797-98.  The  failure  of  the  attempt  to  placate 
the  Porte,  and  the  naval  supremacy  of  England  were  factors 
which  must  render  abortive  Bonaparte's  plans  in  Egypt.  The 
preliminary  successes   of  the  coalition  aided  him  in  the  end 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND   THE   ORIENT  21$ 

by  creating  the  situation  which  raised  him  to  power.  Once 
in  control,  the  victories  of  the  French  armies  in  Italy  and 
Germany,  and  the  jealousy  of  the  powers  in  the  Mediterranean 
were  the  tools  which  he  used  to  disintegrate  the  coalition  and 
to  secure  the  peace  which  was  needed.  Even  in  October, 
1798,  Nelson  had  warned  the  Porte  not  to  let  the  Russian 
fleet  approach  Malta.  "  I  hate  the  Russians,"  he  wrote  Capt. 
Ball  on  January  21,  1799.  Malta  was  an  apple  of  discord 
that  was  destined  to  bring  war,  not  peace,  to  the  courts  of 
Europe  during  the  coming  years. 

The  alliance  between  Russia  and  the  Porte  was  not  durable ; 
the  tone  of  the  parliamentary  debates  in  England  showed  that 
all  was  not  smooth  between  Great  Britain  and  Austria,  and 
direct  antagonism  to  Russia  was  but  thinly  veiled;  the  future 
of  the  Ionian  Islands  was  a  matter  in  which  every  power  was  ]/ 
deeply  interested  and  the  question  might  easily  create  bad  feel- 
ing between  Austria  and  Russia;  such  was  the  real  situation 
in  August,  1799,  when  Bonaparte  set  sail  from  Egypt.1 

1  Bailie u  :  Preussen  und  Frankreich,  i.  pp.  247,  558.  Rodocanachi :  Bonaparte 
et les  iles ioniennes,  pp.  120,  147,  170,  175-179.  De  Testa:  Recueil,  i.  pp.  537,  539, 
542,  548  et  sea.,  553  et  sea.,  567,  577,  586.  Pallain :  Talleyrand  et  le  Direc- 
toire,  pp.  244  et  sea.,  289,  294  et  sea.,  335  et  sea.,  374  et  sea.,  382  et  sea.,  394 
420  et  sea.  Nelson:  Despatches,  iii.  pp.  145,  146,  203,  205,  224,  236,  255,  256,  297, 
312,  316;  iv.  pp.  3,  72,  75,  77,  108;  vii.  p.  clxxvii.  Pouqueville:  Voyage  en 
Moree,  ii.  pp.  7  et  sea.  Intercepted  Corr.  i.  p.  no;  iii.  pp.  122  et  sea.  Harcourt: 
Correspondence  of  Rose,  i.  p.  215.  Tatischeff :  Paul  I.  et  Bonaparte,  in  Nouvelle 
Revue,  xlvii.  pp.  650  et  sea.,  660,  664.  Vivenot :  Vertrauliche  Briefe,  ii.  pp.  28,  29, 
77  >  96,  135,  156,  157,  166,  178,  189,  199,  201-203,  333,  346.  Stael-Holstein :  Corr. 
p.  394.  Miliutin:  Gesch.  des  Krieges,  i.  pp.  67-69,  74,  323  et  sea.,  367  ;  iv.  pp.  164, 
J73;  V'PP-  1S3>  161,  203  et  sea.  207,  213.  Wassiltchikow :  Les  Razoumowski,  ii. 
Pt.  1,  pp.  266  et  sea.,  270  et  sea.,  337  et  sea.  Pisani :  Les  Russes  h  Corfou,  in  Rev. 
d'hist.  dipl.  1888.  Vorontzov :  Arkhiv,  viii.  p.  238  (Rostoptchin  to  S.  Vorontzov, 
Gatchino,  Aug.  25,  1799)  :  "Elle  [England]  se  reserve  le  droit  de  faire  la  paix 
maritime  a  son  gre,  et  si  elle  a  en  vue  les  possessions  des  francais  et  hollandais 
aux  Indes,  ne  sera-t-elle  pas  deux  fois  plus  riche  et  plus  puissante  apres  la  guerre 
qu'elle  ne  l'etait  avant  ?  Ayant  Gibraltar  et  TEmpereur  etant  maitre  de  Malthe 
apres  avoir  detruit  la  marine  francaise  et  espagnole,  ne  sera-t-elle  pas  la  maitresse 
du  commerce  du  Levant  ?"  Cf.  pp.  188,  200,  218,  236  et  sea.,  240-242,  252-256,  259, 
et  seq.,  263,  264,  269,  287-291,  308;  x.  pp.  40,  62,  63,  68-70;  xi.  pp.  6,  12,  20,  21, 
38,  39>  49»  97,  102-105,  107,   112-119,    121,  318-320;  xviii.   pp.  178,  179,  182, 


2l6  EASTERN  PROBLEMS 

Bonaparte  had  learned  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Europe, 
and  stole  away,  leaving  Kleber  in  command,  with  orders  to 
hold  on  till  May  in  the  hope  of  reinforcement  or  until  he  had 
lost  fifteen  hundred  men  by  the  plague.  One  more  effort 
was  made  to  arrest  Turkish  hostility  by  a  letter  to  the  Grand 
Vizier  in  which  Bonaparte  endeavored  to  pursuade  the  Porte 
to  negotiate  with  France  without  English  mediation  or  in- 
terference. He  returned  to  France  claiming  that  the  perils 
of  his  country  had  summoned  him  to  her  defence  ;  his  progress 
to  Paris  became  that  of  a  victor,  and  the  "  return  of  the 
Hero,"  who  many  believed  had  been  sent  to  the  East  by  his 
enemies  that  he  might  disappear  in  oblivion,  changed  the 
desertion  of  the  army  into  the  triumph  of  a  pro-consul.1 

The  motives  for  undertaking  the  Expedition  have  been 
analyzed  ;  and  the  methods  employed  in  it  have  been  studied. 
It  failed  primarily  because  of  the  superiority  of  the  English 
navy  over  that  of  France,  and  secondarily  because  Bonaparte 
was  unable  to  overcome  the  passive  resistance  of  the  na- 
tive population  in  Egypt,  and  because  the  Porte  joined  the 
coalition,  which  was  in  turn  due  more  to  the  moral  effect  of 
Nelson's  victory  than  to  anything  else.  Had  not  the  English 
navy  prevented  the  capture  of  Acre  it  is  fair  to  assume 
that  Bonaparte  stood  more  than  an  even  chance  of  reducing 
all  Syria,  where  the  population  differed  from  that  in  Egypt. 
It  was  not  divided  into  two  classes,  ruler  and  oppressed, 
as   in  Egypt,  but  was   instead  a   mingling  of    irreconcilable 

190,  191,  196,  220-224,  233,  234,  342  et sea.;  xxii.  p.  85;  xxix.  pp.  279,  289,  377. 
Bruckner:  Materialy  dlya  chizneopisanlya  Graf  a  N.  Ranina,  ii.  pp.  115,  116,  497, 
498  ;  iii.  pp.  1-6,  93,  215,  233  et  sea.,  326-328,  375,  433,  521,  638,  647  ;  iv.  p.  276. 

1  Napoleon:  Corr.  Nos.  4341,  4361,  4364,  4374,  4375,  4380-4382.  Inter, 
cepted  Corr.  vol.  iii.  pp.  19,  171  et  sea.  De  Testa:  op.  cit.  vol.  i.  pp.  587  et  sea. 
Napoleon :  Comm.  iv.  p.  441.  Bailleu :  op.  cit.  i.  pp.  206,  221  (Bericht  Sandoz. 
Rollin,  Paris,  Aug.  5,  1798.  Talleyrand  remarks  to  him  in  a  low  voice :  "  Ce 
n'est  pas  que  le  Directoire  serait  fort  afflige  de  l'echec  qu'il  [Bonaparte]  pourrait 
recevoir ;  la  gloire  de  ce  general  a  trop  retentie ,  et  il  ne  serait  pas  fache  de  la 
voir  un  peu  ternie  ")•  Boulay  de  la  Meurthe  :  op.  cit.  p.  241.  This  seems  to  be 
the  final  word  on  the  subject  of  the  secret  information  which  Bonaparte  is  alleged 
to  have  received  in  Egypt  prior  to  the  desertion. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  AND    THE   ORIENT  217 

elements,  many  of  which  were  ready  to  join  a  victorious 
European  leader.  With  Acre,  the  key,  the  "  bridge-head  " 
of  Palestine,  as  Captain  Mahan  calls  it,  in  his  hands,  and  Syria 
no  longer  hostile,  Asia  Minor  lay  open  to  him,  and  nothing 
short  of  a  European  army  could  have  stopped  him.  Ibrahim 
Pasha  proved  this  in  1832.  But  Acre  was  not  captured,  and 
the  dream  of  empire  faded.  Furthermore  Bonaparte  never 
really  understood  the  science  of  sea-power,  however  much  he 
desired  to  possess  it.  He  attributed  to  India  England's 
superiority  and  wealth,  and  based  his  plans  for  the  Egyptian 
Expedition,  as  for  the  continental  blockade,  on  the  theory 
that  a  commercial  power  trading  to  the  ends  of  the  earth  could 
be  struck  in  a  vital  spot,  even  when  the  fighting  machine  of 
its  rival  was  limited  in  its  efficiency  by  the  waves  of  the  sea. 
In  the  very  failure  of  the  Expedition,  therefore,  there  lay  the 
answer  to  the  riddle  of  Bonaparte's  career;  though  he  had 
failed  once,  he  tried  again  and  again  to  secure  the  same  end, 
the-  ruin  of  England.1  The  ultimate  results  of  the  Expedition 
were  to  place  the  question  of  Egypt  in  the  forefront  of 
European  politics,  to  give  to  England  in  Malta  a  position 
unequalled  in  the  Mediterranean,  to  show  her  statesmen  that 
India  must  become  solely  English,  and  to  reveal  the  close 
connection  between  Egypt  and  India,  between  the  Eastern 
Question  and  the  larger  problem  of  Asia.  Bonaparte  had 
not  called  the  Eastern  Question  from  the  recesses  of  Europe ; 
it  was  a  serious  problem  under  the  Ancien  Regime  and  at 
the  time  of  the  Revolution.  His  keen  political  insight,  how- 
ever, bade  him  make  of  it  a  stumbling-block  to  the  alliance 
of  his  enemies ;  and  the  ambition  and  ideals  of  his  chosen 
country,  as  well  as  his  own  genius,  directed  him  to  seek  its 
solution.  Touched  by  his  hand  it  took  the  form  and  charac- 
ter which  it  has  preserved  to  our  day. 

1  Mahan:  Sea  Power  (1793-1812),  i.  pp.  299,  324;   vol.  ii.  p.  27.    Beer:  Gesch. 
des  Welthandels,  3te  Abth.  i.  Halfte,  p.  369.     Adair :  Mission  to  Vienna,  p.  94. 


APPENDIX   I 


TABLE  A 

Tableau  du  Resultat  des  Bilans  de  la  Compagnte 
des  Indes,  1724-40. 


Dates  des  Bilans. 


Fonds  Capital. 


livres. 


Augmentation. 


livres.  s.       d. 


Diminutions. 


livres.  s.       d 


15  mars,  1724 
21  mars,  1725 

29  mars,  1726 
11  juin,  1727 

30  avril,  1728 
30  avril,  1729 
29  avril,  1730 

29  avril,  1 731 

30  juin,  1 73 1 
30  juin,  1732 
30  juin,  1733 
30  juin,  1734 
30  juin,  1735 
30  juin,  1736 
30  juin,  1737 
30  juin,  1738 
30  juin,  1739 
30  juin,  1740 


143,000,000 
139,385,940 
138,360,864 
138,814,398 
141,246,001 
142,093,835 
143,425,124 
142,630,610 
146,380,370 
135,886,602 
139,606,744 
142,948,892 
WS>193>221 
i47,753>93o 
152,042,396 

154,875,785 
159,420,571 
i6i,938,537 


453,533 
2,431,603 

847,833 

3,749,760 

3,72o,i4i 
3,342,147 
2,244,329 
2,560,708 
4,288,466 
2,833,388 
4,544,786 
2,547,955 


3,614,059 
1,025,075 


749»5H 
10,493,767 


These  figures  are  from  a  table  in  Dernis :  Histoire  des  compagnies  de  commerce, 
MSS.  in  Arch,  du  Ministre  de  la  Marine.  They  are  quoted  by  Bonnassieux : 
Grandes  Compagnies,  pp.  281-82.  The  Company  borrowed  over  55  million 
livres  between  1747  and  1770,  having  gone  into  liquidation  once,  Nov.  18,  1764, 
pp.  325,  326. 


220 


APPENDIX  I 


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APPENDIX  I 
TABLE   D 


A  similar  table  in  Daubigny :  Choiseul  et  la  France  d'otttre-mer,  p.  339,  gives 
the  cost  price  of  goods  in  India  and  China  in  addition  to  their  sale  value  in 
France  as  in  the  above  tables.     On  this  basis  the  gross  profit  was  as  follows :  — 


India  Trade. 

Per  cent. 

China  Trade. 

Per  cent. 

1725-36 

49,001,519 

9$ 

9,688,549 

IO4-I 

1736-43 

42,824,315 

93$ 

13,822,407 

*4*i 

1743-56 

58,269,331 

93& 

22,443,427 

i66| 

1757-63 

1764 

2,377,186 

85 

1765 

2,002,249 

8*1 

1766 

2,716,536 

88^ 

2,973,214 

7*1 

1767 

3»896,394 

59* 

2,042,376 

68 

1768 

5,835,060 

58^ 

2,356,488 

6Si 

APPENDIX    II 


TABLE   A 

Anglo-East  India  Trade,  1710-1807/ 
Macpherson:  Indian  Commerce,  pp.  419,  420,  "An  account  of  the  ships  em- 
ployed by  the  United  Company  of  Merchants  of  England  trading  to  the  East 
Indies  [including  China],  of  the  merchandise  and  bullion  exported  by  them,  and 
of  the  merchandise  imported  and  sold  by  them,  since  the  year  17 10,  as  far  as  can 
be  ascertained  from  accounts  already  made  up."  The  amounts  are  in  pounds 
sterling.  The  "  total  exports"  include  Merchandise  and  Bullion  ;  and  the  "  total 
imports"  include  Company's  goods,  Private  Trade,  Neutral  property,  —  all  being 
given  at  sale  amount  in  England. 


Year. 

Ships  Sailed. 

Ships  Arrived. 

Total  Exports. 

Total  Imports. 
Sale  Amounts. 

I7IO 

10 

575.920 

I7SO 

16 

1,121,378 

1780 

20 

401,166 

3,378,134 

1790 

25 

32 

1,461,488 

6,035,438 

1795 

76 

60 

1,298,921 

8,098,495 

1800 

49 

53 

2,304,786 

10,323,452 

1 801 

39 

38 

2,512,779 

9,i53>5" 

1802 

52 

50 

3»826,7SO 

9,628,142 

1803 

55 

44 

2,861,037 

8,425,268 

1804 

51 

54 

3>7  59,227 

8,044,392 

1805 

49 

50 

2,597,054 

8,79i»37o 

1806 

46 

35 

2,317,594 

6,938,952 

1807 

46 

53 

2,245,690 

8,140,499 

224 


APPENDIX  II 


TABLE  B 

The  comparison  of  these  figures  with  those  which  are  official  is  of  interest. 
The  table  given  below  is  condensed  from  Hansard :  Parliamentary  Debates,  vii. 
p.  xv.,  and  has  been  cited  by  Lumbroso  and  others.  It  is  "  an  account  of  the 
value  of  all  imports  into,  and  exports  from  Great  Britain  for  eighteen  years, 
ending  the  5th  January  1806.  .  .  .  The  real  value  of  British  Produce  and  Manu- 
factures Exported  in  as  far  as  the  same  can  be  ascertained  under  the  Ad  Valorem 
Duties  or  computed  at  the  average  Prices  Current  amounted  in  the  Year  ending 
the  5th  January  1805  to  ;£4°,349,642.  And  in  the  Year  ending  the  5th  January 
1806  to  ^4 1,068,942."  The  tables  giving  Foreign  Merchandise  exported  have 
been  omitted  below.  The  significant  point  to  be  noted  is  the  difference  between 
the  sale  value  of  imports  and  exports  as  given  in  Macpherson's  table  of  Indian 
commerce  and  the  official  value  given  by  Hansard.  Attention  should  also  be 
called  to  the  fact  that  the  financial  year  in  Hansard  is  one  year  ahead  of  that 
represented  in  the  larger  table  compiled  from  Macpherson's  Annals  of  Com- 
merce, iv.    Thus  1790  in  Hansard  is  1789  in  Macpherson. 


Official  value  of  Imports. 

Official  value  of  British 

Year. 

Produce  and  Manu- 

From East  Indies 
and  China. 

From  all  other  Parts. 

factures  Exported. 

1789 

3453,897 

14,573,272 

12,724,719 

1790 

3,362,545 

14,458,557 

13.779,506 

1791 

3, r  49,87o 

15,981,015 

14,921,084 

1792 

3,698,713 

15,971,069 

1 6,8  r  0,01 8 

1793 

2,701,547 

16,957,810 

18,336,851 

1794 

3,499,023 

15.757,693 
17,830,418 

13,892,268 

1795 
1796 

4,458,475 

16,725,402 
16,338,213 

5,760,810 

16,976,079 

1797 

3,372,689 

19,814,630 

19,102,220 

1798 

3,942,384 

17,071,572 

16,903,103 

1799 

7,626,930 

20,230,959 

19,672,503 

1800 

4,284,805 

22,552,626 

24,084,213 

1801 

4,942,275 

25,628,329 

24,304,283 

1802 

5,242,441 

27,37I,"5 

25,699,809 

1803 

5,794,906 

25,647,412 

26,993,129 

1804 

6,348,887 

21,643,577 
23,986,869 

22,252,027 

1805 
1806 

5,214,621 

23,935,793 
25,003,308 

(not  given) 

24,273,45! 

APPENDIX  II 


22$ 


TABLE  C 
{Figures  in  pounds  sterling.) 


Imports  tc 

>  the  United  Kingdom. 

Exports  from  the  United  Kingdom. 

Year. 

From  all 
Parts. 

From  the 

From  Turkey 

To  all 
Parts. 

To  the 

To  Turkey 

East  Indies 

and  the 

East  Indies 

and  the 

and  China. 

Levant. 

and  China. 

Levant. 

I783 

13,122,235 

1,301,495 

48,983 

14,681,494 

701,473 

42,666 

1784 

15,272,877 
16,279,419 

2,996,652 

75»l67 
146,906 

15,101,491 

730,858 

43,052 

178S 

2,703,940 

16,117,168 

1,153,532 

82,449 

1786 

15,786,072 

3,156,687 

121,954 

16,300,730 

2,242,038 

113,320 

1787 

17,804,024 

3,430,868 

191,949 

16,869,789 

1,551,209 

99,772 

1788 

18,027,170 

3,453,897 

183,335 

17,472,238 

1,430,633 

47,838 

1789 

17,821,102 

3,359,H8 

223,424 

19,340,548 

1,957,177 
2,386,320 

136,207 

1790 

19,130,886 

3,149,870 

249,187 

20,120,121 

"3,179 

1791 

19,669,782 

3,698,713 

178,388 

22,73!,  995 

2,268,769 

189,291 

1792 

19,659.358 

2,701,433 
3,498,884 

290,599 

24,905,200 

2,425,947 

273.785 

!793 

19,255,116 

184,681 

20,388,828 

2,719,246 

45,270 

1794 

22,276,915 

4,458,447 

324,906 

26,748,083 

2,924,688 

117,700 

1795 
1796 

22,736,889 

5,760,795 

•    84,299 

27,123,338 

2,382,530 

149,938 

23,187,319 

3,372,689 

150,182 

30,518,913 

2,358,707 
2,280,333 

I55,5IO 

1797 

21,013,956 
27,857,889 

3,942,3i8 

104,838 
42,285 

28,917,010 

23.532 

1798 

7,626,930 

33.591,777 

1,145,735 

62,168 

1799 

26,837,432 

4,284,805 

33,o9i 

35,99r,329 

2,433.994 

226,078 

1800 

30,570,605 

4,942,241 

199.773 

43,152,019 

2,835,063 

166,804 

The  real  market  value  given  by  the  Inspector  General  for  the  following  items 


Year. 

Imports  from 
Asia. 

Imports  from 
all  other  Parts. 

Total 
Imports. 

British 

Merchandise 

exported. 

Foreign 

Merchandise 

exported. 

Total 
Exports. 

1799 
1800 

8,918,248 
9,827,278 

40,083,922 
45,573»I38 

49,002,170 
55,400,416 

38,942,498 
39,471,203 

11,347,692 
16,830,843 

50,290,190 
56,302,046 

This  table  is  compiled  from  the  figures  and  statements  to  be  found  in 
Macpherson:  Annals  of  Commerce,  iv.  pp.  40,  68,  99,  120,  137,  182,  198,  214, 
231,  262,  288,  332,  370,  399,  438,  466,  491,  536.  The  total  figures  here  given 
have  been  adopted  by  Lohmann :  Die  amtliche  Handelstatistik,  though  he  does 
not  attempt  to  analyze  them ;  he  has  taken  them  from  Whitworth  and  Chalmers. 


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VITA 

The  author  of  this  dissertation  was  born  of  American 
parents  at  Beirut,  Syria,  Ottoman  Empire,  on  May  21,  1874. 
He  attended  the  German  School  of  the  Kaiserswerth  Dea- 
conesses in  that  place,  and  also  studied  under  private  tutors 
until  he  entered  Lawrenceville  School,  Lawrenceville,  New 
Jersey,  in  September,  1888.  He  was  prepared  for  college 
there  and  at  the  Cutler  School,  New  York  City  (1891-92), 
and  entered  Princeton  University  in  September,  1892.  He 
was  graduated  with  the  degree  of  A.  B.  (cum  laude)  in  1896. 
The  following  autumn  he  was  enrolled  as  a  graduate  student 
in  the  School  of  Political  Science,  Columbia  University,  hav- 
ing as  his  major  subject,  European  History,  his  first  minor, 
United  States  History,  and  his  second  minor,  International 
Law.  He  attended  the  sessions  of  the  University  of  Heidel- 
berg, Germany,  during  the  summer  semester  of  1897,  where 
his  major  subject  was  History,  and  his  two  minor,  Arabic 
and  Syriac.  He  returned  to  Columbia  in  October,  1897, 
and  studied  there  for  two  years  more,  having  substituted  as 
his  second  minor,  Arabic  Language  and  History  for  Interna- 
tional Law.  He  passed  his  examination,  in  course,  for  the 
degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy  in  May,  1899.  He  spent  the 
year  following  also  in  New  York,  working  in  various  libra- 
ries, and  studying  along  the  lines  of  this  monograph.  Dur- 
ing the  year  1900-01  he  was  assistant  in  History  at  Harvard 
University,  and  there  prepared  the  final  draft  of  this  disserta- 
tion. During  the  two  years  since  his  examination  at  Colum- 
bia he  has  been  reading  Arabic  and  has  attended,  optionally, 
several  additional  courses  at  Columbia  and  Harvard. 


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